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There is an extraordinary reluctance to address the question of Ireland’s future,
in a comprehensive and inclusive way in policy arenas.  While Government
focuses almost exclusively on its oft-repeated mantra of building “the best small
country in the world in which to do business”, and most policy developments are
justified on the basis of that target, there is little or no discussion of what
Ireland should look like ten years from now.  There has been little consideration
of how the common good and the well-being of this and future generations are
to be promoted and attained in a fair and sustainable manner.  Yet these are
critical issues.  
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Ireland needs a robust public debate to address the shape of its future. The chapters in
this Socio-Economic Review address key issues that should be central to such a debate.
They set out 
• A detailed analysis and critique of the current situation; 
• A vision of Ireland’s future; 
• A policy framework within which Ireland could move towards a desirable and
sustainable future; 
• A number of specific policy proposals in the wide range of areas addressed.
Social Justice Ireland has long advocated a new guiding vision for Irish society; one based
on the values of  human dignity, equality, human rights, solidarity, sustainability and
the pursuit of the common good. These values are at the core of the vision for a nation
in which all men, women and children have what they require to live life with dignity
and to flourish: including sufficient income; access to the services needed; and active
inclusion in a genuinely participatory society. 
These values reflect the aspirations of the majority of Irish people.
Social Justice Ireland offers this vision and framework as a contribution to the public
debate on the shape of the future.
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1I N TRODUCT ION
Having exited the bailout in December 2013 and seen some improvement on a
number of economic indicators in subsequent months many seem to believe that
all is now well with Ireland.  Some even predict a mini-boom and a quick ‘return to
normal’ with employment growing, house prices rising and interest rates on Irish
Government debt remaining at relatively low levels. 
Irish and European policy-makers point to Ireland as a vindication of their policy
approach and a model to be copied and emulated.  A few years ago at the height of
the Celtic Tiger, policy-makers in Ireland and the EU (most of them the same then
as now) were trumpeting Ireland’s prosperity as a vindication of their policy
approach at that time and a model to be emulated.  Sadly we now know their claims
were wrong.  Surely we should be sceptical about their assertions now. 
There is an extraordinary reluctance to address the question of Ireland’s future, in a
comprehensive and inclusive way, to be specific about the kind of society to be built
from the wreckage of recent years. While Government focuses almost exclusively
on its oft-repeated mantra of building “the best small country in the world in which
to do business”, and most policy developments are justified on the basis of that
target, there is little or no discussion of what Ireland should look like ten years from
now, of how the common good and the well-being of this and future generations
are to be promoted and attained in a fair and sustainable manner.  Yet these are
critical issues.  
While there might be general agreement on eliminating poverty, unemployment
and waiting lists (for housing or healthcare) there is little or no discussion on the
steps to be taken if these and many other desirable outcomes are to be achieved.
Being a good place in which to do business is of course a means towards these
desirable ends. However, Ireland needs a great deal more than that; in particular it
needs a robust public debate, involving all its people, to address these issues.  
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There are four key steps for such a debate to be worthwhile. It should: 
1. Set out a detailed analysis and critique of the present situation; 
2. Agree a vision for Ireland’s future – clarifying where Ireland should be in 10 to
15 years’ time; 
3. Set out a comprehensive policy framework to address the challenges of moving
towards this future; and 
4. Identify a range of specific policy initiatives to be taken within this framework.   
Failure to promote and engage in such a debate has cost Ireland dearly in recent
decades.  By failing to address such questions Ireland, in recent years has, for
example, allowed the single biggest transfer of resources from low and middle
income people to the rich and powerful in its history and accepted the false
justifications that enabled this to happen. The main beneficiaries of this transfer
have been parts of the corporate sector especially the bondholders and financial
institutions who took little or no ’hit’ for their gambling in Ireland’s private banking
sector. Other large corporates also benefitted as their privileged tax position
continues to be protected and they are not asked to make any contribution towards
Ireland’s rescue and ongoing recovery and development.
At the same time, poverty rose, unemployment reached record levels, emigration
escalated dramatically, waiting lists for social housing rose, child poverty, long-term
unemployment and the numbers of working poor people all became entrenched
parts of Ireland’s reality. Public services were reduced significantly. Charges were
introduced for many services while charges were increased in areas where they had
previously existed. Funding for the community and voluntary sector was cut
disproportionately at the very moment when the demand for their services was
increasing.  The fact that the poorest 10% of the population had seen the biggest
proportionate fall in their income was more or less ignored.
Interestingly enough the situation across the EU is not much better. The European
Commission’s Social Protection Report for 2013 (published March 2014) shows the
social situation worsening across the Union. It states: 
The latest figures on living and income conditions in the EU show that the EU
is not making any progress towards achieving its Europe 2020 poverty and social
exclusion target of lifting at least 20 million people from poverty and social
exclusion by 2020. There are 6.7 million more people living in poverty or social
exclusion since 2008, a total of 124.2 million people for the EU28 or close to 1
in 4 Europeans in 2012. Poverty and social exclusion has increased in more than
1/3 of the Member States in both 2011 and 2012. (European Commission Social
Report, 2014: 7)
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Ireland is one of those countries as we show in chapters 3 and 5 of this Review.  
Social Justice Ireland fully acknowledges Ireland’s difficult fiscal position in recent
times. We also accept that Ireland must pay its way. However, we believe strongly
that there were alternatives to the approach the Irish Government followed,
alternatives that would have led to fewer job losses and greater protection of the
vulnerable while rescuing the economy and moving Ireland towards a desirable and
sustainable future.  
The following chapters in this Socio-Economic Review address these issues. They set
out 
• Our detailed analysis and critique of the current situation; 
• Our vision of Ireland’s future; 
• A policy framework within which Ireland could move towards a desirable and
sustainable future; 
• A range of specific policy proposals in the wide range of areas addressed.
Social Justice Ireland has long advocated a new guiding vision for Irish society; one
based on the values of  human dignity, equality, human rights, solidarity,
sustainability and the pursuit of the common good. These values are at the core of
the vision for a nation in which all men, women and children have what they
require to live life with dignity and to fulfil their potential: including sufficient
income; access to the services they need; and active inclusion in a genuinely
participatory society. 
These values matter. They are not minority views as is sometimes stated, but reflect
the aspirations of the majority of Irish citizens. Indeed, in February 2014, 85% of
the members of the Convention on the Constitution convened by the government
voted to afford greater constitutional protection to Economic, Social and Cultural
(ESC) rights. This included a recommendation to include explicit mention of rights
to housing, social security, essential healthcare, the rights of people with disabilities,
linguistic and cultural rights in the Irish Constitution.  These are rights that Social
Justice Ireland has argued for over many years.
To achieve our vision we have set out a policy framework that identifies five key
policy areas for reform.1  
1The authors have presented an earlier version of this framework in Healy et al. (2013).
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• The first is macroeconomic stability, which requires a stabilisation of Ireland’s
debt levels, fiscal and financial stability and sustainable economic growth, and
an immediate boost to investment, which has collapsed during the crisis. (Dealt
with in chapters 2 and 4)
• The second is the need for a just taxation system, which would require an
increase in the overall tax-take to the European average; such an increase must
be implemented equitably and in a way that reduces income inequality. (These
issues are dealt with in much greater detail in chapter 4).
• The third area is social protection, the strengthening of social services and
social infrastructure, the prioritisation of employment, and a commitment to
quantitative targets to reduce poverty.  (Chapters 3 – on income distribution; 4
– taxation; 5 - work, unemployment and job creation; 6 - public services; 7 -
housing and accommodation; 8 – healthcare; and 9 - education and educational
disadvantage).
• The fourth area is that of the governance of our country, which requires new
criteria in policy evaluation, the development of a rights-based approach, and
the promotion of deliberative democracy. (Chapter 10).
• Fifth, policies must be adopted that create a sustainable future, through the
introduction of measures to slow down climate change and protect the
environment, the promotion of balanced regional development, and promotion
of new economic and social indicators to measure performance alongside
traditional national accounting measures such as GNP, GDP and GNI.  (Chapters
11 – sustainability; 12 - rural development; and 13 -the global south).
It is time that Ireland started to think long-term, setting out the kind of sustainable,
equitable and democratic society it wishes to build and how it proposes to reach that
destination.  All Irish people should be engaged in this process in a real and
meaningful way, focused on building a world where people care for each other and
for the natural world, with a commitment to building a compassionate society and
a better future.
Social Justice Ireland offers this analysis and critique, this vision of the future and
policy framework, together with its detailed proposals, as a contribution to the
public debate that is urgently needed on the central question of what steps need to
be taken if we are to move towards a fairer future.
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2FROM CR IS IS  TO  V I ABLE
FUTURE  PATHWAY
This Socio-Economic Review is published at a time when many Irish and European
policymakers are holding up Ireland as a success story, as the first, and thus far, only
country to emerge from the Troika’s structural adjustment programme. The
Presidents of both the German Bundesbank and the European Commission, and
the Taoiseach, have all hailed Ireland’s performance during, and exit from, the
Troika financing programme as an example to be emulated.2 To those who have
advocated fiscal consolidation focused on reducing government expenditure as a
response to the Eurozone crisis, and as a mechanism to reduce bond yields on
government debt, the Irish exit seems a vindication. It is likely that the mantra used
to justify this approach, the simple slogan of ‘there is no alternative’, will be used
again to justify continued reductions in vital public expenditure and to continue a
neo-liberal approach to economic and social policymaking (see Box 2.1), while
repeating many of the mistakes made in the years leading up to the crisis. 
Social Justice Ireland does not accept many of the assumptions that have informed
much of the commentary in public and policy-making arenas in recent times. We
believe that there are alternatives, and that it is now more important than ever that
there be robust public debate about the policy choices facing Ireland in the years
ahead, and the values upon which these choices are based. This requires the
articulation of a new vision based on an understanding of the common good, and
a renewed commitment to vindicate economic, cultural and social rights for all, so
that every citizen, whatever their social or economic status, might be able to fulfil
their potential in a flourishing society. Such an approach will demand a progressive
change in the distribution of wealth, power and income in Irish society. Achieving
this vision requires a radically different set of policies than those pursued during
the 2008-2014 period. 
2 http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Interviews/2014_01_24_weidmann_
irishtimes.html
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In this chapter we will chart the broad outlines of an economic and social policy
framework which guides the contributions to specific policy areas outlined in the
Socio-Economic Review. We will first provide a brief history and context, Irish and
European, to the continuing economic and social crisis in Ireland, and examine the
new European and international institutional framework that will shape Irish
economic policy in the coming years. Finally, we will present our own alternative
policy framework, which proposes positive policy alternatives that can be pursued
over the coming years. 
2.1 The Irish Economic Crisis, 2008-2014
Ireland has experienced a prolonged recession since 2009, one of the deepest in the
European Union in the present crisis. This has caused a rapid rise in unemployment,
and the re-emergence of significant levels of emigration. This section will briefly
provide our analysis of how and why the crisis emerged, and then explore the policy
response to the crisis, and its effects.3
2.1.1 The Emergence of the Crisis, 1990s-2008
The Irish Context
During the 1990s, Ireland rapidly converged with EU-15 levels of GDP per capita and
by the 2000s was surpassing the EU-15 average (see Chart 2.1). Rapid economic
expansion facilitated budget surpluses for the first time since the 1960s, and both
phenomena led to the rapid reduction of Ireland’s real debt burden. Migration fell
while both total employment and the size of the labour force grew rapidly, driven
by increased demand and on the supply side by a demographically young
population and the entry of women into the labour force (see Chart 2.2). In some
areas of policymaking, Ireland adapted influential neo-liberal nostrums: capital and
income taxes were rapidly reduced, particularly after 1997; public enterprises
previously considered of strategic importance were privatised; housing provision
became reliant on the debt-driven private sector; financial regulation was placed on
a ‘light-touch’ model; industrial policy was based on attracting foreign direct
investment through low corporate tax rates; and the International Financial Services
Centre (IFSC) was created to take advantage of global financial liberalisation. 
However, policy was also influenced by other factors, such as the need to maintain
industrial peace and retain social cohesion. Social Partnership provided a framework
in which otherwise excluded groups gained an input into public policy. Industrial
peace was secured through national pay agreements. In the early 2000s, policymakers
believed they could distribute the proceeds of growth through tax reductions and
12 Socio-Economic Review 2014
3 For a much more detailed outline of our understanding of how and why the crisis
emerged cf. Healy et al (2013), Ireland - A Narrative, which is available on our website
at www.socialjustice.ie
increases in social security payments. Ireland was hailed internationally as proof that
a country could develop using neo-liberal economic policies and investment in
education and training while retaining a social safety net.4
Chart 2.1 –GDP per capita at current Chart 2.2 – Rate of Unemployment
market prices per head of population (Left Axis) and Employment Rate 
(EU-15=100), Ireland 1992-2012. (Right Axis), Ireland 1992-2012.
Source: AMECO (2014). Source: AMECO (2014); Eurostat (2014).
The years leading up to the crisis were characterised by a credit-led, asset-price
bubble in residential and commercial property. This was encouraged by ineffective
planning regulations, a lack of resources for social and voluntary housing, and the
failure of the National Spatial Strategy, which was designed to assure balanced
regional development. Ireland’s entry to the Eurozone also provided an impetus for
credit expansion, as currency risk evaporated and the European Central Bank’s
(ECB) main refinancing rate was kept at a level – particularly between 2000 and 2005
- conducive to low-growth, low-inflation Germany and France. Irish policymakers
did not appreciate the need to use fiscal, micro-prudential, housing and zoning
policies as tools to address housing need, property-price bubbles, and to compensate
for the loss of monetary policy upon entry to the Eurozone.
Credit outstanding advanced for home loans nearly trebled between March 2003
and September 2008, while credit advanced for construction and real estate
expanded nearly fivefold in the same period (see Graph 2.4). To finance this lending
the six domestic Irish banks dramatically expanded and altered their balance sheets,
taking advantage of interbank lending provided by Eurozone and international
banks, and by issuing debt securities (bonds). Debt securities rose from 0.1% (€71m)
of Irish banking liabilities in December 1999 to 8.5% (€43.5bn) in May 2008, while
deposits from non-Irish credit institutions rose from nearly 20% of liabilities to 30%
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4 http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/29/opinion/29friedman.html?_r=0
(O’Connor et. al., 2012: 69). The combined balance sheet of the Irish banks rose
nearly fivefold to over €500bn by September 2008.    
Graph 2.3 – Index of GDP per capita at Graph 2.4 - Credit Outstanding to Irish
current market prices for selected Households and Firms (€bn), March 
Eurozone members (2002=100), 2003 – August 2013 
2003-2013 
Source: AMECO (2014). Source: Central Bank of Ireland (2014).  
Irish policymakers were initially slow to realise the consequences of the liquidity
problems that emerged in global financial markets in August 2007. Despite
preparation following the bank run on Northern Rock in the UK, senior
policymakers were taken by surprise in September 2008 when informed by the
domestic Irish banks about large cash outflows, and the possible failure to meet
maturing liabilities, given an inability to raise cash on the wholesale market. The
Irish authorities - believing that Irish banks were solvent and requiring only
liquidity support - issued a blanket guarantee which covered nearly 80% of the
banks’ existing liabilities, amounting to €400bn, owed by the Irish banks.5
This precipitous and unwise decision to socialise the banking debt accumulated
throughout the bubble years surprised many of Ireland’s European partners.
Although the ‘no bondholder left behind’ approach was later affirmed as a Euro area
policy by the European Central Bank, it was the failures of the Irish regulatory
authorities that led to the banking crisis itself. The initial bank guarantee was a
wholly Irish decision.
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5 The six domestic Irish banks were Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, Anglo Irish Bank,
Irish Life and Permanent, Irish Nationwide Building Society and the Educational
Building Society. There remains considerable confusion about the events leading up
to and immediately after the bank guarantee was issued on the night of the 29th
September. No definitive account of the events has yet emerged.
Box 2.1:   Neoliberalism – what’s in a word?
The term ‘neo-liberalism’ has become more widely used in popular debate since the
economic crisis began. A speech by President Higgins which used the term attracted
some opposition as it was interpreted as a political insult by some (O’Brien, 2013).
Initially the term was used by a small group of radical economic thinkers such as
Friedrich van Hayek and Milton Friedman to describe their own distinctive
economic and social philosophy (Friedman, 1951; Stedman Jones, 2012). However,
the term is increasingly used as a helpful analytic category used to describe a specific
theory of government – not a theory of economics as is commonly imagined - and
an associated economic and social policy agenda, and institutional framework.
Indeed, President Higgins (2013) made this explicitly clear, distinguishing neoliberal
doctrine from classical and neo-classical economics.
Finlayson (2013) has provided a useful précis of neo-liberalism as a governing
philosophy which is based first on an ‘economic’ theory of human nature – that is,
that human beings are rational and utility-maximising, and second, on the liberal
principle that people should be left to do what they want, and how they want.
Following these principles, price is seen as the key mechanism in transmitting
information, allowing rational individuals make decisions and allocate resources;
and following this, effective competition and competitive exchange is required for
prices to be accurate. Finally, Finlayson argues that, due to these principals, neo-
liberals do not hold a concept of the ‘common good’ in politics as they fear that
government will act on a set of principles dictated by the common good, which will
in turn make rational individual decision-making difficult. 
Such a perspective is not necessarily anti-state, as is often implied. Rather, neoliberals
advocate an enhanced role for market processes in many areas of social and
economic life, which can often result in the rule of the state actually expanding as
it takes up additional regulatory powers to ensure market competition and
enforcement of rules. Associated with this is the widespread outsourcing and
privatisation of government services, which doesn’t actually reduce the scope of the
government, but theoretically increases competition and thus more accurate – but
not necessarily lower - pricing.
On a wider institutional but less precise basis, the term ‘neoliberal’ is used to describe
the thrust of policy development from the 1970s on. This larger shift involved the
liberalisation of capital flows, deregulation of finance and the concomitant growth
of international capital flows and the power of international financial institutions
and actors. In the Irish context, neo-liberal ideas in areas such as the role of finance
and low levels of taxation were often simply accepted as ‘common sense’ rather than
explicitly identified with a specific philosopher. It is hopefully clearer now that
underlying policy approaches to areas such as banking regulation were neo-liberal
beliefs in the superiority of the price mechanism and competition in leading to
beneficial outcomes.
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What are the reasons for the emergence of the crisis? Kelly (2010) consistently – years
before the crisis itself - identified the proximate cause of a future recession: the
misallocation of investment towards property created by a massive expansion of
credit, and the subsequent collapse in property prices, and in turn, the value of the
banking systems assets, which led to the insolvency of the banking institutions. In
terms of the severity of the fiscal crisis, official reports highlighted the pro-cyclical
structure of the Irish taxation system; for example, the report by the Governor of
the Central Bank estimated that cyclical taxes (Corporation Tax, Stamp Duty and
Capital Gains Tax) rose from accounting for 7% of the total tax take in 1987 to 30%
in 2006 (Honohan, 2010: 29; Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector
in Ireland, 2011: 70; Regling & Watson, 2010: 27). These reports also highlighted the
failures in financial regulation, under-capacity in key state institutions, and the
collective behaviour of senior banking executives and boards, which allowed the
massive expansion of credit. 
Graph 2.5 – Public Social Expenditure as a % of GDP, 2007
Source: OECD, 2011.
Excessive Government expenditure on social transfers has also been blamed for the
emergence of the fiscal crisis. However, Irish social expenditure leading up to the
crisis was below the OECD average (Graph 2.5), and the government was running
budget surpluses and allowing the national debt to fall (Graph 2.7). On the tax and
social contributions side Ireland maintained a relatively low tax-take of unstable
composition, particularly in terms of the reliance on transactional taxes such as
stamp duty and capital gains tax. Ireland also operated a range of tax reliefs which
facilitated significant reductions in individuals’ tax liabilities, particularly those on
higher incomes (Collins & Walsh, 2011).
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Indeed, Ireland’s tax take as a percentage of GDP has remained one of the lowest in
the European Union over the last fifteen years (see Graph 2.6). The dangerous mix
of a relatively low-tax take and pro-cyclical composition was revealed when the
property bubble burst, as the tax take from stamp duty and capital gains collapsed:
in 2007, Capital Gains Tax (CGT) yielded €3,105m and Stamp Duty yielded €3,185m
but by 2010 Capital Gains Tax yielded only €347m while Stamp Duty yielded only
€960m. Government, and many commentators, had come to believe that Ireland
could combine a low-tax model with increasing levels of social security provision.
Graph 2.6 – Receipts from Tax and Graph 2.7 – Government Net 
Social Contributions as a % of GDP, Deficit/Surplus (left axis) and Gross 
Ireland, Denmark and EU-27 1995-2012 public debt (right axis) as a % of GDP, 
Germany and Ireland, 1995-2008
Source: Eurostat, 2014. Source: AMECO, 2014.
Overall, Ireland’s policy-making during this lead-up to the crisis was underpinned
by a series of false assumptions and conclusions. These included:
i) Economic growth was good in itself and the higher the rate of economic growth
the better it would be for Ireland. 
ii) Everyone would enjoy the benefits of economic growth, which would trickle
down automatically.
iii) Infrastructure and social services at an EU-average level could be delivered with
one of the lowest total tax-takes in the EU.
iv) The growing inequality and the widening gaps between those on higher
incomes and those on lower incomes that followed from this approach to policy-
development were not important because ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’.
v) Reducing taxes was far better than investing that money in developing and
improving infrastructure and services; the sum of individual decisions would
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produce greater and more lasting prosperity than the collective decisions of the
Irish people.
Arising from this series of false policy conclusions and false assumptions, there were
many resulting policy failures. Among these were: 
i) Failure to take action to broaden the tax base by, for example:
a. introducing a site-value tax. 
b. removing existing tax exemptions which have no demonstrated cost-benefit
advantage. 
ii) Failure to overcome infrastructure deficiencies, such as in broadband, public
transport, primary health care, water, energy, social housing and waste. 
iii) Failure to create a universal health service based on need. 
iv) Failure to address income inequality. 
v) Failure to appropriately regulate the banking, financial and professional services
sector.
vi) Failure to control the property bubble by providing affordable, quality housing
for all.
The European Context
Rising defaults on subprime loans in the United States were the triggers for the
Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Crotty (2009) has pointed to a fundamental cause in
the underlying structural and theoretical weaknesses of a post-1980s ‘New Financial
Architecture’ – created through financial deregulation - which accentuated asset
price bubbles, concentrated risk and created incentives for financial institutions to
become extremely leveraged. While deregulated global finance has often been
stereotyped as an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ phenomenon, within the EU the liberalisation of
the financial sector had also been pursued as good in itself and cross-border
European financial flows were viewed as a benign result of monetary integration
and capital liberalisation. 
Blankenburg, King, Konzelmann and Wilkinson (2013) have described the way in
which the GFC revealed the structural distinctions between the core and the
periphery that had emerged within the Eurozone. The common currency removed
exchange rate risks and led to a convergence of interest rates and yields on
government debt. From this balance-of-payments view – of which Martin Wolf of
the Financial Times is the most influential exponent - of the origins of the Eurozone
crisis, current account deficits within the Eurozone were financed in Ireland and
Spain by large private sector deficits mitigated by smaller public sector surpluses,
while in Greece and Portugal a combination of private and public sector deficits
emerged (Blankenburg, King, Konzelmann & Wilkinson, 2013: 464). 
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Graph 2.8 – Current Account as a % of GDP for selected Eurozone member-states,
2001-2008
Source: Eurostat (2014).
Liberalised capital and financial markets facilitated lending by financial institutions
within the core to financial institutions and states in the ‘periphery’- sometimes
through intermediaries - and in this way allowed the perpetuation of trade
imbalances within the Eurozone, with the associated distinction between a current
account surplus ‘core’ and a current account deficit ‘periphery’ (see Graph 2.8). 
The European Commission (2012: 11) has recognised the emergence of current
account imbalances within the Eurozone – and indeed the European Union – as a
feature of the 2000s, noting that France, Britain and, to a lesser extent, Germany
played an important role in intermediating financial flows, sometimes from non-
EU countries, towards the deficit countries, contributing to ‘credit-driven booms,
reductions in savings and excessive investment in non-productive activities in the
periphery, and excessive risk concentration in the financial systems of the core
countries’.
The architects of the political economy of European Monetary Union (EMU) were
focused on what they saw as the dangers of public debt and deficits: the European
treaties prohibit bailouts (hence the structure of the financing given the programme
countries), prohibit the ECB purchasing government debt in the primary market
(i.e monetising debt) while the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established to
provide a framework to control public debt and deficits levels. 
The ECB’s sole mandate is to maintain price stability, rather than achieve full
employment. The structure of the EMU created by the European treaties closely
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resembles the German tradition of ordoliberalism (or Freiburg School tradition): the
creation of a strong rules-based legal and regulatory framework within which the
free market is permitted to function, combined with an independent, technocratic
central bank strongly committed to sound money. This model initially masked the
distributional conflicts that could erupt within the EMU, both between capital and
labour, and between nation-states. It also ignored the rapid rise in private debt that
occurred in the periphery of the Eurozone, particularly Ireland and Spain.
Chart 2.9 – Public Debt as a % of GDP, Chart 2.10 - Private debt in % of GDP, 
selected Eurozone countries, 2001-2010 selected Eurozone countries, 2001-2010
Source: AMECO (2014). Source: Eurostat (2014).
During the early 1990s some commentators – particularly economist historians –
expressed doubts about the viability of creating a common currency union along
the model of the Eurozone (cf.  Krugman, 1994: 182-187; von Hagen and
Eichengreen, 1996; de Grauwe, 1992; Godley, 1992). Some economists argued that
the Euro area was not, and is still not, an ‘optimal currency union’ (OCU). In
practice, language and cultural barriers still restrict labour mobility – indeed, massive
labour migrations would be extremely disruptive - and each member-state still
retains distinctive economic institutions (see Mundell, 1961 for the original
concept). Therefore, while economic recessions may remain local phenomena,
countries are deprived of monetary policy tools, such as devaluation, which have
traditionally been used to combat such recessions. Without those tools, the burden
of adjustment would fall on wages and prices within a Eurozone member rather
than on their currency, in a process sometimes called an ‘internal devaluation’.
De Grauwe (1998) perceptively warned that ‘excessive debt accumulation by the
private sector can be equally, if not more, risky [than public sector debt]… this has
escaped the attention of the founders of EMU, concerned as they were by the
dangers of too much government debt’. By the end of 2008, the Eurozone was
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confronted by a banking sector whose underlying assets – for example, lending into
the property sector in Ireland or Spain, or derivatives purchased from investment
banks – were worth, or would be worth, far less than their face value. While many
banks in the European ‘core’ were effectively bailed-out by the US government
through its extensive nationalisations of European banks’ counter-parties, and were
heavily supported by the US Federal Reserve through its asset purchase programmes,
they were still exposed to banks in the periphery.
2.1.2 The Response to the Crisis: Socialising debt, austerity 
and structural reform, 2008-2014
The European Response
Initially, in November 2008, EU member-states participated in expansionary fiscal
policies in an attempt to mitigate the crisis. The Commission played a role in co-
ordinating measures through a European Economic Recovery Plan, which played
an important role in preventing the European economy contracting more than it
would, arguably heading off another Great Depression. Germany, for example,
produced a spending programme equal to nearly 3.3% of GDP spread over two years. 
European governments reluctantly nationalised some of their more egregiously
exposed financial institutions in September and October 2008. However, many
governments, particularly in France and Germany, refused to acknowledge the
solvency crisis their banking sectors faced. Lacking a European policy and legal
framework on banking resolution, which would have provided for the winding up
of a collapsed financial institution, the ECB argued that no bank should be allowed
to default. The structure of inter-European lending – with ‘core’ banks and financial
institutions holding bonds issued by, and deposits at, ‘peripheral’ banks, particularly
Spanish ones, and ‘peripheral’ governments – meant that peripheral governments
and citizens were required to re-capitalise domestic banks in the interest of
protecting the position of foreign bondholders. 
The ECB feared a ‘contagion’ resulting from a defaulting bank could collapse the
European financial system. However, a concomitant commitment from ‘core’
countries to buttress their own financial institutions was not required. This ‘no
bondholder left behind’ policy was a massive socialisation of the debt, which would
fall on the citizens of the ‘peripheral’ countries, and potentially upon the citizens
of the ‘core’ countries if they were required to offer assistance.
The Greek fiscal crisis emerged in 2009 when it became clear that the Greek state
had falsified its level of national debt with the aid of US investment banks and
others. When the true debt and deficit levels became known, Greek bond yields rose
precipitously. European policymakers viewed the crisis as entirely a result of Greek
profligacy and Greece, unable to finance itself through the government bond
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market, became the first country to enter an IMF/EU/ECB ‘troika’ financial aid
programme. In return, the Troika demanded that Greece embark on an austerity
programme, entailing fiscal consolidation and ‘structural reforms’ of the Greek
state. Some of these were understandable, such as reform of the statistics agency.
But others, such as labour market reform, merely increased job insecurity and
unemployment. Two key characteristics of Greece’s institutional problems were
ignored: the high level of tax evasion amongst the country’s elite and its high level
of economic inequality, which is the greatest in the EU. 
Despite repeated warnings from some prominent economists that the austerity
programme would precipitate a deep depression and a profound social crisis,
European policymakers and the IMF forged ahead. However, the latter at least
recognised the impossibility of Greek recovery given the size of its debt burden.
Eventually in February 2012, the ECB and German government came to an
agreement and private sector involvement in a write-down of Greek public sector
debt was secured. One of the results of this is that Greek government debt is now
held entirely by international organisations, while future funding will likely rely on
the official sector to roll over its existing government debt – that is, the European
Union – until Greece regains access to something like market funding.  The IMF
(2013) offered some limited criticisms of the Greek programme, pointing at the
lateness of other elements of the Troika in accepting the need for debt write-downs,
and admitted that it underestimated the effects of fiscal consolidation on Greece.  
Table 2.1 – Selected Timeline for Euro-crisis
Date
Nov-08 European Recovery Plan (1.5% of EU GDP) announced.  MAy-10 IMF/EU
€110bn Programme for Greece, Finance Ministers announce creation of
the EFSF.  SEp-10 EU Commission presents ‘six-pack’ rules to prevent
excessive macroeconomic imbalances and deficits.  oCT-10 Agreement
to establish a permanent crisis mechanism (the ESM).  Nov-10 IMF/EU
€85bn Programme for Ireland.  MAR-11 Euro area leaders agree to lower
interest rates on Greek loans and increase maturity of loans.  MAy-11
IMF/EU €78bn Programme for Portugal.  Jul-11 Second Greek
Programme of €109bn (later €130bn) proposed, lowered interest rates on
assistance loans and lengthened maturities.  Aug-11 ECB begins
purchasing Italian and Spanish bonds in the secondary market.  SEp-11
European Council, Parliament and Commission agree final ‘six-pack’
legislation.
oCT-11 Mario Draghi begins term as President of the ECB, European Council
Agreement on Greek PSI, agreement on the adoption of increased
budgetary surveillance and fiscal compact, Greek PM announces
referendum on debt deal
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Nov-11 Greek PM cancels referendum, resigns and Greek coalition formed under
pressure from EU leaders, Italian PM resigns and replaced by technocratic
administration, European Commission proposes the ‘two-pack’,
strengthening budgetary surveillance and monitoring.   DEC-11 25 EU
countries agree to new treaty on fiscal compact, sanctions for those who
breach rules/ ECB extends range of collateral it accepts, trebles
refinancing operations to 36 months to extend liquidity, €500bn take up
of these Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO).  FEb-12 New ESM
treaty signed which ties ESM treaty to fiscal compact, final agreement on
second rescue programme for Greece and higher level of write-downs for
private investors.  MAR-12 Fiscal Compact treaty signed, ESM ceiling
extended to €700bn.  JuN-12 Spain requests assistance from ESM to
recapitalise banking sector. Euro area endorses banking union and
possible retroactive recapitalisations and future recapitalisations by ESM.
Jul-12 President of ECB says ECB will ‘do whatever it takes’.
Aug-12 ECB announces Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), which involves
possible interventions into short-term secondary government debt
markets.
SEp-12 Finance Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands and Finland seem to rule
out retroactive direct recapitalisations despite July 2012 agreement.
oCT-12 IMF admits fiscal multipliers have been under-estimated - implying fiscal
consolidation had much greater contractionary effect than previously
appreciated
FEb-12 Irish agreement with ECB on Anglo-Irish Promissory Notes
MAR-13 Cyprus announced deposit levy at behest of EU/IMF, introduces capital
controls
DEC-13 Ireland exits the EU/IMF Programme
The nature of the Greek crisis has led to a common conception that the problems
arising throughout the Eurozone have been fundamentally problems of public debt.
However, this is misleading, as Ireland and Spain ran low deficits, and even
surpluses, throughout early 2000s, as was noted above. The current large budget
deficits are a result of the economic collapse in the peripheral countries, which is
related to the overhang of private debt, and the interest payments on the bank debt
taken on by governments. Efforts to address rising public debt through tax rises and
expenditure cuts have not just failed; they have exacerbated the fall-out from private
debt crises in the periphery. The creation of the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF), which was used to fund the Greek, Irish and Portuguese programmes, and
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Box 2.2:   The ‘Six Pack’, ‘Two Pack’ and the Fiscal Compact
One of the results of the diagnosis of the financial crisis as a public finance crisis was
the strengthening of the framework – the Stability and Growth Pack (SGP) - which
governs member-states fiscal rules, increasing the surveillance and disciplining role
of the European Commission. Additionally, the Commission was tasked with
identifying and preventing macroeconomic imbalances, such as the persistent
current account imbalances which built up during the early and mid-2000s. Despite
opposition from the centre-left and left in the European Parliament, and the
concerns expressed by French President Hollande, this framework will likely remain
in place for some time and shape Irish fiscal policy over the next decade. 
The legal framework is contained in the ‘six pack’ of five regulations and a directive,
applying to the EU-28, the ‘two pack’ which applies to the Euro area member-states
and increases monitoring by the European Commission – including submission of
national budgets no later than 15 October – and the ‘Fiscal Compact’, an
intergovernmental treaty (Britain and the Czech Republic did not sign it) which
requires the direct transposition of the SGP measures into national law. The SGP
rules state that government deficits must be 3% or less; government debt to GDP
ratio must be 60% or less; and that Government structural deficits must be 0.5% or
less. The structural deficit may be up to 1% if debt to GDP is significantly below 60%,
and requires a 1/20th reduction in debt per year if a country has a debt to GDP ratio
above 60%. The requirements of the Fiscal Compact have been given effect in Irish
law in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012. 
Ireland is currently in the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) which requires the
reduction of the General Government Deficit to under 3% of GDP by 2015. The
1/20th rule applying to the path of debt reduction will begin to fully apply in 2019.
Between 2015 and 2019 Ecofin and the European Commission will determine
whether the pace of debt reduction is adequate (Department of Finance, 2013a: 5).
Following 2015, Ireland must attempt to attain its medium-term budget objective
(MTO), a medium-term budgetary position which must be achieved with reference
to structural measures (that is, taking account of the difference between potential
and actual GDP). Ireland’s current MTO is balanced budget in structural terms
(Department of Finance, 2013b: 48).
Public spending is governed by an ‘Expenditure benchmark’, which limits growth
in government expenditure. When a member-state has not achieved its MTO, a
reference rate for growth in government expenditure is calculated based on potential 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a new permanent facility, were designed
to facilitate public lending to the distressed EU members. However, these funds did
not contain a provision of joint liability. Rather, each country’s contribution to the
EFSF and ESM is based on their GDP, and each country guarantees that portion of
the subscription it provides.
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The ESM was accompanied by the Fiscal Compact, which requires the writing of
fiscal rules into the law of member-states, a price extracted by Germany for the
creation of the ESM. Additionally, the Directorate-General for Economic and
Financial Affairs, the most hawkish element of the European Commission, has been
given additional powers to monitor both countries fiscal and wider macro-economic
policies, including excessive current account surpluses through the ‘six-pack’ and
‘two-pack’. The latter is a belated recognition within the Commission that Germany
should engage in a more expansionary fiscal policy.    
In June 2012 the Euro Area Group and European Council agreed to recapitalise banks
directly through the ESM. They also agreed that the link between bank debt and
national debt should be broken, raising the possibility of relief for Spain and Ireland.
However, this was seemingly quashed by the finance ministers of Germany, the
Netherlands and Finland months later. 
The ECB has become increasingly interventionist, willing to play the role of lender of
last resort to the banking sector and perhaps even governments through extending
liquidity,. From May 2010 the ECB had carried out a Securities Market Programme
(SMP), purchasing government debt in the secondary market in an attempt to stabilise
yields. Of more significance was the ECB announcement in August 2012 of plans for
unlimited purchases in secondary bond markets of selected short-term government
bonds in the event of yields rising above a certain level through the Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMT) mechanism. This announcement has produced a
reduction in the bond yields of both programme and non-programme peripheral
countries. However, the ECBs commitment to purchasing government debt on
secondary markets through the OMT has yet to be tested. 
growth estimates and a convergence rate of expenditure is provided which must be
followed to achieve the MTO. In Ireland’s case, the reference rate is 0.6% of GDP and
the convergence rate is 1.4%, leading to rounded figure of -0.7% of GDP for real
expenditure growth - in practice a reduction - between 2014 and 2016 (European
Commission, 2013: 30).
We opposed the Compact and wider EU fiscal rules on a number of bases: that it
does not address what is essentially a balance of payments crisis created by persistent
and excessive private credit creation; that there is considerable debate and confusion
about the measure of ‘potential’ output severely affects the view of structural output;
and that it is undemocratic, removing decisions about resource allocation and tax
and spending from parliaments. However, it is likely that these rules will remain in
place and will have to be adhered to. Given the operation of the ‘Expenditure
benchmark’, any increase in expenditure above the benchmark will require
discretionary revenue increases. Given this, there should be a serious debate about
the level of revenue required to finance public expenditure over the coming years.
Chart 2.11 Comparison of 10-year Government Bond yields (Maastricht Criteria),
2005-2011
Source: Eurostat (2013).
The current European strategy involves a series of measures:
• reducing deficits throughout the EU through fiscal consolidation;
• lending to distressed countries and requiring they undertake structural
adjustment programmes in return;
• promoting ‘re-balancing’ through ‘internal devaluation’ in those countries with
current account deficits to increase ‘competitiveness’;
• creating a banking union to centralise regulation of European banks and provide
a banking resolution scheme;
• creating supervisory structures for the European Commission and other
member- states to monitor member-state’s budgets and macroeconomic
indicators; and the writing of a fiscal rule into the law of each member state.
Between 2010 and 2012 there were proposals by member-states, and even the
Commission, for the creation of a genuine ‘economic union’ with common debt
issuance, and eventually, a common fiscal policy. However, the current approach,
agreed in December 2013, is to effectively suspend the June 2012 agreement until the
creation of a common banking union with shared supervision by the ECB, a common
resolution scheme and a deposit insurance scheme. A mutualised funding scheme to
resolve – or wind down – bankrupt financial institutions won’t be in place for ten years,
though under French pressure this could be introduced faster. The focus on the
banking union has been used to avoid Europe’s and the Eurozone’s real social and
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economic challenges; the erosion of European social security systems, often under
the pressure of the European Commission and Troika, the contraction in growth
occasioned by the turn to austerity, the growth in European unemployment, growing
income inequality and the need to adapt to climate change.
Box 2.3:   Democratic Legitimacy
The current strategy of placing the burden of economic adjustment on prices, wages
and government spending throughout the EU is leading to rapid reduction in
inflation, and even raising the possibility of deflation. Deflation would raise the real
debt burden facing both private and public debtors in Europe, potentially extending
a ‘balance-sheet’ recession. A set of policies – structural adjustment and austerity –
intended to reduce debt burdens will actually perpetuate them. This approach is
clearly unsustainable. It is also unsustainable that such decisions are taken without
consulting European citizens. Ireland needs a public debate about the trajectory of
the European Union, and such a debate must reach beyond even the immediate and
Decisions made during the economic crisis have raised serious questions as to
democratic legitimacy of the processes by which these decisions are made, both
in Ireland and in Europe. In Ireland, decisions allocating vast resources to the fi-
nancial sector were made by a few senior politicians and officials, sometimes with-
out a meeting of the full Cabinet, and without a full debate. The establishment of
NAMA is a prime example; NAMA was established rapidly, and its operations were
initially extremely opaque. In its disposals of assets, NAMA makes decisions affect-
ing communities throughout Ireland, but those communities have little power to
influence NAMA. 
At the European level, the structural adjustment programmes have been overseen
by the IMF, European Commission and the European Central Bank, none of which
have a directly elected component. The Troika are involved in making major deci-
sions about resources and economic policy areas which were traditionally the pre-
serve of democratically accountable national governments. Often represented as
mere technocrats, Troika members actually have differing and very political views
on the role of government in society, the functioning of the labour market, and
appropriate level of the social security. For example, the President of the ECB,
Mario Draghi, informed the Wall Street Journal in February 2012 that ‘The
European social model has already gone’. 
The stricter European fiscal rules were adopted with relatively little national public
debate, and their implications – particularly the increased supervisory powers of
the Commission - have not been fully absorbed, except perhaps when the German
Bundestag sees elements of the Irish budget before the Dáil does. Streek (2011) has
noted that these increased powers may lead to citizens in the EU – particularly in
the Programme countries – viewing their governments as nothing but the agents
of the Commission, ECB or the IMF.
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pressing concerns surrounding the link between Ireland’s private bank debt and
national debt and instead focus on what type of European Union Irish citizens seek
for the future.
When challenged about the role of the ECB and the dangers of monetary union in
the early 1990s, Jacques Delors used to reply that ‘social Europe is coming’.
Unfortunately, the response to the crisis has ignored ‘social Europe’; indeed, the
European response has been to dismantle many of the social protections that Delors
considered, and considers, as constituting the pinnacle of European achievement.
The role of a ‘social Europe’ in the coming debate on Ireland’s place in Europe must
be central. This will require Irish politicians to take a hard look at their own role in
promoting or dismantling ‘social Europe’ in the last twenty years.
The Irish Response
The dangers of attempting an austerity policy in the face of a ‘balance-sheet’
recession – characterised by private firms and households holding debts larger than
the value of the underlying assets – have been highlighted by many economic
commentators, and the effects of Irish austerity have borne them out. Output has
contracted rapidly, partly under the pressure of austerity, reducing government’s
tax revenue, while the severity of unemployment has led to increases in the social
protection budget, even as most rates of social protection payments have fallen. This
has led to remarkably little reduction in Ireland’s deficit to GDP figures, due to a
combination of successive bank bailouts, leading to a potentially onerous future
interest schedule, and the contraction of GDP, partly due to austerity measures.
Between 2008 and 2010 the policy of austerity failed to increase market and investor
confidence and the continuing insolvency of Ireland’s banks – despite extensive
recapitalisations (see Table 2.2) - led to increasing doubts about the future solvency
of the Irish state, as reflected by steadily rising bond yields on Irish government debt.
In late 2009, the government sought to achieve a back-door recapitalisation by
establishing the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), which was designed
to purchase loans related to commercial property developments at a price above
their market value (but below their face value of €74bn) and hold the assets until
such return as was possible could be made on the loans. However, the market value
(ultimately €32bn) of the loans NAMA sought to acquire was far lower than
policymakers initially assumed, requiring extensive recapitalisation of the banking
sector in 2010. Attempts were made to enforce some kind of burden sharing on those
who held bonds issued by Irish private banks. However, the European Central Bank
insisted that there could be no write-downs on any Euro area bank debt, even as
unemployment rose rapidly in Ireland and the country came under severe pressure
on international debt markets. 
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Table 2.2 – Total Cost of Irish Banking Rescue by Source of Funding and Year (€bn)
2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
NPRF 7 3.7 10 20.7  
Promissory Notes 30.7 30.7  
Exchequer 4 0.9 6.5 1.3 12.7  
Total 11 35.3 16.5 1.3 64 
Source: http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2012/04/18/00157.asp; Healy (2013).
Though the Irish state had raised significant cash reserves, in September and
November 2010 European leaders placed considerable pressure on Irish leaders to
be placed in an IMF/EU programme. European policymakers feared that high bond
yields on Irish government debt would have a contagion effect on other vulnerable
Euro area economies. Ireland’s IMF/EU programme required fiscal consolidation to
bring the general government deficit (GGD) to GDP ratio below the 3% prescribed
in the Growth and Stability Pact by 2015, and a considerable recapitalisation and
downsizing of the Irish banking sector. This has brought the total adjustment
between 2008 and 2015 to €32.3bn, equivalent to 18% of 2015 forecasted GDP (see
Table 2.3). In addition, a structural adjustment programme comprising reforms to
social security and the labour market, and privatisation of public utilities, was agreed
as part of the programme.
Table 2.3 - Budgetary Adjustments 2008-2015 (€m)  
Adjustment Description Taxation Expenditure Total Running 
  Total 
Adjustment July 2008 €1,000 €1,000 €1,000 
Budget 2009 €1,215 €747 €1,962 €2,962 
Adjustments Feb/March 2009 €2,090 €2,090 €5,052
Supplementary Budget 2009 €3,621 €1,941 €5,562 €10,614 
Budget 2010 €23 €4,051 €4,074 €14,688
Budget 2011 €1,409 €4,590 €5,999 €20,687 
Budget 2012 €1,600 €2,200 €3,800 €24,487
Budget 2013 €1,432 €1,940 €3,372 €27,859
Budget 2014 €880 €2,000 €2,480 €30,339
Budget 2015* €700 €1,300 €2,000 €32,339 
Total of Adjustments €10,880 €21,459
% Division of Adjustments 33.6% 66.4%   
Notes: *Projected
2.1.3 The Troika programme, 2010-2013
The Troika Programme – a financing package of €85bn, of which €67.5bn was
provided by the EU, IMF, Sweden, Denmark, Britain and €22.5bn by the Irish
National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) and Irish Exchequer cash balances - was
designed to return Ireland to market funding by December 2013, through a radical
reorganisation and downsizing of the Irish banking sector – correctly viewed as the
source of Ireland’s crisis – and a reduction of Ireland’s deficit to below 3% of GDP
by 2015. Though the IMF and Irish authorities belatedly recognised the damage
caused by the policy of austerity, the dominant belief was that a rapid fiscal
consolidation would increase confidence in Irish government debt, facilitating
Ireland’s ability to return to self-financing. Relatively short shrift was given to the
idea of pushing out the period of adjustment, which would have reduced the impact
on the Irish economy and society. Indeed, the former IMF mission chief to Ireland
has argued that a less sharp fiscal contraction combined with a write-down of
banking debt was not just possible, but desirable (The Irish Times, 2013). 
Table 2.4 – Components of changes in Real GDP, 2008-2014
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Real gDp -2.2 -6.4 -1.1 2.2 0.2 0.6 1.8
Final Domestic Demand -2.2 -9.7 5 -3 -1.1 0 0.3
-private Consumption 0.1 -5.1 0.9 -1.6 -0.3 -0.3 0.5
-public Consumption 0.6 -3.4 -6.9 -2.8 -3.7 -0.6 -2.8
-gross fixed investment -9.6 -26.9 -22.6 -9.5 -0.1 2 4
Net Exports 1.5 4.6 3 5.7 1.6 0.6 1.5
-Exports -1.1 -3.8 6.4 5.4 1.6 1.1 2.9
-Imports -3 -9.8 3.6 -0.4 0 0.6 1.9
Source: International Monetary Fund (2013: 34)
The initial assumptions of Ireland’s economic performance under the
EU/Programme were extremely optimistic – even in the IMF’s programme
assumptions - particularly in relation to domestic demand (see Table 2.5). This was
reflected in the greater confidence in the policy of austerity, particularly in the
European institutions. However, as a result of weaker growth the nominal amount
of cuts required to achieve the deficit targets under the Programme were
correspondingly higher. As with other EU/IMF programmes, the Troika did not
adopt a uniform perspective on Ireland’s economy. The IMF were more worried
30 Socio-Economic Review 2014
about the impact of the rapid pace of fiscal consolidation on Ireland’s economy than
other members of the Troika, and were supportive of Ireland’s efforts to gain relief
on legacy banking debt, particularly given the IMF’s general fear that IMF financing
was being used to delay reforms to the Euro area’s banking system. 
Table 2.5 – Comparison of IMF Programme Assumptions in 2010 and 2013
December 2010 IMF December 2013 IMF Deficit 
Target/Deficit 
out-turn
Real Real Fiscal Real Real Fiscal
GDP GNP Consolidation GDP GNP Consolidation 
(€bn)** (€bn)  
2011 0.9 -1.5 6 2.2 -1.6 6 -13.1%
2012 1.9 0.8 3.6 0.2 1.8 3.8 -8.2%
2013 2.4 1.4 3.1 0.3 0.2 3.4 -7.3%
2014 3 2.3 n/a 1.7 1.3 2.5* -4.8%
2015 3.4 3.4 n/a 2.5 2.1 2*** -2.9%  
Source: Department of Finance (2010; 2013a); International Monetary Fund (2010; 2013).
Notes: *Budget 2014 was composed of €2.5bn in permanent measures and €0.6bn in once-
off measures.
**Budgetary adjustments agreed in second review.
***IMF Staff assume €2.4bn adjustment is required to reach deficit target (IMF, 2013: 15).
Despite considerable latitude in the division of cuts to tax increases, successive
governments pursued a fiscal consolidation consisting of two-thirds expenditure
cuts to one-third tax increases. Some Troika officials, citing the ESRI, have stated
that the overall fiscal adjustment in budgets between 2009 and 2014 has been
progressive (Szélsky & Florián, 2013). However, the progressivity is affected by the
€9.6bn of measures – included public sector pay cuts - announced in 2009, 50% of
which were tax cuts. The ESRI has shown that budgets introduced between 2010 and
2014, including the three budgets introduced under the ministrations of the Troika,
were in fact regressive, taking more as a percentage of income from those on lower
incomes (Callan et. al., 2013; Callan, 2013). Moreover, measures of the distributional
impact of successive budgets do not capture the effects of reductions in expenditures
on service provision – such as, for example, health, education or services for the
homeless - upon which those on lower incomes, or in vulnerable positions, are more
likely to rely.
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Table 2.6 – Poverty and Deprivation Rates, 2008-2011
2008 2009 2010 2011
At risk of poverty rate (%) 14.4 14.1 14.7 16
Deprivation Rate (%) 13.8 17.1 22.6 24.5
Consistent poverty rate (%) 4.2 5.5 6.3 6.9
Source: CSO (2013: 1).
Leading up to the crisis, the percentage of the population at risk of poverty, in
consistent poverty and the deprivation rate all declined following a sustained
commitment of government to increase social security payments to the most
vulnerable during the period between 2004 and 2008. This progress has been
partially reversed during the recession, as wages and social welfare payments have
fallen (see Table 2.5). This has particularly affected extremely vulnerable groups; in
2011 56% of children in lone parent households suffered two or more types of
enforced deprivation, up from 44.1% in 2009. The quintile share ratio – measuring
the difference between the average equivalised income of the top 20% of households
from the bottom 20% - in 2011 was 4.9, up from 4.3 in 2009. Given the regressive
nature of budgets since 2010, it is likely that both relative and absolute poverty have
increased since 2011.
The exit from the EU/IMF Programme occurred at the end of 2013. Though hailed
as a success, the return to market financing has been largely underpinned – as have
bond yields throughout the European periphery – by the ECB’s commitment to
OMT, a commitment that has yet to be tested. ‘Success’ in certain areas is the result
of wider failures: reductions in expenditure growth in social protection have been
partly a result of mass emigration since 2009. The IMF (2012: 5) estimated in
December 2012 that without the shrinking labour force – a shrinkage fuelled by
emigration - since 2009, unemployment would stand at 20%. However, there have
been some positive signs since the middle of 2013, with the decline in numbers in
employment finally turning around, and a reduction in unemployment to 12.1%,
following a high of 15.1% in the third quarter of 2011 (CSO, 2014).
Additionally, the government has identified the need to raise the investment rate,
and has transferred the remainder of the NPRF, some €6.4bn, to the Ireland Strategic
Investment Fund (ISIF). The NPRF has already been used to provide the bulk of
capital for funds that will supply investment to small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs). The ISIF has been established to focus on commercial and strategic
investments. This is too narrow a remit, and before the ISIF is established on a
statutory basis government should take a broader view of economic activity, and
commit to invest some of the ISIF in the broader social economy. This would involve
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more investment than currently envisaged in the period immediately ahead in areas
such as social housing, primary care facilities, energy efficiency and school facilities.
2.2 The Choices Ahead
Even within the confines of the EU/IMF programme there were real choices; these
choices have become even more important as government can no longer attribute its
choices to the Troika. We now face stark choices about the amount of resources that
our health service and our welfare state should receive, about the distribution of
wealth and power in our society, and about the level of taxation required to furnish
the resources necessary for a compassionate and civilised society. It is time to have a
real debate about our economic and social priorities in the years ahead; whether, for
example, it is time to reduce taxes for higher-rate taxpayers, or whether it is time to
invest in our social services and infrastructure and strengthen our social security
system; whether we want to return to a privately-financed system of housing provision
that leads to vacant homes, broken banks and record numbers on the social housing
list, or whether we wish to create a society that guarantees quality accommodation
for all; whether we wish the standard of healthcare to depend on the contents of our
wallets, or the common demands of our humanity. Whether, in a word, we wish to
collectively pursue the public purpose, or return to the petty politics of private greed.
We had hoped these issues would be addressed in the Government’s Medium Term
Economic Strategy (MTES) published in December 2013. That document, however,
contains very little substantial information and goes into very little detail on the
future that Government wishes to build.
Social Justice Ireland has long advocated a new guiding vision for Irish society; one
based on the values of  human dignity, equality, human rights, solidarity,
sustainability and the pursuit of the common good. These values are at the core of
the vision for a nation in which all men, women and children have what they
require to live life with dignity and to fulfil their potential: including sufficient
income; access to the services they need; and active inclusion in a genuinely
participatory society. These are not minority views as is sometimes stated, but reflect
the aspirations of the majority of Irish citizens. Indeed, in February 2014, 85% of
the members of the Convention on the Constitution convened by the government
voted to afford greater constitutional protection to Economic, Social and Cultural
(ESC) rights. This included a recommendation to include explicit mention of rights
to housing, social security, essential healthcare, the rights of people with disabilities,
and linguistic and cultural rights, in the Irish Constitution. 
Policy will be heavily constrained in future years, not least by the requirement under
the ‘six-pack’ that additional discretionary expenditure must be funded by
additional discretionary revenue. The current trajectory of government policy is for
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a reduction in total expenditure (including interest rates) and a reduction in total
revenue (of which tax revenue is by far the largest component) to 2015. The
Department of Finance’s April 2013 Stability Programme Update contained an
indicative projection of revenue and expenditure to 2019, assuming expenditure
growth of 1% per annum and a growth in total revenue equal to potential growth
in GDP.6 Though these figures are purely indicative they do show one possible
scenario, where total revenue falls to 33.9% of GDP and total expenditure falls to
33.1% of GDP, which would take place if additional taxation was not levied. For
comparison, the EU-27 is estimated to have a total revenue of 45.2% of GDP and
total expenditure of 47.9% of GDP in 2015 (AMECO, 2014).
graph 2.12 – Total Revenue and Total Expenditure as a % of gDp, 2005-20197
Source: AMECO (2014), Department of Finance (2013a; 2013b). 
Notes: *Figures to 2012 are taken from the AMECO database. 
**The cost of recapitalisation of banking institutions has been removed.
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6 Given the more optimistic outlook for the interest costs published by the Department
and possibility of the Commission changing its understanding of Ireland’s output gap
the 2016 and 2019 figures could change.
7 Total expenditure takes account of all government expenditure, including interest
payments, which in the April 2013 Stability Programme Update account for some
4.8% of GDP per annum between 2016 and 2018 and 4.7% of GDP annum in 2019. It
is likely that these figures will be more optimistic upon completion of the April 2014
Stability Programme Update.
***Figures from 2013 to 2015 are taken from Budget 2014 figures and outlined projections. 
Can we provide high-quality public services to all while allowing total expenditure
to fall as a percentage of GDP? And if there is an improvement in various indicators
should any additional revenue be used to reduce taxes or increase expenditure. We
believe a new policy framework is required; one that recognises the need to increase
taxes towards the European average in order to fund the public services that we need,
while implementing new criteria for policy evaluation.  
2.3 A policy Framework for a New Ireland
To achieve our vision we have established a policy framework that identifies five key
policy areas for reform.8
• The first is macroeconomic stability, which requires a stabilisation of Ireland’s
debt levels, fiscal and financial stability and sustainable economic growth, and
an immediate boost to investment, which has collapsed during the crisis. (Dealt
with here and in chapter 4)
• The second is the need for a just taxation system, which would require an
increase in the overall tax-take to the European average; such an increase must
be implemented equitably and in a way that reduces income inequality. (These
issues are dealt with in much greater detail in chapter 4).
• The third area is social protection, the strengthening of social services and social
infrastructure, the prioritisation of employment, and a commitment to
quantitative targets to reduce poverty.  (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9).
• The fourth area is that of the governance of our country, which requires new
criteria in policy evaluation, the development of a rights-based approach, and
the promotion of deliberative democracy. (Chapter 10).
• Fifth, policies must be adopted that create a sustainable future, through the
introduction of measures to slow down climate change and protect the
environment, the promotion of balanced regional development, and promotion
of new economic and social indicators to measure performance, alongside
traditional national accounting measures such as GNP, GDP and GNI.  (Chapters
11, 12 and 13).
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8 The authors have presented an earlier version of this framework in Healy et al. (2013).
Table 2.7 – A policy framework for a New Ireland
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i) Ensuring macroeconomic stability
Ensuring macroeconomic stability requires a reduction in Ireland’s debt burden, the
launching of an investment programme and a restoration of fiscal and financial
stability. All of these measures are connected. An investment programme will
contribute to growth which would in turn lower Ireland’s deficit and real debt
burden. A reduction of, or commitment to reduce, Ireland’s debt burden will
increase confidence in the capacity of Ireland’s economy to expand and for the
country to fully exit the EU/IMF programme without the requirement of additional
credit facilities or the activation of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
programme, thus reducing yields on Irish government debt.
As we have noted, Ireland’s macroeconomic policy will be severely constrained.
Since Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), monetary policy has rested with the
European Central Bank, and the single currency has prevented the kind of currency
devaluation engaged in by Ireland during the late 1980s (Kinsella, 2013). Following
the introduction of the fiscal rules, Ireland’s fiscal policy will also be constrained as
noted in Box 2.2. 
a) Debt Sustainability
In October 2013, the Department of Finance has estimated that the debt-to-GDP
ratio will peak in 2014 at 124.1%, somewhat higher than the 121.4% estimated in
2012 and the 123% estimated in April 2013 (Department of Finance, 2013a: C19).
The estimated peak of the debt-to-GDP ratio has tended to rise due to overly
optimistic expectations of economic growth. By 2016, the Department expects that
14.3% of general government revenues will be devoted to servicing Ireland’s debt
(Department of Finance, 2013a: C20). Some improvements to the debt sustainability
position have been made in 2013 with the extension of the maturities of the €22.4bn
of European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) loans agreed by the
European Council in June 2013 (see Chart 2.13). The Department of Finance
estimates that Ireland will turn a primary surplus – the budget deficit less interest
payments - in 2014. However, a return to debt sustainability is dependent on
economic growth, and the ability to issue debt in private capital markets at
sustainable rates. In terms of the former, the government and Troika have tended
to over-estimate Ireland’s capacity to expand through an austerity induced
recession.  In terms of the latter, the continuing weakness of the Irish banking sector,
and doubts about the separation of sovereign and banking debt could pose
significant challenges to debt sustainability.
There has yet to be a full recognition by European partners that a large proportion
of Ireland’s debt was accumulated in the course of rescuing the Irish banking sector,
and ensuring that there was relatively lower burden-sharing than would have been
expected in any other enterprise. In addition, the loss of confidence in Ireland
during 2009-2010 was a direct result of fixed-asset analysts and other observers of
the government bond market viewing Ireland’s assumption of banking debt as
unsustainable with a corresponding change in the pricing of Irish government debt.
The total cost of the banking rescue has been €64bn, of which €12.6bn has come
directly from the Exchequer, €30.7bn through promissory notes and €20.7bn from
the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF).9 Of the €192bn in gross government
debt in 2012, over 20% was accounted for directly by the bank recapitalisation alone.
This part of Ireland’s debt represents a direct subsidy by the Irish public of
international bondholders and the European banking system. In June 2012 the
Eurogroup appeared to recognise this, holding out the possibility that the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) would retroactively recapitalise the Irish banking sector
by purchasing the Irish government’s bank equities. However, differences have since
emerged between the leading nation-states in the Eurozone, with considerable
uncertainty now surrounding the question of additional bank recapitalisations, let
alone retroactive recapitalisations. This has re-opened the question of the
connection between sovereign and banking debt. Given the upcoming capital
adequacy tests, Irish banks may be judged to require additional capital to account
for losses on their mortgage and commercial loan books. It is recognised by Irish
policymakers that the Irish banking sector is, and has been, unprepared for
recognising widespread losses on distressed mortgages (e.g Honohan, 2013). 
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9 Parliamentary Question 18719/12.
Chart 2.13 – Maturity Dates of Irish government Debt, 2014-2053
Source: NTMA (2014).
Notes: *Official Sector Includes Bilateral, IMF, EFSF, and EFSM.
**Floating Rate Bonds were issued as part of the restructuring of the IRBC promissory
notes.
If there are no additional liabilities arising from the banking sector and no further
economic shocks, Ireland’s debt may be sustainable, assuming continuing low
government debt yields and economic growth. However, deflation in the Eurozone
and in Ireland could increase Ireland’s real debt burden if it continues. To increase
debt sustainability, European authorities should also consider further changes to
the status of the government bonds which were issued to replace the promissory
notes including further extending the maturity and considering a lower interest
rate. Such measures could also be further applied to the loans received under the
EU/IMF Programme, in a similar manner to the EFSF loans. 
b) Fiscal and financial stability and sustainable economic growth
The connection between fiscal policy, output and employment has been at the heart
of the austerity debate in Ireland and Europe. Reducing government expenditure
and/or increasing tax revenues are not the same thing as reducing the deficit, and
meeting deficit reduction targets requires rapid underlying growth. Ireland should
make the case for a European-wide approach to growth, one that takes account of
the spill-over effects of combined fiscal consolidation. Unfortunately the fiscal rules
introduced mitigate against a European-wide fiscal expansion, though breaching
the rules is allowed in ‘extraordinary circumstances’. 
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Sustainable employment growth can be underpinned by an investment programme
that invests in both economic and social infrastructure. Kelly and McQuinn (2013)
have noted that, given the relationship between government’s fiscal accounts and
the balance sheets of the banking sector, austerity could have a deeper impact than
thought by policymakers given the concomitant increase in mortgage arrears and
business loan defaults on banking balance sheets, which necessitate greater levels
of recapitalisation. This was not appreciated by policymakers during the crisis as
austerity led to bank bailouts which led to further austerity.  
Financial stability is also a pre-requisite for a stable supply of credit to households
and firms. The Programme for Government promised the creation of a Strategic
Investment Bank to carry out lending to SMEs; this seems unlikely to be
implemented. A pre-requisite for financial stability is a regulated financial system
with a plurality of ownership. For that reason we argue that consideration should
be given to the proposal that Permanent TSB be re-mutualised, while government
should continue holding a stake in both of the two pillar banks, which should
continue to provide universal banking services. The case for a Strategic Investment
Bank – similar to the German state-owned KfW remains strong.
c) An Investment Programme
Ireland’s GNP, measured at constant market prices, remains 10% under its peak in
2007. GDP remains over 7% under its peak, and domestic demand remains 18%
under its 2008 level (CSO, 2013). Investment as % of GDP in Ireland in 2013 was 10%,
the lowest in the European Union (Eurostat 2013). Both the Troika and Department
of Finance have acknowledged that consumption and domestic demand have
remained stagnant, and they have previously relied on growing exports to boost
growth in their projections. There is some disagreement about the growth in
investment in 2013 and 2014 (see Table 2.8).
Table 2.8 – Projected Growth in Investment, 2013-2014*
Department of European
Finance ESRI IMF Commission
2013 4.9 2.1 2.9 2.9
2014 6.8 4.5 4.4 4.4
Source: Department of Finance (2013), Duffy et. al. (2013), IMF (2013), European
Commission (2013). 
Notes: *The Department of Finance projections were published in October 2013;
December  2013 for all others.
These figures are from an extremely low base. Domestic economic investment is
sorely needed to provide employment and provide much-needed infrastructure; this
would reduce short-term unemployment and increase the long-run productivity of
the Irish economy. The government has created a new investment fund – the Ireland
Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF) - using the NPRF’s €6.4bn discretionary investment
portfolio. However, the fund is orientated towards commercial investment
opportunities such as energy, broadband and water. 
The authors believe that there must be an off-balance sheet investment programme
between 2014 and 2016 of €7bn, as we proposed in our briefing document, Investing
for Growth, Jobs & Recovery (Social Justice Ireland, 2013). This would directly create
employment and also enhance growth, which would contribute to reducing the
deficit by reducing unemployment and increasing tax returns. We propose that the
investment programme target both economic and social infrastructure, including
the construction of social housing units, investment in water infrastructure, and
investment in primary care facilities. 
ii) Towards a Just Taxation System
The American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes once said that ‘taxes are the price we
pay for a civilized society’. We have long argued that Ireland’s total tax-take is simply
too low to pay for the services and social welfare provision that is necessary to ensure
human dignity for all. We believe that the incidence of taxation falls too much on
the shoulders of those on middle and low incomes. Therefore, the overall tax take
must rise in such a way that the burden falls of those most able to bear it.
a) Bring Taxes towards the European average
Ireland’s tax-take in 2010 was 28.2% of GDP, some 7.4% below the European average.
The Department of Finance believes that the total tax-take as a % of GDP will rise to
31.5% of GDP by 2016. Table 2.9 indicates the difference in the projected additional
tax yield if Ireland’s tax burden moved closer to the European average than that
indicated by the Department of Finance in the April 2013 Stability Programme
Update. There has been some debate on the appropriate measures of Ireland’s fiscal
capacity in recent years, given the difference between Ireland’s GNP and GDP. The
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC) has suggested a hybrid measure in the form: [H
= GNP+0.4 (GDP-GNP)] (IFAC, 2012: 53). Social Justice Ireland has argued that the
tax-take should be increased to 34.9% of GDP, below the Eurostat threshold defining
a low-tax country. An equivalent figure under the IFAC would be to increase taxes
to a level that fluctuates around 39.5% of H. 
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Table 2.9 – Potential Irish Total Tax Revenues, 2011-2016 (€bn)
Year Tax as % GDP Tax as % of H Total Tax The Tax Gap
Receipts (GDP)  
2012 30.3% 34.2% 49,569 7,525  
2013 31.0% 35.1% 52,049 6,548  
2014 31.7% 36.0% 55,245 5,577  
2015 31.9% 36.3% 57,914 5,446  
2016 31.5% 36.0% 59,574 6,430  
Source: Department of Finance (2013: 49-50).
Notes: *The Tax Gap is calculated as the difference between the projected tax take and
that which would be collected if total tax receipts were equal to 34.9% of GDP.
As we noted before, the reliance on relatively low level of taxation to fund vital
public services certainly contributed to the scale of the crisis in the public finances.
Ireland can never hope to address its longer-term deficits in infrastructure and social
provision if we continue to collect substantially less tax income than that required
by other European countries (cf chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this
issue). There should also be a public debate on the appropriate level of taxation
required over the next twenty years to fund our public services and social security
system. Future policy development will likely involve increasing public spending
and tax levels as well as changes in how services are delivered. These questions
should be openly debated instead of avoided by policymakers.
b) Increase Taxes equitably
If Ireland is to increase its total tax-take, it must do so in a fair and equitable manner.
Social Justice Ireland believes that the necessary tax reforms should be partly attained
by increasing income taxes for those on highest incomes, and by reforming the tax
code and broadening the tax base. This will involve shifting taxation towards
wealth, ensuring those who benefit the most from Ireland’s economic system
contribute the most, in the most efficient manner. 
In its Policy Briefing on Budget Choices, Social Justice Ireland proposed that the
Universal Social Charge apply at a rate of 10% for all those earning over €100,000,
rather than the current rate of 7 per cent. We also advocate a minimum effective tax
rate of 6 per cent for corporation tax, reform of reliefs accruing to those paying the
marginal tax rate, and the introduction of a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) in line
with proposals outlined by the European Commission and accepted by leading
member-states. 
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A key part of Ireland’s industrial strategy has been to attract foreign domestic
investment through the use of a low headline corporation tax rate. However, this
has recently caused reputational damage due to the utilisation of the Irish tax regime
by multinational corporations to avoid taxes on their corporate profits. In practice,
this policy has delivered some short-term gains in terms of foreign direct
investment. In the medium-term, the main beneficiaries of Ireland’s tax regime may
well be multinational corporations and Irish professional services companies
providing tax and legal services. 
A key medium-term priority must be the reconceptualization of the role of the Irish
corporation tax regime. Under international pressure from the G20 and OECD,
controversial loopholes have been closed but a serious discussion must take place
about the role of corporation tax in Ireland’s industrial strategy, and the role of
‘brass-plate’ companies headquartered in Dublin for tax purposes.10 We advocate
Ireland change its stance towards the corporation tax debate in Europe and
negotiate a Europe-wide minimum headline corporation tax of 17.5%.
c) Reduce income inequality
Income inequality, gender inequality and inequality of opportunity, are problems
in Irish society. They produce a range of negative outcomes for those who are poor
and/or excluded. Growing inequality exacerbates the negative effects on people who
are poor and/or excluded. Pickett and Wilkinson (2011) have pointed to the negative
consequences of inequality for all sections of society, pointing to better outcomes
in everything from subjective well-being to lower crime in more equal societies.
Stigliz (2013) has warned of the wider effects of inequality on the political economy
of a nation, as wealthier citizens gain an outsize influence in policy formulation,
reducing opportunities for the majority through their choices of policy. In Ireland,
increases in social protection payments, particularly between 2004 and 2007, played
an important role in reducing inequality. This has reversed since 2010, as successive
government prioritised cuts in expenditure over increases in taxation, raising serious
questions for Irish society. 
While budgets in 2008 were progressive, changes in taxation and expenditure since
2010 have been regressive, with the increase in VAT impacting particularly
significantly on those with the lowest incomes (Callan et. al., 2012, 2013). This does
not take into account cuts to public services, which have a greater impact on those
who rely on services; the sick, poor and vulnerable. The Gini coefficient, a measure
of income inequality, has risen from a low in 2009 of 29.3 to 31.1 in 2011 (CSO, 2013).
Reducing inequality must be a core objective of Government policy. Though the
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10 See Department of Finance (2013) for recent adjustments to Ireland’s corporation tax
policy.
promotion of pre-distribution income equality is important, redistribution through
tax and spending decisions should be used to achieve greater equality in Ireland.
iii) Enhancing social protection 
There have been significant cuts to social services and payments since 2008. Social
Justice Ireland believes many of these cuts have been socially destructive and counter-
productive. Many cuts have been capricious and were implemented without an
adequate examination of their impact. Moreover, in reducing the deficit the balance
between expenditure reductions and taxes has been weighted too much towards
cuts. Investment in social infrastructure is required now to ensure that it is not
eroded further which could potentially have significant future costs. Gross capital
expenditure has fallen from €9bn in 2008 to €3.3bn in 2013, and a social
infrastructure deficit will inevitably emerge in a climate of underinvestment as the
population continues to grow. Finally, the goal of universal provision for all must
remain, particularly in the area of health, where inequalities persist between the
insured and uninsured population, as well as within the uninsured population.
These inequalities will grow as user charges are introduced, and medical cards
removed. As we have noted before, given the widespread aspiration in Irish society
for these services, the issue of taxation must be addressed.
a) Protect services and the social infrastructure
Since 2008 the government has cut spending by €20,159m while increasing taxes
by €10,180m: a ratio of €2 in spending cuts for €1 in tax rates. By the projected end
of the EU/IMF programme in 2015 taxation will have contributed €10,880m and
spending cuts €21,459m to the total budgetary adjustments: the ratio of tax cuts to
spending cuts will remain unaltered (Department of Finance, 2013b). Measures
were, and are, required to reduce the deficit, but they should not fall
disproportionately upon the most vulnerable in society. 
Cuts to services and social protection payments ensure that they do. Social Justice
Ireland believes that the ratio of spending cuts to tax increases should have been
reversed. Future tax and spending policy should prioritise the building of Ireland’s
social infrastructure, including as a priority social housing, primary and mental
health facilities, and early education facilities. Adequate social infrastructure and
services are necessary to achieve sufficient dignity and equality for all citizens, from
children to older people, particularly in the context of an increased total fertility
rate and gradually ageing population.
b) Combat Unemployment
Unemployment has risen rapidly since 2008 but has recently begun to fall, and by
the fourth quarter of 2013 stood at 253,200 or 12.1% of the labour force (CSO, 2014).
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Employment has finally begun to rise, with an increase of 61,100 in employment
between the fourth quarter of 2012 and fourth quarter of 2013. Long-term
unemployment was at 7.2% of the labour force as of the second quarter of 2013,
accounting for 61.4% of those who are unemployed. The International Monetary
Fund (2013: 12) estimates that unemployment will still be 11.7% in 2015, while the
department of Finance believes it will stand at 11.8% in 2015 and 11.4% in 2016
(Department of Finance, 2013a). The Government’s Medium-Term Economic Strategy
estimates unemployment will fall to 8.1% by 2020 (2013).
Government currently operates a number of schemes such as the Community
Employment Programme, Tús, and Rural Social Scheme which support part-time
work. However, government has also introduced schemes such as JobBridge, an
unpaid internship programme which provides an additional €50 a week for working
between 30 and 40 hours, and the proposed Local Government Social Employment
Scheme, which provides an additional €20 a week for working 19.5 hours a week for
a local authority, with the potential for sanctions if the person refuses. There are
dangers in the latter schemes, such as labour market displacement, exploitation,
demoralisation, and the erosion of the principle of a ‘fair day’s wage for a fair day’s
work’. They can also ignore the underlying lack of employment opportunities in the
economy.
The Nevin Economic Research Institute (2013: 33) has pointed to the fact that there
is currently 1 vacancy for every 32.3 jobseekers. Combining the rate of
underemployment – those involuntarily working part-time and seeking full-time
work – with the rate of unemployment shows that some 396,500 people, or 18.3%
of the labour force, are seeking more work. Without a restoration of domestic
demand and investment, it is simply not conceivable that employment will grow in
the non-traded sector. Policy discussions on ‘labour market activation’ often do not
take this reality into account, and political rhetoric can verge on the demonization
of the unemployed.   
With regard to increasing demand and investment in the economy to increase
employment, our proposal for an investment programme would have an impact in
reducing unemployment.
c) Reduce Poverty 
There is a real danger that Irish society will permit those on the lowest incomes, and
in particular those dependent on social welfare, to fall behind once again, as it did
in the late 1990s. From 2006, Ireland’s poverty levels had been slowly falling, driven
by increases in social welfare payments delivered in the Budgets of 2005-2007. These
increases compensated only partly for the extent to which social welfare rates had
fallen behind other incomes in society over the preceding two decades. However,
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these advances have been reversed since 2009 with the at risk-of-poverty-rate rising
from a low of 14.1% in 2009 to 16% in 2011, consistent poverty has risen from a low
of 4.2% in 2008 to 6.9% in 2011 while the deprivation rate has risen from a low of
11.8% in 2007 to 24.5% in 2011 (CSO, 2013c:1). In 2011, the single largest
demographic group at-risk-of-poverty was children; nearly one in five was at risk of
poverty (CSO, 2013). 
It would be a great mistake for Ireland, and Irish policy makers, to repeat the
experience of the late 1990s. At that time, economic growth benefited only those
who were employed while others, such as those dependent on pensions and other
social welfare payments slipped further and further behind. We believe that policy
in the future should provide equity in social welfare rates across genders, adequate
payments for children, and higher payments for those with disabilities. 
iv) Reforming Governance
It has been widely recognised that Ireland’s governance was poor in certain areas
prior to the economic crisis, particularly in relation to financial regulation.
Moreover, the economic crisis has led to government making rash and hasty
decisions without consultation, whether in relation to financial or budgetary policy,
which have been recognised as damaging or – in the case of the bank guarantee –
catastrophic. Reforming governance and widening participation are a necessity;
below are three immediate priorities required to achieve this.
a) Reform Policy Evaluation 
Policy evaluation has been extremely poor in some cases throughout the crisis. Social
Justice Ireland welcomes the steps taken by Government to increase their research
and evaluative capacity. However, we believe that Government should also take steps
to increase the transparency of budgetary and other important decisions, which are
often opaque. Government should publish their analysis of the distributional
impact of budgetary measures, and engage in public debate in light of that analysis.
The government previously published Poverty Impact Assessment Guidelines
provided by the Office of Social Inclusion (2008) in the budgetary documentation
using the ESRI’s SWITCH tax-benefit model which captures the distributional
impact of changes in most taxes and benefits, but this practice was discontinued
from Budget 2010. Government should begin this practice again and also adopt a
gender inequality analysis and apply it to each budgetary measure. This should be
a statutory responsibility for Government.  
b) A Rights-based approach
Social Justice Ireland believes strongly in the importance of developing a rights-based
approach to social, economic and cultural issues. The need to develop these rights
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is becoming ever more urgent for Ireland in the context of achieving recovery. Such
an approach would go a long way towards addressing the growing inequality Ireland
has been experiencing. Social, economic and cultural rights should be
acknowledged and recognised, just as civil and political rights have been. We believe
seven basic rights that are of fundamental concern to people who are socially
excluded and/or living in poverty should be acknowledged and recognised. These
are the rights to sufficient income to live life with dignity: meaningful work;
appropriate accommodation; relevant education; essential healthcare; cultural
respect; and real participation in society. To be vindicated, these rights will require
greater public expenditure and provision of services.
c) Democratic Deliberation
Decisions taken by government must be openly debated both inside and outside the
Oireachtas. Since 2008, austerity measures have been implemented in a haphazard
manner, with little public debate and often a lack of explanation and justification
for the measures by Government. Instead of reasoned debate with citizen and civil
society participation, decisions have been taken at an elite level. For example,
Government has provided a high-level forum called the IFSC Clearing House Group
for the financial industry, and 23 changes in the Finance Act 2012 were made to
accommodate this group (McGee, 2012). We have already examined the lack of
democratic accountability and legitimacy in many of the actions taken during the
crisis. 
Social Justice Ireland believes that a new social model for Ireland must be founded on
the idea of deliberative democracy, in which decisions about what kind of society
and economy Ireland needs are founded upon reasoned and enlightened debate,
and in which decisions taken by government are justified and accessible to the
general public.11 A deliberative decision making process is one where all stakeholders
are involved, but the power differentials are removed (Healy and Reynolds, 2011).
In such a process stakeholders are involved in the framing, implementing and
evaluating of policies and measures that impact on them. Each citizen should have
a role and voice in how our society is governed. This should not be confined to five-
yearly general elections, particularly when election debates do not provide
substantive discussions on our country’s future.  The proposed Public Participation
Networks to be introduced in Local Authorities as part of the reform of local
government will provide an opportunity for real engagement between local people
and the local authorities across the country (for further information on this cf.
chapter 10).
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11 See Gutmann & Thompson (2004) and Healy and Reynolds (2011) for more on the
concept of deliberative democracy.
v) Creating a Sustainable Future
Sustainable development is development which meets the needs of the present
while not compromising the needs of the future. In this regard financial,
environmental, economic and social sustainability are all key objectives. In light of
this, new indicators must be compiled measuring both well-being and sustainability
in society, and used as an objective beside the traditional measures of GDP and GNP. 
a) Combat climate change and protect the environment
Climate change remains the largest long-term challenge facing Ireland today. The
challenge of reducing Ireland’s fossil fuel emissions should not be postponed in the
face of the current recession. We believe that Ireland should adopt ambitious
statutory targets regarding the limitation of fossil fuel emissions, and introduce
taxation measures necessary to compensate for the full costs of resource extraction
and pollution. While the publication of the General Scheme of a Climate Action and
Low Carbon Development Bill 2013 was welcome, it only committed to already
existing EU2020 and Kyoto Protocol targets. Additionally, there are not adequate
sectoral targets or quantitative measures against which individual stakeholders can
measure their progress.  
The economic crisis has, for obvious reasons, focused attention on economic growth
and financial stability. This should not come at the expense of the physical
environment, as the failure to tackle climate change now will have significant
impacts into the future, including on food production, regional and global
ecosystems, and on flood-prone countries. 
b) Balanced Regional Development 
A sustained recovery requires balanced regional development. The boom years saw
an attempt to redress growing regional imbalances in socio-economic development
through National Spatial Strategy (2002-2020), though it failed to do so, partly
because of Government’s own initiatives such as the decentralisation programme
for public servants (Meredith and van Egeraat, 2013). 
During the recession, particular regions of Ireland have suffered more than others.
The unemployment rate in Dublin is the lowest in the country at 12% while the
South-East remains the hardest hit with an unemployment rate of 18.3% (CSO,
2013: 22). Rural areas have been severely impacted by cuts in services. The authors
believe that policy must ensure balanced regional development through the
provision of public services – including cultural, economic and social services - and
through capital spending projects, and the adoption of a new National Spatial
Strategy, which could be formulated through a deliberative national debate.
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c) New Indicators
Creating a sustainable Ireland requires the adoption of new indicators to measure
progress. GDP alone as a measure of progress is unsatisfactory, as it only describes
the monetary value of gross output, income and expenditure in an economy. The
Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social
Progress, led by Nobel prize winning economists Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz
and established by President Sarkozy, argued that new indicators measuring
environmental, financial sustainability, well-being, and happiness are required. 
The National Economic and Social Council (2009) has published the Well-Being
Matters report, which suggested that measures of well-being could be constructed
that capture data on six domains of people’s lives that contribute to well-being
including: economic resources; work and participation; relationships and care;
community and environment; health; and democracy and values. We believe that
a new social model should deploy such indicators alongside national accounting
measures. The OECD Global Project on Measuring the Progress of Society has
recommended a use of such indicators to inform evidence-based policies (Marrone,
2009: 23). They would serve as an alternate benchmark for success.
2.4 Conclusion
So, having set out our understanding of the economic crisis and the context within
which it developed, reflected on the responses to the crisis and its human and
economic cost, set out a policy framework for a new Ireland and provided some
details of the policy initiatives required under each of its five pillars we now move
on to look in much greater detail at key aspects of these five pillars. 
We provide a fuller analysis of both the first pillar, macroeconomic stability, and
the second pillar, a just taxation system, in chapter 4 where we also set out a more
detailed set of policy proposals.    
We address the third pillar, social protection, in chapters 3 – on income
distribution; 4 – taxation; 5 - work, unemployment and job creation; 6 - public
services; 7 - housing and accommodation; 8 – healthcare; and 9 - education and
educational disadvantage).  On each of these we provide an analysis and critique of
the present situation, set out a vision for a fairer future and make a detailed set of
policy proposals aimed at moving in that direction.
The fourth pillar, governance is addressed in chapter 10, where we again provide
analysis and critique together with concrete policy proposals. 
The fifth pillar, sustainability, is addressed in chapters 11 – sustainability; 12 - rural
development; and 13 - the global south following the same approach.
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3. 
I NCOME  D ISTR IBUT ION
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE: INCOME DISTRIBUTION
To provide all with sufficient income to live life with dignity. This would require enough
income to provide a minimum floor of social and economic resources in such a way
as to ensure that no person in Ireland falls below the threshold of social provision
necessary to enable him or her to participate in activities that are considered the
norm for society generally.
The persistence of high rates of poverty and income inequality in Ireland requires
greater attention than they currently receive. Tackling these problems effectively is
a multifaceted task. It requires action on many fronts, ranging from healthcare and
education to accommodation and employment. However, the most important
requirement in tackling poverty is the provision of sufficient income to enable
people to live life with dignity. No anti-poverty strategy can possibly be successful
without an effective approach to addressing low incomes.
This chapter addresses the issue of income in four parts. The first (section 3.1)
examines the extent and nature of poverty in Ireland today while the second
(section 3.2) profiles our income distribution. The final two sections address
potential remedies to these problems by outlining the issues and arguments
surrounding achieving and maintaining an adequate social welfare income (section
3.3) and the introduction of a basic income (section 3.4). All address issues related
to the achievement of one pillar of Social Justice Ireland’s Core Policy Framework (see
Chapter 2), ‘Enhancing Social Protection’.
3.1 poverty
While there is still considerable poverty in Ireland, there has been much progress on
this issue over recent years. Driven by increases in social welfare payments, particularly
payments to the unemployed, the elderly and people with disabilities, the rate of
poverty significantly declined between 2001 and 2009. However, the most recent data,
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analysed in this section, indicates that poverty has once again begun to increase. It
climbed from a record low level in 2009 to a higher level in 2010 and 2011, driven by
recent budgetary policy which reversed earlier social welfare increases.12
Data on Ireland’s income and poverty levels are now provided by the annual SILC
survey (Survey on Income and Living Conditions). This survey replaced the European
Household Panel Survey and the Living in Ireland Survey which had run throughout
the 1990s. Since 2003 the SILC / EU-SILC survey has collected detailed information
on income and living conditions from up to 120 households in Ireland each week;
giving a total sample of between 4,000 and 6,000 households each year.
Social Justice Ireland welcomes this survey and in particular the accessibility of the
data produced.13 Because this survey is conducted simultaneously across all of the
EU states, the results are an important contribution to the ongoing discussion on
relative income and poverty levels across the EU. It also provides the basis for
informed analysis of the relative position of the citizens of member states. In
particular, this analysis is informed by a set of agreed indicators of social exclusion
which the EU Heads of Government adopted at Laeken in 2001. These indicators
(known as the updated-Laeken indicators) are calculated from the survey results and
cover four dimensions of social exclusion: financial poverty, employment, health
and education. They form the basis of the EU Open Method of Co-ordination for
social protection and social inclusion and the Europe 2020 poverty and social
exclusion targets.14
What is poverty?
The National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) published by government in 1997
adopted the following definition of poverty:
People are living in poverty if their income and resources (material, cultural and social)
are so inadequate as to preclude them from having a standard of living that is regarded
as acceptable by Irish society generally. As a result of inadequate income and resources
people may be excluded and marginalised from participating in activities that are
considered the norm for other people in society.
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12 Irish household income data has been collected since 1973 and all surveys up to the
period 2008-2010 recorded poverty levels above 15 per cent.
13 However, we note the delay in publishing the 2012 results, the second such delay in
recent years. At a time when income and living standards data are central to much
public policy analysis and formation, it is crucial that the SILC data, from the 2013
survey onwards, returns to being published in a timely way.
14 For more information on these indicators see Nolan (2006:171-190).
This definition was reiterated in the 2007 National Action Plan for Social Inclusion
2007-2016 (NAPinclusion).
Where is the poverty line?
How many people are poor? On what basis are they classified as poor? These and
related questions are constantly asked when poverty is discussed or analysed.
In trying to measure the extent of poverty, the most common approach has been to
identify a poverty line (or lines) based on people’s disposable income (earned
income after taxes and including all benefits). The European Commission and the
UN, among others, use a poverty line located at 60 per cent of median income. The
median disposable income is the income of the middle person in society’s income
distribution. This poverty line is the one adopted in the SILC survey. While the 60
per cent median income line has been adopted as the primary poverty line,
alternatives set at 50 per cent and 70 per cent of median income are also used to
clarify and lend robustness to assessments of poverty.
The most up-to-date data available on poverty in Ireland comes from the 2011 SILC
survey, conducted by the CSO.15 In that year the CSO gathered data from a
statistically representative sample of more than 4,300 households containing 11,005
individuals. The data gathered by the CSO is very detailed. It incorporates income
from work, welfare, pensions, rental income, dividends, capital gains and other
regular transfers. This data was subsequently verified anonymously using PPS
numbers.
According to the CSO, the median disposable income per adult in Ireland during
2011 was €18,148 per annum or €348.05 per week. Consequently, the income
poverty lines for a single adult derived from this are:
50 per cent line €174.03 a week  
60 per cent line €208.84 a week  
70 per cent line €243.65 a week  
Updating the 60 per cent median income poverty line to 2014 levels, using published
CSO data on the growth in average earnings in 2012 (+0.5 per cent) and ESRI
projections for 2013 (+1.0 per cent) and 2014 (+1.4 per cent) produces a relative
income poverty line of €214.95 for a single person. In 2014, any adult below this
3. Income Distribution 51
15 The CSO has delayed the release of the 2012 data (originally scheduled for late 2013).
This is due to be published before the end of April 2014 and once available will form
the basis of a Social Justice Ireland Policy Briefing on this topic.
weekly income level will be counted as being at risk of poverty (CSO, 2013:6; Duffy,
FitzGerald, Timoney and Byrne, 2013:iii).
Table 3.1 shows what income corresponds to the poverty line for a number of
household types. The figure of €214.95 is an income per adult equivalent figure. It
is the minimum weekly disposable income (after taxes and including all benefits)
that one adult needs to be above the poverty line. For each additional adult in the
household this minimum income figure is increased by €141.87 (66 per cent of the
poverty line figure) and for each child in the household the minimum income figure
is increased by €70.93 (33 per cent of the poverty line).16 These adjustments reflect
the fact that as households increase in size they require more income to meet the
basic standard of living implied by the poverty line. In all cases a household below
the corresponding weekly disposable income figure is classified as living at risk of
poverty. For clarity, corresponding annual figures are also included. 
Table 3.1:  The Minimum Weekly Disposable Income Required to Avoid Poverty in
2014, by Household Types
Household containing: Weekly poverty line Annual poverty line
1 adult €214.95 €11,208  
1 adult + 1 child €285.89 €14,907  
1 adult + 2 children €356.82 €18,606  
1 adult + 3 children €427.76 €22,304 
2 adults €356.82 €18,606 
2 adults + 1 child €427.76 €22,304 
2 adults + 2 children €498.69 €26,003 
2 adults + 3 children €569.62 €29,702 
3 adults €498.69 €26,003  
One immediate implication of this analysis is that most weekly social assistance rates
paid to single people are almost €27 below the poverty line.
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16 For example the poverty line for a household with 2 adults and 1 child would be
calculated as €214.95 + €141.87 + €70.93 = €427.76.
How many have incomes below the poverty line?
Table 3.2 outlines the findings of various poverty studies since detailed poverty studies
commenced in 1994. Using the EU poverty line set at 60 per cent of median income,
the findings reveal that 16 out of every 100 people in Ireland were living in poverty in
2011. The table shows that the rates of poverty decreased significantly after 2001,
reaching a record low in 2009. These decreases in poverty levels were welcome. They
were directly related to the increases in social welfare payments delivered over the
Budgets spanning these years.17 However poverty increased again in 2010 and 2011 as
the effect of budgetary changes to welfare and taxes, as well as wage reductions and
unemployment, drove more low income households into poverty.
Table 3.2: Percentage of population below various relative income poverty lines,
1994-2011
1994 1998 2001 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011
50% line 6.0 9.9 12.9 10.8 8.6 6.9 7.6 8.5
60% line 15.6 19.8 21.9 18.5 16.5 14.1 14.7 16.0
70% line 26.7 26.9 29.3 28.2 26.8 24.5 24.7 24.1
Source: CSO (2013:12) and Whelan et al (2003:12), using national equivalence scale.
Note: All poverty lines calculated as a percentage of median income.
Because it is sometimes easy to overlook the scale of Ireland’s poverty problem, it is
useful to translate the poverty percentages into numbers of people. Using the
percentages for the 60 per cent median income poverty line and population statistics
from CSO population estimates, we can calculate the numbers of people in Ireland
who have been in poverty for a number of years between 1994 and 2011. These
calculations are presented in table 3.3. The results give a better picture of just how
significant this problem really is in Ireland today.
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17 See table 3.8 below for further analysis of this point.
Table 3.3: The numbers of people below relative income poverty lines in Ireland,
1994-2011
% of persons population Numbers 
in poverty of Ireland in poverty
1994 15.6 3,585,900 559,400
1998 19.8 3,703,100 733,214
2001 21.9 3,847,200 842,537
2003 19.7 3,978,900 783,843
2004 19.4 4,045,200 784,769
2005 18.5 4,133,800 764,753
2006 17.0 4,232,900 719,593
2007 16.5 4,375,800 722,007
2008 14.4 4,485,100 645,854
2009 14.1 4,533,400 639,209
2010 14.7 4,554,800 669,556
2011 16.0 4,574,900 731,984
Source: Calculated using CSO on-line database population estimates, Whelan et al
(2003:12) and CSO SILC results for various years.
Note: Population estimates are for April of each year.
The table’s figures are telling. Compared to 10 years ago, 2004, there are over 50,000
less people in poverty; even accounting for the recent increases. Notably, over the
period from 2004-2008, the period corresponding with consistent Budget increases
in social welfare payments, almost 140,000 people left poverty. Despite this, since the
onset of the recession and its associated implications for incomes (earnings and
welfare), the number in poverty has increased once again, rising by 90,000 since 2009.
Furthermore, the fact that there are more than 730,000 people in Ireland living life
on a level of income that is this low remains a major concern. As shown above (see
table 3.1) these levels of income are low and those below them clearly face
difficulties in achieving what the NAPS described as “a standard of living that is
regarded as acceptable by Irish society generally”.
Annex 3 provides a more detailed profile of those groups in Ireland than are living
in poverty.
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The incidence of poverty
Figures detailing the incidence of poverty reveal the proportion of all those in
poverty that belong to particular groups in Irish society. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 report
all those below the 60 per cent of median income poverty line, classifying them by
their principal economic status. The first table examines the population as a whole,
including children, while the second table focuses exclusively on adults (using the
ILO definition of an adult as a person aged 16 years and above).
Table 3.4 shows that in 2011, the largest group of the population who are poor,
accounting for 25.8 per cent of the total, were children. The second largest group
were those working in the home (17.5 per cent). Of all those who are poor, 30.8 per
cent were in the labour force and the remainder (64.4 per cent) were outside the
labour market.18
Table 3.4: Incidence of persons below 60% of median income by principal economic
status, 2003-2011
2003 2005 2006 2007* 2010 2011
At work 16.0 15.7 16.1 16.8 13.5 14.2
Unemployed 7.6 7.5 8.3 9.2 15.1 16.6
Students/school 8.6 13.4 15.0 14.1 12.3 14.7
On home duties 22.5 19.7 18.4 18.7 17.3 17.5
Retired 9.0 7.5 5.8 7.1 4.4 4.3
Ill/disabled 9.1 7.9 8.0 7.4 5.4 4.8
Children (under 16 years) 25.4 26.8 26.6 25.9 29.2 25.8
Other 1.9 1.6 1.8 0.8 2.8 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Collins (2006:141), CSO SILC Reports (2007:19; 2009:48; 2013:15).
Note: * Data for 2007 not excluding SSIA effect as not published by CSO.
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18 This does not include the ill and people with a disability, some of whom will be active
in the labour force. The SILC data does not distinguish between those temporally
unable to work due to illness and those permanently outside the labour market due
to illness or disability.
Table 3.5 looks at adults only and provides a more informed assessment of the nature
of poverty. This is an important perspective as children depend on adults for their
upbringing and support. Irrespective of how policy interventions are structured, it
is through adults that any attempts to reduce the number of children in poverty
must be directed. The table shows that in 2011 almost one-fifth of Ireland’s adults
with an income below the poverty line were employed. Overall, 41.5 per cent of
adults at risk of poverty in Ireland were associated with the labour market.
The incidence of being at risk of poverty amongst those in employment is
particularly alarming. Many people in this group do not benefit from Budget
changes in welfare or tax. They would be the main beneficiaries of any move to make
tax credits refundable, a topic addressed in Chapter 4.
Table 3.5: Incidence of adults (16yrs+) below 60% of median income by principal
economic status, 2003-2010
2003 2005 2006 2007* 2010 2011
At work 21.4 21.4 21.9 22.7 19.1 19.1
Unemployed 10.2 10.2 11.3 12.4 21.3 22.4
Students/school 11.5 18.3 20.4 19.0 17.4 19.8
On home duties 30.1 26.9 25.1 25.2 24.4 23.6
Retired 12.0 10.2 7.9 9.6 6.2 5.8
Ill/disability 12.2 10.8 10.9 10.0 7.6 6.5
Other 2.5 2.2 2.5 1.1 4.0 2.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Calculated from Collins (2006:141), CSO SILC Reports (2007:19; 2009:48;
2013:15).
Note: * Data for 2007 not excluding SSIA effect as not published by CSO.
Finally, table 3.6 examines the composition of poverty by household type. Given
that households are taken to be the ‘income receiving units’ (income flows into
households who then collectively live off that income) there is a value in assessing
poverty by household type. Social Justice Ireland welcomes the fact that the CSO has,
at our suggestion, begun to publish the SILC poverty data broken down by
household category, even though this data has yet to be released for the 2010 and
2011 SILC. From a policy making perspective this information is crucial as anti-
poverty policy is generally focused on households (households with children,
pensioner households, single person households etc.). The 2009 data shows that
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22.8 per cent of households which were at risk of poverty were headed by somebody
who was employed. Almost 44 per cent of households at risk of poverty were found
to be headed by a person outside the labour force.19
Table 3.6: Households below 60% of median income classified by principal
economic status of head of household, 2004-2009
2004 2006 2007* 2008* 2009
At work 29.8 29.5 31.3 39.6 22.8
Unemployed 12.0 14.7 12.3 11.5 26.0
Students/school 2.8 4.6 5.1 4.1 5.4
On home duties 28.0 30.7 28.7 25.7 26.7
Retired 13.5 8.5 10.9 7.9 6.6
Ill/disabled 12.0 11.5 11.2 10.1 10.9
Other 1.9 0.7 0.4 1.1 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSO SILC Reports (2007:39; 2008:36; 2009:49; 2010:49)
Note: * Data for 2007 and 2008 not excluding SSIA effect as not published by CSO.
The Scale of poverty - Numbers of people
As the three tables in the last section deal only in percentages it is useful to transform
these proportions into numbers of people. Table 3.3 revealed that 731,984 people
were living below the 60 per cent of median income poverty line in 2011. Using this
figure, table 3.7 presents the number of people in poverty in that year within various
categories. Comparable figures are also presented for 2005, 2009 and 2010.
The data in table 3.7 is particularly useful in the context of framing anti-poverty
policy. Groups such as the retired and the ill/disabled, although carrying a high risk
of poverty, involve much smaller numbers of people than groups such as adults who
are employed (the working poor), people on home duties and children/students.
The primary drivers of the 2005-09 poverty reductions were increasing incomes
among those who are on home duties, those who are classified as ill/disabled, the
retired and children. Between 2005 and 2009 the numbers of workers in poverty
declined while the numbers of unemployed people in poverty notably increased.
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19 Those on home duties, students and school attendees, retired plus a proportion of the
ill and disabled.
This reflected the rise in unemployment in the labour market as a whole during
those years. As the table shows, the increase in poverty between 2009 and 2011 can
be principally explained by the increase in poverty among people with jobs, people
who are unemployed and children.
Table 3.7: Poverty Levels Expressed in Numbers of People, 2005-2011
2005 2009 2010 2011
overall 764,753 639,209 669,556 731,984
Adults
On home duties 150,656 115,058 115,833 128,097
Unemployed 57,356 82,458 101,103 121,509
Students/school 102,477 93,325 82,355 107,602
At work 120,066 91,407 90,390 103,942
Ill/disabled 60,415 40,909 36,156 35,135
Retired 57,356 30,043 29,460 31,475
Other 12,236 9,588 18,748 15,372
Children
Children (under 16 yrs) 204,954 176,422 195,510 188,852
Children (under 18 yrs) n/a 223,084 226,979 232,039
Source: Calculated using CSO SILC Reports (2013:15; 2006:13) and data from table 3.3.
poverty and social welfare recipients
Social Justice Ireland believes in the very important role that social welfare plays in
addressing poverty. As part of the SILC results the CSO has provided an interesting
insight into the role that social welfare payments play in tackling Ireland’s poverty
levels. It has calculated the levels of poverty before and after the payment of social
welfare benefits. 
Table 3.8 shows that without the social welfare system almost 51 per cent of the Irish
population would have been living in poverty in 2011. Such an underlying poverty
rate suggests a deeply unequal distribution of direct income – an issue we address
further in the income distribution section of this chapter. In 2011, the actual poverty
figure of 16 per cent reflects the fact that social welfare payments reduced poverty
by almost 35 percentage points.
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Looking at the impact of these payments on poverty over time, it is clear that the
increases in social welfare over the period 2005-2007 yielded noticeable reductions
in poverty levels. The small increases in social welfare payments in 2001 are reflected
in the smaller effects achieved in that year. Conversely, the larger increases, and
therefore higher levels of social welfare payments, in subsequent years delivered
greater reductions. This has occurred even as poverty levels before social welfare
increased. A recent report by Watson and Maitre (2013) examined these effects in
greater detail and noted the effectiveness of social welfare payments, with child
benefit and the growth in the value of social welfare payments, playing a key role in
reducing poverty levels up until 2009.
Table 3.8: The role of social welfare (SW) payments in addressing poverty
2001 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011
Poverty pre SW 35.6 40.1 41.0 46.2 50.2 50.7
Poverty post SW 21.9 18.5 16.5 14.1 14.7 16.0
The role of SW -13.7 -21.6 -24.5 -32.1 -35.5 -34.7
Source: CSO SILC Reports (2006:7; 2013:12) using national equivalence scale.
As social welfare payments do not flow to everybody in the population, it is interesting
to examine the impact they have on alleviating poverty among certain groups, such
as older people, for example. Using data from SILC 2009, the CSO found that without
any social welfare payments 88 per cent of all those aged over 65 years would have
been living in poverty. Benefit entitlements reduce the poverty level among this group
to 9.6 per cent in 2009. Similarly, social welfare payments (including child benefit)
reduce poverty among those under 18 years of age from 47.3 per cent to 18.6 per cent
– a 60 per cent reduction in poverty risk (CSO, 2010:47).20 These findings, combined
with the social welfare impact data in table 3.8, underscore the importance of social
transfer payments in addressing poverty; a point that needs to be borne in mind as
Government continues to address Ireland’s ongoing crisis.
Analysis in Annex 3 (see table A3.1 and the subsequent analysis) shows that many
of the groups in Irish society which experienced increases in poverty levels over the
last decade have been dependent on social welfare payments. These include
pensioners, the unemployed, lone parents and those who are ill or have a disability.
Table 3.9 presents the results of an analysis of five key welfare recipient groups
performed by the ESRI using poverty data for five of the years between 1994 and
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20 This data has not been updated in the SILC publication for 2011 or the CSO revision
of SILC for 2010.
2001. These are the years that the Irish economy grew fastest and the core years of
the famed ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom. Between 1994 and 2001 all categories experienced
large growth in their poverty risk. For example, in 1994 only five out of every 100
old age pension recipients were in poverty. In 2001 this had increased ten-fold to
almost 50 out of every 100. The experience of widow’s pension recipients is similar.
Table 3.9: Percentage of persons in receipt of welfare benefits/assistance who
were below the 60 per cent median income poverty line,
1994/1997/1998/2000/2001
1994 1997 1998 2000 2001
Old age pension 5.3 19.2 30.7 42.9 49.0
Unemployment 
benefit/assistance 23.9 30.6 44.8 40.5 43.1
Illness/disability 10.4 25.4 38.5 48.4 49.4
Lone Parents 
allowance 25.8 38.4 36.9 42.7 39.7
Widow’s pension 5.5 38.0 49.4 42.4 42.1
Source: Whelan et al (2003: 31)
Table 3.9 highlights the importance of adequate social welfare payments to prevent
people becoming at risk of poverty. Over the period covered by these studies, groups
similar to Social Justice Ireland repeatedly pointed out that these payments had failed
to rise in proportion to earnings elsewhere in society. The primary consequence of
this was that recipients slipped further and further back and as a consequence more
and more fell into poverty. It is clear that adequate levels of social welfare need to
be maintained to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated. We outline
our proposals for this later in this chapter.
The poverty gap
As part of the 2001 Laeken indicators, the EU asked all member countries to begin
measuring their relative “at risk of poverty gap”. This indicator assesses how far
below the poverty line the income of the median (middle) person in poverty is. The
size of that difference is calculated as a percentage of the poverty line and therefore
represents the gap between the income of the middle person in poverty and the
poverty line. The higher the percentage figure, the greater the poverty gap and the
further people are falling beneath the poverty line. As there is a considerable
difference between being 2 per cent and 20 per cent below the poverty line this
approach is significant
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Table 3.10: The Poverty Gap, 2003-2011
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 2009 2011
Poverty gap size 21.5 19.8 20.6 17.5 17.4 16.2 19.6
Source: CSO SILC reports (2008:16; 2013:12)
Note: * Data for 2007 not excluding SSIA effect as not published by CSO.
The SILC results for 2011 show that the poverty gap was 19.6 per cent, compared to
17.7 per cent in 2010 (not in table) and 16.2 per cent in 2009. Over time, the gap had
decreased from a figure of 21.5 per cent in 2003. The 2011 poverty gap figure implies
that 50 per cent of those in poverty had an equivalised income below 80.4 per cent
of the poverty line. Watson and Maitre (2013:39) compared the size of the market
income poverty gap over the years 2004, 2007 and 2011. Adjusting for changes in
prices, they found that in 2011 terms the gap was €261 for households below the
poverty line, an increase from a figure of €214 in 2004. They also found that after
social transfers, those remaining below the poverty line were further from that
threshold in 2011 than in 2004. 
As the depth of poverty is an important issue, we will monitor closely the movement
of this indicator in future editions of the SILC. It is crucial that, as part of Ireland’s
approach to addressing poverty, this figure declines in the future. It is of concern
that recent figures once again record increases. 
poverty and deprivation
Income alone does not tell the whole story concerning living standards and
command over resources. As we have seen in the NAPS definition of poverty, it is
necessary to look more broadly at exclusion from society because of a lack of
resources. This requires looking at other areas where ‘as a result of inadequate
income and resources people may be excluded and marginalised from participating
in activities that are considered the norm for other people in society’ (NAPS, 1997).
Although income is the principal indicator used to assess wellbeing and ability to
participate in society, there are other measures. In particular, these measures assess
the standards of living people achieve by assessing deprivation through use of
different indicators. To date, assessments of deprivation in Ireland have been limited
and confined to a small number of items. While this is regrettable, the information
gathered is worth considering.
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Table 3.11: Levels of deprivation for eleven items among the population and those
in poverty, 2011 (%)
Total Those in
pop poverty*
Without heating at some stage in the past year 12.2 21.7
Unable to afford a morning, afternoon or evening 
out in the last fortnight 21.1 35.8
Unable to afford two pairs of strong shoes 3.1 5.2
Unable to afford a roast once a week 6.7 9.3
Unable to afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish 
every second day 2.8 5.8
Unable to afford new (not second-hand) clothes 7.3 16.3
Unable to afford a warm waterproof coat 2.2 4.6
Unable to afford to keep the home adequately warm 6.8 11.9
Unable to replace any worn out furniture 21.7 34.3
Unable to afford to have family or friends for a 
drink or meal once a month 14.8 26.5
Unable to afford to buy presents for family or 
friends at least once a year 5.8 13.3
Source: CSO (2013:14)
Note: * Poverty as measured using the 60 per cent median income poverty line.
Deprivation in the SILC survey
Since 2007 the CSO has presented 11 measures of deprivation in the SILC survey,
compared to just eight before that. While this increase is welcome, Social Justice
Ireland and others have expressed serious reservations about the overall range of
measures employed. We believe that a whole new approach to measuring
deprivation should be developed. Continuing to collect information on a limited
number of static indicators is problematic in itself and does not present a true picture
of the dynamic nature of Irish society.
The details presented in table 3.11, therefore, should be seen in the context of the
above reservation. The table shows that in 2011 the rates of deprivation recorded
across the set of 11 items varied between 2 and 21 per cent of the Irish population.
Overall 59.8 per cent of the population were not deprived of any item, while 15.7
per cent were deprived of one item, 9.2 per cent were without two items and 15.4
per cent were without three or more items. It is of interest that from 2007 onwards,
as the economic crisis unfolded, the proportion of the population which
experienced no deprivation has fallen steadily from 75.6 per cent in 2007 to 63.9
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per cent in 2010 and 59.8 per cent in 2011. Simultaneously, the proportion of the
population experiencing deprivation of two or more items has more than doubled,
increasing from 11.8 per cent in 2007 to 24.5 per cent in 2011 (CSO, 2013:13).
Deprivation and poverty combined: consistent poverty
‘Consistent poverty’ combines deprivation and poverty into a single indicator. It
does this by calculating the proportion of the population simultaneously
experiencing poverty and registering as deprived of two or more of the items in table
3.11. As such, it captures a sub-group of the poor.
The 2007 SILC data marked an important change for this indicator. Coupled with
the expanded list of deprivation items, the definition of consistent poverty was
changed. From 2007 onwards, to be counted as experiencing consistent poverty
individuals must be both below the poverty line and experiencing deprivation of at
least two items. Up to 2007 the criteria was below the poverty line and deprivation
of at least one item. The National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 2007-2016
(NAPinclusion) published in early 2007 set its overall poverty goal using this earlier
consistent poverty measure. One of its aims was to reduce the number of people
experiencing consistent poverty to between 2 per cent and 4 per cent of the total
population by 2012, with a further aim of totally eliminating consistent poverty by
2016. A revision to this target was published as part of the Government’s National
Reform Programme 2012 Update for Ireland (2012). The revised poverty target is to
reduce the numbers experiencing consistent poverty to 4 per cent by 2016 and to 2
per cent or less by 2020. Social Justice Ireland participated in the consultation process
on the revision of this and other poverty targets. While we agree with the revised
2020 consistent poverty target (it is not possible to measure below this 2 per cent
level using survey data) we have proposed that this target should be accompanied
by other targets focused on the overall population and vulnerable groups.21 These
are outlined at the end of this chapter.
Using these new indicators and definition, the 2011 SILC data indicates that 6.9 per
cent of the population experience consistent poverty, an increase from 4.2 per cent
in 2008 and 5.5 per cent in 2009 (CSO, 2013:12). In terms of the population, the
2011 figures indicate that just over 315,000 people live in consistent poverty. Over
time, the reality of the current recession and its austerity measures are pushing
Ireland further away from these targets.
Annex 3 also examines the experience of people who are in food poverty, fuel
poverty alongside an assessment of the research on minimum incomes standards
in Ireland.
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Moving to persistent poverty
Social Justice Ireland is committed to using the best and most up-to-date data in its
ongoing socio-economic analysis of Ireland. We believe that to do so is crucial to
the emergence of accurate evidence-based policy formation. It also assists in
establishing appropriate and justifiable targeting of state resources.
Among the EU Laeken indicators mentioned earlier is an indicator of persistent
poverty. This indicator measures the proportion of those living below the 60 per cent
of median income poverty line in the current year and for two of the three preceding
years. Persistent poverty, therefore, identifies those who have experienced sustained
exposure to poverty which is seen to harm their quality of life seriously and to increase
their levels of deprivation. To date the Irish SILC survey has not produced any detailed
results and breakdowns for this measure. We regret the unavailability of this data and
note that there remain some sampling and technical issues impeding its annual
publication. Social Justice Ireland believes that this data should be used as the primary
basis for setting poverty targets and monitoring changes in poverty status. Existing
measures of relative and consistent poverty should be maintained as secondary
indicators. As the persistent poverty indicator will identify the long-term poor, we
believe that the CSO should produce comprehensive breakdowns of those in
persistent poverty, similar to the approach it currently takes with relative income
poverty. Presently, if there are impediments to the annual production of this indicator,
they should be addressed and the SILC sample augmented if required. A measure of
persistent poverty is long overdue and a crucial missing piece in societies knowledge
of households and individuals on low income. 
poverty: a European perspective
It is helpful to compare Irish measures of poverty with those elsewhere in Europe.
Eurostat, the European Statistics Agency, produces comparable ‘at risk of poverty’
figures (proportions of the population living below the poverty line) for each EU
member state. The data is calculated using the 60 per cent of median income poverty
line in each country. Comparable EU-wide definitions of income and equivalence
scale are used.22 The latest data available is for the year 2012 for all member states
except Ireland. 
As table 3.12 shows, Irish people experience a below average risk of poverty when
compared to all other EU member states. Eurostat’s 2008 figures marked the first
time Ireland’s poverty levels fell below average EU levels. This phenomenon was
driven, as outlined earlier in this review, by sustained increases in welfare payments
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22 Differences in definitions of income and equivalence scales result in slight differences
in the poverty rates reported for Ireland when compared to those reported earlier
which have been calculated by the CSO using national definitions of income and the
Irish equivalence scale.
in the years prior to 2008. Ireland’s poverty levels remained below average EU levels
since then to 2011, although over that time poverty rates increased. In 2012, across
the EU, the highest poverty levels were found in the recent accession countries of
Bulgaria and Romania and the two countries caught up in the EU-wide economic
crash - Spain and Greece. The lowest levels were in Denmark, the Netherlands and
the Czech Republic. 
Table 3.12: The risk of poverty in the European Union in 2012
Country poverty Risk Country poverty Risk
Greece 23.1 Luxembourg 15.1
Romania 22.6 Belgium 14.8
Spain 22.2 Cyprus 14.7
Bulgaria 21.2 Austria 14.4
Croatia 20.5 Sweden 14.1
Italy 19.4 France 14.1
Latvia 19.2 Hungary 14.0
Lithuania 18.6 Slovenia 13.5
Portugal 17.9 Slovakia 13.2
Estonia 17.5 Finland 13.2
Poland 17.1 Denmark 13.1
UK 16.2 Netherlands 10.1
Germany 16.1 Czech Rep 9.6
IRElAND 15.2 Eu-27 average 16.9
Malta 15.1 Eu-28 average 16.9
Source: Eurostat online database
Note: Table uses the most up-to-date comparable data available for countries and
corresponds to the year 2012 for all countries except Ireland where the value is for 2011.
The average risk of poverty in the EU-28 for 2012 was 16.9 per cent. Chart 3.1 further
develops the findings of table 3.12 and shows the difference between national
poverty risk levels and the EU-28 average. 
While there have been some reductions in poverty in recent years across the EU, the
data does suggest that poverty remains a large and ongoing EU-wide problem. In
2012 the average EU-28 level implied that 84.9 million people are in poverty across
the EU. 
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Chart 3.1: Percentage difference in National Poverty risk from EU-28 average
Source: Eurostat online database
Note: Chart uses the most up-to-date comparable data available for countries and
corresponds to the year 2012 for all countries except Ireland where the value is for 2011.
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Europe 2020 Strategy – Risk of poverty or Social Exclusion
As part of the Europe 2020 Strategy, European governments have begun to adopt
policies to target these poverty levels and are using as their main benchmark the
proportion of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This indicator
has been defined by the European Council on the basis of three indicators: the
aforementioned ‘at risk of poverty’ rate after social transfers; an index of material
deprivation;23 and the percentage of people living in households with very low work
intensity.24 It is calculated as the sum of persons relative to the national population
who are at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in households
with very low work intensity, where a person is only counted once even if recorded
in more than one indicator. 25
Table 3.13: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 
Ireland and the EU 2007-2012
2007 2009 2011 2012
Ireland % Population 23.1 25.7 29.4 n/a
Ireland 000s people 1,005 1,150 1,319 n/a
EU % Population* 24.4 23.2 24.3 24.8
EU 000s people* 119,360 114,328 121,543 124,229
Source: Eurostat online database
Notes: 2012 data for Ireland has yet to be submitted by the CSO to Eurostat.
EU data for 2007 and 2009 is for the EU-27, 2011 and 2012 data are for the EU-28
(including Croatia)
Table 3.13 summarises the latest data on this indicator for Europe and chart 3.2
summarises the latest Irish data (which is for 2011). While Social Justice Ireland regrets
that the Europe 2020 process shifted its indicator focus away from an exclusive
concentration on the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate, we welcome the added attention at a
European level to issues regarding poverty, deprivation and joblessness. Together with
Caritas Europa, we have initiated a process to monitor progress on this strategy over
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23 Material deprivation covers indicators relating to economic strain and durables.
Severely materially deprived persons have living conditions severely constrained by a
lack of resources. They experience at least 4 out of 9 listed deprivations items.
(Eurostat, 2012)
24 People living in households with very low work intensity are those aged 0-59 living
in households where the adults (aged 18-59) work less than 20% of their total work
potential during the past year (Eurostat, 2012)  
25 See European Commission (2011) for a more detailed explanation of this indicator.
the years to come (Mallon and Healy, 2012 and Leahy et al, 2012). However, it is clear
already that the austerity measures which are being pursued in many EU countries
will result in the erosion of social services and lead to the further exclusion of people
who already find themselves on the margins of society. This is in direct contradiction
to the inclusive growth focus of the Europe 2020 Strategy. It is reflected in the figures
in table 3.13 which show an increase in risk levels in 2011 and 2012.
Chart 3.2: Population at risk of poverty or social exclusion, Ireland 2011
Source: Compiled from Eurostat online database
Note: 2012 data for Ireland has yet to be submitted by the CSO to Eurostat.
3.2 Income Distribution
As previously outlined, despite some improvements poverty remains a significant
problem. The purpose of economic development should be to improve the living
standards of all of the population. A further loss of social cohesion will mean that
large numbers of people continue to experience deprivation and the gap between
them and the better-off will widen. This has implications for all of society, not just
those who are poor, a reality that has begun to receive welcome attention recently. 
Analysis of the annual income and expenditure accounts yields information on trends
in the distribution of national income. However, the limitations of this accounting
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system need to be acknowledged. Measures of income are far from perfect gauges of a
society. They ignore many relevant non-market features, such as volunteerism, caring
and environmental protection. Many environmental factors, such as the depletion
of natural resources, are registered as income but not seen as a cost. Pollution is not
registered as a cost but cleaning up after pollution is seen as income. Increased
spending on prisons and security, which are a response to crime, are seen as increasing
national income but not registered as reducing human well-being. 
The point is that national accounts do not include items that cannot easily be
assigned a monetary value. But progress cannot be measured by economic growth
alone. Many other factors are required, as we highlight elsewhere in this review.26
However, when judging economic performance and making judgements about how
well Ireland is really doing, it is important to look at the distribution of national
income as well as its absolute amount.27
Ireland’s income distribution: latest data
The most recent data on Ireland’s income distribution, from the 2011 SILC survey,
is summarised in chart 3.3. It examines the income distribution by household
deciles, starting with the 10 per cent of households with the lowest income (the
bottom decile) up to the 10 per cent of households with the highest income (the top
decile). The data presented is for disposable income. This is the amount of money
households have in their pocket to spend after they have received any
employment/pension income, paid all their income taxes and received any welfare
entitlements.
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26 We return to critique National Income statistics in chapter 11. There, we also propose
some alternatives. 
27 We examine the issue of the world’s income and wealth distribution in chapter 13.
Chart 3.3: Ireland’s Income Distribution by 10% (decile) group, 2011
Source: Collins (2013)
In 2011, the top 10 per cent of Irish households received 24.85 per cent of the total
disposable income while the bottom decile received 2.05 per cent. Collectively, the
poorest 50 per cent of households received a very similar share (25.04 per cent) to
the top 10 per cent. Overall the share of the top 10 per cent is more than 12 times
the share of the bottom 10 per cent. Table 3.14 outlines the cash values of these
income shares in 2011. It shows that the top 10 per cent of households receive an
average weekly disposable income (after all taxes and having received all benefits)
of just under €2,000 while the bottom decile receives €165 per week. In 2011, the
average household disposable income was €801 a week / €41,798 per annum (CSO,
2012: 10). While the nominal value of these shares has declined in recent years, the
spread of income reflected in the table has become more unequal according to the
CSOs 2011 SILC report. An examination of income distribution over the period 1987-
2011 is provided in annex 3.
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Table 3.14: Amounts of disposable income, by decile in 2011
Decile Weekly disposable income Annual disposable income
bottom €164.70 €8,588  
2nd €292.15 €15,234 
3rd €412.27 €21,497 
4th €512.24 €26,710 
5th €626.51 €32,668 
6th €735.99 €38,377 
7th €889.89 €46,401 
8th €1,067.94 €55,685 
9th €1,322.30 €68,949 
Top €1,992.14 €103,876  
Source: Calculated from Collins (2013:4).  
Note: Annual figures are rounded to the nearest Euro to ease interpretation.
Direct income distribution
It is noteworthy that Ireland’s disposable income distribution (after redistribution
through taxes and transfers) has been largely static despite improvements in welfare
payments which reduced poverty, as highlighted in table 3.8. The implication of
this is that simultaneous with improvements in welfare payments and redistributive
taxes, the underlying distribution of direct or market income has become more
unequal. Collins and Kavanagh (2006: 155, 162) highlighted the ‘marked increase
in the level of direct income inequality’ over the period from 1973 to 2004.
Table 3.15 suggests that the level of direct income inequality has continued to widen.
Over the period from 1987 to 2011 the direct income shares of all deciles except the
top two have declined. Compared to the situation in 1987, the gap between the
bottom and top deciles has dramatically widened.  By 2011 the share of the top 10
per cent was more than four and a half times that of the bottom 50 per cent. While
the role of the redistribution system is to intervene and address this inequality via
taxation and welfare payments, the fact that the underlying income inequality
continues to worsen suggests that the challenges faced by the redistribution system
have become much greater over time. 
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Table 3.15: The distribution of household direct income, 1987-2011 (%)
Decile 1987 2004 2011
bottom 0.38 0.19 0.33
2nd 1.00 0.48 0.46
3rd 1.40 1.05 1.13
4th 3.30 2.64 2.33
5th 6.10 5.70 3.83
6th 8.70 8.65 6.66
7th 11.60 11.49 10.23
8th 15.09 14.96 15.00
9th 20.08 19.54 21.84
Top 32.46 35.31 38.17
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
bottom 20% 1.38 0.67 0.79
bottom 50% 12.08 10.06 8.05
Top 10:bot 10 85 times 185 times 116 times
Source: Collins and Kavanagh (2006:155) and Collins (2013:2)
Note: Data for 1987 is from the Household Budget Survey, 2004 and 2011 data from SILC.
Income distribution: a European perspective
Another of the indicators adopted by the EU at Laeken assesses the income
distribution of member states by comparing the ratio of equivalised disposable
income received by the bottom quintile (20 per cent) to that of the top quintile. This
indicator reveals how far away from each other the shares of these two groups are –
the higher the ratio, the greater the income difference. Table 3.16 presents the most
up-to-date results of this indicator for the 28 EU states. The data indicate that the
Irish figure increased to 4.6 from a ratio of 4.2 in 2009, reflecting the already noted
increase in income inequality in 2011. Ireland now has a ratio just below the EU
average and, given recent economic and budgetary policy, this looks likely to persist
and may even worsen. Overall, the greatest differences in the shares of those at the
top and bottom of income distribution are found in many of the newer and poorer
member states. However, some EU-15 members, including the Spain, Greece,
Portugal, Italy and the UK also record large differences.
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Table 3.16: Ratio of Disposable Income received by bottom quintile to that of the
top quintile in the EU-28
Country Ratio Country Ratio
Spain 7.2 France 4.5
Greece 6.6 Germany 4.3
Latvia 6.5 Austria 4.2
Romania 6.3 Luxembourg 4.1
Bulgaria 6.1 Hungary 4.0
Portugal 5.8 Belgium 3.9
Italy 5.5 Malta 3.9
Estonia 5.4 Slovakia 3.7
Croatia 5.4 Finland 3.7
United Kingdom 5.4 Sweden 3.7
Lithuania 5.3 Netherlands 3.6
Poland 4.9 Czech Republic 3.5
Cyprus 4.7 Slovenia 3.4
IRElAND 4.6 Eu-27 average 5.1
Denmark 4.5 Eu-28 average 5.1
Source: Eurostat online database
Note: Chart uses the most up-to-date comparable data available for countries and
corresponds to the year 2012 for all countries except Ireland where the value is for 2011.
A further measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient, which ranges from
0 to 100 and summarises the degree of inequality across the entire income
distribution (rather than just at the top and bottom).28 The higher the Gini
coefficient score the greater the degree of income inequality in a society. As table
3.17 shows, over time income inequality has been reasonably static in the EU as a
whole, although within the EU there are notable differences. Countries such as
Ireland cluster around or just above the average EU score and differ from other high-
income EU member states which record lower levels of inequality. As the table
shows, the degree of inequality is at a notably lower scale in countries like Finland,
Sweden and the Netherlands. For Ireland, the key point is that despite the
aforementioned role of the social transfer system, the underlying degree of direct
income inequality dictates that our income distribution remains much more
unequal than in many of the EU countries we wish to emulate in term of economic
and social development.
3. Income Distribution 73
28 See Collins and Kavanagh (2006: 159-160) who provide a more detailed explanation
of this measure.
Table 3.17: Gini coefficient measure of income inequality for selected EU states,
2005-2011
2005 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012
EU-27/28 30.6 30.6 30.9 30.5 30.8 30.6
IRElAND 31.9 31.3 29.9 28.8 29.8 n/a
UK 34.6 32.6 33.9 32.4 33.0 32.8
France 27.7 26.6 29.8 29.9 30.8 30.5
Germany 26.1 30.4 30.2 29.1 29.0 28.3
Sweden 23.4 23.4 24.0 24.8 24.4 24.8
Finland 26.0 26.2 26.3 25.9 25.8 25.9
Netherlands 26.9 27.6 27.6 27.2 25.8 25.4
Source: Eurostat online database
Notes: The Gini coefficient ranges from 0-100 with a higher score indicating a higher level
of inequality.
The table uses the most up-to-date comparable data available for countries and
corresponds to the year 2012 for all countries except Ireland, where the value is for
2011. 
EU data for 2005-2009 is for the EU-27, 2011 and 2012 data are for the EU-28
(including Croatia)
3.3 Maintaining an Adequate level of Social Welfare
From 2005 onwards, there was major progress on benchmarking social welfare
payments. Budget 2007 benchmarked the minimum social welfare rate at 30 per
cent of Gross Average Industrial Earnings (GAIE). This was a key achievement and
one that we correctly predicted would lead to reductions in poverty rates,
complementing those already achieved and detailed earlier. Annex 3 outlines how
this significant development occurred.
Setting a benchmark: 2011 onwards
In late 2007 the CSO discontinued its Industrial Earnings and Hours Worked dataset
and replaced it with a more comprehensive set of income statistics for a broader set
of Irish employment sectors. The end of that dataset also saw the demise of the GAIE
figure from Irish official statistics. It has been replaced with a series of measures,
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including a new indicator measuring average earnings across all the employment
sectors now covered. While the improvement to data sources is welcome, the end
of the GAIE figure poses problems for continuing to calculate the social welfare
benchmark. To this end, Social Justice Ireland commissioned a report in late 2010 to
establish an appropriate way of continuing to calculate this benchmark. 
A report entitled ‘Establishing a Benchmark for Ireland’s Social Welfare Payments’
(Collins, 2011) is available on Social Justice Ireland’s website. It established that 30
per cent of GAIE is equivalent to 27.5 per cent of the new average earnings data being
collected by the CSO. A figure of 27.5 per cent of average earnings is therefore the
appropriate benchmark for minimum social welfare payments and reflects a
continuation of the previous benchmark using the new CSO earnings dataset.
Table 3.18 applies this benchmark using CSO data for the third quarter of 2013
(published February 2014). The data is updated using ESRI projections for wage
growth in 2014 (1.4 per cent); an update for 2015 won’t be available until later in
2014 when the ESRI publish wage growth projections for 2015. Between 2012 and
2013 average earnings declined, from €691.93 to €677.13, driven by public sector pay
reductions (Haddington Road Agreement). 
In 2014 27.5 per cent of average weekly earnings equals €188.82, marginally more
than the current minimum social welfare rate of €188. The figure is likely to increase
further for 2015 implying that the appropriate budgetary policy in Budget 2015
(October 2014) would be to increase minimum social welfare rates to ensure
equivalence with 27.5 per cent of average weekly earnings. This would address some
of the losses in buying power over recent years and maintain the benchmark. We
will develop this proposal further in our pre-Budget submission in mid-2014.
Table 3.18: Benchmarking Social Welfare Payments for 2014 (€)  Year 
Average Weekly 27.5% of Average 
Earnings Weekly Earnings 
2012* 691.93 190.28  
2013* 677.13 186.21  
2014** 686.61 188.82  
Notes: * actual data from CSO average earnings Q3 of each year
** simulated value based on CSO data and ESRI QEC wage growth projections
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Individualising social welfare payments
The issue of individualising payments so that all recipients receive their own social
welfare payments has been on the policy agenda in Ireland and across the EU for
several years. Social Justice Ireland welcomed the report of the Working Group,
Examining the Treatment of Married, Cohabiting and One-Parent Families under the Tax
and Social Welfare Codes, which addressed some of these individualisation issues. 
At present the welfare system provides a basic payment for a claimant, whether that
be, for example, for a pension, a disability payment or a job-seeker’s payment. It then
adds an additional payment of about two-thirds of the basic payment for the second
person. For example, following Budget 2014, a couple on the lowest social welfare
rate receives a payment of €312.80 per week. This amount is approximately 1.66
times the payment for a single person (€188). Were these two people living
separately they would receive €188 each; giving a total of €376. Thus by living as a
household unit such a couple receive a lower income than they would were they to
live apart.
Social Justice Ireland believes that this system is unfair and inequitable. We also
believe that the system as currently structured is not compatible with the Equal
Status Acts. People, more often than not, women, are disadvantaged by living as part
of a household unit because they receive a lower income. We believe that where a
couple is in receipt of welfare payments, the payment to the second person should
be increased to equal that of the first. Such a change would remove the current
inequity and bring the current social welfare system in line with the terms of the
Equal Status Acts (2000-2004). An effective way of doing this would be to introduce
a basic income system which is far more appropriate for the world of the 21st
century.
3.4 basic Income
Over the past 12 years major progress has been achieved in building the case for the
introduction of a basic income in Ireland. This includes the publication of a Green
Paper on Basic Income by the Government in September 2002 and the publication of
a book by Clark entitled The Basic Income Guarantee (2002). A major international
conference on basic income was held in Dublin during Summer 2008 at which more
than 70 papers from 30 countries were presented. These are available on Social Justice
Ireland’s website. More recently, Healy et al (2012) have provided an initial set of
costing for a basic income and new European and Irish Basic Income networks have
emerged.29
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19 These networks are the European Citizens’ Initiative for Unconditional Basic Income
and Basic Income Ireland.
The case for a basic income
Social Justice Ireland has consistently argued that the present tax and social welfare
systems should be integrated and reformed to make them more appropriate to the
changing world of the 21st century. To this end we have sought the introduction of
a basic income system. This proposal is especially relevant at the present moment
of economic upheaval. 
A basic income is an income that is unconditionally granted to every person on an
individual basis, without any means test or work requirement. In a basic income
system every person receives a weekly tax-free payment from the Exchequer while
all other personal income is taxed, usually at a single rate. The basic-income
payment would replace income from social welfare for a person who is unemployed
and replace tax credits for a person who is employed.
• Basic income is a form of minimum income guarantee that avoids many of the
negative side-effects inherent in social welfare payments. A basic income differs
from other forms of income support in that:
• It is paid to individuals rather than households;
• It is paid irrespective of any income from other sources;
• It is paid without conditions; it does not require the performance of any work
or the willingness to accept a job if offered one; and
• It is always tax free.
There is real danger that the plight of large numbers of people excluded from the
benefits of the modern economy will be ignored. Images of rising tides lifting all
boats are often offered as government’s policy makers and commentators assure
society that prosperity for all is just around the corner. Likewise, the claim is often
made that a job is the best poverty fighter and consequently priority must be given
to securing a paid job for everyone. These images and claims are no substitute for
concrete policies to ensure that all members of society are included. Twenty-first
century society needs a radical approach to ensure the inclusion of all people in the
benefits of present economic growth and development. Basic income is such an
approach.
As we are proposing it, a basic income system would replace social welfare and
income tax credits. It would guarantee an income above the poverty line for
everyone. It would not be means tested. There would be no ‘signing on’ and no
restrictions or conditions. In practice, a basic income recognises the right of every
person to a share of the resources of society.
The Basic Income system ensures that looking for a paid job and earning an income,
or increasing one’s income while in employment, is always worth pursuing, because
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for every euro earned the person will retain a large part. It thus removes poverty traps
and unemployment traps in the present system. Furthermore, women and men
would receive equal payments in a basic income system. Consequently the basic
income system promotes gender equality because it treats every person equally.
It is a system that is altogether more guaranteed, rewarding, simple and transparent
than the present tax and welfare systems. It is far more employment friendly than
the present system. It also respects other forms of work besides paid employment.
This is crucial in a world where these benefits need to be recognised and respected.
It is also very important in a world where paid employment cannot be permanently
guaranteed for everyone seeking it. There is growing pressure and need in Irish
society to ensure recognition and monetary reward for such work. Basic income is a
transparent, efficient and affordable mechanism for ensuring such recognition and
reward.
Basic income also lifts people out of poverty and the dependency mode of survival.
In doing this, it also restores self-esteem and broadens horizons. Poor people,
however, are not the only ones who should welcome a basic income system.
Employers, for example, should welcome it because its introduction would mean
they would not be in competition with the social welfare system. Since employees
would not lose their basic income when taking a job, there would always be an
incentive to take up employment.
Costing a basic income
During 2012 Healy et al presented an estimate for the cost of a basic income for
Ireland. Using administrative data from the Census, social protection system and
taxation system, the paper estimated a cost where payments were aligned to the
existing social welfare payments (children = €32.30 per week; adults of working age
= €188.00 per week; older people aged 66-80 = €230.30 per week; and older people
aged 80+ = €240.30 per week). The paper estimated a total cost of €39.2 billion per
annum for a basic income and outlined a requirement to collect a total of €41 billion
in revenue to fund this. It is proposed that the revenue should be raised via a flat 45
per cent personal income tax and the continuance of the existing employers PRSI
system (renamed a ‘social solidarity fund’). It is important to remember that nobody
would have an effective tax rate of 45 per cent in this system as they would always
receive their full basic income and it would always be tax-free. Healy et al also
outlined further directions for research in this area in the future and are likely to
contribute future inputs into the evolving Irish and European basic income
networks.
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Ten reasons to introduce basic income
• It is work and employment friendly.
• It eliminates poverty traps and unemployment traps.
• It promotes equity and ensures that everyone receives at least the poverty
threshold level of income.
• It spreads the burden of taxation more equitably.
• It treats men and women equally.
• It is simple and transparent.
• It is efficient in labour-market terms.
• It rewards types of work in the social economy that the market economy often
ignores, e.g. home duties, caring, etc.
• It facilitates further education and training in the labour force.
• It faces up to the changes in the global economy.
 Key policy priorities on income distribution
• If poverty rates are to fall in the years ahead, Social Justice Ireland believes that
the following are required: 
– benchmarking of social welfare payments. 
– equity of social welfare rates.
– adequate payments for children. 
– refundable tax credits.
– a universal state pension.
– a cost of disability payment.
Social Justice Ireland believes that in the period ahead Government and policy-makers
generally should:
• Acknowledge that Ireland has an on-going poverty problem.
• Adopt targets aimed at reducing poverty among particular vulnerable groups such
as children, lone parents, jobless households and those in social rented housing.
• Examine and support viable, alternative policy options aimed at giving priority
to protecting vulnerable sectors of society. 
• Carry out in-depth social impact assessments prior to implementing proposed
policy initiatives that impact on the income and public services that many low
income households depend on. This should include the poverty-proofing of all
public policy initiatives.
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• Provide substantial new measures to address long-term unemployment. This
should include programmes aimed at re-training and re-skilling those at highest
risk. 
• Recognise the problem of the ‘working poor’.  Make tax credits refundable to
address the situation of households in poverty which are headed by a person
with a job. 
• Introduce a cost of disability allowance to address poverty and social exclusion
of people with a disability.
• Recognise the reality of poverty among migrants and adopt policies to assist this
group. In addressing this issue also reform and increase the ‘direct provision’
allowances paid to asylum seekers.
• Accept that persistent poverty should be used as the primary indicator of poverty
measurement and assist the CSO in allocating sufficient resources to collect this
data.
• Move towards introducing a basic income system. No other approach has the
capacity to ensure all members of society have sufficient income to live life with
dignity. 
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4. 
TAXAT ION
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE: TAXATION
To collect sufficient taxes to ensure full participation in society for all, through a fair
tax system in which those who have more, pay more, while those who have less, pay
less.
The fiscal adjustments of recent years highlight the centrality of taxation in budget
deliberations and to policy development at both macro and micro level. Taxation
plays a key role in shaping Irish society through funding public services, supporting
economic activity and redistributing resources to enhance the fairness of society.
Consequently, it is crucial that clarity exist with regard to both the objectives and
instruments aimed at achieving these goals. To ensure the creation of a fairer and
more equitable tax system, policy development in this area should adhere to our
core policy objective outlined above. In that regard, Social Justice Ireland is committed
to increasing the level of detailed analysis and debate addressing this area.30
This chapter first considers Ireland’s present taxation position and outlines the
anticipated future taxation needs of the country. Given this, we outline approaches
to reforming and broadening the tax base and proposals for building a fairer tax
system. The issues addressed in this chapter include a number of the elements of
Social Justice Ireland’s Core Policy Framework (see Chapter 2) including: ‘Ensure
Macroeconomic Stability’, ‘Move Towards Just Taxation’ and ‘Enhance Social
Protection’.
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30 We present our analysis in this chapter and in the accompanying annex 4.
Table 4.1: The changing nature of Ireland’s tax revenue (€m)   
2007 2008 2009 2011 2012
Taxes on income and wealth
Income tax 13563 13148 11801 14009 15201
Corporation tax 6393 5071 3889 3751 4216
Motor tax - households* 526 583 582 556 580
Other taxes 5 6 201 184 189
Fees - Petroleum & Minerals 5 10 2 4 4
Various Levies on income 411 414 373 317 300
Social Insurance 9053 9259 8924 7532 6786
Total taxes on income and
wealth 29957 28491 25771 26353 27276
Taxes on capital
Capital gains tax 3097 1424 545 416 414
Capital acquisitions tax 391 343 256 244 283
Pension Fund Levy 0 0 0 463 475
Total taxes on capital 3488 1767 801 1123 1172
Taxes on expenditure
Custom duties 30 21 11 18 35
Excise duties including VRT 5993 5547 4909 4904 4809
Value added tax 14057 12842 10175 9588 10029
Rates 1267 1353 1471 1499 1435
Motor tax- businesses** 431 477 476 455 475
Stamps (excluding fee stamps) 3244 1763 1003 936 954
Other fees and levies 194 242 231 282 296
Total taxes on expenditure 25216 22246 18275 17682 18032
Eu Taxes 519 484 359 416 417
Total Taxation*** 59180 52988 45207 45574 46897
Total Taxation as % gDp# 31.2 29.4 27.9 28.0 28.6
Source: CSO on-line database tables N1222:T22 and N1202: T02.
Notes: *Motor tax is an estimate of the portion paid by households.
**Motor tax is an estimate of the portion paid by business.
*** Total taxation is the sum of the rows in bold.
# Total taxation expressed as a % of published CSO GDP at current prices values.
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Ireland’s total tax-take: current and future needs
The need for a wider tax base is a lesson painfully learnt by Ireland during the past
number of years. A disastrous combination of a naïve housing policy, a failed
regulatory system and foolish fiscal policy and economic planning caused a collapse
in exchequer revenues. It is only through a determined effort to reform Ireland’s
taxation system that these mistakes can be addressed and avoided in the future. The
narrowness of the Irish tax base resulted in almost 25 per cent of tax revenues
disappearing, plunging the exchequer and the country into a series of fiscal policy
crises. As shown in table 4.1, tax revenues collapsed from over €59 billion in 2007
to €45 billion in 2009; it has since increased to almost €47 billion in 2011. 
While a proportion of this decline in overall taxation revenue is related to the
recession, a large part is structural and requires policy reform. As detailed in chapter
2, Social Justice Ireland believes that over the next few years policy should focus on
increasing Ireland’s tax-take to 34.9 per cent of GDP, a figure defined by Eurostat as
‘low-tax’ (Eurostat, 2008:5). Such increases are certainly feasible and are unlikely to
have any significant negative impact on the economy in the long term. As a policy
objective, Ireland should remain a low-tax economy, but not one incapable of
adequately supporting the economic, social and infrastructural requirements
necessary to support our society and complete our convergence with the rest of Europe.
Table 4.2: Projected current tax revenues, 2013-2016   
2013 2014 2015 2016 
€m €m €m €m 
Customs 250 255    
Excise Duties* 4,720 4,815    
Capital Gains Tax 390 400    
Capital Acquis. Tax 405 380
Stamp Duties 1,310 1,475
Income Tax ** 15,730 17,045
Corporation Tax 4,355 4,380
Value Added Tax 10,365 10,740
Property / Local Tax 300 550
Total# 37,825 40,040 42,285 43,985
Source: Department of Finance, Budget 2014: C15, C18.
Notes: * Excise duties include carbon tax and motor tax revenues.
**Including USC.
#These figures do not incorporate other tax sources including revenues to the
social insurance fund and local government charges. These are incorporated
into the totals reported in table 4.3 below.
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Looking to the years immediately ahead, Budget 2014 provided some insight into
the expected future shape of Ireland’s current taxation revenues and this is shown
in table 4.2. The Budget provided a detailed breakdown of current taxes for 2013 and
2014 and overall projections for 2015-2016. Over the next three years, assuming
these policies are followed, overall current revenue will climb to almost €44 billion. 
The Governments April 2013 Stability Programme Update also set out projections for
the overall scale of the national tax-take (as a proportion of GDP).The document
initially looked out to 2016 and then modelled a ‘medium-term budgetary objective’
out to 2019. These figures are reproduced in table 4.3 and have been used to calculate
the cash value of the overall levels of tax revenue expected to be collected. While
the estimates in the table are based on the tax-take figures from the Stability
Programme Update and the national income projections in it, the documents
provided limited details on the nature and composition of these figures. 
It should be borne in mind that over recent years the Department’s projections for
the overall taxation burden have continually undershot the end-of-year outcomes.
However, even taking the Department’s projections as the likely outcome, Chart 4.1
highlights just how far below average EU levels (assuming these remain at a near
record low of 35.7 per cent of GDP) and the Social Justice Ireland target (34.9 per cent
of GDP) these taxation revenue figures are. Table 4.3’s Tax Gap, the difference
between the 34.9% benchmark and Government’s planned level of taxation, stands
at €5.5 billion in 2014 and averages at €6.7 billion per annum over the next six years. 
Table 4.3: Ireland’s projected total tax take and the tax gap, 2012-2019  
year Tax as % gDp Total Tax Receipts The Tax gap 
2012 30.3% 49,569 7 ,525  
2013 31.0% 52,049 6,548  
2014 31.7% 55,245 5,577
2015 31.9% 57,914 5,446
2016 31.5% 59,574 6,430
2017 31.3% 61,442 7,067
2018 31.2% 63,882 7,576
2019 30.9% 66,304 8,583
Source: Calculated from Department of Finance SPU (2013: 49, 50, 53).
Notes: * Total tax take = current taxes (see table 4.1 and 4.2) + Social Insurance Fund
income + charges by local government.
**The Tax Gap is calculated as the difference between the projected tax take and
that which would be collected if total tax receipts were equal to 34.9% of GDP.
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Chart 4.1: Ireland’s Projected Taxation Levels to 2015 and comparisons with EU-27
averages and Social Justice Ireland target
Source: Calculated from Eurostat (2013: 172) and Department of Finance SPU (2013: 49,
50, 53).
Note: The EU-27 average was 35.7% of GDP in 2011 and this value is used for all years.
Future taxation needs
Government decisions to raise or reduce overall taxation revenue needs to be linked
to the demands on its resources. These demands depend on what Government is
required to address or decides to pursue. The effects of the current economic crisis,
and the way it has been handled, carry significant implications for our future
taxation needs. The rapid increase in our national debt, driven by the need to
borrow both to replace disappearing taxation revenues and to fund emergency
‘investments’ in the failing commercial banks, has increased the on-going annual
costs associated with servicing the national debt.
National debt has increased from a level of 25 per cent of GDP in 2007 - low by
international standards - to 124 per cent of GDP in 2013, a figure which the
Department of Finance expects will represent it peak (2013: C19). Despite favourable
lending rates and payback terms, there remains a recurring cost to service this large
national debt – costs which have to be financed by current taxation revenues.
Furthermore, the erosion of the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) through
using it to fund various bank rescues (over €20 billion) has transferred the liability
for future public sector pensions onto future exchequer expenditure. Although there
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may be some return from a number of the rescued banks, it will be small relative to
the funds committed and therefore will require additional taxation resources.
These new future taxation needs are in addition to those that already exist for
funding local government, repairing and modernising our water infrastructure,
paying for the health and pension needs of an ageing population, paying EU
contributions and funding any pollution reducing environmental initiatives that
are required by European and International agreements. Collectively, they mean
that Ireland’s overall level of taxation will have to rise significantly in the years to
come – a reality Irish society and the political system need to begin to seriously
address.
As an organisation that has highlighted the obvious implications of these long-
terms trends for some time, Social Justice Ireland welcomes the development over the
past year where the Government published a section of the April 2013 SPU focused
on the ‘long-term sustainability of public finances’.
Research by Bennett et al (2003), the OECD (2008) and the ESRI (2010) have all
provided some insight into future exchequer demands associated with healthcare
and pensions in Ireland in the decades to come. The Department of Finance drew
on the recent European Commission publication entitled ‘The 2012 Ageing Report:
Economic and budgetary projections for the EU27 Member States (2010-2060)’. Table 4.4
summarises some of its baseline projections for Ireland. Over that period the report
anticipates an increase in the elderly population (65 years +) from 11.5 per cent of
the population in 2010 to 21.9 per cent in 2060. Over the same period, the
proportion of those of working age will decline as a percentage of the population
and the old-age dependency ratio will increase from approximately six people of
working age for every elderly person today to three for every elderly person in 2060
(EU Commission, 2012: 399-401; Department of Finance, 2013:42).
While these increases imply a range of necessary policy initiatives in the decades to
come, there is an inevitability that an overall higher level of taxation will have to be
collected.
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Table 4.4: Projected Age Related Expenditure, as % GDP 2010-2060
Expenditure areas 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Total pensions 9.3 11.5 11.4 12.5 14.3 15.0
of which:
Social security pensions 7.5 9.0 9.0 10.0 11.4 11.7
Old-age /early pensions 5.6 7.0 7.0 7.9 9.4 9.7
Other pensions 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0
Public Service pensions 1.8 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.9 3.3
Health care 7.3 7.2 7.7 8.1 8.2 8.3
long-term care 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.6
Education 6.3 7.1 6.5 6.0 6.5 6.4
other age-related (JA etc) 2.6 3.1 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.3
Total age-related spending 26.6 30.2 29.1 30.0 32.7 33.6
Source: Department of Finance (2013:43) and European Commission (2012:400)
Is a higher tax-take problematic?
Suggesting that any country’s tax take should increase normally produces negative
responses. People think first of their incomes and increases in income tax, rather
than more broadly of reforms to the tax base. Furthermore, proposals that taxation
should increase are often rejected with suggestions that they would undermine
economic growth. However, a review of the performance of a number of economies
over recent years sheds a different light on this issue. For example, in the years prior
to the current international economic crisis, Britain achieved low unemployment
and higher levels of growth compared to other EU countries (OECD, 2004). These
were achieved simultaneously with increases in its tax/GDP ratio. In 1994 this stood
at 33.7 per cent and by 2004 it had increased 2.3 percentage points to 36.0 per cent
of GDP (it stands at 36.1 per cent in the latest figure, see Annex 4). Furthermore, in
his March 2004 Budget the then British Chancellor Gordon Brown indicated that
this ratio would reach 38.3 per cent of GDP in 2008-09 (2004:262); it subsequently
reached 37.6 per cent in 2008 before the economic crisis took hold. His
announcement of these increases was not met with predictions of economic ruin
or doom for Britain and its economic growth remained high compared to other EU
countries (IMF, 2004 & 2008).
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Taxation and competitiveness
Another argument made against increases in Ireland’s overall taxation levels is that
it will undermine competitiveness. However, the suggestion that higher levels of
taxation would damage our position relative to other countries is not supported by
international studies of competitiveness. Annually the World Economic Forum
publishes a Global Competitiveness Report ranking the most competitive economies
across the world.31
Table 4.5 outlines the top fifteen economies in this index for 2013-14 as well as the
ranking for Ireland (which comes 28th). It also presents the difference between the
size of the tax-take in these, the most competitive, economies in the world, and
Ireland, for 2012.32
Only two of the top fifteen countries, for which there is data available, report a lower
taxation level than Ireland: Switzerland and the US. All the other leading
competitive economies collect a greater proportion of national income in taxation.
Over time Ireland’s position on this index has varied, most recently rising from 31st
to 28th, although in previous years Ireland had been in 22nd position. When Ireland
has slipped back the reasons stated for Ireland’s loss of competitiveness included
decreases in economic growth and fiscal stability, poor performances by public
institutions and a decline in the technological competitiveness of the economy
(WEF, 2003: xv; 2008:193; 2011: 25-26; 210-211). Interestingly, a major factor in that
decline is related to underinvestment in state funded areas: education; research;
infrastructure; and broadband connectivity. Each of these areas is dependent on
taxation revenue and they have been highlighted by the report as necessary areas
of investment to achieve enhanced competitiveness.33 As such, lower taxes do not
feature as a significant priority; rather it is increased and targeted efficient
government spending.
A similar point was expressed by the Nobel Prize winning economist Professor
Joseph Stiglitz while visiting Ireland in June 2004. Commenting on Ireland’s long-
term development prospects, he stated that “all the evidence is that the low tax, low
service strategy for attracting investment is short-sighted” and that “far more
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31 Competitiveness is measured across 12 pillars including: institutions, infrastructure,
macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and
training, goods markets efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial market
development, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication and
innovation. See WEF (2013: 541-545) for further details on how these are measured.
32 This analysis updates that first produced by Collins (2004: 15-18).
33 A similar conclusion was reached in another international competitiveness study by
the International Institute for Management Development (2007).
important in terms of attracting good businesses is the quality of education,
infrastructure and services.” Professor Stiglitz, who chaired President Clinton’s
Council of Economic Advisors, added that “low tax was not the critical factor in the
Republic’s economic development and it is now becoming an impediment”.34
Table 4.5: Differences in taxation levels between the world’s 15 most competitive
economies and Ireland.
Competitiveness Country Taxation level
Rank versus Ireland
1 Switzerland -0.1
2 Singapore not available
3 Finland +15.8
4 Germany +9.3
5 United States -4.0
6 Sweden +16.0
7 Hong Kong SAR not available
8 Netherlands +10.3
9 Japan +0.3
10 United Kingdom +6.9
11 Norway +13.9
12 Taiwan, China not available
13 Qatar not available
14 Canada +2.4
15 Denmark +19.7
28 IRElAND -
Source: World Economic Forum (2013:16)
Notes: a) Taxation data from OECD (2013) for the year 2012 except for the Netherlands
and Japan where the taxation data is for 2011. 
b) For some countries comparable data is not available.
c) The OECD’s estimate for Ireland in 2010 = 28.283 per cent of GDP
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34 In an interview with John McManus, Irish Times, June 2nd 2004.
Reforming and broadening the tax base
Social Justice Ireland believes that there is merit in developing a tax package which
places less emphasis on taxing people and organisations on what they earn by their
own useful work and enterprise, or on the value they add or on what they contribute
to the common good. Rather, the tax that people and organisations should be
required to pay should be based more on the value they subtract by their use of
common resources. Whatever changes are made should also be guided by the need
to build a fairer taxation system, one which adheres to our already stated core policy
objective.
There are a number of approaches available to Government in reforming the tax
base. Recent Budgets have made some progress in addressing some of these issues
while the 2009 Commission on Taxation Report highlighted many areas that
require further reform. A short review of the areas we consider a priority are
presented below across the following subsections:
Tax Expenditures / Tax Reliefs
Minimum Effective Tax Rates for Higher Earners
Corporation Taxes
Site Value Tax
Second Homes
Taxing Windfall Gains
Financial Transactions Tax
Carbon Taxes
Tax Expenditures / Tax Reliefs
A significant outcome from the Commission on Taxation is contained in part eight
of its Report which details all the tax breaks (or “tax expenditures” as they are
referred to officially). Subsequently, two members of the Commission produced a
detailed report for the Trinity College Policy Institute which offered further insight
into this issue (Collins and Walsh, 2010). Since then, the annual reporting of the
costs of tax expenditures has improved considerably with much more details than
in the past being published in the annual Revenue Commissioners Statistical Report.
The most recent tax expenditure data was published in 2012 by the Revenue
Commissioners and covers the tax year 2010 (2012:17-24). In summarising this data,
Collins (2013:15-19) noted that the top 30 tax breaks involve revenue forgone of €17
billion. Added to this were the tax break costs of legacy property tax reliefs (€386
million in 2010) and a series of smaller tax expenditures for which the Revenue do
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not have any data estimates. In their 2010 review, Collins and Walsh (2010) found
that 32 per cent of the total number of tax breaks were lacking cost estimates.
Some progress has been made in addressing and reforming these tax breaks in recent
Budgets, and we welcome this progress. However, despite this, recent Budgets and
Finance Bills have introduced new tax breaks targeted at high earning multinational
executives and research and development schemes and extended tax breaks for film
production and the refurbishment of older building in urban areas. For the most
part, there has been no or limited accompanying documentation evaluating the
cost, distributive impacts or appropriateness of these proposals.
Both the Commission on Taxation (2009:230) and Collins and Walsh (2010:20-21)
have also highlighted and detailed the need for new methods for
evaluation/introducing tax reliefs. We strongly welcome these proposals, which are
similar to the proposals the directors of Social Justice Ireland made to the Commission
in written and oral submissions. The proposals focus on prior evaluation of the costs
and benefits of any proposed expenditure, the need to collect detailed information
on each expenditure, the introduction of time limits for expenditures, the creation
of an annual tax expenditures report as part of the Budget process and the regular
scrutiny of this area by an Oireachtas committee. We believe that these proposals
should be adopted as part of the necessary reform of this area.
There is further potential to reduce the cost in this area. Recipients of these tax
expenditures use them to reduce their tax bills, so it needs to be clearly understood
that this is tax which is being forgone. Social Justice Ireland has highlighted a number
of these reforms in our pre-Budget Policy Briefings, Budget Choices, and will further
address this issue in advance of Budget 2015. During the past year we have
highlighted the need to reform the most expensive tax break, which is associated
with pensions. In a report commissioned by Social Justice Ireland, Larragy showed
that standard rating the pension tax break, combined with a small number of other
adjustments, would provide sufficient revenue to fund the introduction of a
universal pension for all aged over 65 years (Larragy, 2013).  
Social Justice Ireland believes that reforming the tax break system would make the
tax system fairer. It would also provide substantial additional resources which would
contribute to raising the overall tax take towards the modest and realistic target we
have outlined earlier.
Minimum Effective Tax Rates for Higher Earners
The suggestion that it is the better-off who principally gain from the provision of
tax exemption schemes is underscored by a series of reports published by the
Revenue Commissioners entitled Effective Tax Rates for High Earning Individuals and
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Analysis of High Income Individuals’ Restriction. These reports provided details of the
Revenue’s assessment of the top earners in Ireland and the rates of effective taxation
they incur.35 The reports led to the introduction of a minimum 20 per cent effective
tax rate as part of the 2006 and 2007 Finance Acts for all those with incomes in
excess of €500,000. Subsequently, Budgets have revised up the minimum effective
rate and revised down the income threshold from where it applies – reforms we have
welcomed as necessary and long-overdue. Most recently, the 2010 Finance Bill
introduced a requirement that all earners above €400,000 pay a minimum effective
rate of tax of 30 per cent. It also reduced from €250,000 to €125,000 the income
threshold where restrictions on the use of tax expenditures to decrease income tax
liabilities commence.
The documentation accompanying Budget 2014 included the latest Revenue
Commissioners analysis of the operation of these new rules using data for 2011
(Revenue Commissioners, 2013). Table 4.6 gives the findings of that analysis for 286
individuals with income in excess of €400,000. The report also includes information
on the distribution of effective income tax rates among the 857 earners with
incomes between €125,000 and €400,000.
Table 4.6: The Distribution of Effective Income Tax Rates among those earning in
excess of €125,000 in 2011 (% of total) 
Effective Individuals with incomes Individuals with incomes
Income Tax Rate  of €400,000+ of €125,000 - €400,000 
0%-5% 0% 1.63%  
5% < 10% 0% 10.74%  
10% < 15% 0% 17.62%  
15% < 20% 0% 19.72%
20% < 25% 0% 26.02%
25% < 30% 20.63% 23.45%
30% < 35% 79.02% 0.70%
35%< 40% 0% 0.12%
> 40% 0.35% 0%
Total Cases 286 857
Source: Revenue Commissioners (2013).
Notes: Effective rates are for income taxation only as the reliefs are off-set against these
liabilities. They do not include tax paid under the USC and PRSI.
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35 The effective taxation rate is calculated as the percentage of the individual’s total pre-
tax income that is liable to income tax and that is paid in taxation.
Social Justice Ireland welcomed the introduction of this scheme which marked a
major improvement in the fairness of the tax system. The published data indicate
that is seems to be working well for those above an income of €400,000. However,
between €125,000 and €400,000 there are still surprisingly low effective income
taxation rates being reported; half of these individuals pay less than 20 per cent of
their income in income taxes. Such an outcome may be better than in the past, but
it still has some way to go to reflect a situation where a fair contribution is being
paid.
The report also includes average effective taxation rates paid by these individuals
where both income taxes and USC are included. It states that the average effective
tax rate faced by earners above €400,000 in 2011 was 39.7 per cent, equivalent to
the amount of income tax and USC paid by a single PAYE worker with a gross income
of €130,000 in that year. Similarly, the average income tax and USC effective tax rate
faced by people earning between €125,000 - €400,000 in 2011 (28.8 per cent) was
equivalent to the amount of income tax paid by a single PAYE worker with a gross
income of approximately €55,000 in that year. The contrast in these income levels
for the same overall rate of income taxation brings into question the fairness of the
taxation system as a whole. 
Social Justice Ireland believes that it is important that Government continues to raise
the minimum effective tax rate so that it is in-line with that faced by PAYE earners
on equivalent high-income levels. Following Budget 2014 a single individual on an
income of €125,000 gross will pay an income tax and USC effective tax rate of 39.3
per cent; a figure which suggests that the minimum threshold for high earners has
potential to adjust upwards over the next few years. We also believe that
Government should reform the High Income Individuals’ Restriction so that all tax
expenditures are included within it. The restriction currently does not apply to all
tax breaks individuals avail of, including pension contributions. This should change
in Budget 2015.
Corporation Taxes
In Budget 2003 the standard rate of corporation tax was reduced from 16 per cent
to 12.5 per cent, at a full year cost of €305m. This followed another reduction in
2002, which had brought the rate down from 20 per cent to 16 per cent. At the time
the total cost in lost revenue to the exchequer of these two reductions was estimated
at over €650m per annum. Serious questions remain concerning the advisability of
pursuing this policy approach. Ireland’s corporation tax rate is now considerably
below the corresponding rates in most of Europe. Windfall profits are flowing to a
sector that is already extremely profitable. Furthermore, Ireland’s low rate of
corporation tax is being abused by multi-national companies which channel profits
through units, often very small units, in Ireland to avail of the lower Irish rate of
tax. In many cases this is happening at a cost to fellow EU members’ exchequers and
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with little benefit in terms of jobs and additional real economic activity in Ireland.
Understandably, Ireland is coming under increasing pressure to reform this system.
There is no substantive evidence in any of the relevant literature to support the
contention that corporations would leave if the corporate tax rate was higher – at
17.5 per cent for example. Furthermore, the logic of having a uniform rate of
corporation tax for all sectors is questionable. David Begg of ICTU has stated, “there
is no advantage in having a uniform rate of 12.5 per cent corporation tax applicable
to hotels and banks as well as to manufacturing industry” (2003:12). In the last few
years there has been some improvement in this situation with special, and higher,
tax rates being charged on natural resource industries and non-trading income.
Social Justice Ireland welcomes this as an overdue step in the right direction.
As the European Union expands corporation tax competition is likely to intensify.
Already Bulgaria has set its rate at 10 per cent and others continue to reduce their
headline rates and provide incentives targeted at reducing the effective corporate
tax rate. Over the next decade Ireland will be forced to either ignore tax rates as a
significant attraction/retention policy for foreign investors, which would be a major
change in industrial policy, or to follow suit, despite the exchequer costs, and
compete by further cutting corporation tax. Sweeney has warned of a dangerous
situation in which Ireland could end up “leading the race to the bottom” (2004:59).
The costs of such a move, in lost exchequer income, would be enormous.
An alternative direction could be to agree a minimum effective rate for all EU
countries. Given the international nature of company investment, these taxes are
fundamentally different from internal taxes and the benefits of a European
agreement which would set a minimum effective rate are obvious. They include
protecting Ireland’s already low rate from being driven down even lower, protecting
the jobs in industries which might move to lower taxing countries and protecting
the revenue generated for the exchequer by corporate taxes. Social Justice Ireland
believes that an EU wide agreement on a minimum effective rate of corporation tax
should be negotiated and this could evolve from the current discussions around a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). Social Justice Ireland believes
that the minimum rate should be set well below the 2012 EU-27 average headline
rate of 23.2 per cent but above the existing low Irish level.36 A headline rate of 17.5
per cent and a minimum effective rate of 10 per cent seem appropriate. This reform
would simultaneously maintain Ireland’s low corporate tax position and provide
additional revenues to the exchequer. Were such a rate in place in Ireland in 2013,
corporate tax income would have been between €1.2 billion and €1.7 billion higher
– a significant sum given the current economic challenges. 
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The recent attention given to the abuses of the international corporate tax system,
whereby some highly profitable multinational are paying very small amounts of
profit taxes and in some cases none, further strengthens the need to address effective
corporate tax rates. Social Justice Ireland welcomes the attention the OECD is now
giving this issue via its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project (OECD, 2013).
It is important that this work leads to the emergence of a transparent international
corporate finance and corporate taxation system where multinational firms pay a
reasonable and credible effective corporate tax rate. 
Site Value Tax
Taxes on wealth are minimal in Ireland. Revenue is negligible from capital
acquisitions tax (CAT) because it has a very high threshold in respect of bequests
and gifts within families and the rates of tax on transfers of family farms and firms
are very generous (see tax revenue tables at the start of this chapter). While recent
increases in the rate of CAT are welcome, the likely future revenue from this area
remains limited given the tax’s current structure. The requirement, as part of the
EU/IMF/ECB bailout agreement, to introduce a recurring property tax led
Government in Budget 2012 to introduce an unfairly structured flat €100 per annum
household charge and a value based Local Property Tax in Budget 2013. While we
welcome the overdue need to extend the tax base to include a recurring revenue
source from property, we believe that a Site Value Tax, also known as a Land Rent
Tax, would be a more appropriate and fairer approach.
In previous editions of this publication we have reviewed this proposal in greater
detail.37 There has also been a number of research papers published on this issue over
the past decade.38 Overall they point towards a recurring site value tax that is fairer
and more efficient than other alternatives. Social Justice Ireland believes that the
introduction of a site value tax would be a better alternative than the current
Government value based local property tax. A site value tax would lead to more
efficient land use within the structure of social, environmental and economic goals
embodied in planning and other legislation. 
Second Homes 
A feature of the housing boom of the last decade was the rapid increase in ownership
of holiday homes and second homes. For the most part these homes remain empty
for at least nine months of the year. It is a paradox that many were built at the same
time as the rapid increases in housing waiting lists (see chapter 7). 
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of Ireland (2004), Collins and Larragy (2011), and O’Siochru (2012).
Results from Census 2011 indicated that since 2006 there had been a 19 per cent
increase in the number of holiday homes, with numbers rising from 49,789 in 2006
to 59,395 in 2011. The Census also found that overall, the number of vacant houses
on Census night was 168,427 (April 2011) – some of which are also likely to be second
homes.
What is often overlooked when the second home issue is being discussed is that the
infrastructure to support these houses is substantially subsidised by the taxpayer.
Roads, water, sewage and electricity infrastructure are just part of this subsidy which
goes, by definition, to those who are already better off as they can afford these
second homes in the first place. Social Justice Ireland supports the views of the ESRI
(2003) and the Indecon report (2005:183-186; 189-190) on this issue. We believe
that people purchasing second houses should have to pay these full infrastructural
costs, much of which is currently borne by society through the Exchequer and local
authorities. There is something perverse in the fact that the taxpayer should be
providing substantial subsidies to the owners of these unoccupied houses at a time
when so many people do not have basic adequate accommodation. 
The introduction of the Non Principal Private Residence (NPPR) charge in 2009 was
a welcome step forward. However, notwithstanding subsequent increases, the
charge was very low relative to the previous and on-going benefits that are derived
from these properties. It stood at €200 in 2013 and was abolished under the 2014
Local Government Reform Act. 
While second homes are liable for the local property tax, as are all homes, Social
Justice Ireland believes that second homes should be required to make a further
annual contribution in respect of the additional benefits these investment
properties receive. We believe that Government should re-introduce this charge and
that it should be further increased and retained as a separate substantial second
homes payment. An annual charge of €500 would seem reasonable and would
provide additional revenue to local government of approximately €170 million per
annum.
Taxing Windfall Gains
The vast profits made by property speculators on the rezoning of land by local
authorities was a particularly undesirable feature of the recent economic boom. For
some time Social Justice Ireland has called for a substantial tax to be imposed on the
profits earned from such decisions. While this may not be an issue in Ireland at this
time of austerity, it is best to make the system fairer before any further unearned
gains are reaped by speculators. Re-zonings are made by elected representatives
supposedly in the interest of society generally. It therefore seems appropriate that a
sizeable proportion of the windfall gains they generate should be made available to
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local authorities and used to address the ongoing housing problems they face (see
chapter 7). In this regard, Social Justice Ireland welcomes the decision to put such a
tax in place. The windfall tax level of 80 per cent is appropriate and, as table 4.7
illustrates, this still leaves speculators and land owners with substantial profits from
these rezoning decisions. The profit from this process should be used to fund local
authorities. We fear that when the property market recovers in years to come there
will be lobbying for this tax to be reduced or removed. Government should
anticipate and resist this. 
Table 4.7: Illustrative examples of the Operation of an 80% Windfall Gain Tax on
Rezoned Land
Agricultural profit as %
land Rezoned Tax post-Tax original
value value profit @ 80% profit value
€50,000 €400,000 €350,000 €280,000 €70,000 140%  
€100,000 €800,000 €700,000 €560,000 €140,000 140%  
€200,000 €1,600,000 €1,400,000 €1,120,000 €280,000 140%  
€500,000 €4,000,000 €3,500,000 €2,800,000 €700,000 140%  
€1,000,000 €8,000,000 €7,000,000 €5,600,000 €1,400,000 140%  
Note: Calculations assume an eight-fold increase on the agricultural land value upon
rezoning.  
Financial Transactions Tax
As the international economic chaos of the past few years has shown, the world is
now increasingly linked via millions of legitimate, speculative and opportunistic
financial transactions. Similarly, global currency trading increased sharply
throughout recent decades. It is estimated that a very high proportion of all financial
transactions traded are speculative currency transactions which are completely free
of taxation. 
An insight into the scale of these transactions is provided by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange
and Derivatives Market Activity (December 2013). The key findings from that report
were:
• In April 2013 the average daily turnover in global foreign exchange markets was
US$5.3 trillion; an increase of almost 35 per cent since 2010 and 331 per cent
since 2001.
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• The major components of these activities were: $2.046 trillion in spot
transactions, $680 billion in outright forwards, $2.228 trillion in foreign
exchange swaps, $54 billion currency swaps, and $337 billion in foreign
exchange options and other products.
• 58 per cent of trades were cross-border and 42 per cent local.
• The vast majority of trades involved four currencies: US Dollar, Euro, Japanese
Yen and Pound Sterling.
• Most of this activity (60 per cent) occurred in the US and UK.
• The estimated daily foreign exchange turnover for Ireland was US$11 billion.
The Tobin tax, first proposed by the Nobel Prize winner James Tobin, is a progressive
tax, designed to target only those profiting from speculation. It is levied at a very
small rate on all transactions but given the scale of these transactions globally, it has
the ability to raise significant funds.
Social Justice Ireland regrets that to date Government has not committed to
supporting recent European moves to introduce a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT)
or Tobin Tax. In September 2011 the EU Commission proposed an FTT and
subsequently updated this proposal in February 2013. It suggested that an FTT would
be levied on transactions between financial institutions when at least one party to
the transaction is located in the EU. The exchange of shares and bonds would be
taxed at a rate of 0.1% and derivative contracts, at an even lower rate of 0.01%. The
rates are minimums as countries with the EU retain the right to set individual tax
rates and could choose higher levels if desired. Overall the Commission projects that
the FTT would raise €30-35 billion per annum.
To date 11 of the 27 EU member states have signed up to this tax and Social Justice
Ireland believes that Ireland should also join this group. In our opinion, the tax offers
the dual benefit of dampening needless and often reckless financial speculation and
generating significant funds. We believe that the revenue generated by this tax
should be used for national economic and social development and international
development co-operation purposes, in particular assisting Ireland and other
developed countries to fund overseas aid and reach the UN ODA target (see chapter
13). According to the United Nations, the amount of annual income raised from a
Tobin tax would be enough to guarantee to every citizen of the world basic access
to water, food, shelter, health and education. Therefore, this tax has the potential
to wipe out the worst forms of material poverty throughout the world.
Social Justice Ireland believes that the time has come for Ireland to support the
introduction of a financial transactions tax. 
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Carbon Taxes
Budget 2010 announced the long-overdue introduction of a carbon tax. This had
been promised in Budget 2003 and committed to in the National Climate Change
Strategy (2007). The tax has been structured along the lines of the proposal from the
Commission on Taxation (2009: 325-372) and is linked to the price of carbon credits
which was set at an initial rate of €15 per tonne of CO2 and subsequently increased
in Budget 2012 to €20 per tonne. Budget 2013 extended the tax to cover solid fuels
on a phased basis from May 2013 with the full tax applying from May 2014. Products
are taxed based on the level of the emissions they create. 
While Social Justice Ireland welcomed the introduction of this tax, it regrets the lack
of accompanying measures to protect those most affected by it, in particular low
income households and rural dwellers. Social Justice Ireland believes that as the tax
increases the Government should be more specific in defining how it will assist these
households. Furthermore, there is a danger that given the difficult fiscal
circumstances Ireland now finds itself in, any increases in the carbon tax over the
next few years may divert from the original intention of encouraging behavioural
change, towards a focus on raising revenue.
building a fairer taxation system
The need for fairness in the tax system was clearly recognised in the first report of
the Commission on Taxation more than 25 years ago. It stated:
“…in our recommendations the spirit of equity is the first and most important
consideration. Departures from equity must be clearly justified by reference to
the needs of economic development or to avoid imposing unreasonable
compliance costs on individuals or high administrative costs on the Revenue
Commissioners.” (1982:29) 
The need for fairness is just as obvious today and Social Justice Ireland believes that
this should be a central objective of the current reform of the taxation system. While
we recognise that many of the reforms below can only occur once the current crisis
in the exchequer’s finances has been resolved, we include them here because they
represent necessary reforms that would greatly enhance the fairness of Ireland’s
taxation system. This section is structured in six parts:
Standard rating discretionary tax expenditures
Keeping the minimum wage out of the tax net
Favouring changes to tax credits rather than tax rates and tax bands
Introducing Refundable Tax Credits
Reforming individualisation
Making the taxation system simpler
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Standard rating discretionary tax expenditures
Making all discretionary tax reliefs/expenditures only available at the standard 20
per cent rate would represent a crucial step towards achieving a fairer tax system. If
there is a legitimate case for making a tax relief/expenditure available, then it should
be made available in the same way to all. It is inequitable that people on higher
incomes should be able to claim certain tax reliefs at their top marginal tax rates
while people with less income are restricted to claim benefit for the same relief at
the lower standard rate of 20 per cent. The standard rating of tax expenditures,
otherwise known as reliefs, offers the potential to simultaneously make the tax
system fairer and fund the necessary developments they are designed to stimulate
without any significant macroeconomic implications. 39
Recent Budgets have made substantial progress towards achieving this objective and
we welcome these developments. However, there remains considerable potential to
introduce further reform. In a recent paper, Collins (2013:17) reported that in 2009
(the latest Revenue data available) there were €2.3 billion of tax breaks made
available at the marginal rate and that if these were standardised the estimated
saving was just over €1 billion.
Keeping the minimum wage out of the tax net
The decision by the Minister for Finance to remove those on the minimum wage
from the tax net was a major achievement of Budget 2005. This had an important
impact on the growing numbers of working-poor and addressed an issue with which
Social Justice Ireland is highly concerned. 
The fiscal and economic crisis of 2008-13 lead to Government reversing this policy,
first via the income levy in second Budget 2009, then via the Universal Social Charge
(USC) in Budget 2011 and via a PRSI increase in Budget 2013. Since Budget 2012 the
USC is charged on all the income of those who earn more than €10,036 per annum.
Using the unadjusted minimum wage of €8.65 per hour, the threshold implies that
a low-income worker on the minimum wage and working more than 23 hours per
week (earning €199 per week) is subject to the tax. Social Justice Ireland believes that
this threshold is far too low and unnecessarily depresses the income and living
standards of the working poor. Budget 2012 raised the entry point for the USC from
€4,004 per annum to €10,036 per annum, a move welcomed by Social Justice Ireland.
However, the imposition of the USC at such low income levels raises a very small
amount of funds for the exchequer. Forthcoming Budgets should continue to raise
the point at which the USC commences and in the years to come, as more resources
become available to the Exchequer, Social Justice Ireland will urge Government to
restore the policy of keeping the minimum wage fully outside the tax net. 
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Favouring changes to tax credits rather than tax rates and tax bands
Social Justice Ireland believes that any future income tax changes should be focused
on changes to tax credits rather than tax bands and tax rates. This is more desirable
in the context of achieving fairness in the taxation system.
To emphasise this point, table 4.8 presents a comparison of reforms to tax rates, tax
credits and tax bands. In all cases the policy examined would carry a full year cost
of approximately €205 million.40 The reforms examined are for changes to the 2014
income taxation system and are:
• a decrease in the top tax rate from 41% to 40% (full year cost €205 million)
• an increase in the personal tax credit of €108 with commensurate increases in
couple, widowed parents and lone parents credit (full year cost €205 million)
• an increase in the standard rate band (20% tax band) of €1,350 (full year cost
€202.5 million)
Table 4.8: Comparing gains under three possible income tax reforms: 
tax rates, tax credits and tax bands (€)  
gross Income €15,000 €25,000 €50,000 €75,000 €100,000 €125,000 
Decrease in the top tax rate from 41% to 40% (full year cost €205 million) 
Single earner 0 0 172 422 672 922  
Couple 1 earner 0 0 82 332 582 832  
Couple 2 earners 0 0 0 94 344 594          
Increase in the personal tax credit of €108 (full year cost €205 million)
Single earner 0 108 108 108 108 108 
Couple 1 earner 0 50 216 216 216 216 
Couple 2 earners 0 0 216 216 216 216          
Increase in the standard rate band of €1,350 (full year cost €202.5 million) 
Single earner 0 0 283.50 283.50 283.50 283.50
Couple 1 earner 0 0 283.50 283.50 283.50 283.50
Couple 2 earners 0 0 0 567.00 567.00 567.00
Notes: All workers are assumed to be PAYE workers. For couples with 2 earners the income is
assumed to be split 65%/35%. Cost estimates are based on the latest available Department
of Finance income taxation ready reckoner and are applied to the structure of the 2014
income taxation system. The increase in the personal tax credit assumes a commensurate
increase in the couple, widowed parents and lone parent’s credit.
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significantly different currently.
Although all of the income taxation options cost the same, they each carry different
effects on the income distribution. The fairest outcome is achieved by increasing
tax credits. It provides the same value to all taxpayers across the income distribution
provided they are earning sufficient to pay more than €108 in income taxes.
Therefore, the increased income received by a single earner on €25,000 and on
€125,000 is the same – an extra €108. 
However, a decrease in the top tax rate only benefits those paying tax at that rate.
Therefore, the single earner on €25,000 gains nothing from this change while those
on €50,000 gain €172 per annum and those on €100,000 gain €672 per annum. The
higher the income, the greater the gain. This is the least fair outcome of the three
examined.
Changing the entry point to the top tax rate (i.e. increasing the standard rate band)
also provides gains which are skewed towards higher incomes. A single earner on
€25,000 gains nothing from this reform and it is only from individual incomes of
€34,150 plus, and couples with 2 earners with gross income above €68,300, that
gains are experienced. Above these thresholds the gains are the same for all single
earners and couples.
In terms of fairness, changing tax credits is the best option. Government should
always take this option when it has money available to reduce income taxes.
Introducing refundable tax credits
The move from tax allowances to tax credits was completed in Budget 2001. This
was a very welcome change because it put in place a system that had been advocated
for a long time by a range of groups. One problem persists however. If a low income
worker does not earn enough to use up his or her full tax credit then he or she will
not benefit from any tax reductions introduced by government in its annual budget. 
Making tax credits refundable would be a simple solution to this problem. It would
mean that the part of the tax credit that an employee did not benefit from would
be “refunded” to him/her by the state. 
The major advantage of making tax credits refundable lies in addressing the
disincentives currently associated with low-paid employment. The main
beneficiaries of refundable tax credits would be low-paid employees (full-time and
part-time). Chart 4.2 displays the impacts of the introduction of this policy across
various gross income levels. It clearly shows that all of the benefits from introducing
this policy would go directly to those on the lowest incomes.
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Chart 4.2: How much better off would people be if tax credits were made
refundable?
Note: * Except where unemployed as there is no earner
With regard to administering this reform, the central idea recognises that most
people with regular incomes and jobs would not receive a cash refund of their tax
credit because their incomes are too high. They would simply benefit from the tax
credit as a reduction in their tax bill. Therefore, as chart 4.2 shows, no change is
proposed for these people and they would continue to pay tax via their employers,
based on their net liability after deduction of tax credits by their employers on behalf
of the Revenue Commissioners. For other people on low or irregular incomes, the
refundable tax credit could be paid via a refund by the Revenue at the end of the tax
year. Following the introduction of refundable tax credits, all subsequent increases
in the level of the tax credit would be of equal value to all employees. 
To illustrate the benefits of this approach, charts 4.3 and 4.4 compare the effects of
a €100 increase in the personal tax credit before and after the introduction of
refundable tax credits. Chart 4.3 shows the effect as the system is currently
structured – an increase of €100 in credits, but these are not refundable. It shows
that the gains are allocated equally to all categories of earners above €50,000.
However, there is no benefit for those workers whose earnings are not in the tax net.
Chart 4.4 shows how the benefits of a €100 a year increase in personal tax credits
would be distributed under a system of refundable tax credits. This simulation
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demonstrates the equity attached to using the tax-credit instrument to distribute
budgetary taxation changes. The benefit to all categories of income earners
(single/couple, one-earner/couple, dual-earners) is the same. Consequently, in
relative terms, those earners at the bottom of the distribution do best.
Chart 4.3: How much better off would people be if tax credits were increased by
€100 per person?
Note: * Except where unemployed, as there is no earner
Overall the merits of adopting this approach are: that every beneficiary of tax credits
would receive the full value of the tax credit; that the system would improve the net
income of the workers whose incomes are lowest, at modest cost; and that there
would be no additional administrative burden placed on employers.
Outside Ireland, the refundable tax credits approach has gained more and more
attention, including a detailed Brooking Policy Briefing on the issue published in
the United States in late 2006 (see Goldberg et al, 2006). In reviewing this issue in
the Irish context Colm Rapple stated that “the change is long overdue” (2004:140).
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Chart 4.4: How much better off would people be if tax credits were increased by
€100 per person and this was refundable?
Note: * Except where unemployed, as there is no earner
During late 2010 Social Justice Ireland published a detailed study on the subject of
refundable tax credits. Entitled ‘Building a Fairer Tax System: The Working Poor and the
Cost of Refundable Tax Credits’, the study identified that the proposed system would
benefit 113,000 low-income individuals in an efficient and cost-effective manner.41
When children and other adults in the household are taken into account the total
number of beneficiaries would be 240,000. The cost of making this change would
be €140m. The Social Justice Ireland proposal to make tax credits refundable would
make Ireland’s tax system fairer, address part of the working poor problem and
improve the living standards of a substantial number of people in Ireland. The
following is a summary of that proposal:
Making tax credits refundable: the benefits
• Would address the problem identified already in a straightforward and cost-
effective manner.
• No administrative cost to the employer.
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• Would incentivise employment over welfare as it would widen the gap between
pay and welfare rates.
• Would be more appropriate for a 21st century system of tax and welfare.
Details of Social Justice Ireland proposal
• Unused portion of the Personal and PAYE tax credit (and only these) would be
refunded.
• Eligibility criteria in the relevant year.
• Individuals must have unused personal and/or PAYE tax credits (by definition).
• Individuals must have been in paid employment.
• Individuals must be at least 23 years of age.
• Individuals must have earned a minimum annual income from employment of
€4,000.
• Individuals must have accrued a minimum of 40 PRSI weeks.
• Individuals must not have earned an annual total income greater than €15,600.
• Married couples must not have earned a combined annual total income greater
than €31,200.
• Payments would be made at the end of the tax year.
Cost of implementing the proposal
• The total cost of refunding unused tax credits to individuals satisfying all of the
criteria mentioned in this proposal is estimated at €140.1m.
Major findings
• Almost 113,300 low income individuals would receive a refund and would see
their disposable income increase as a result of the proposal.
• The majority of the refunds are valued at under €2,400 per annum, or €46 per
week, with the most common value being individuals receiving a refund of
between €800 to €1,000 per annum, or €15 to €19 per week.
• Considering that the individuals receiving these payments have incomes of less
than €15,600 (or €299 per week), such payments are significant to them.
• Almost 40 per cent of refunds flow to people in low-income working poor
households who live below the poverty line. 
• A total of 91,056 men, women and children below the poverty threshold benefit
either directly through a payment to themselves or indirectly through a
payment to their household from a refundable tax credit.
• Of the 91,056 individuals living below the poverty line that benefit from
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refunds, most, over 71 per cent receive refunds of more than €10 per week with
32 per cent receiving in excess of €20 per week.
• A total of 148,863 men, women and children above the poverty line benefit from
refundable tax credits either directly through a payment to themselves or
indirectly (through a payment to their household. Most of these beneficiaries
have income less than €120 per week above the poverty line.
• Overall, some 240,000 individuals (91,056 + 148,863) living in low-income
households would experience an increase in income as a result of the
introduction of refundable tax credits, either directly through a refund to
themselves or indirectly through a payment to their household.
Once adopted, a system of refundable tax credits as proposed in this study would
result in all future changes in tax credits being equally experienced by all employees
in Irish society. Such a reform would mark a significant step in the direction of
building a fairer taxation system and represent a fairer way for Irish society to
allocate its resources. 
Reforming individualisation
Social Justice Ireland supports individualisation of the tax system. However, the
process of individualisation followed to date has been deeply flawed and unfair. The
cost to the exchequer of this transition has been in excess of €0.75 billion, and
almost all of this money has gone to the richest 30 per cent of the population. A
significantly fairer process would have been to introduce a basic income system that
would have treated all people fairly and ensured that a windfall of this nature did
not accrue to the best off in this society (see chapter 3).
Given the current form of individualisation, couples with one partner losing his/her
job end up even worse off than they would have been had the current form of
individualisation not been introduced. Before individualisation was introduced, the
standard-rate income-tax band was €35,553 for all couples. Above that, they would
start paying the higher rate of tax. Now, the standard-rate income-tax band for
single-income couples is €41,800 while the band for dual-income couples covers a
maximum of a further €23,800 (up to €65,600). If one spouse (of a couple previously
earning two salaries) leaves a job voluntarily or through redundancy, the couple
loses the value of the second tax band.
Making the taxation system simpler
Ireland’s tax system is not simple. Bristow (2004) argued that “some features of it,
notably VAT, are among the most complex in the world”. The reasons given to justify
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this complexity vary but they are focused principally around the need to reward
particular kinds of behaviour which is seen as desirable by legislators. This, in effect,
is discrimination either in favour of one kind of activity or against another. There are
many arguments against the present complexity and in favour of a simpler system.
Discriminatory tax concessions in favour of particular positions are often very
inequitable, contributing far less to equity than might appear to be the case. In many
circumstances they also fail to produce the economic or social outcomes which were
being sought and sometimes they even generate very undesirable effects. At other
times they may be a complete waste of money, since the outcomes they seek would
have occurred without the introduction of a tax incentive. Having a complex system
has other down-sides. It can, for example, have high compliance costs both for
taxpayers and for the Revenue Commissioners. 
For the most part, society at large gains little or nothing from the discrimination
contained in the tax system. Mortgage interest relief, for example, and the absence of
any residential or land-rent tax contributed to the rise in house prices up to 2007.
Complexity makes taxes easier to evade, invites consultants to devise avoidance
schemes and greatly increases the cost of collection. It is also inequitable because those
who can afford professional advice are in a far better position to take advantage of that
complexity than those who cannot. A simpler taxation system would better serve Irish
society and all individuals within it, irrespective of their means.
Key policy priorities on Taxation
Social Justice Ireland believes that Government should:
• increase the overall tax take
• adopt policies to broaden the tax base
• develop a fairer taxation system
Policy priorities under each of these headings are listed below.
Increase the overall tax take
• Move towards increasing the total tax take to 34.9 per cent of GDP (i.e. a level
below the low tax threshold identified by Eurostat).
Broaden the tax base
• Continue to reform the area of tax expenditures and put in place procedures
within the Department of Finance and the Revenue Commissioners to monitor
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on an on-going basis the cost and benefits of all current and new tax
expenditures.
• Continue to increase the minimum effective tax rates on very high earners
(those with incomes in excess of €125,000) so that these rates are consistent with
the levels faced by PAYE workers.
• Move to negotiate an EU wide agreement on minimum corporate taxation rates
(a rate of 17.5 per cent would seem fair in this situation).
• Adopt policies to ensure that corporations based in Ireland pay a minimum
effective corporate tax rate of 10 per cent.
• Impose charges so that those who construct or purchase second homes pay the
full infrastructural costs of these dwellings.
• Retain the 80 per cent windfall tax on the profits generated from all land re-
zonings.
• Join with other EU member states to adopt a financial transactions tax (FTT).
• Adopt policies which further shift the burden of taxation from income tax to
eco-taxes on the consumption of fuel and fertilisers, waste taxes and a land rent
tax. In doing this, government should avoid any negative impact on people with
low incomes.
Develop a fairer taxation system
• Apply only the standard rate of tax to all discretionary tax expenditures.
• Adjust tax credits and the USC so that the minimum wage returns to falling
outside the tax net.
• Make tax credits refundable.
• Recognise that in terms of fairness, changing tax credits is the best option.
Government should always take this option when it has money available to
reduce income taxes.
• Ensure that individualisation in the income tax system is done in a fair and
equitable manner.
• Integrate the taxation and social welfare systems.
• Begin to monitor and report tax levels (personal and corporate) in terms of
effective tax rates.
• Develop policies which allow taxation on wealth to be increased.
• Ensure that the distribution of all changes in indirect taxes discriminate
positively in favour of those with lower incomes.
• Adopt policies to simplify the taxation system.
• Poverty-proof all budget tax packages to ensure that tax changes do not further
widen the gap between those with low income and the better off.
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5. 
WORK , UNEMPLOYMENT  AND
JOB  CREAT ION
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE: WORK, UNEMPLOYMENT AND JOB CREATION
To ensure that all people have access to meaningful work
The scale and severity of the 2008-2010 economic collapse saw Ireland revert to the
phenomenon of widespread unemployment. Since then, despite the attention given
to the banking and fiscal collapse, the transition from near full-employment to high
unemployment has been the most telling characteristic of this recession. The
implications for individuals, families, social cohesion and the exchequer’s finances
have been serious and the effects are likely to be felt for many years to come. CSO
data and economic forecasts for the remainder of 2014 indicate that unemployment
will reach an annual rate of between 11.5 and 12 per cent of the labour force in 2014,
having been 4.7 per cent before the recession in 2007. Significant improvements
have been achieved over the past two years, but there can be little doubt but that we
are in a very challenging period in which a high level of long-term unemployment
has once again become a characteristic of Irish society.
This chapter reviews the evolution of this situation and considers the implications
and challenges which arise for Government and society.42 It also looks at the impact
on various sectors of the working-age population and, given this, it outlines a series
of proposals for responding to this unemployment crisis. To date, Social Justice Ireland
considers that the response has been slow and limited. As the chapter shows, the
scale and nature of our unemployment crisis deserves greater attention, in particular
given the scale of long-term unemployment. The chapter concludes with some
thoughts on the narrowness of how we consider and measure the concept of ‘work’.
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42 The analysis complements information on the measurement of the labour market and
long-term trends in employment and unemployment detailed in annex 5.
The issues addressed in this chapter principally focus on one pillar of Social Justice
Ireland’s Core Policy Framework (see Chapter 2), ‘Enhance Social Protection’.
Recent trends in employment and unemployment
The nature and scale of the recent transformation in Ireland’s labour market is
highlighted by the data in table 5.1. Over the seven years from 2007-2013 the labour
force decreased by just over 4 per cent, participation rates dropped, full-time
employment fell by almost 18 per cent, representing some 312,000 jobs, while part-
time employment increased by almost 17 per cent. By the end of 2013 the number
of underemployed people, defined as those employed part-time but wishing to work
additional hours, had increased to 143,300 people – almost 7 per cent of the labour
force. Over this period unemployment increased by over 150,000 people, bringing
the unemployment rate up from 4.6 per cent to 11.7 per cent. 
Table 5.1: Labour Force Data, 2007 – 2013
2007 2010 2013 Change 07-13
Labour Force 2,260,600 2,168,200 2,163,100 -4.3%
LFPR % 63.8 60.2 60.1 -3.7%
Employment % 68.8 59.0 61.4 -7.4%
Employment 2,156,000 1,857,300 1,909,800 -11.4%
Full-time 1,765,300 1,422,800 1,453,000 -17.7%
Part-time 390,700 434,400 456,800 +16.9%
Underemployed n/a 116,800 143,300 -
Unemployed % 4.6 14.3 11.7 +7.1%
Unemployed 104,600 310,900 253,200 +142.1%
LT Unemployed % 1.4% 7.9% 7.2% +5.8%
LT Unemployed 31,700 172,100 155,500 +390.5%
Source: CSO, QNHS on-line database.
Notes: All data is for Quarter 4 of the reference year.
LFPR = Labour force participation rate and measures the percentage of the adult
population who are in the labour market.
Underemployment measures part-time workers who indicate that they wish to
work additional hours which are not currently available.
Comparable underemployment data is not available for 2007.
LT = Long Term (12 months or more).
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This transformation in the labour market has significantly altered the nature of
employment in Ireland when compared to the pre-recession picture in 2007. Overall,
employment fell 11.4 per cent between 2007-2013 and table 5.2 traces the impact of
this fall across various sectors, groups and regions. Within the CSO’s broadly defined
employment sectors, industrial employment has seen the biggest fall of over 37 per
cent while there has been a small fall in services employment. Agricultural
employment records an increase over the period and a significant increase between
2010 and 2013. However, it is likely that the low figure recorded for 2010 was as a
result of sampling problems in the CSO Quarterly National Household Survey
(QNHS) and that agricultural employment did not fall to such a low level. A
consequence of the correction to this sampling problem over the most recent set of
QNHS reports (Q4 2012 to Q4 2013) has been a perceived increased in agricultural
employment (and overall employment).43 A large part of this increase is a sampling
correction so that a significant proportion of the 26,600 jobs reported to have been
created in agriculture between Q4 2012 and Q4 2013 are statistical corrections rather
than new jobs. However, overall employment has been growing, representing a
welcome recovery.
Overall, job losses have had a greater impact on males than females with male
employment down 15 per cent since 2007 while female employment decreased by
6.7 per cent. The proportional impact of the crisis has hit employment levels for
employees and self-employed in much the same way; although there are many more
of the former and the actual job losses among employees is significantly higher. 
The consequence of all these job losses has been the sharp increase in
unemployment and emigration. Dealing with unemployment, table 5.3 shows how
it has changed between 2007 and 2013, a period when the numbers unemployed
increased by over 140 per cent. As the table shows, male unemployment increased
by 92,000 and female unemployment by 56,000. Most of the unemployed, who had
been employed in 2007 and before it, are seeking to return to a full-time job with
approximately 11 per cent of those unemployed in 2013 indicating that they were
seeking part-time employment. The impact of the unemployment crisis was felt
right across the age groups and it is only over the past year that there has been a
decrease in numbers aged above 34 years that are unemployed. Younger age groups
have seen their numbers unemployed consistently fall since 2011 – a phenomenon
not unrelated to the return of high emigration figures over recent years.44
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43 See CSO QNHS (2014) for more details.
44 See chapter 10 for more information on recent migration trends.
Table 5.2: Employment in Ireland, 2007 – 2013
2007 2010 2013 Change 07-13
Employment 2,156,000 1,857,300 1,909,800 -11.4%
Sector
Agriculture 114,300 85,400 116,800 +2.2%
Industry 551,600 355,300 347,200 -37.1%
Services 1,482,900 1,409,900 1,444,600 -2.6%
gender
Male 1,221,800 994,100 1,038,200 -15.0%
Female 934,200 863,200 871,600 -6.7%
Employment Status
Employees* 1,775,900 1,548,900 1,571,400 -11.5%
Self Employed 364,300 298,000 324,500 -10.9%
Assisting relative 15,800 10,300 13,900 -12.0%
Region
Border 221,100 187,400 185,800 -16.0%
Midlands 126,100 103,400 111,100 -11.9%
West 206,400 181,500 185,900 -9.9%
Dublin 640,000 552,600 572,100 -10.6%
Mid-East 251,900 226,300 225,900 -10.3%
Mid-West 173,200 151,000 151,300 -12.6%
South-East 226,600 185,800 197,100 -13.0%
South-West 310,600 269,300 280,600 -9.7%
Source: CSO, QNHS on-line database.
Notes: * Numbers recorded as employed include those on various active labour market
policy schemes. See also notes to table 5.1.
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Table 5.3: Unemployment in Ireland, 2007 - 2013
2007 2010 2013 Change 07-13
Unemployment 104,600 310,900 253,200 +142.1%
gender
Male 66,700 211,100 158,900 +138.2%
Female 37,900 99,800 94,300 +148.8%
Employment sought
Seeking FT work 85,900 272,600 216,600 +152.2%
Seeking PT work 16,200 23,700 27,800 +71.6%
Age group
15-19 years 9,400 18,300 12,300 +30.9%
20-24 years 21,700 54,200 36,400 +67.7%
25-34 years 33,000 96,800 73,300 +122.1%
35-64 years 40,400 140,700 130,500 +223.0%
Region
Border 14,000 29,200 29,000 +107.1%
Midlands 6,500 20,300 17,600 +170.8%
West 8,400 33,000 25,000 +197.6%
Dublin 30,200 82,400 63,200 +109.3%
Mid-East 9,400 33,100 32,200 +242.6%
Mid-West 9,500 31,100 18,200 +91.6%
South-East 12,100 41,700 36,200 +199.2%
South-West 14,400 40,200 31,800 +120.8%
Duration
Unemp. less than 1 yr 72,000 136,700 95,200 +32.2%
Unemp. more than 1 yr 31,700 172,100 155,500 +390.5%
LT Unemp. as % Unemp 30.3% 55.4% 61.4%
Source: CSO, QNHS on-line database
Note: See also notes to table 5.1.
The rapid growth in the number and rates of long-term unemployment are also
highlighted in table 5.3 and in chart 5.1. The number of long-term unemployed was
less than 32,000 in 2007 and has increased since, reaching 155,500 at the end of 2013.
For the first time on record, the QNHS data for late 2010 indicated that long-term
unemployment accounted for more than 50 per cent of the unemployed and by the
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end of 2013 the long-term unemployed represented just over 60 per cent of the
unemployed. The transition to these high levels since 2007 has been rapid – see chart
5.1. The experience of the 1980s showed the dangers and long-lasting implications of
an unemployment crisis characterised by high long-term unemployment rates. It
remains a major policy failure that Ireland’s level of long-term unemployment has
been allowed to increase so rapidly in recent years. Furthermore, it is of serious
concern that to date Government policy has given limited attention to the issue. 
Addressing a crisis such as this is a major challenge and we outline our suggestions
for immediate policy action later in the chapter. However, it is clear that reskilling
many of the unemployed, in particular those with low education levels, will be a
key component of the response. Using the latest data, for 2011, almost 60 per cent
of the unemployed had no more than second level education with 30 per cent not
having completed more than lower secondary (equivalent to the junior certificate).
At the other extreme, the scale and severity of the recession has resulted in high
levels of third-level graduates becoming unemployed.45 While Government should
not ignore any group in its overdue attempts to address the unemployment crisis,
major emphasis should be placed on those who are most likely to become trapped
in long term unemployment – in particular those with the lowest education levels. 
Chart 5.1: The Increased Presence of Long-Term Unemployed in Ireland, 2007-2013
Source: CSO, QNHS on-line database
Note: Data is for Q4 of each year
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45 The CSO has not updated its profile of unemployment by completed education level
since this data.
Previous experiences, in Ireland and elsewhere, have shown that many of those
under 25 and many of those over 55 find it challenging to return to employment
after a period of unemployment. This highlights the danger of the aforementioned
large increases in long-term unemployment and suggests a major commitment to
retraining and re-skilling will be required. In the long-run Irish society can ill afford
a return to the long-term unemployment problems of the 1980s. In the short-run
the new-unemployed are adding to the numbers living on low-income in Ireland
and this, in turn, will continue to have a negative impact on future poverty figures
(see chapter 3).
Two further themes arise from the employment and unemployment data and we
address these over the next two subsections: youth unemployment and the increase
in precarious work. We then conclude this section by examining trends on the live
register.
Youth unemployment
While the increase in unemployment has been spread across all ages and sectors (see
table 5.3), chart 5.2 highlights the very rapid increase in the numbers unemployed
under 25 years-of-age. The numbers in this group more than doubled between 2007
and 2009 peaking at 83,100 in quarter 2 2009. Since then decreases have occurred,
reaching 50,000 in late 2013. Although we have limited empirical knowledge of the
reasons for these decreases, a large part of the decrease is probably due to emigration.
Chart 5.2: Youth Unemployment in Ireland, by gender 2007-2013
Source: CSO, QNHS on-line database.
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Although youth unemployment represents about one-fifth of the total population
that are unemployed, there is merit in giving it particular attention. Experiences of
unemployment, and in particular long-term unemployment, alongside an inability
to access any work, training or education, tends to leave a ‘scaring effect’ on young
people. It increases the challenges associated with getting them active in the labour
market at any stage in the future. The latest data on the number of young people
aged 18-24 years in Ireland who are not in education, employment or training
(NEETs) is 23.8 per cent in 2012 (NERI, 2013: 36). 
In the short-term it makes sense for Government to invest in the ‘youth
unemployed’ and Social Justice Ireland considers this to be a central priority of any
programme to seriously address the unemployment crisis. At a European level, this
issue has been receiving welcome attention over the past year; driven by high levels
of youth unemployment in other crisis countries.
Under-employment, Part-time employment and Precarious Work
The figures in table 5.1 also point towards the growth of various forms of precarious
work over recent years. Since 2007 employment has fallen by 11 per cent; but this
figure masks a bigger decline in full-time employment (18 per cent) and a growth in
part-time employment (+ 17 per cent). Within those part-time employed there has
also been an increase in the numbers of people who are underemployed, that is
working part-time but at less hours than individuals are willing to work. By the end
of 2013 the numbers underemployed stood at 143,300 people, about seven per cent
of the total labour force and almost one-third of all part-time workers.
While an element of these figures can be explained by the recession, and the
suppressed levels of activity in some sectors, they also suggest the emergence of a
greater number of workers in precarious employment situations. The growth in the
number of individuals with less work hours than ideal, as well as those with
persistent uncertainties on the number and times of hours required for work, is a
major labour market challenge. Aside from the impact this has on the well-being of
individuals and their families, it also impacts on their financial situation and adds
to the working-poor challenges we outlined in chapter 3. There are also impacts on
the state given that Family Income Supplement (FIS) and the structure of jobseeker
payments tends to lead to Government subsidising these families incomes; and
indirectly subsidising some employers who create persistent precarious work
patterns for their workers.
As the labour market improves, Social Justice Ireland believes that now is the time to
adopt measures to address and eliminate these problems.
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The Live Register
While the live register is not an accurate measure of unemployment, it is a useful
barometer of the nature and pace of change in employment and unemployment.
Increases suggest a combination of more people unemployed, more people on
reduced employment weeks and consequently reductions in the availability of
employment hours to the labour force. Table 5.4 shows that the number of people
signing on the live register increased rapidly since the onset of the economic crisis
in 2007. The numbers peaked in July 2011 and by January 2014 the numbers signing-
on the live register had increased more than 240,000 compared to seven years earlier. 
Table 5.4: Numbers on the Live Register (unadjusted), Jan 2007 - 2014
year Month Males Females Total
2007 January 95,824 62,928 158,752 
2008 January 116,160 65,289 181,449 
2009 January 220,412 105,860 326,272 
2010 January 291,648 145,288 436,936 
2011 January 292,003 150,674 442,677 
2011 July (peak) 297,770 172,514 470,284 
2012 January 283,893 155,696 439,589 
2013 January 273,627 155,769 429,396 
2014 January 248,723 150,907 399,630 
Source: CSO Live Register on-line database.
The live register data offers a useful insight into the skills and experience of those
signing on. Table 5.5 presents a breakdown of the January 2014 live register number
by people’s last occupation and also examines the differences between those over
and under 25 years. The figures once again highlight the need for targeted reskilling
of people who hold skills in sectors of the economy that are unlikely to ever return
to the employment levels of the early part of the last decade.
118 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Table 5.5: Persons on Live Register by last occupation – January 2014
occupational group overall under 25 yrs over 25 yrs
Managers and administrators 16,795 531 16,264
Professional 22,036 1,789 20,247
Associate prof.& technical 11,284 1,369 9,915
Clerical and secretarial 37,202 2,816 34,386
Craft and related 84,437 7,502 76,935
Personal and protective service 50,508 8,177 42,331
Sales 43,713 10,898 32,815
Plant and machine operatives 66,781 8,630 58,151
Other occupation 46,276 9,678 36,598
Never worked / not stated 20,598 9,147 11,451
Total 399,630 60,537 339,093
Source: CSO Live Register on-line database.
Responding to the unemployment crisis
The scale of these increases is enormous and it is crucial that Government,
commentators and society in general remember that each of these numbers
represent people who are experiencing dramatic and, in many cases, unexpected
turmoil in their lives and their families’ lives. As Irish society comes to terms with
the enormity of this issue, we believe that this perspective should remain central.
To date, the policy response to this crisis has been limited, comprising
announcements of apprenticeship schemes, ‘Job Initiative’ (2011) reforms, annual
Action Plans and the ‘Pathways to Work’ programme. Each of these has targeted
small reforms and had limited success given the scale of the unemployment crisis –
for the most part the long-term unemployment, skill deficits, under-employment
and precarious work issues have been given limited attention.
In responding to this situation Social Justice Ireland believes that Government a clear
and integrated set of policy priorities. We set these out in detail in the final section
of this chapter.  
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Even the most optimistic economic and labour market projections for the years to
come suggest that unemployment will remain a major factor. The Department of
Finance’s estimates in Budget 2014 point towards a rate 11.7 per cent in 2016; we
anticipate this figure will be revised during 2014 to a figure of approximately 10 per
cent in 2016. As recovery emerges, it is important that policy focuses on those
furthest from being able to rejoin the numbers employed and assist those within
employment but struggling as the working poor.
Work and people with disabilities
Results from Census 2011 have provided new data on the scale and nature of
disability in Ireland. In a report published in November 2012, the CSO reported that
a total of 595,335 people had a disability in Ireland; equivalent to 13 per cent of the
population. The most common disability overall was a difficulty with pain,
breathing or other chronic illness or condition which was experienced by 46.2 per
cent of all people with a disability; this was followed by a difficulty with basic
physical activities, experienced by 41.1 per cent. The report found that both of these
disabilities were strongly age-related. It also showed that 1.1 per cent of the
population were blind or had a sight related disability (51,718 people); 1.3 per cent
of the population suffered from an intellectual disability (57,709 people); 2 per cent
of the population were deaf or had a hearing related disability (92,060 people); 2.1
per cent of the population had a psychological or emotional condition (96,004
people); 3 per cent of the population had a difficulty with learning, remembering
or concentrating (137,070 people); 5.3 per cent of the population had a difficulty
with basic physical activities (244,739 people); and 6 per cent of the population had
a disability connected with pain, breathing or another chronic illness or condition
(274,762 people) (CSO, 2012: 45, 51-53).46
The Census 2011 data also revealed that there was 162,681 persons with a disability
in the labour force representing a participation rate of 30 per cent, less than half
that for the population in general. These findings reflect earlier results from the 2006
National Disability Survey (CSO, 2008 and 2010) and a 2004 QNHS special module
on disability (CSO, 2004). This low rate of employment among people with a
disability is of concern. Apart from restricting their participation in society it also
ties them into state dependent low-income situations. Therefore, it is not surprising
that Ireland’s poverty figures reveal that people who are ill or have a disability are
part of a group at high risk of poverty (see chapter 3).
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46 Note, some individuals will experience more than one disability and feature in more
than one of these categories. 
Social Justice Ireland believes that further efforts should be made to reduce the
impediments faced by people with a disability to obtain employment. In particular,
consideration should be given to reforming the current situation in which many
such people face losing their benefits, in particular their medical card, when they
take up employment. This situation ignores the additional costs faced by people
with a disability in pursuing their day-to-day lives. For many people with disabilities
the opportunity to take up employment is denied to them and they are trapped in
unemployment, poverty or both.
Some progress was made in Budget 2005 to increase supports intended to help
people with disabilities access employment. However, sufficient progress has not
been made and recent Budgets have begun to reduce these services. New policies,
including that outlined above, need to be adopted if this issue is to be addressed
successfully. It is even more relevant today, given the growing employment
challenges of the past few years.
Asylum seekers and work
Social Justice Ireland is very disappointed that the government continues to reject
any proposal that the right to work of asylum seekers should be recognised. Along
with others, we have consistently advocated that where government fails to meet
its own stated objective of processing asylum applications in six months, the right
to work should be automatically granted to asylum seekers. Detaining people for an
unnecessarily prolonged period in such an excluded state is completely
unacceptable. Recognising asylum seekers’ right to work would assist in alleviating
poverty and social exclusion in one of Ireland’s most vulnerable groups.47
The need to recognise all work
A major question raised by the current labour-market situation concerns
assumptions underpinning culture and policy making in this area. The priority
given to paid employment over other forms of work is one such assumption. Most
people recognise that a person can be working very hard outside a conventionally
accepted “job”. Much of the work carried out in the community and in the
voluntary sector comes under this heading. So too does much of the work done in
the home. Social Justice Ireland’s support for the introduction of a basic income
system comes, in part, because it believes that all work should be recognised and
supported (see chapter 3).
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The need to recognise voluntary work has been acknowledged in the Government
White Paper, Supporting Voluntary Activity (Department of Social, Community and
Family Affairs, 2000). The report was prepared to mark the UN International Year
of the Volunteer 2001 by Government and representatives of numerous voluntary
organisations in Ireland. The report made a series of recommendations to assist in
the future development and recognition of voluntary activity throughout Ireland.
A 2005 report presented to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Arts, Sport, Tourism,
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs also provided an insight into this issue. It
established that the cost to the state of replacing the 475,000 volunteers working for
charitable organisations would be at least €205 million and could be as high as €485
million per year.
Social Justice Ireland believes that government should recognise in a more formal way
all forms of work. We believe that everyone has a right to work, to contribute to his
or her own development and that of the community and the wider society. However,
we believe that policy making in this area should not be exclusively focused on job
creation. Policy should recognise that work and a job are not always the same thing.
The Work of Carers
The work of Ireland’s carers receives minimal recognition despite the essential role
their work plays in society. Recent results from the 2011 Census offer a new insight
into the scale of these commitments, which save the state large costs that it would
otherwise have to bear.
Census 2011 found that 4.1 per cent of the population aged over 15 provided some
care for sick or disabled family members or friends on an unpaid basis. This figure
equates to 187,112 people. The dominant caring role played by women was
highlighted by the fact that 114,113 (61 per cent) of these care providers were
female.48 When assessed by length of time, the census found that a total of 6,287,510
hours of care were provided by carers each week, representing an average of 33.6
hours of unpaid help and assistance each. Two thirds of this volume of care was
provided by female carers (CSO, 2012: 71-77). Using the minimum wage as a simple
(an unrealistically low) benchmark to establish the benefit which carers provide
each year suggests that Ireland’s carers provide care valued at more than €2.8bn per
annum.
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48 A CSO QNHS special module on carers (CSO, 2010) and a 2008 ESRI study entitled
‘Gender Inequalities in Time Use’ found similar trends (McGinnity and Russell, 2008:36,
70).
Social Justice Ireland welcomed the long overdue publication of a National Carers
Strategy in July 2012 (Department of Health, 2012). The document includes a
‘roadmap for Implementation’ involving a suite of actions, and associated timelines
and identifies the Government Department responsible for their implementation.
However, these actions were confined to those that could be achieved on a cost
neutral basis. The first annual progress report of the strategy was published by
Minister Kathleen Lynch in January 2014 (Department of Health, 2014). It points
towards some progress on the actions set out, but these are, as a group, limited given
the unwillingness of Government to allocate some resources to supporting those in
this sector.
Social Justice Ireland believes that further policy reforms should be introduced to
reduce the financial and emotional pressures on carers. In particular, these should
focus on addressing the poverty experienced by many carers and their families
alongside increasing the provision of respite care for carers and for those for whom
they care. In this context, the 24 hour responsibilities of carers contrast with the
improvements over recent years in employment legislation setting limits on
working-hours of people in paid employment.
Key policy priorities on work, unemployment and job creation
• Adopt the following policy positions in responding to the recent rapid increase
in unemployment:
– Launch a major investment programme focused on creating employment
and prioritise initiatives that strengthen social infrastructure, such as the
school building programme and the social housing programme.
– Resource the up-skilling of those who are unemployed and at risk of
becoming unemployed through integrating training and labour market
programmes.
– Maintain a sufficient number of active labour market programme places
available to those who are unemployed.
– Adopt policies to address the worrying trend of youth unemployment. In
particular, these should include education and literacy initiatives as well as
retraining schemes.
– Recognise that many of the unemployed are skilled professionals who
require appropriate support other than training.
– Resource a targeted re-training scheme for those previously unemployed in
the construction industry, recognising that this industry is never likely to
recover to the level of employment it had prior to 2007.
– Recognise the scale of the evolving long-term unemployment problem and
adopt targeted policies to begin to address this.
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– Ensure that the social welfare system is administered such that there is
minimal delays in paying the newly unemployed the social welfare benefits
to which they are entitled.
• Funded programmes supporting the community should be expanded to meet
the growing pressures arising from the current economic downturn.
• A new programme should be put in place targeting those who are very long-term
unemployed (i.e. 5+ years).
• Policy should seek at all times to ensure that new jobs have reasonable pay rates
and adequately resource the labour inspectorate.
• As part of the process of addressing the working poor issue, reform the taxation
system to make tax credits refundable.
• Develop employment-friendly income-tax policies which ensure that no
unemployment traps exist. Policies should ease the transition from
unemployment to employment.
• Adopt policies to address the obstacles facing women when they return to the
labour force. These should focus on care initiatives, employment flexibility and
the provision of information and training.
• Reduce the impediments faced by people with a disability in achieving
employment. In particular, address the current situation in which many face
losing their benefits when they take up employment.
• Recognise the right to work of all asylum seekers whose application for asylum
is at least six months old and who are not entitled to take up employment.
• Recognise that the term “work” is not synonymous with the concept of “paid
employment”. Everybody has a right to work, i.e. to contribute to his or her own
development and that of the community and the wider society. This, however,
should not be confined to job creation. Work and a job are not the same thing.
• Request the CSO to conduct an annual survey to discover the value of all unpaid
work in the country (including community and voluntary work and work in the
home). Publish the results of this survey as soon as they become available.
• Give greater recognition to the work carried out by carers in Ireland and
introduce policy reforms to reduce the financial and emotional pressures on
carers. In particular, these should focus on addressing the poverty experienced
by many carers and their families as well as on increasing the provision of respite
opportunities to carers and to those for whom they care.
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6.  
PUBL IC  SERV ICES
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE: PUBLIC SERVICES
To ensure the provision of, and access to, a level of public services regarded as
acceptable by Irish society generally
Later chapters will analyse a range of public services such as healthcare, education
and housing. This chapter, however, looks at public services in a range of areas not
addressed elsewhere.  These include public transport, library services, financial
services, information and communications technology, telecommunications, free
legal aid, sports facilities and regulation.
In addressing these issues we analyse key parts of their present situation, clarify the
challenges they face and set out possible pathways towards developing a fairer
future.  All of these chapters address issues related to the achievement of one
element of Social Justice Ireland’s Core Policy Framework (see Chapter 2) i.e. ‘Enhance
Social Protection’.  
It is important to note that ‘public services’ is not synonymous with ‘public sector’.
While the public sector delivers a wide spectrum of public services, such services are
also delivered by the community and voluntary sector and by the business sector in
a variety of combinations with the public sector.  
As noted in chapter 2, public services and infrastructure have been eroded since the
crisis of 2008. At both national and local level, social services and related initiatives
have been cut just as the demands for these services were increasing. We have also
noted that particular budgetary decisions may provide a short-term gain or saving
for Government but have huge negative long-term consequences. The need to
protect services by adjusting deficit reduction is an aspect of Social Justice Irelands
Core Policy Framework as outlined in chapter 2. Social Justice Ireland is very
concerned that many decisions made since 2008 will have negative long-term
effects. Government’s continuing insistence on prioritising expenditure cuts over
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increasing taxation in Ireland has serious implications for public services and
negative effects on Ireland’s low and middle-income individuals and households.
(For further information on these issues cf. chapters 2 and 3.)
Many public services provided by community and voluntary organisations have
come under huge pressure in recent years as the recession has forced an ever-growing
number of people to seek their help. But, at the very moment when the demand for
services increased, Government reduced the funding being made available to many
such organisations providing these services. Because poorer people rely on public
services more than those who are better off, it is they who are most acutely affected
by cuts to services.
public transport
‘The provision of adequate and affordable public transport will not only address the
needs of those who are isolated from services or employment, it will contribute to
reduced traffic and environmental pollution and better public health’ (Farrell et al.
2008: 44). Increased car dependency compounds issues relating to social isolation,
increasing obesity and health hazards connected to heavy traffic and environmental
pollution. Coupled with this, access in terms of transport to jobs, health services,
education and other facilities is a major factor in ensuring social inclusion (Lucas,
et al, 2001; Wilkinson & Mormot, 2003; Considine & Dukelow, 2009).
Consequently, public transport is an important component of any strategy to
address issues such as health and to ensure social inclusion.  
In Ireland there has been a decline in the use of public transport and passenger
numbers; Dublin Bus passenger numbers fell by 22% from 2007 to 2012. The main
public transport provider, CIE, suffered a decline in passenger journeys of 21 per
cent from 2007-2011. Passenger numbers continued to decline in 2013, although
tempering slightly (Department of Transport: 2009, Department of Transport
Tourism and Sport, 2011, National Transport Authority: 2013).
The Department of Transport (2009), indicates that creating a sustainable transport
system involves ensuring that alternatives to car transport are available.  Improving
public transport systems, along with investment in cycling and walking, is a central
means by which this will be achieved. ‘Public transport has to gain a higher share
than today in the transport mix, become easily accessible for everyone and fully
integrated with non-motorised modes’ (European Commission, 2011:24). However,
the increase in car dependency and the decline in the use of public transport in
Ireland suggests that public transport provision is not adequate or of sufficient
quality. In a consultation report for A Sustainable Transport Future: a New Transport
Policy for Ireland 2009 – 2020, concerns were highlighted in regard to the quality of
public transport, lack of integration, lack of capacity, overcrowding, poor availability
and design of routes.
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Further to this, The European Green City Index report carried out in 2009 ranked
Dublin last out of 30 cities in the transport category. The length of its public
transport network and the extent of its cycle lanes are well below the average. It
noted that less than 20 per cent of people take public transport to work; nearly 61
per cent use private cars (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009). This data does not take
cognisance of recent developments such as the ‘Dublin Bikes’ scheme, cross-city
cycle lanes and the rollout of integrated public transport ticketing (the ‘Leap’ card)
(The National Competitiveness Council, 2012).  However, even with these
improvements, problems persist. In 2011 the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) highlighted that one of the most significant barriers to achieving sustainable
transport in Ireland relates to ‘lack of reliable and efficient public transport and
cycling facilities’ (Browne et al. 2011: vii).  
The Department of Transport Tourism and Sport acknowledges the ‘need to
rebalance transport policy to favour public transport’ (2011:33). However, subsidy
reductions in 2013 resulting in fare increases across all public transport operators
[Dublin Bus, Iarnród Éireann, Bus Éireann and Luas] does little to encourage this.
Maintaining affordability should be central to delivery of an accessible public
transport system. It is crucial that Government continues to give priority to public
transport over private transport in allocating funding in the years ahead.
While the main focus so far in this section has been on the provision of alternatives
to car transport, it is also important to note that car transport is often the only
option, for example in rural areas. Welcome improvements have been made over
recent decades relating to motorways and other central routes in Ireland. However
‘Ireland’s remaining road network often consists of poorly maintained roads which
are not capable of meeting usual demand, certainly not to an international level’
(Engineers Ireland, 2012:12). In 2014 a package of €332.9 million was announced
for the maintenance of regional and local roads ‘The focus on road maintenance
and repair comes against a backdrop of ongoing limited resources and an overall cut
of 17% this year [2014] on the 2013 funding’ (Department of Transport, Tourism and
Sport, 2014). The condition of these roads is deteriorating; work to improve and
maintain regional and local roads is required. 
In light of the discussion relating to the role public transport plays in underpinning
social inclusion it is also essential that continued support is provided for the
development and maintenance of the rural transport programme.49 It should also
be recognised that public transport in Ireland requires a sustained level of
investment to ensure that it is of a sufficient quality.  
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49 Issues specifically related to the provision of public services in rural areas are addressed
in chapter 12.
library services
Libraries play an important role in Irish society, performing a valuable community
and educational service and ensuring access to reading, information and learning.
‘They provide a focal point for community and intergenerational contact, and
enable access to learning and an ever-expanding range of information for a wide
constituency through an increasingly broad and varied range of media’ (McGrath
et al, 2010: 6). Recent research by the Carnegie Trust (2012) indicated that overall
more than three quarters (79 per cent) of those in Ireland said that libraries were
‘very important’ or ‘essential’ for communities, this was higher than any other
jurisdiction included in this research. 
Statistics provided for 2011 further underscore the important function that libraries
play in Ireland. In that year registered membership of libraries increased by 11.3per
cent from 809,169 to 900,811. Fractionally under one in five of the population (19.6
per cent) are registered as members of the public library service, up from 19.1 per
cent in 2010. Children’s membership of the library saw a decline of 2.7 per cent in
2011, while adult membership in the same period increased by 2.4 per cent. Visits
to full-time branches increased by 11.9 per cent from 14.7 million to 16.45 million
and estimated visits to all branches increased by 1.1 million over 2010 (Public Library
Authority, 2011). In 2012 it was estimated50 that overall investment in public libraries
would be reduced. Local authorities estimated that they would invest €137 million
of their revenue budgets on public library services in 2012. This represented a
decrease of 2.6 per cent on the 2011 figure of €140.6 million. Total local authority
expenditure on library stock was set to decrease by 12.1 per cent on the 2011 figure.
The reduced funding for stock is of particular concern in light of the growing
demand for the service and the need to preserve quality (An Comhairle
Leabharlanna, 2012).  
‘Branching Out’ (Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government,
2008) was a major review of library services in Ireland and built on a publication of
the same name undertaken in 1998 (Department of Environment, Heritage and
Local Government, 1998). Between 1998 and 2008, when this review of policy was
published, there were significant improvements in the services provided by libraries.
These included improvements in book collections, ICT infrastructure and electronic
services and building infrastructure. According to the review, it is imperative that
the improvements made in the library service to date are maintained. This is
particularly important given the continued growth in demand on library services.
While, great improvements have been made and a vision of a vibrant library service
is articulated in the new strategy, Opportunities for AllP: A Strategy for Public Libraries
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50 The actual report for 2012 was not available at the time of writing.
2013-2017 there have been reductions in regard to funding for libraries over the past
number of years. One of its key recommendations in this strategy concerns the need
for public libraries to ‘explore the potential to secure additional funding through
philanthropy, enterprise, public-private partnership and other alternative sources’
(Department of Environment, Community and Local Government 2013:35). The
securing of additional funding should not be utilised as a means to further reduce
funding to public libraries.
The issue of fees is viewed as a barrier to use, with An Chomhairle Leabharlanna’s
2010 annual report concluding that the benefits of free access outweigh the value
of the money gained. This is a particularly important point in the current economic
climate and Social Justice Ireland urges local authorities to reconsider this measure;
indeed, one of the aims in the new strategy indicates that libraries will attempt to
ensure equity of access for all through the provision of free core services by 2017. 
Public libraries play a crucial role in Irish society and have the potential to play an
even more important role into the future. Social  Justice  Ireland believes  that,  as
part  of our commitment  to providing a  continuum of education  provision  from
early childhood to third level and throughout the life-cycle, Ireland needs to
recognise the potential that the library service offers. This requires ready availability
and easy access to information. Coupled with this is the need for easy access to
modern means of communication. Libraries are obvious centres with potential to
support these objectives. To play this potential role, continued support for, and
expansion of, the library service is essential. 
Financial services and inclusion
Financial exclusion refers to a household’s difficulty in accessing and using financial
services. This has particular implications as we move towards an increasingly
cashless society because groups already financially excluded will become more
marginalised. A 2011 study by the ESRI examined four dimensions of financial
exclusion: access to a bank current account, access to credit, ability to save and access
to housing insurance (Russell et al, 2011). Of these, access to a bank current account
was considered the most fundamental because exclusion from basic banking
services means households may face difficulties carrying out everyday transactions
such as paying bills, receiving earnings or welfare benefits, transferring funds or
purchasing goods and services. 
This research highlighted serious deficiencies in the ability of Irish households to
access these basic financial services. In 2008 it was found that 20 per cent of Irish
households did not have a bank current account – a figure that is almost three times
higher than the average for the EU15.  The proportion without a bank current
account rose to 40 per cent among those with low education qualifications, 38 per
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cent in households in the bottom 20 per cent of the income distribution, 50 per cent
among local authority tenants, 52 per cent among those who are ill or living with a
disability, and 27 per cent among those aged over 55 years (Russell et al 2011:126-
127).
The Strategy for Financial Inclusion published in 2011 demonstrated that a binding
requirement on banks in other EU countries to address the issues faced by people
who are financially excluded yielded positive results. ‘As a significant first step in
this direction, a binding requirement to support the provision of a BPA (basic
payment account) was introduced for Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland in 2009
as part of the recapitalisation of those banks, and this commitment was extended
to the remainder of the domestic banking sector in a package of sector-wide
commitments, which was agreed with the European Commission in 2010 as part of
its Decision on the Bank of Ireland Restructuring Plan’ (Steering Group on Financial
Inclusion, 2011: 7).
While the provision of a basic payment account does not address all elements of
financial exclusion, it is considered to be the most important initial requirement. A
pilot project of providing a standard bank account ran for 9 months up to the 31st
March 2013 with a total of 205 accounts opened. A particular consideration of note
is the need for greater involvement from post offices and credit unions in providing
an access points, especially given the geographic reach of bank branches (Report of
the Financial Inclusion Working Group on the Standard Bank Account Pilot Project,
2013). Further work in regard to development of the product prior to national rollout
is currently being pursued.  
Information and communications technology
In 2013 an estimated 84 per cent of households had a home computer. This was an
increase of 14 percentage points since 2008. Internet connection has also increased
substantially over this period, with an estimated 82 per cent now connected to the
internet at home compared with 72 per cent in 2010 and 63 per cent in 2008. There
has been strong growth each year in internet connections. 78 per cent of individuals
used the internet in the 3 months prior to the survey, with 61 per cent of individuals
using the internet every day in the 3 months prior to the survey (CSO, 2013).
However, almost one in five Irish adults have never used the internet, with over half
of people aged 60 to 74 having never used the internet (Department of
Communication, Energy, Natural Resources, 2013).
These figures underscore the progressively important role that ICT plays in modern
society and the level of progress being made in regard to access to digital technology
in Ireland. ‘Digital literacy is increasingly becoming an essential life competence
and the inability to access or use ICT has effectively become a barrier to social
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integration and personal development. Those without sufficient ICT skills are
disadvantaged in the labour market and have less access to information to empower
themselves as consumers, or as citizens saving time and money in offline activities
and using online public services (European Commission, 2008: 4). Digital
competence is also one of the competencies highlighted as part of the key
competencies required for lifelong learning by the European Commission in 2006.
Factors such as disability, age and social disadvantage all have significant roles to
play in increasing digital exclusion. Apart from the impact on the individual, there
are also losses to the business community and the economy at large (McDaid &
Cullen, 2008).
In 2012 the Government published its digital strategy for delivering public services.
Covering the period 2012 to 2015, this strategy encourages greater sharing of data
between Government public bodies, wider adoption of online payments and the
use of smartphone optimised sites and apps. It also identified a number of services
which may be particularly suitable for electronic delivery, such as the renewal of
adult passports, planning applications and objections and welfare applications.
With this increasing focus on digital communication and a move to the delivery of
services via electronic formats, Government needs to show sustained commitment
to counteract the issue of digital exclusion in particular for the more vulnerable
sectors of society. The Government in 2013 committed to getting 288,000 people
“on line” over the period to 2016. Delivering a new scheme [BenefIT 4] which targets
specific groups most likely to be non-internet users for digital skills training-–
funding of €1.4m was provided in 2013 for training 24,000 citizens at multiple
locations across Ireland (Department of Communication, Energy, Natural
Resources, 2013). Resources will continue to be required in this area if this target is
to be met. At an economic level this is essential to promote competitiveness and
effectiveness, while at a social services level it is essential to ensure digital exclusion
does not become another form of exclusion being experienced by those who are
already vulnerable.
Telecommunications
Two issues are of note in this area. Firstly, the Commission for Communications
Regulation (ComReg) has put in place a system to ensure that a basic set of
telecommunications services is available to all consumers throughout the country.
This is known as a Universal Service Obligation (USO). The services to be provided
include: meeting reasonable requests for connections at a fixed location to the public
communications network and access to publicly available telephone service; provision
of directory services and maintenance of the national directory database; public
telephone provision; specific services for disabled users; affordability of tariffs and
options for consumers to control expenditure (ComReg, 2011: 13). Eircom is the
designated Universal Service Provider (USP) and has a number of obligations regarding
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the supply of these services. Social Justice Ireland welcomes the vigilance of ComReg
in maintaining the quality of the service provided under this obligation, taking into
account any potential negative effects on disadvantaged members of the community
were these obligations not to be met. Eircom was re-designated as the Universal Service
Provider in June 2012 with the term set to last until 30 June 2014 (ComReg, 2012).
Secondly, as part of the Digital Agenda for Europe, the European Commission has
set targets of 30mbps broadband for all citizens and 50 per cent of citizens
subscribing to 100mbps by 2020.  While there have been substantial increases in the
numbers of people connecting to the internet (see section on Information and
Communications Technology), Ireland is performing badly in relation to the roll-
out and take-up of advanced broadband services. The take-up (subscriptions as a
percentage of population) of fixed broadband was 24.6 per cent in January 2013, 0.4
percentage points higher than 2012, but below the European average of 28.8 per
cent. The share of high speed connections, at least 30 Mbps, was higher than
average, 20.4 per cent compared to 14.8 per cent in the EU. However, ultra-fast
connections, at least 100 Mbps, remain low and accounted for only 1.4 per cent of
all subscriptions compared to 3.4 per cent in the EU (European Commission, 2013).
‘Given the weak telecommunications investment climate in Ireland, our dispersed
population patterns and the recession, there is a strong risk, if appropriate action is
not taken, that Ireland is likely to fall even further behind as other countries are
moving ahead to deploy advanced telecoms networks’ (Forfas, 2011:27).
Government has recognised the need to address Ireland’s performance in regard to
advanced broadband technology, The National Broadband Plan was published in
August 2012 committing to the role-out of:  
• 70Mbps – 100Mbps to more than half of the population by 2015;
• at least 40Mbps, and in many cases much faster speeds, to at least a further 20
per cent of the population and potentially as much as 35 per cent around smaller
towns and villages; and
• a minimum of 30Mbps for every remaining home and business in the country –
no matter how rural or remote (Department of Communications, Energy and
Natural Resources, 2012:1).
A recent release from Eurostat revealed that while, 82% of Irish households have
internet access above the EU average of 79%,, only 67% of Irish households have
access to a broadband connection; this is well below the EU average of 76% (Eurostat,
2013). The targets in the NBS are ambitious and will require substantial investment
to be achieved. However, there will be many advantages to businesses and
individuals. The plan recognises the need to bring faster broadband to rural areas
and, where the market fails to deliver, the Government will intervene (Department
of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, 2012). The roll-out and delivery
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of high quality broadband particularly to rural areas will need to be monitored
carefully, in terms of cost and quality; this is vital to ensure access for all. 
Free legal aid
Citizens depend on the law and associated institutions to defend their rights and
civic entitlements. The free legal aid system is a central part of this system,
particularly for those with limited incomes. The Legal Aid Board provides civil legal
aid to people of modest means, with recipients contributing a nominal sum. Social
Justice Ireland believes that free legal aid is an important public service. In the current
economic climate, with rising unemployment and decreasing income, the demands
on the Legal Aid Board are continuing to grow. Most notably, there has been an
increase in demand for services regarding debt issues.
According to the Legal Aid Board Annual Report, while 2012 saw a reduction of 9
per cent in applicants, the cumulative increase in applicants for such services over
the six years to 2012 is well over 70 per cent (2012:8).
The Board has indicated that the sustained increase in demand is being primarily
driven by two factors. The first, and most significant, is the economic downturn
which has resulted in many more people becoming eligible for the legal services
provided by the Board. Secondly, there appears to be a greater need for legal services
during times of economic crisis, particularly in areas such as family law, debt issues
and employment.
There has been a massive increase in demand for this service at a time when
resources are being reduced. The budget allocation for general legal services
(excluding refugee/asylum related matters) was reduced from €26.988 million in
2008 to €26.31 million in 2009, €24.225 million in 2010, and €24.125 million in
2011 (Legal Aid Board, 2009, 2010 &2011). 
Despite an increased throughput by the Legal Aid Board’s staff in law centres, those
people entitled to access the civil legal aid scheme are having to wait longer. This is
seen as an area of particular concern; tighter financial constraints, a moratorium on
staffing and an increase in demand for services is having a very significant impact.
Waiting times for a first appointment other than those deemed priority were in
excess of four months in 16 of the law centres (Legal Aid Board, 2012). It is important
to remember that justice delayed is justice denied.
Social Justice Ireland believes that the provision of, and adequate support for, this
service is a basic requirement of governance. In light of the increasing pressure on
this service, it is vital that it is adequately resourced and supported by the
Government.
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Sports
A report carried out by Indecon International Economic Consultants (2010)
highlighted the contribution provided by sport to the Irish economy.  It also showed
the important role played by sport in assisting the development of social capital and
in contributing to the health and quality of life of the population. Therefore, the
considerable rise in participation in sports, from 34 per cent in 2009 to 46 per cent
in 2011, with further increases recorded in the initial 6 months of 2013 (preliminary
results from The Irish Sports Monitor, 2103) on the same period in 2011, are hugely
welcome (Irish Sports Council, 2013).
The Draft National Sports Facilities Strategy 2012-2015 acknowledges the important
role that sport plays in terms of health, economic and social benefits. It outlines
three overall objectives (Department of Transport Tourism and Sport, 2012:3): 
• participation in sport and physical activity at all levels; 
• opportunities for the achievement of excellence at the elite levels of sport, both
nationally and internationally; and 
• social inclusion.
It must be noted that firstly, income plays a large role when it comes to participation
in sports in Ireland, with only 38 per cent of those in the lowest income bracket
playing sport compared with 56 per cent of those in the highest income bracket (The
Irish Sports Council, 2011). Secondly, people who are socially disadvantaged are less
likely to participate in sport and, therefore, less likely to obtain the health benefits
of physical activity. With this in mind an aspect of sports policy which is important
is the ‘need to improve the provision and accessibility of sports facilities in socially
disadvantaged areas’ (Department of Transport Tourism and Sport, 2012:12). The
National Sports Council has developed a creative initiative of local sports
partnerships. Some of these are working effectively to address this problem.
Continued funding for local sports partnerships would be most worthwhile. 
Another aspect of the sporting landscape in Ireland which deserves consideration
is the issue of volunteerism. The 2010 Indecon study conservatively estimated that
over 270,000 people participate in some form of sport-related voluntary activity;
the Irish Sports Council Strategic Plan (2009) estimated that the number was closer
to 400,000. The estimated value of volunteering is between €321 million and €582
million per annum (Indecon, 2010). People engaging in volunteering bring
numerous social benefits. In 2011 the proportion of people volunteering for sport
increased from 7 per cent to 15 per cent. However, preliminary results from the 2013
Sports Monitor suggest that volunteering has decreased (Irish Sports Council, 2013).
Government should continue to support policies aimed at encouraging
volunteering and enhancing the experience of volunteers. 
134 Socio-Economic Review 2014
As sports policy is developed against the background of increasingly scarce public
expenditure resources, Social Justice Ireland believes that in-depth consideration
needs to be given as to how the returns on these investments can be maximised. In
many cases simple schemes to encourage participation and use of existing sports
facilities are all that is required.
Regulation
Regulatory policy in Ireland has failed in many areas and requires significant reform.
This has been clearly demonstrated in the problems that have emerged in the
financial services sector. While some of the required reforms have been put in place,
a serious re-think is required to ensure that regulation plays a stronger and far more
effective role to ensure there is no repetition of the huge failures of the past decade.
Central to our opinion on how regulation should develop is the view that all current
and future regulation be required to consider the societal impact of any reforms
proposed. They should also have the capacity to monitor what is happening and to
act effectively and quickly when problems are identified. Regulation should be
judged on how it affects social, cultural and sustainability issues in society as well
as on the economy. Implementing regulation with this as its central aim would
certainly achieve better regulation for all. It would also ensure consistently better
outcomes for consumers. Such an approach, for example, would have prevented the
failure of the regulatory process in the current banking crisis.
Social Justice Ireland also believes that there should be solid and justifiable reasons
for introducing regulation. It should not be introduced just to create
choice/competition within the market. For example, to achieve competition in the
electricity market the electricity regulator increased the price of electricity. While
this may achieve competition, we question the benefit to the public at large..
Furthermore, assessment mechanisms should be established to allow an analysis of
regulation pre and post implementation. Examination of societal impacts should
be central to such an assessment procedure. We also believe that inputs should be
sought from interested parties, including the community and voluntary sector, as
part of the assessment procedure.
The impact of regulation within the context of regional policy is another important
consideration. Cross-subsidisation issues, in postal or electrical services, are
important to retain equity between rural and urban dwellers. A further challenge
for regulatory authorities must be to retain this inter-regional equity.
Regulation and regulatory law has profoundly failed Ireland in recent years. It
should be framed in ways that ensure it is effective, timely, accessible and
interpretable. Currently regulatory law is complex and in many cases requires those
being regulated to divert a considerable quantity of resources to keep abreast of
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developments. Complex regulation also makes it difficult for interested parties to
actively participate in the pre and post-regulation assessment mechanisms. Social
Justice Ireland believes it is important that where regulation has been judged to be a
failure, Government should reform it at the earliest opportunity.
Key policy priorities for public Services
• Focus policy on ensuring that there is provision of, and access to, a level of public
services regarded as acceptable by Irish society generally.
• Ensure equality of access across all public services.
• Target funding strategies to ensure that far greater priority is given to providing
an easy-access, affordable, integrated and high-quality public transport system
as well as ensuring the maintenance of roads.  
• Ensure adequate support for the Rural Transport Initiative that increases
significantly the quality of life of those living in remote rural areas, particularly
older people and women.
• Support the further development of library services throughout the country,
including provision of open-access information technology.
• Ensure that financial institutions provide people with easily accessed and
affordable basic bank accounts and financial facilities, as per the Strategy for
Financial Inclusion (2011), to ensure accessibility, explore the possibilities of
achieving this through the post office and credit union network in addition to
other financial institutions. 
• Give more in-depth consideration to how public funds are used to encourage
sport and sporting activity. In many cases simple schemes to encourage
participation and use of existing sports facilities are required.
• Adopt further information technology programmes to increase the skills of
disadvantaged members of society.
• With increased investment in advanced broadband systems, continued
monitoring is required in regard to both the quality and cost of its provision to
ensure accessibility.
• Take action to address the huge failures identified in regulatory processes. These
processes should ensure that all types of regulation take into account potential
impact on social, cultural and sustainability issues within society as well as on
the economy. Implementing regulation with this balance as its central aim
would achieve better regulation for all.
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7. 
HOUS ING  AND
ACCOMMODAT ION  
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE: HOUSING & ACCOMMODATION
To ensure that adequate and appropriate accommodation is available for all people
and to develop an equitable system for allocating resources within the housing sector
Issues relating to housing and accommodation have featured prominently in policy
debates in Ireland over recent years. Most of this has been concerned with the
provision and cost of privately owned accommodation. However, more recent
developments in the area of housing relate to challenges involving the large surplus
housing stock in areas of low demand, and low housing stock in areas of high
demand, high levels of mortgage arrears, unfinished developments and increasing
social housing need, as well as changes in tenure patterns and the focus of housing
policy. All of these issues are discussed in this chapter and they all relate to one
element of Social Justice Ireland’s core policy framework (see chapter 2) ‘Enhance
Social Provision’.
During the boom years, Ireland experienced an astonishing growth in property
construction and house prices. Initially the increase in housing construction was
a response to rising demand, as a result of a sustained growth in the population,
low interest rates and increasing income per capita. As noted in chapter 2, this
situation changed and construction was promoted and supported as an end in itself
because it appeared to generate economic growth. Construction became a major
element and driver of the Irish economy. Housing construction increased at a rate
which was not supported by demand. The result was a housing bubble which
contributed to the economic crisis. According to Kitchin et.al (2010), poor financial
and planning regulations, along with tax incentives, served to support this negative
phenomenon.
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Housing: a New philosophy
Given the changes which have occurred in the housing landscape in Ireland it is
imperative that a new paradigm from which to progress housing policy into the
future is identified. Drudy (2006) outlines the basic elements of two approaches to
housing – housing as a commodity or housing as a home.
When housing is viewed as a commodity the market is seen to be the ideal provider
and state intervention is limited to facilitating and encouraging private provision
through, for example, tax incentives. While some state provision of housing would
exist, it would be limited to very low income groups. The implications of this
standpoint is to develop a  housing system which provides speculative profit for those
with the resources, excluding people based on their ability to pay and generating a
housing system which perpetuates inequality and segregation (Drudy, 2006). The
alternative to this is to view ‘housing as a home’, placing the emphasis on– ‘shelter, a
place to stay, to feel secure, to build a base, find an identity and participate in a
community and society’ (Drudy, 2006:244). This view regards housing as a
fundamental social requirement, in much the same way as education or health. 
Social Justice Ireland strongly endorses the need to view housing as a fundamental
social right as per the Core Policy Framework discussed in Chapter 2. Over recent
times it is clear that housing in Ireland has been seen as a commodity rather than a
home and this has had major implications for Irish society.  Had society adopted
the approach of viewing housing as a social right over the past decade the Irish
economy, and many Irish families, would not be in the precarious financial position
they are now in. It is time that we formally incorporated this approach into our
national housing policy. 
government Housing policy Statement 2011
The framework for the current national housing policy is found in the Government’s
Housing Policy Statement which was released in June 2011. It states ‘Our vision for
the future of the housing sector in Ireland is based on choice, fairness, equity across
tenures and on delivering quality outcomes for the resources invested. The overall
strategic objective will be to enable all households to access good quality housing
appropriate to household circumstances and in their particular community of
choice’ (Department of Environment, Community and Local Government, 2011).
The statement further specifies that it will not entice people to treat housing as a
commodity. 
The statement focuses on:
• the removal of incentives to purchase;
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• the creation of a viable and well regulated private rental sector containing
quality housing provision;
• the standing down of affordable housing programmes;
• Review of Part V of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (currently
underway);  
• the move to greater provision through options such as the Rental
Accommodation Scheme and the long term leasing initiative;
• the remaining capital build programmes to focus, in particular, on regeneration
and projects that cater for special needs; and
• bolstering the role of the voluntary and co-operative sector.
This has been accompanied by a massive reduction in capital spending on housing
over the past number of years. The allocation for housing in budget 2014
(Department of Finance, Budget 2014) was €576 million (i.e. €304 million in current
spending and €273 million in capital expenditure)51. The dramatic decline in the
allocation for social housing illustrates the Government’s approach to housing
policy, with a reorientation of funding from construction towards leasing initiatives
but no coherent approach to reducing the number of households on waiting lists.
New figures indicate that there are almost 90,000 households on waiting lists for
social housing, showing housing need in Ireland is at a crisis point [while there was
a reduction of approximately 9,000 households on the 2011 figure, differing
methodologies used for the collection of data means that numbers are not
comparable]. It appears that Government has no credible plan of sufficient scale to
address this issue in the foreseeable future. 
Housing tenure in Ireland 
Ireland’s housing policy historically resulted in very high levels of owner occupation
to the detriment of other tenure types. Housing policy in the past favoured investment
in residential development which, combined with policies of mortgage-interest tax
relief and very favourable tenant purchase schemes, has resulted in a high level of
home ownership. The abolition of local rates on residential property and the
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51 Revised estimates Budget 2014 indicate the following output targets in housing. Secure
1,200 housing units through leasing arrangements. Transfer 4,000 households from
rent supplement to rental accommodation scheme & other social housing supports.
Deliver 200 units under Social Housing Investment Programme. Deliver an additional
500 units under Social Housing Stimulus Programme. Deliver 175 Special Needs Units
under Capital Assistance Scheme. Deliver 40 Traveller Specific Units. Upgrade 14,166
units under retrofitting programme. Meet the housing needs of up to 150 people with
disabilities transitioning from institutional care.
subsequent failure to implement a system of residential property tax ensured that
owner occupation was additionally subsidised. Further to this, in the social housing
sector people had the option of purchasing their own house and many did. In practice
this transferred wealth to the purchaser as these houses were available for far less than
their real market value. These policies over years produced a housing system that was
not tenure neutral and led to the residualisation of the rental sector, both public and
private. Using data from various Censuses of Population, table 7.1 shows how Irish
tenure patterns have changed. In 2006 77.2 per cent of households were owner-
occupiers, a figure which gave Ireland one of the highest rates of owner occupancy in
the EU. Irelands traditionally high-level of home ownership is indicative of two
factors: it shows the value which Irish people placed on owning their own home and
it underscores the level to which Irish housing policy has supported owner
occupation, placing little value on other tenure types.
This trend has begun to reverse with a substantial reduction in the level of owner-
occupied dwellings in 2011 and a return to levels in renting which have not been
seen since 1971 (see table 7.1). In 2011 owner occupied dwellings accounted for 70.8
per cent, down from 77.2 per cent in 2006, a reduction of almost 7 percentage points
in this period and just under 10 percentage points since 1991. There has also been a
dramatic 47 per cent increase in the number of households in rented
accommodation between 2006 and 2011, up from 323,007 to 474,788. The overall
percentage of households renting their accommodation rose to 29.252 per cent,
causing home ownership rates to fall sharply (see table 7.1) (CSO, 2012). People’s
reluctance to buy property and to continue to rent instead may be due to such
factors as the unavailability of mortgage finance and instability in the housing and
employment markets. 
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52 ‘Other’ refers to the category of people who indicated that they were living in their
dwellings rent free. In the CSO publication The roof over our heads this category of
people is included in the number of households renting, giving a total of 474,788 or
29.2%.
Table 7.1- Nature of Occupancy of Private Households, Ireland 1961-2011
year owner-occupied Rented other
1961 59.8% 35.6% 4.6%
1971 68.8% 28.9% 2.3%
1981 74.7% 22.6% 2.6%
1991 80.0% 17.9% 2.1%
2002 79.8% 18.5% 1.7%
2006 77.2% 21.3% 1.5%
201153 70.8% 27.7% 1.6%
Source: CSO (2012:63)
Total Housing Stock
Census 2011 revealed interesting insights into the total housing stock in Ireland. In
April 2011 there were 1,994,845 permanent dwellings or housing units in the State.
This is an increase of 225,232 units, or 12.7 per cent, on the level in 2006,
representing an annual average growth rate of 2.4 per cent. While this increase is
significant it is a notable reduction on the increase in stock which occurred between
2002 and 2006, when the housing stock increased by 309,560 (21 per cent),
representing an average annual growth rate of 4.9 per cent, which is the highest on
record (CSO, 2012:7). Comparing figures from census 2002, 2006 and 2011, it is clear
that a significant slowdown in the housing stock growth has occurred – a slowdown
which was inevitable due to the oversupply of housing in many areas of the country
which took place over the last 20 years.
Housing Stock and population growth
Table 7.2 shows the growth in housing stock compared to the growth in population
over a 20 year period. The rise in housing stock was significantly greater than the
growth in population (71.9 per cent compared with 30.1 per cent). There were 785
new housing units for every 1,000 persons added to the population between 1991
and 2011 (CSO, 2012:7). This illustrates that the increase in housing which occurred
over the 10 year period leading up to census 2011 was unsustainable, with more than
one in four of all occupied dwellings in Ireland being built during this decade.
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53 The 2011 data cited in this table differs slightly from the publication released by the
CSO The roof over our heads. This is because in order for the data to be comparable with
other years it required that the category of people who ‘did not state’ the nature of
their occupancy be removed from the total number of dwellings prior to calculating
the percentage of owner-occupied, rented and other. This is in keeping with other CSO
publications, such as Measuring Irelands Progress 2011. 
Table 7.2- Population and housing stock 1991-2011
Census population % Change in Housing % Change in
year population Stock Housing Stock
1991 3,525,719 - 1,160,249 -
1996 3,626,087 2.8 1,258,948 8.5
2002 3,917,203 8.0 1,460,053 16.0
2006 4,239,848 8.2 1,769,613 21.2
2011 4,588,252 8.2 1,994,845 12.7
Source: CSO (2012:7)
House completions
Table 7.3 outlines the rate of house completions in the various sectors from 2001 up
to the third quarter of 2013. The peak was in 2006 when over 93,000 units were
completed. Since then the rate of dwelling completion has declined rapidly. The
total number of house completions in 2010 was 14,602, with a further fall to 8,488
in 2012, with preliminary data for 2013 showing a continuation of this trend. 2012
figures for total house completions have more than halved when compared with
levels in 1993 (21,391 units across all sectors). In 1993, Local Authorities completed
1,200 units, voluntary/non-profit accounted for 890 units with the private sector
making up the remaining 19,301 units (cf. annex 7).
In 2009 the vast majority of new houses (80 per cent) were built by the private sector
(down from 91 per cent in 2007). In 2012 private sector completions accounted for
88 per cent of total completions. While the private sector still is responsible for the
highest number of completions the fall-off has been dramatic, going from over
70,000 in 2007 to almost 7,500 in 2012. 
Local authorities completed 3,362 new homes in 2009, this figure dropped
substantially to 363 in 2012. The Government has indicated that a return to large
scale building of local authority housing is unlikely and has instead decided to focus
resources in the area of social leasing initiatives and the Rental Accommodation
Scheme (RAS) in order to ensure social housing provision. The figures for 2009
revealed a welcome growth in the levels of voluntary/non-profit and co-op housing.
These organisations built 2,011 dwellings during that year. This trend underscored
the growing role this sector is playing in Irish housing. Currently according to the
Irish Council for Social Housing (2013) the housing association sector manages up
to 27,000 homes.  However, a reduction in capital funding has a seen a major
reduction in completions of housing from this sector, with only 653 completions
in 2012 and again preliminary data for 2013 showing a continuation of this trend.
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The Government’s housing policy statement indicates that the role of the voluntary
and cooperative sector will be central in providing social housing into the future.
With the elimination of the Capital Loans and Subsidy Scheme, it is essential that
this sector is supported. 
Table 7.3 - House Completions, 1993–2013 (Q.3)
year local Authority voluntary/ Non private Total
Housing profit Housing Housing
2001 3,622 1,253 47,727 52,602
2002 4,403 1,360 51,932 57,695
2003 4,516 1,617 62,686 68,819
2004 3,539 1,607 71,808 76,954
2005 4,209 1,350 75,398 80,957
2006 3,968 1,240 88,211 93,419
2007 4,986 1,685 71,356 78,027
2008 4,905 1,896 44,923 51,724
200928 3,362 2,011 21,076 26,420
2010 1,328 741 12,533 14,602
2011 486 745 9,295 10,480
2012 363 653 7,472 8,488
2013 up to Q3 253 100 5,318 5,671
Source: Department of Environment, Community and Local Government Housing
Statistics (2013) Note: Local authority house completions do not include second-hand
houses acquired by them. New units acquired under Part V, Planning & Development
Acts 2000-2006 for local authority rental purposes are included. Voluntary & co-operative
housing consists of housing provided under the capital loan & subsidy and capital
assistance schemes.
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54 There is a discrepancy of 29 in total house completions. This is as a result 39 voluntary
and co-operative units completed in this year being represented by just 10 ESB
connections due to the nature of the units. 
Social Justice Ireland believes that the voluntary and co-operative sector has the capacity
to make a significant contribution in addressing housing need in Ireland and that
Government must provide the assistance needed to ensure its continued growth. With
the Government’s housing policy statement focusing on the bolstering of this sector,
it will be necessary to ensure appropriate regulation, while also ensuring that
sufficient funding and pathways to funding are available in order for this sector to
contribute towards addressing the level of housing need in Ireland. However this
sector cannot be expected to provide for all of Ireland’s social housing needs.
Further to the completions the local authorities also acquire a number of units. The
downward trend in output is further mirrored in the data relating to acquisitions
for social housing from local authorities. Going from 2,002 acquisitions in 2007, to
325 in 2011 and 351 in 2012. The number of new units in social housing output has
been declining significantly over the past number of years. The total number of new
social housing units (includes completions for both local authority and voluntary
and cooperative housing as well as local authority acquisitions) in 2007 was 8,673
falling to 6,100 in 2009 down to 1,391 in 2012. In addition to this there were also a
number of new properties acquired on long-term lease under The Rental
Accommodation Scheme (RAS) (cf. Annex 7). However, even with the inclusion of
the new RAS units and acquisitions, the output of new social housing units has
fallen considerably. 
Government should ensure it provides sufficient, continued investment in developing
and maintaining the stock of some 130,000 local authority houses. Bringing back into
use the numerous voids in this stock throughout the country will assist. The major
scaling back which is currently occurring in regard to local authority stock will have
long term negative consequences for people in housing need. 
vacant housing stock 
As the increase in housing stock significantly outstripped the growth in population
it became increasingly clear that there would be insufficient demand to sustain this
growth, particularly given the uneven geographical distribution. Given the vacancy
rate, the trend in house building in Ireland has been counter to what might be
expected. Counties with the highest rates of vacant stock in 2006 subsequently
enlarged their housing stock by the highest percentage in the ensuing years, and
those counties with low vacancy levels increased their stock the least (Kitchin, et.al.
2010), with Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim and Longford recording a more than 18%
increase in housing stock over that period (CSO, 2012).Coupled with this, according
to Kitchen (2010), the lack of a residential property tax ensured that local authorities
adopted a model of funding which pursued income from development levies. This
was further supported by central Government through tax incentive schemes and
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poor regulation of local planning. These factors have resulted in vacant housing
stock in areas where there is the least demand as well as unfinished estates and
developments across the country.
In 2011 the overall vacancy rate was 14.5 per cent (if holiday homes are excluded the
vacancy rate drops to 11.5 per cent). In 2011 the vacant units consisted of 59,395
holiday homes, 168,427 houses and 61,629 apartments. The total vacancy rate in
2011 fell by 0.5 per cent compared to 2006. However, the increase in total housing
stock over this period means that the number of vacant units increased by 23,129
(see table 7.4).  The vacancy rate for 2011 varies considerably across the country. It
is highest in Leitrim, at 30.5 per cent, followed by Donegal (28.6 per cent), Kerry
(26.4 per cent) and Mayo (24.7 per cent). The lowest vacancy rate was recorded in
South Dublin (5.4 per cent), followed by Fingal (7.0 per cent), Dun Laoghaire
Rathdown (7.7 per cent) and Kildare (8.0 per cent). A vacancy rate of 10.2 per cent,
or 24,638 units, was recorded for Dublin City (CSO, 2012).  
Table 7.4  Vacancy rate and number of vacant units for 1991, 1996, 2002, 
2006 & 2011
year vacancy Rate % % Change on Number of Change in  
vacancy rate units vacant number of   
units vacant
1991 9.1 ——— 105,142 ——-
1996 8.4 - 0.7% 105,250 +      108
2002 9.8 +1.4% 143,418 + 38,168
2006 15 +5.2% 266,322 +122,904
2011 14.5 -.5% 289,451 +   23,129
Source: CSO (2012)
unfinished housing estates
The plethora of unfinished housing estates throughout Ireland is largely a result of
many local authorities disregarding good planning guidelines.  Consideration was
not given to ‘regional and national objectives, sensible demographic profiling of
potential demand and the fact that much of the land zoned lacked essential services
such as water and sewage treatment plants, energy supply, public transport or roads’
(Kitchin, et.al. 2010: 28). This has obvious social and economic implications for
people owning houses, often in negative equity and living in poorly finished estates.
In some instances these home owners have few neighbours, no street lighting, paths
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or green areas and are located a good distance away from amenities or services
(Kitchin et.al. 2010).
The Progress Report on Actions to Resolve Unfinished Housing Developments
(Department of Environment, Community and Local Government, 2012) indicates
that as a result of recommendations from the Advisory Group on Unfinished
Housing Developments (2011) the Government’s initial priority was to address
public safety issues. But it also aimed to bring together the main stakeholders at
national, regional and local level to ensure that there was a coordinated response,
to put in place stronger legislation with a view to ensuring the engagement of
developers in resolving any unfinished estates and to build confidence in the
housing sector by engaging in best practice in regard to utilising vacant housing for
beneficial use. 
The first report assessing the numbers of unfinished housing developments released
in 2011 indicated that from a total of 2,876 housing development sites of two or more
dwellings, there are 2,066 unfinished housing developments in the country. Of
these, 1,822 were predominantly inactive at the time of inspection and only 245
active. The number of developments still considered ‘unfinished’ in the 2013 survey
had fallen to 1,258, of which 992 developments have residents living in them
(Department of Environment, Community and Local Government, 2011, 2013).
Social Justice Ireland believes that Government should continue to meet
commitments given to prioritise those estates with people living in them and which
remain unfinished; this is vital given the social consequences as outlined above.
It has been indicated that the numbers of vacant homes and the completion of
unfinished housing estates are features of the current housing landscape in Ireland
which provide some opportunities for the Government to address ongoing housing
need. The Irish Council for Social Housing and the National Association of Building
Cooperatives have indicated that ‘opportunities exist for the voluntary and
cooperative sector to have an impact on the issue of unfinished housing
developments by working in partnership with Local Authorities to serve local social
housing need’ (Advisory Group on Unfinished Housing Developments, 2011:12).  
Social Justice Ireland considers it imperative that the Government continue to assess
the appropriateness of vacant estates/individual sites to be used for social housing
and advise local authorities/AHBs on how best to transfer these units to social use.
The potential role which could be played by NAMA in addressing social housing
need has been indicated but progress has been slow. ‘To date demand has been
confirmed by the Local Authorities for 1,900 properties that NAMA has made
available (This relates to all developments and not just developments identified as
‘unfinished’).  A further 290 properties are currently being evaluated bringing the
total that may be deemed suitable to 2,190 potentially. Contracts have been signed
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and transactions completed for 466 units.  384 of these units relates to units within
Unfinished Housing Developments’ (Department of Environment, Community and
Local Government, 2013:12).
While these options have the potential to provide a number of housing units for
social housing purposes it also must be acknowledged that this flow of houses will
be limited in terms of the scale of social housing need. Therefore it is important that
Government begin to plan for social housing need into the future, identifying ways
in which this can be met. 
Mortgage arrears
A further problem relating to housing in Ireland is the ongoing issue of mortgage
arrears.  Central Bank figures (table 7.5) reveal the scale of this difficulty and also
the level to which it has grown over the period from June 2012 to September 2013.
The total number of mortgage arrears has been increasing steadily. At end-September
2013, there were 768,136 private residential mortgage accounts for principal
dwellings held in the Republic of Ireland. Of these 99,189 or 12.9 per cent, were in
arrears of more than 90 days. This compares to 81,035 accounts (10.6 per cent of
total) that were in arrears of more than 90 days at end of June 2012 or 91,358 arrears
cases29 (11.5 per cent of total) at end of September 2012. At end of September 2013
there were a further 42,331 mortgages in arrears of less than 90 days, a slight fall off
from 50,031 in the previous September. In total there were 141,520 mortgages in
arrears of some form at end of September 2013. This amounts to almost 18.5 per cent
of the total residential mortgage loans at that time. These figures highlight the scale
of this issue and the necessity to implement long term sustainable solutions. 
With regard to this, the report of the Inter-Departmental Mortgage Arrears Working
Group (2011) (The Keane Report) made a range of recommendations, including, the
need for new bankruptcy legislation, non-judicial debt settlement options and
further mortgage restructuring solutions. The report also recommended the
establishment of mortgage-to-rent schemes. Such schemes would allow certain
struggling mortgage holders to remain in the family home as social housing tenants. 
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55 The figures published are the total stock of mortgage accounts in arrears of more than
90 days, as reported to the Central Bank of Ireland. They include mortgages that have
been restructured and are still in arrears of more than 90 days as well as mortgages in
arrears of more than 90 days that have not been restructured (Central Bank, 2012) .
Table 7.5 - Mortgage Arrears
Jun-12 Sep-12 Jun-13 Sep-13
outstanding: Total residential mortgage 
loan accounts outstanding 765,267 794,275 770,610 768,136
Total mortgage arrears cases outstanding 128,197 141,389 142,892 141,520
In arrears up to 90 days 47,162 50,031 45,018 42,331
In arrears 91 to 180 days 18,764 19,814 17,612 16,680
In arrears over 180 days 62,271 71,544 80,262 82,509
Total arrears cases over 90 days outstanding 81,035 91,358 97,874 99,189
% of accounts in arrears for more than 10.6% 11.5% 12.7% 12.9%
90 days
Repossessions: Residential properties in 944 944 1,001 1,050
possession 
Restructured Mortgages: Total outstanding 84,941 81,634 79,357 80,555
classified as restructured 
of which are not in arrears 40,221 43,600 42,309 43,034
Source: Central Bank (2013)
Since then, several responses to this issue have occurred, among them  the revised
Code of Conduct on Mortgage Arrears (CCMA), which came into effect from July
2013, setting out the framework which must be utilised by lenders when dealing
with borrowers in or at risk of falling into arrears. Under the CCMA the lenders must
operate within a revised Mortgage Arrears Resolution Process (MARP), which has
four steps, communication, financial information, assessment and resolution. 
The Central Bank has also set targets for the main banks whereby they must propose
sustainable mortgage solutions for a specific number of mortgages by specific dates;
at the last review these targets were being met. However, the Central Bank did
indicate that some issues in regard to the long term sustainability of solutions being
offered remained to be addressed, for instance, short term loan modifications being
offered in instances where there was no tangible evidence of the borrower’s
circumstances changing (Central Bank, 2013). This needs continued monitoring. 
The Personal Insolvency Act 2012 introduced new debt resolution processes and the
Insolvency Service of Ireland has been established under this act. This service is only
in operation a short time and its effectiveness remains to be analysed.
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The Mortgage Arrears Information and Advice Service was established in September
2012. The service is made up of three strands of which two relate to the provision of
general mortgage arrears information, an information helpline run within the
Citizens Information Board and a website. The third element relates to the provision
of independent financial advice at the point where a mortgage lender has presented
the borrower with long term forbearance proposals relating to the mortgage. The
level of calls made to the helpline is relatively low, at 8,500 calls in the course of over
one year; the website seems to be a more successful resource with 177,000 visitors
over the same period. The Independent Financial Advice Service had a very small
number of users, with figures indicating that from 11,000 borrowers who had been
advised of the service, only 200 invoices from accountants for provision of this
service were issued (it is possible that there is in excess of this number utilising this
services and the invoices have yet to be issued). The low level of people utilising these
services is concerning, especially when the scale of the problem is considered (table
7.5) (Department of Social Protection, 2013).
A mortgage to rent scheme and mortgage to lease arrangements were rolled out by
the Department of Environment, Community and Local Government in 2012.
Under this approach the property is bought by an approved housing body (housing
association or co-operative) at current market value and the household becomes a
social housing tenant of the housing body. The purchase of the house is partly
financed by a loan from the original mortgage lender and partly from the
Exchequer. Included in the criteria for qualification is the necessity for the person
to qualify for social housing, the net household income must not exceed specific
limits, and the individual must have been involved in the MARP with their lender.
These schemes are designed to assist the most distressed mortgage holders and
should only be viewed as a small component in addressing the overall issue. 
The scale of this issue requires action which will bring about long term sustainable
solutions for those individuals involved. It is imperative that those facing major
adjustments as a result of mortgage arrears are dealt with fairly by banks. This
requires that under any repayment schedule they have sufficient income to provide
a minimum adequate standard of living.
Housing needs assessment: 
Waiting lists – how many and how long? 
Social housing support ‘is broadly defined as accommodation provided, or arranged,
by housing authorities or approved housing bodies for households who are unable
to provide for their accommodation needs from their own resources’ (Department
of Environment, Community and Local Government, 2011, pg.48). A national
summary of social housing assessments is carried out on a periodic basis and
provides a vital insight into the level of need for social housing support across the
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country. The most recent assessment of housing needs took place in 2013. The
following section provides an overview of the key findings of the Summary of Social
Housing Assessments 2013. It must be noted that the approach used in the collection
of the data in 2013 differs from that employed in previous years and therefore the
figures are not strictly comparable. However, it is clear that large and lengthy waiting
lists are becoming a feature of Irish society. 
These waiting lists are developed on the basis of a concept called ‘net need’. ‘Net
need’ refers to ‘the number of households in need of housing support who are not
currently receiving social housing support (those already in local authority,
voluntary cooperative or RAS accommodation are excluded)’ (Housing Agency,
2011:1). The net need figure for 2008 showed that 56,249 households were in need
of social housing support at 31 March 2008. This is an increase of 31 per cent on the
level of need in 2005. While acknowledging that the data from 2008 and 2011 are
not strictly comparable, it is still alarming to see that the increase reported in net
need from 2008 to 2011 amounted to 42,069 households. This is a 74.8 per cent
increase over the period. Again although numbers are not directly comparable due
to changes in methodologies employed, in 2013, 89,872 households were assessed
as qualified for housing support, this is a reduction of 8,446 households or 9 per
cent on the 2011 total, but is still 33,623 households more than in 2008 (Housing
Agency, 2013) [refer to Annex for further data relating to housing need in Ireland]. 
Categorisation of main need for social housing support has been revised, therefore
it is not possible to present a comparative table [refer to annex 7 for comparative
data in regard to net need categories for periods 2005, 2008, 2011]. Table 7.6 displays
information in regard to the major categories of need for social housing support in
2013, the largest category accounting for 52 per cent or 46,584 households requiring
support relates to those dependent on rent supplement.  The next largest section,
20,349 households or 23 per cent, had their main need categorised as ‘unsuitable
accommodation due to particular household circumstances’. According to the
Housing Agency ‘It is likely that this category is populated by households not in
receipt of rent supplement, but with a difficulty in affording private
accommodation’ (2013:6). 
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Table 7.6 - Main Need for social housing support 2013
Main need for social housing support Number of %
households
Dependent on Rent Supplement 46,584 52
Unsuitable accommodation due to particular
household circumstances 20,349 23
Reasonable requirement for separate accommodation 9,587 11
In an institution, emergency accommodation or hostel 2,808 3
Household member has a physical disability 1,392 2
Household member has a sensory disability 190 —
Household member has a mental health disability 1,034 1
Household member has an intellectual disability 1,078 1
Household member has another form of disability 244 —
Unsuitable accommodation due to exceptional
medical or compassionate grounds 2,909 3
Overcrowded Accommodation 2,896 3
Unfit Accommodation 647 1
Unsustainable mortgage* 154 —
Total 89,872 100
Source: Housing Agency, (2013:10)  
*Where mortgage deemed unsustainable under the Mortgage Arrears Resolution
Process (MARP) 
Further to this, 11 per cent of households were found to have specific
accommodation requirements, 4 per cent due to a disability, 3 per cent due to
homelessness and 2 per cent requiring traveller specific accommodation, with the
final 2 per cent in need of age specific accommodation. 
The household structure of those who were on the waiting list in 2011 shows that
48,748 households, or 49.6 per cent, were single adult households. This was the
highest category again in 2013, accounting for 44 per cent or 39,803 households.  In
2013, single persons with children represented over 27,005 households or 30 per
cent of the total. Two or more adults (with or without children) accounted for 22,174
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(25 per cent) of households, with the remaining 1 per cent (890 households) being
multi adult households. 
The majority of people in need of housing support in 2011 were under 40 years of
age at 69 per cent. This is again the case in 2013 with this cohort accounting for 64
per cent.  In 2011 the largest category, 30.5 per cent, occurred within the age range
of 31 – 40 years. In 2013 the largest category, 29,353 households or 33 per cent, were
those categorised in the age range of 30 but less than 40, with 5 per cent aged 60
years or over; 71 per cent of households in need of housing support in 2013 had Irish
citizenship, while 21 per cent were EU citizens and the balance of 8 per cent were
categorised as having refugee status, permission to remain in the state or subsidiary
protection status.
There is a clear association between being in housing need and low income.
According to the OECD (2011) people with low incomes are more likely to face
poorer basic housing conditions and are also less likely to be satisfied with their
housing arrangements. Breakdown of net income data for the 2013 needs
assessment is not currently available. However, it is interesting to note that the
majority of households qualifying for social housing support were found to be
dependent on social welfare as their only source of income. Social welfare was the
only source of income for 72 per cent of households, 6 per cent had income from
employment and social welfare, with 11 per cent of households having income from
employment only. 
The length of time spent by households on waiting lists once they have applied for
social housing support is another area which deserves attention. Table 7.7 has the
details. While 24 per cent of households had qualified in the previous 12 months,
it is extremely concerning that 32 per cent of those assessed as being in need of social
housing support were waiting in excess of four years.
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Table 7.7- Length of time on record of qualified households
Length of time Number of Households %
Less than 6 months 11,696 13
Between 6 and 12 months 9,645 11
Between 1 and 2 years 14,436 16
Between 2 and 3 years 13,841 15
Between 3 and 4 years 11,986 13
Between 4 and 5 years 10,449 12
Between 6 and 7 years 9,765 11
More than 7 years 8,004 9
Total 89,872 100
Source: Housing Agency (2013:11)
The need for housing in Ireland is currently at an intolerable level. These numbers
represent the most vulnerable people in Irish society. Social Justice Ireland has
repeatedly highlighted the unacceptable level of progress being made in regard to
counteracting this issue; it is imperative that swift and significant action is taken to
address this current state of affairs. 
The private rented sector
Traditionally, the private rented sector has been the residual sector of the Irish
housing system, characterised by poor-quality accommodation and non-secure
tenure at the lower end of the housing market. Today, this sector is highly
differentiated, with high-quality housing and relatively secure tenure at the upper
end of the market and low-quality housing and insecurity of tenure at the lower end.
Reliance on this sector as a housing option fell to its lowest point of 7 per cent in
1991. Since then, however, it has risen substantially. The census of 2011 showed that
almost 19 per cent of all households were renting from a private landlord (table 7.8).
The private rental sector is increasingly becoming the tenure of choice for a
substantial number of households (see table 7.8) as well as being viewed as means
by which to address social housing provision. 
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Table 7.8 Percentage distribution of housing units by occupancy status, 1961-2011
occupancy 
Status 1961 1971 1981 1991 2002 2006 2011
LA Rented 18.4 15.9 12.7 9.7 6.9 7.5 7.9
Private Rented 17.2 10.9 8.1 7.0 11.1 10.3 18.8
Owner Occupied 53.6 60.7 67.9 80.2 77.4 77.2 70.8
Other 10.8 12.5 11.2 3.0 4.6 5.0 2.556
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: CSO (2003, 2007 & 2012)
As noted above, Irish Government policy did not prioritise the private rental sector;
which was viewed as secondary to owner-occupation. Reflecting this approach,
legislation and regulation of this sector was often lacking. In an attempt to address
this, the Private Residential Tenancy Board was established in 2004. The role of the
PRTB includes the establishment and maintenance of a register of all private rental
residential accommodation, the provision of a cheap and efficient resolution service
to handle tenant and landlord disputes and the undertaking of research into the
private rental market (PRTB, 2010). 
However, despite legal requirements and the linking of tax deductions to
registration, a number of privately rented residences in the country are not
registered with the PRTB. The total number of tenancies registered with the Board
at the end of 2010 was 231,818 (PRTB, 2010). This compares with findings in census
2011, in which 305,377 households indicated that they were renting from a private
landlord, a discrepancy of over 31 per cent. At end of 2012 there were 264,434
tenancies registered with the PRTB. While this is a significant increase, it is still lower
than the findings in census 2011 (PRTB, 2012). 
The task of ensuring that the standard of accommodation offered by this sector is
at an appropriate level falls to the Private Residential Tenancy Board (PRTB) and
Local Authorities. The level and geographical distribution of inspections carried out
by the Local Authorities of the registered properties indicates that in some areas
inspections are common while in others they are far lower. Overall there has been a
notable increase in the number of inspections being carried out. In 2007, 14,008
inspections were carried out. This rose to 17,186 in 2008 and 19,801 in 2009. 2010
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56 Other refers to households who indicated that they were living rent free or renting
from a voluntary body. Those who did not state the nature of their occupancy have
not been included. 
saw another increase with 21,614 inspections being carried out. However this fell by
almost 1000 in 2012 to 19,616. This should be monitored closely to ensure the
momentum of enforcing regulatory standards is not lost.  In 2012 of the 16,055
dwellings inspected, 7,348 were found to be failing to meet regulatory standards.
This is a serious issue and needs to be tackled appropriately especially given the
increasingly important role that this sector is playing in the housing scene in
Ireland. 
The Government’s housing policy statement recognises the need to deliver a well
regulated rental sector, ensuring that rental is a real housing option for everyone.
Considering the growth in the private rental sector in Ireland, and bearing in mind
the figures relating to the registration and inspection of these tenancies, further
development of the work of the Private Residential Tenancy Board (PRTB) in regard
to ensuring official registration of all private rented properties is necessary. While
there have been huge improvements in regard to the regulation of this sector, given
the increasing demand for private rented accommodation, the risk of an increase is
substandard accommodation is a real concern. Social Justice Ireland believes that the
Government must take the necessary steps to ensure that all local authorities carry
out a reasonable number of inspections and enforce minimum standards.  This will
assist in ensuring the quality of accommodation offered by this sector is of
appropriate standard. 
Beyond this, it appears that pressures are building in the private rental market in
certain regions. Increasing demand for private rented accommodation, as illustrated
(table 7.8), a decrease in availability, [Daft, 2013 indicating that the stock of rental
properties on the market in Q3 2013 was at its lowest since the same period in 2007],
added to increasing rents, the PRTB Rent Index Q3 2013, showed that rents increased
nationally by 1.9 per cent on the same quarter in 2012. While, this rise is primarily
driven by substantial increases in the Dublin market of 6.4 per cent on an annual
basis, there has been an annual increase 0.5 per cent in rents for houses outside of
Dublin. These trends underscore the questionable nature of pursuing the delivery
of social housing through the private rental sector. In light of the changes relating
to affordability and stock availability in certain areas, the ability to meet housing
need through this tenure is unclear. These developments need to be monitored
closely in order to establish whether recent developments are persistent. 
Rent supplement
When rent supplement was introduced it was only intended as a short-term housing
support for those who suffered a sudden drop in income. While there has been a fall
of almost 10, 000 recipients over the period from 2010 to 2012, over time this
programme has seen a massive increase in participants and costs as outlined in table
7.9. Rising form 59,726 recipients in 2007 to 87,684 in 2012, an increase of over 27,958,
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resulting in this mechanism becoming a housing support for many. In addition, a
large cohort of recipients are in receipt for prolonged periods of time. In December
2011 there were approximately 53,000 recipients of rent supplement for a period of
18 months or more. In December 2012 this cohort accounted for almost half the rent
supplement recipients or 41, 670. These are the target group for the Rental
Accommodation Scheme (RAS) (Department of Social Protection 2011&2012).  It is
clear that people are in receipt of rent supplement for long periods of time as
progression to other social housing provision such as RAS has not occurred. 
Table 7.9 Rent Supplement Cost and number of Recipients for 2002, 2007, 2009,
2010, 2011, 2012  
year Expenditure  €000 Recipients 
2007 391,466 59,726  
2008 440,548 74,038  
2009 510,751 93,030  
2010 516,538 97,260
2011  502,748 96,803
2012 422,536 87,684  
Source: Department of Social Protection (2012)
Rent supplement operates under maximum rent limits. These should reflect local
conditions and family composition. The review in 2013 established new maximum
rent limits regionally which are in line with the most up-to-date market data
available. The 2013 review increased these limits for a number of areas. Even though
these limits have been increased, voluntary agencies [Focus, Threshold] expressed
concern in the past that increases in minimum contributions towards rent
supplement over a number of years has increased difficulty for some recipients to
source good quality accommodation appropriate to their needs, forcing them into
substandard accommodation.  This is an issue of great concern which needs to be
monitored closely. 
Plans are in place to move the operation of rent supplement from the Department
of Social Protection to the Department of Environment, Community and Local
Government developing a Housing Assistance Payment (HAP), this is due to be
piloted in 2014. The Department states: ‘The housing policy framework contains
the announcement of the transfer of responsibility in providing housing needs for
long-term rent supplement recipients to housing authorities on a phased basis. A
multi-agency steering group has been established by the Department of
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Environment, Community and Local Government to give effect to the Housing
Policy Initiative and this group is currently developing proposals and operational
protocols for the transfer of tenants’ (Department of Social Protection, 2011:23). This
is a welcome move and will hopefully result in increased efficiency as well as
ensuring better quality and more secure accommodation for tenants. It is also
considered likely that this move will eliminate the poverty trap associated with rent
supplement as people will pay differential rents to allow them to proceed to work
while retaining some of their housing support benefit. 
Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS) 
and Social Housing leasing
As previously discussed the Government has ruled out a return to large capital
funded construction programmes by local authorities, instead focusing on the
enhanced role that the Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS) and the Social
Housing Leasing Initiative will play in the delivery of social housing. 
RAS was designed to address the needs of people on rent supplement for periods of
over 18 months. It provides a longer term contract and more security of tenure than
is associated with people who have their accommodation needs met under rent
supplement. The local authority rents the unit from the landlord at reduced market
rent for periods of between one and four years. Unlike rent supplement, which
involves the tenant dealing with the landlord, under the RAS the local authority
deals directly with the landlord. At the end of 2012, since its inception in 2005,
25,463 households had been transferred from rent supplement directly to RAS, with
a further 17,747 transferred to other social housing options. This gives a total of
43,210, 5,451 of these transfers occurred in 2012 (Department of Environment,
Community and Local Government, 2013).
With the longer term leasing option, units are leased to either local authorities or
approved housing bodies (AHB) for a period of 10 – 20 years [properties have been
sourced within the private sector, from NAMA and also the unsold affordable
properties]. Unlike RAS, where the landlord retains responsibility for the upkeep and
maintenance of the property, under this initiative the local Authority or the AHB
take on this responsibility. In both instances people have increased security of tenure
and improved quality of accommodation as the property must comply with
standards for rented houses. The Long Term Leasing Initiative has resulted in
approximately, 3,700 units over the period from 2010 to 2012 (Department of
Environment, Community and Local Government, 2010, 2011, 2012). The growing
role of Approved Housing Bodies can be seen from the number of units acquired
under this initiative; this sector had acquired a total of 2449 units by Q1 2013. The
majority of these units have come through the unsold affordable units. By Q1 of
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2013 nearly 2000 units were leased by housing association via this stream (ICSH,
2013:6).
With almost 90,000 households on local authority waiting lists in 2013, it is clear
that the scale at which property is being provided under these schemes is
insufficient to meet demand. It is now necessary for alternative options in regard to
supply of social housing to be developed and implemented. If this does not occur
there will be no progress made in regard to addressing the huge level of social
housing need. Social Justice Ireland recognises that the means by which social
housing provision on the scale required is to be financed is of central concern and
requires exploration. For example consideration could be given to the establishment
of a National Housing Authority which would be answerable to the Minister for the
Environment, Community and Local Government and would assume charge of the
current stock of local authority houses and a range of other issues related to social
housing. Such a body could have responsibility for the delivery of social housing
and could also take on the role of providing finance to voluntary and cooperative
housing agencies as well as assisting in addressing the issue of mortgage arrears.  
Homelessness
People experiencing homelessness are not a homogenous group and there are many
reasons why people become homeless. ‘Structural explanations locate the reasons
for homelessness in social and economic structures and cite poverty, negative labour
market forces, cuts and restrictions in social welfare payments and reductions or
shortfalls in the supply of affordable housing as the leading causes. Individual
accounts, on the other hand, focus on the personal characteristics and behaviours
of homeless people and suggest that homelessness is the consequence of personal
problems, such as mental illness and addiction’ (O’Sullivan, 2008:21).
Census 2011 revealed that 3,808 persons were either sleeping rough or in
accommodation designated for the homeless on the night of the count. Of these,
2,539 were male and 1,269 were female. Of the 64 persons found sleeping rough, all
but six were males. Dublin accounted for 59 of the 64 rough sleepers. The Dublin
rough sleeper count in November 2013 shows that rough sleepers are on the increase
with 139 indicated in this count a worrying trend which will need to be monitored
and addressed. Further to this, the proportion of persons with disabilities among the
homeless population was significantly higher, at 42 per cent, than for the general
population, at 13 per cent.  49 per cent reported that they did not have an educational
qualification beyond lower secondary level compared to 25 per cent of the general
population. Almost one third reported that their health was ‘fair, ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’
compared to 10 per cent of the general population (CSO, 2012). These statistics show
the myriad of difficulties surrounding the phenomenon of homelessness.
Furthermore, even though comparisons between data is limited, a recent report by
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the Homelessness Oversight Group (2013) suggests that there has been little
improvement in the numbers of people experiencing long term homelessness.  
In addressing homelessness, policy needs to focus on both the structural and
individualistic causes. Decreases in funding for homeless services places severe
pressure on services dealing with the many complexities of this issue at a time when
service providers are reporting a significant increase in demand. The need to support
service delivery in regard to preventative strategies is clear, however it is also
important to note that people who experience homelessness require ongoing
support after being housed to ensure the sustainability of the tenancy. It is therefore
imperative that the Government make available an adequate level of funding for
organisations providing such supports.   
Another issue associated with homelessness relates to gaining an accurate measure
of the numbers of people experiencing this difficulty. Clearly complications arise
due to the complexity of matters surrounding homelessness and the level to which,
by its very nature, is a hidden problem. There has traditionally been a gap between
the administrative data (local authority Needs Assessment) held and the numbers
of people accessing homeless services.  There have, however, been major welcome
developments in regard to the collection and collation of data in regard to
homelessness, with the introduction and rollout of PASS [Pathway Accommodation
and Support System]. Social Justice Ireland believes that it is important that resources
continue to be put in place to ensure that comparable accurate data in regard to
persons experiencing homelessness is available. Accurate data will allow for timelier
and more appropriate responses to homelessness. 
In February 2013 Government published a Homelessness Policy Statement which
commits it to prioritising the provision of long-term housing as early as possible,
rather than putting homeless people through a process of short and medium-term
housing ’steps’, This would amount to a housing led approach, ultimately achieving
the goal of ending long-term homelessness and the incidence of rough sleeping by
2016. The Homelessness Oversight Group (2013) indicate that this high level goal is
attainable by 2016 if certain recommendations are in place. Among these are; The
need to establish a co-ordinating body to oversee that actions are put in place to
achieve the 2016 target; the need for broader policy in relation to social housing to
fully integrate the 2016 objective; the development of a structured plan in order to
assist in the move from a shelter led approach to a sustainable housing led response
coupled with more preventative measures in regard to homelessness; also the social
housing leasing scheme should be made more efficient, along with a requirement
to ensure that AHBs, Local Authorities and NAMA identify a certain proportion of
housing for homeless people; as well as the development of lending products by the
Housing Finance Agency which would support the provision of housing for the
homeless.  
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Social Justice Ireland has also previously indicated that it should be possible to end
long term homelessness and incidence of rough sleeping by 2016 if sufficient
resources are targeted at the goal without delay. To demonstrate that its
commitment to addressing the issue of homelessness in Ireland is real and not just
rhetorical Social Justice Ireland believes that Government should immediately
allocate the resources required to end long term homelessness in Ireland by 2016. 
Traveller accommodation
The number of people enumerated as Irish Travellers in Census 2011 increased by
32 per cent from 22,435 to 29,573, with all counties apart from Limerick and
Waterford showing increases larger than the increase in the general population.
Further findings in Census 2011 indicate that only 12 per cent of Irish Travellers
lived in caravans and mobile homes, with almost 84 per cent of the Traveller
population living in permanent housing. This is a significant fall from 2006, when
one in four Irish Travellers lived in temporary accommodation (CSO, 2012). 
The All-Ireland Traveller Health Study (2010) showed that while the majority of
Traveller families have basic household amenities [flush toilet, running water, waste
disposal], there are still a disproportionately greater amount of Traveller families
without these amenities than in the general population. Signiﬁcant numbers of
families in group housing or sites reported lack of footpaths, public lighting, ﬁre
hydrants and safe play areas. A quarter (24.4 per cent) of Traveller families in the
Republic considered where they lived to be ‘unhealthy’ or ‘very unhealthy’ and
significant numbers (26.4 per cent) considered their place of residence unsafe.
‘Traveller accommodation is inextricably linked to almost all other aspects of
Travellers’ lives – their traditions, health, education, employment prospects and any
number of other issues’ (Coates et.al. 2008:81). Despite many legislative and policy
changes and increased support for Traveller specific accommodation, there is
widespread consensus that in practice Traveller accommodation is a challenging
area to address. According to Coates et al (2008), politicians, policy makers and local
authorities as well as Traveller organisations and members of both the Traveller and
settled community, are dissatisfied with the existing situation in regard to Traveller
accommodation in Ireland. 
Capital funding for Traveller accommodation has been significantly reduced.
Concerns have also been raised regarding the failure on the part of the Local
Authorities to draw down funding ring-fenced for traveller specific accommodation
[refer to written Dail Answers #43692/13]. Given the link between housing and
quality of life, there is a need for the Government to ensure that local authorities
fulfil their obligations in relation to Traveller accommodation. 
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Housing and people with disabilities
‘The housing options available to people with disabilities generally fall far short of
those available to the general population. Limited understanding of disability and
the needs and aspirations of people with disabilities on the part of society generally
may result in inadequate policy responses to the housing needs of people with
disabilities’ (Browne, 2007: iv).
Additional housing costs are a feature of having a disability. Primarily these costs
are for adjustments to residences to ensure access and continued use and there are
several housing adaptation grants available for this purpose. The Government
indicates in the National Housing Strategy for People with a Disability 2011-2016, that
promotion of independent living for people with disabilities and the elderly is
supported by the availability of such grants. According to the Housing Agency
(2013), while a substantial number of grants have been awarded since 2007, data in
2013 indicated that Authorities were approving far fewer grants. Funding for these
grants has been substantially reduced over recent years. Coupled with this, a review
of the qualifying criteria took place with many organisations [Disability Federation
of Ireland, Age Action] expressing serious concern regarding new criteria and the
consequent reduction in the level of grants available to individuals. Social Justice
Ireland believes that given social and economic benefits of people remaining in their
own homes, it is imperative that adequate funding should be made available to
ensure that they can do so; this would also be in keeping with the recent National
Housing Strategy for People with a Disability 2011-2016.
The national strategy represents a very welcome policy outline aimed at ensuring
that the rights of people with disability are upheld. It sets out a framework for
delivering housing to people with disabilities through mainstream housing policy.
The vision underpinning this strategy is: ‘To facilitate access for people with
disabilities to the appropriate range of housing and related support services,
delivered in an integrated and sustainable manner, which promotes equality of
opportunity, individual choice and independent living’ (Department of the
Environment, Community and Local Government, 2011: 34).  The National
Implementation Framework to support this strategy was released in 2012. This
framework identifies the manner in which the Government and other stakeholders
will ensure the continued implementation of the objectives established in the
strategy. It focuses on several aspects of housing in regard to people with disabilities.
Among them are ensuring people with disabilities within the community are
provided with the requisite supports to access and maintain housing which meets
their needs, and addressing the manner in which the transitioning of people from
institutional care to more independent living is to be achieved. The Government
should make available the appropriate level of funding to ensure the ongoing
implementation of this framework. 
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Housing and children
Factors which impact on child wellbeing and development are varied and
interconnected. The OECD (2011), highlighted that housing conditions and child
development outcomes are strongly linked because children spend the largest
proportion of their time indoors. Poor housing affects children at different stages of
their life. For example, lack of affordable housing may have an impact during early
childhood as it weakens the family’s ability to meet basic needs, while neighbourhood
effects are more likely to have negative impacts on adolescents. Furthermore,
associations between poor housing conditions and child development are more often
than not irreversible and transfer to adulthood. One of the objectives of the National
Children’s Strategy is to ensure that ‘Children will have access to accommodation
appropriate to their needs’ (Department of Health and Children, 2000, pg. 65). One
of the ways in which this was to be achieved was through the prioritisation of families
with children for accommodation under the new streams of housing to become
available under the local authority and Voluntary Housing Programmes.
In 2008, 27,704 households with children were identified as being in need of social
housing. In 2005 this figure was 22,335 (Office of Minister for Children and Youth
Affairs, 2010). Figures from 2008 and 2011 are not strictly comparable and it is
difficult, therefore to assess the extent to which this trend has continued.
Nonetheless, in 2011 a total of 43,578 households which were in need of social
housing support included children. The 2013 assessment of housing need does not
provide sufficient breakdown of data in order to allow analyses of the numbers of
households with children. However, single persons with children accounted for
27,005 (30 per cent) households on the waiting list, with a further 22,174 households
in the category of two or more adults with or without children. Therefore, it is
possible to conclude that well in excess of 30 per cent of households on the waiting
list were households which included children. The special report relating to
homeless people in Census 2011 revealed a further disturbing finding that there were
457 children aged 14 and under in the homeless count, representing 12 per cent of
the total number of homeless people in Ireland (CSO, 2012). As already highlighted,
low income and low accommodation standards are associated with poor health
levels and poor future educational and life opportunities. Given Ireland’s already
deplorable record in regard to child poverty, Social Justice Ireland believes that the
area of children and housing requires urgent action.
In reviewing the current context relating to housing and accommodation in Ireland
it is apparent that a new approach is required. Growing affordability problems in
the private rental sector in some regions combined with vast social housing need
and very limited private construction, indicate a housing and accommodation
system which is in disarray. The existing approach to housing is disjointed and does
not tackle the situation in a comprehensive manner.  
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The development of a national housing strategy is long overdue. A national housing
strategy should seek to address the myriad of problems relating to housing in
Ireland, across the spectrum from private rented accommodation through to social
housing provision. The development of a national housing strategy would ensure
overall policy coherence in a complex system. This policy should take cognisance
of projections of need based on accurate regional and demographic analysis,
allowing for the identification of appropriate provision both in the private and
social housing spheres. Finally it must be noted that a prerequisite for the efficacy
of any housing policy is suitable policies for planning, transport and infrastructure,
ensuring sustainable development into the future. Fundamentally there is a need
for a considered approach to addressing the complex range of concerns relating to
housing and accommodation; if not there will be limited progress made in resolving
housing issues. Policy to date has failed to balance the advancement of home
ownership, the development of a stable rental sector, both public and private, and
the use of property for private determination. This balance still needs to be achieved.
policy priorities on Housing and Accommodation in Ireland
• Develop an Integrated Housing Strategy for Ireland 
• Take the required action to ensure the supply of social housing, including co-op
and voluntary/non-profit housing, is on the scale required to eliminate local
authority housing waiting lists. 
• Explore the potential for a National Housing Agency, answerable to the Minister
for Environment, which would assume charge of the current stock of local
authority houses and a range of other issues related to social housing. Such a
body could have responsibility for the delivery of social housing and could also
take on the role of providing finance to voluntary and cooperative housing
agencies as well as assisting in addressing the issue of mortgage arrears.  
• Ensure continued investment in developing social housing in order to maintain
an adequate stock of social housing units including bringing back into use any
vacant social housing units. 
• Ensure prompt delivery and adequate resources to support Long Term Leasing
initiatives and the Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS).
• Ensure that adequate resources are made available for the national roll out of the
Housing Assistance Payment. 
• Make adequate funding available to resolve effectively, ongoing issues regarding
unfinished housing estates so that suitable units can be brought into beneficial
use. Social Justice Ireland considers it imperative that the Government continue
to assist and advise local authorities/AHBs on how best to transfer these units to
social use. 
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• Government should also meet commitments given, in regard to prioritising
those unfinished estates which are currently occupied by residents.
• Take the necessary steps to ensure that all local authorities carry out a reasonable
number of inspections annually of private rented accommodation and that
further efforts are made to ensure official registration of all such properties.
• Allocate the resources required to end long term homelessness in Ireland by
2016. 
• Ensure that those facing major adjustments as a result of mortgage arrears are
dealt with fairly by banks. This requires that under any repayment schedule they
have sufficient income to provide a minimum adequate standard of living.57
Provide sufficient funding for the ongoing implementation and monitoring of
the National Housing Strategy for People with Disability 2011-2016. 
• Ensure the adequate resourcing of housing adaptation grants for people in need
of such assistance.
• Provide continued investment in the Traveller accommodation programme and
ensure local authorities are fulfilling their obligations in this area. 
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57 Details of what these income levels should be are provided by the Vincentian
Partnership for Social Justice in its studies – 2006 and 2010 – on this issue. 
8.  
HEALTHCARE
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE: HEALTHCARE
To provide an adequate healthcare service focused on enabling people to attain the
World Health Organisation’s definition of health as a state of complete physical,
mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
Healthcare is a social right that every person should enjoy. People should be assured
that care is guaranteed in their times of illness or vulnerability. Being so
fundamental to wellbeing, healthcare services are important in themselves and they
are also important as a factor in economic success in a range of ways, including
improving work participation and productivity. Protection of services is one of the
key policy areas that must be addressed urgently as part of the Core Policy
Framework we set out in Chapter 2 under the heading of Enhancing Social
Protection. This is amongst five priority areas identified by Social Justice Ireland
which must be addressed in order to realise the vision for Ireland articulated there.
The standard of care is dependent to a great degree on the resources made available,
which in turn are dependent on the expectations of society. The obligation to
provide healthcare as a social right rests on all people. In a democratic society this
obligation is transferred through the taxation and insurance systems to government
and other bodies that assume or contract this responsibility. Health services need
to be available as a right as envisaged in our Core Policy Areas, Enhance Social
Provision and Reform Governance set out in Chapter 2. These are very important
considerations in Ireland today as fundamental changes are underway in Ireland’s
healthcare system. This chapter outlines some of the major considerations Social
Justice Ireland believes Government should bring to bear on such decision-making. 
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poverty and Health
Health is not just about healthcare. The link between poverty and ill-health has been
well established by international and national research. A World Health
Organization Commission that reported in 2008 on the social determinants of
health found that health is influenced by factors such as poverty, food security,
social exclusion and discrimination, poor housing, unhealthy early childhood
conditions, poor educational status and low occupational status. A more recent
report by the World Health Organization into 53 European countries highlights how
people have not shared equally in Europe’s social, economic and health
development and that in fact health inequalities are not diminishing but are
increasing in many countries (WHO, Regional Office for Europe, 2013). In Ireland,
studies conducted by the Irish Public Health Alliance (IPHA) detail striking
differences in life expectancy and premature death between people in different
socio-economic groups. The Pfizer Health Index published in 2012 showed that
those from a lower socio-economic background are more likely to be affected by a
wide range of medical conditions (including heart disease, cancer, depression and
arthritis) than middle class people (ABC1) (Pfizer, 2012). 
Analysis of Census 2011 data by the CSO confirms the relationship between social
class and health. While 95 per cent of people in the top social class enjoyed good or
very good health, this proportion fell across the social groups to below 75 per cent
in social class 7 (CSO, 2012a). In summary, poor people get sick more often and die
younger than those in the higher socio-economic groups. Poverty directly affects
the incidence of ill-health, it limits access to affordable healthcare and reduces the
opportunity for those living in poverty to adopt healthy lifestyles. A recent study by
Eurofound reveals that the health status of Europeans has deteriorated during the
economic crisis in respect of the prevalence of chronic diseases and that the gap
between the self-reported health of low-income earners and that of the highest
income earners is increasing (Eurofound, 2012). In Ireland a survey conducted by
the CSO during 2012 measuring the response of households to the economic
downturn (CSO 2013), shows that a large majority have reduced their spending with
more than half having cut back spending on groceries. This is of particular concern.
The latest report from a study that has tracked a large cohort of Irish children from
birth highlights a widening health and social gap by the time they are just 5 years
old. Children from the highest social class (professional/managerial) are more likely
than those from the lowest socio-economic group to report that their children are
very healthy and have no problems. The socio-economic background of the child
is also shown to be associated with being overweight or obese (Growing Up in
Ireland, 2013).  Appendix 8 discusses the social determinants of health and health
inequality in Ireland in more detail.  
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Table 8.1 -  Life Expectancy at Birth by sex, 2011
Country Males Females Difference
Italy 80.1 85.3 -5.2
Sweden 79.9 83.8 -3.9
Spain 79.5 85.6 -6.1
Netherlands 79.4 83.1 -3.7
Cyprus 79.3 83.1 -3.8
United Kingdom 79.0 83.0 -4.0
France 78.7 85.7 -7.0
Ireland 78.6 83.0 -4.4
Malta 78.6 83.0 -4.4
Luxembourg 78.5 83.6 -5.1
Germany 78.4 83.2 -4.8
Austria 78.3 83.8 -5.5
Belgium 78.0 83.3 -5.3
Greece 78.0 83.6 -5.6
Denmark 77.8 81.9 -4.1
Portugal 77.3 83.8 -6.5
Finland 77.3 83.8 -6.5
Slovenia 76.8 83.3 -6.5
EU 76.7 82.6 -5.9
Czech Republic 74.8 81.1 -6.3
Poland 72.6 81.1 -8.5
Slovakia 72.3 79.8 -7.5
Estonia 71.4 81.3 -9.9
Hungary 71.2 78.7 -7.5
Romania 71.1 78.2 -7.1
Bulgaria 70.7 77.8 -7.1
Latvia 68.6 78.8 -10.2
Lithuania 68.1 79.3 -11.2
CSO, 2013. Note: 2009 data used for EU 
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life expectancy 
According to Eurostat’s figures for 2011, Irish males had life expectancies of 78.6 years
while Irish females were expected to live 4.4 years longer, reaching 83 years (CSO,
2013), figures which have gradually improved over the past decade. Based on these
figures, Ireland’s life expectancy performance is slightly above the European average.
The EU average, however, is pulled down by low life expectancies, especially among
men, in such countries as Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania (see Table 8.1). Relative to
the older member states of the EU, the Irish figures are somewhat less impressive.
Furthermore, life expectancy at birth for both men and women in Ireland is lower in
the most deprived geographical areas than in the most affluent (CSO, 2010). For
example, life expectancy at birth of men living in the most deprived areas was 73.7
years (in 2006/07) compared with 78 years for those living in the most affluent areas.
For women the corresponding figures were 80 and 82.7 years (CSO, 2010).
Ireland’s life expectancy figures should be considered in the context of many of the
findings of the PHAI reports referred to above and in Appendix 8 and the poverty
figures discussed earlier (see Chapter 3). Ireland’s poverty problem has serious
implications for health, because of the link between poverty and ill health. Thus,
those in lower socio-economic groups have a higher percentage of both acute and
chronic illnesses. 
Access to Healthcare: Medical Cards and Health Insurance 
In a report from 2012, international experts noted that Ireland is the only EU health
system that does not offer universal coverage of primary care. People without
medical or GP visit cards (approximately 60 per cent of the population) must pay
the full cost of almost all primary care services and outpatient prescriptions. These
experts also noted that gaps in population and cost coverage distinguish Ireland
from other EU countries, as does an element of discretion and lack of clarity about
the scope of some services, especially community care services, in which there are
service and regional differences (World Health Organisation & European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2012). In 2011 Ireland’s public
spending on healthcare was 67% down from 75.9% in 2007 (OECD, 2013). 
An increasing share of payments being transferred to households due to the results
of the economic crisis has been observed by the OECD in a number of countries
(2013). According to the OECD, in Ireland, the share of public financing of health
spending decreased by nearly 6 percentage points between 2008 and 2010, while
the share of out-of-pocket payments by households increased (OECD, 2012). The
share of private spending as a proportion of all health spending in Ireland increased
by 2 percentage points between 2009 and 2011 (OECD, 2013). Out-of-pocket
expenses in healthcare tend to operate as a much bigger barrier for poorer people
168 Socio-Economic Review 2014
who defer visits or treatment as a result and this trend is being continued through
measures contained in Budget 2014, such as increases in prescription charges.
In 2010, 47 per cent of adults over 18 years had private health insurance, a
percentage that had decreased since 2007 (CSO, 2011). Figures released by the
Health Insurance Authority suggest that those people with private health insurance
continues to decline, and that an estimated 44.6 per cent of the population had
inpatient health insurance plans at end September 2013 (HIA, 2013). Department
of Health figures suggest that in 2012, 40.4 per cent of the population (1,853,877
people) had a medical card and 2.9 per cent (131,102 people) had a GP visit card
(Department of Health, 2013).
The length of waiting lists remains a cause of major concern in the Irish healthcare
system. According to monthly trends published by the Department of Health, there
have been very significant increases during 2013 in the numbers waiting for elective
procedures (in-patient and day-case) both for adults (waiting more than 8 months)
and children (waiting more than 20 weeks) (2013, Figure 3.3). For example, in
October 2012 the number of adults waiting more than 8 months was under 3,000;
in September 2013 it was approaching 6,000 and it had exceeded 6,000 in July and
August.
Budget 2014 provided for a cut of €666million to healthcare. The amount allocated
for the health services was €13,660 billion (including €397 million in capital
expenditure) (Department of Health, 2013). This level of cut comes at a time when
there is already an underlying deficit of €419billion with the HSE and follows
successive government budgets that have cut spending in the health service by 22%
between 2008 and 2013 (HSE, 2013). This has occurred while simultaneously a major
system transformation is being pursued (including major organizational change
such as the abolition of the HSE, the establishment of separate Directorates and a
reconfiguration toward a universal primary care system). One commentator has
noted that the two things happening at once – cutbacks and fundamental
transformation - ‘has exposed faultlines in the ability of the health service to ensure
acceptable levels of safe patient care’ (Houston, 2013). International evidence from
the World Health Organization and others suggests that significant year-on-year
variations in the level of statutory funding available for health services is disruptive
to the sustained delivery of services of  a given quality and desired level of access
(World Health Organization & European Observatory on Health Systems and
Policies, 2012). These international experts who reviewed the Irish healthcare
system in 2012 concluded that continuing budgetary cuts and consequent
adjustments raises ‘serious concerns whether this can be achieved without
damaging access to necessary services for certain groups’ (World Health
Organization & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2012, p.47).
The Chief Executive of the HSE has acknowledged to the Oireachtas Committee on
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Health stating that it will not be possible to meet fully in 2014 all of the growing
demands being placed on the health service (Wall, 2014).
Social Justice Ireland believes that the cuts of over €600 million imposed by Budget 2014
are not consistent with Ireland having a decent healthcare service characterized by
safety and high quality outcomes and we do not believe that the Budget targets will
be met. Furthermore, this places an impossible requirement on the health services,
particularly at a time of population growth and population ageing.
Budget 2014 envisaged the equivalent of a cut of a further 2,400 full-time jobs in
healthcare by end of 201458, and this will inevitably affect frontline services that are
already struggling to deliver services on a day-to-day basis. According to the HSE,
there has already been a loss of the equivalent of 12,505 full-time jobs since
September 2007 (-11 per cent) (HSE, 2013). Between 2011 and 2012 alone, there was
a reduction of 1.7 per cent in nursing staff (Department of Health, 2013).
In addition, the very significant increase in prescription charges introduced in
Budget 2014 (from €1.50 to €2.50 per item) will present a significant additional cost
to many people, especially those whose medical conditions require several different
medicines such as older people.59 This, along with a further increase in the threshold
in the Drug Repayment Scheme, will cause some people to avoid accessing the
medicines they need. The introduction of a GP visit card on return to work for
unemployed people (instead of retention of a full medical card) will exacerbate an
existing poverty trap, as some parents are afraid to take up a job and consequently
lose their medical card even though their income remains low. The ‘doctor visit
only’ cards can create problems because many people are in the unenviable situation
of knowing what is wrong with them but not having the resources to purchase the
medicines they need. 
Social Justice Ireland believes these measures will most adversely affect people on low-
incomes. This is not compatible with a health-service characterised by quality and
equity. An international study of the Irish health system has noted the existence of
financial barriers to access to healthcare, especially among those just above the
threshold for a medical or GP visit card (World Health Organisation & European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2012). 
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58 And for reasons explained in the HSE Service Plan for 2014 such as recruitment already
in train for new services, this involves a gross reduction of 3,500 full-time equivalent
jobs in 2014.
59 For example, evidence from TILDA, the Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing shows that
20per cent of people over 50 take five or more medications; nearly 50 per cent of those
over 75 take five or more medications (WHO and the European Observatory on Health
Systems and Policies, 2012).
Full medical card coverage is necessary for all people in Ireland who are vulnerable.
The number of people benefitting from Discretionary Medical Cards fell by 15 per
cent between 2011 and 2012, from 74,281 people to 63,126 (HSE, 2012). During 2013,
examples of arbitrary cancellation of medical cards for people dealing with serious
health conditions such as families with children with serious congenital illnesses,
were highlighted in the media. Despite this, Budget 2014 envisaged a cut of €113
from medical cards by way of ‘probity’ measures. Although it is welcome that the
HSE Service Plan for 2014 has since acknowledged that this level of savings are not
feasible from ‘probity’ measures (the cutback has been reduced to €23million),
nonetheless reduction of €87 million (3.5%)  in Community (demand-led) primary
care schemes is also provided for in the 2014 Service Plan. This does not represent a
commitment to moving more toward primary care, which is government policy
(under the Future Health strategy). 
One aspect of Budget 2014 measures that has been welcomed by Social Justice Ireland
is the introduction of free GP care for children under five, as a first step toward
providing free GP care for all. 
However, one would have to conclude that overall the thrust of policy is disjointed,
lacks coherence and involves a level of expenditure reduction that is not compatible
with a well-managed system.
Health expenditure
Healthcare is a social right for everyone and a move to a rights based approach is a
key action under the heading of Governance Reform in the Core Policy Framework
set out in Chapter 2 - one of five priority areas identified by Social Justice Ireland
which must be addressed in order to realise its vision for Ireland. For this right to be
upheld governments must provide the funding needed to ensure that the relevant
services and care are available when required. While cutbacks during the recent
recession initially led to a big rise in the health spending share of GDP in Ireland,
since 2010 there has been a decrease in health spending relative to GDP (OECD,
2013). Comparative statistics are available for total expenditure on health (i.e. public
plus private) across the EU. Table 8.2 shows that Ireland spent 9.2 per cent of GDP
on healthcare, slightly below the EU-27 average of 9.9 per cent in 2010 (the latest
comparable data available from the CSO). In Gross National Income (GNI) terms
this expenditure translates into a figure of 11 per cent.60 More recent comparable
figures available from the OECD reflect reductions in health expenditure in recent
years, indicating that the health expenditure as a percentage of GDP had fallen to
8.9 per cent in 2011, below the OECD average of 9.3 per cent (amongst 34 OECD
countries) (OECD, 2013).
8. Healthcare 171
60 GNI is similar to the concept of GNP and has a similar value. GDP includes profit
exports not available for domestic consumption
Table 8.2 -  EU 27 Expenditure on Health as a percentage of GDP, 2009 and 2010
Country 2009 2010
Netherlands 12.0 11.9
France 11.9 11.9
Germany 11.7 11.6
Denmark 11.5 11.4
Portugal 10.7 11.0
Austria 11.0 11.0
Ireland (% of GNI) 11.3 11.0
Belgium 10.8 10.7
Greece 10.6 10.3
EU 9.9 9.9
Sweden 10.0 9.6
United Kingdom 9.8 9.6
Italy 9.4 9.5
Spain 9.6 9.5
Slovenia 9.3 9.4
Ireland (% of GDP) 9.4 9.2
Finland 9.1 9.0
Slovakia 9.1 8.8
Malta 8.5 8.7
Czech Republic 8.0 7.9
Luxembourg 7.9 7.8
Poland 7.4 7.5
Hungary 7.6 7.3
Lithuania 7.5 7.0
Bulgaria 7.2 6.9
Latvia 6.6 6.7
Estonia 6.7 6.0
Cyprus 6.1 6.0
Romania 5.6 5.6
CSO, 2013 from the WHO Health for all database; Includes public and private spending
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Healthcare costs tend to be higher in countries which have a higher old age
dependency ratios. This is not yet a significant issue for Ireland as the old age
dependency ratio is low compared to the much higher EU average (11.6 per cent of
the population is aged 65 years and over according to the 2011 Census and the old-
age dependency rate is 17.4 per cent (CSO, 2012c)). 
However, Ireland’s public spending on healthcare has reduced in recent years as
Table 8.3 shows. The decline between 2008 and 2012, 10.4 per cent, has been
particularly rapid in the opinion of international experts (WHO & European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2012). 
Table 8.3  Ireland: Current public expenditure on health care, 2002-2011
Year Total (€m) % of gNI % of gDp per capita at 
constant 2012 
prices (€) 
2002 7,933 7.3 6.1 2,645 
2003 8,853 7.4 6.3 2,755 
2004 9,653 7.5 6.4 2,773 
2005b 11,160 7.9 6.9 3,026 
2006 12,248 7.9 6.9 3,091 
2007 13,736 8.4 7.2 3,223 
2008 14,588 9.3 8.1 3,193 
2009 15,073 11.1 9.3 3,269
2010 14,452 10.9 9.1 3,249
2011 13,728 10.4 8.4 3,044
CSO, 2013.  b: break in the series.
The public share of health spending in Ireland (67%) had dropped to below the
OECD average (72 per cent from general govt revenue and social security) by 2011,
as Figure 8.1 shows (OECD, 2013a). The reduction in the public share of health
funding in Ireland can be explained by a series of measures introduced to make
people pay more out of their pockets such as increases in the share of direct
payments for prescribed medicines and appliances (OECD, 2013). As already noted,
out-of-pocket expenses in healthcare tend to operate as a much bigger barrier for
poorer people who defer visits or treatment as a result.
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Figure 8.1 - Expenditure on health by type of financing, 2011 (or nearest year)
OECD, 2013: OECD Health Statistics 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en
1. Data refer to total health expenditure
An open and transparent debate on funding of healthcare services is needed. Ireland
must decide what services are expected and how these should be funded. Despite
expenditure of 9.2 per cent of GDP going to fund healthcare (in 2010) there are still
recurring problems in such areas as waiting lists, bed closures, staff shortages, long-
term care and community care. However, this debate must acknowledge the
enormous financial expenditure on healthcare. Public healthcare expenditure grew
rapidly over the decade 2000 to 2010, from €5.334bn to €14.165bn. This was an
increase of 160 per cent over a period in which inflation increased by 33 per cent.
The difference is attributed in part to improved and expanded services, as well as to
organisational changes such as home-helps, for example, becoming salaried
members of staff within the HSE. However, the issue of medical inflation also needs
to be addressed. International experts have noted that, despite increased investment
during the previous decade, when the financial crisis occurred in 2008 Ireland still
had poorly developed primary and community care services (WHO & European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2012).
The Minister for Health has announced that €13.660bn (including €397 million in
capital expenditure) has been allocated for 2014 on current and capital spending
(Department of Health, 2013). In 2013, the budget allocation for gross public
expenditure on healthcare was €14.023bn. In terms of government’s overall
174 Socio-Economic Review 2014
expenditure, healthcare accounted for 27 per cent in 2011, the second largest area
of expenditure (after social protection) (Department of Expenditure & Reform,
2011).
Clearly there are significant efficiencies to be gained in restructuring the healthcare
system. Obtaining value for money is essential. However, these efforts should be
targeted at areas in which efficiencies can be delivered without compromising the
quality of the service. Social Justice Ireland continues to argue that there is a need to
be specific about the efficiencies that are needed and how they are to be delivered. 
As well as a debate on the overall budget for healthcare, there should be discussion
and transparency on the allocation to each of the services. Currently about 60% per
cent of the budget is allocated to Primary, Community and Continuing Care, which
includes the medical card services schemes (Department of Health, Key Trends 2013,
figure 6.2). Social Justice Ireland recommends an increase in this percentage and
greater clarity about the budget lines.
The model of healthcare 
Community-based health and social services require a model of care that:
• is accessible and acceptable to the communities they serve;
• is responsive to the particular needs and requirements of local communities; 
• is supportive of local communities in their efforts to build social cohesion; and
• accepts primary care as the key component of the model of care, affording it
priority over acute services as the place where health and social care options are
accessed by the community.
Action is required in four key areas if the basic model of care that is to underpin the
health services is not to be undermined. There areas are:
Older people’s services
Primary care, primary care teams and primary care networks
Children and family services
Disability and mental health
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older people’s services
Although Ireland’s population is young in comparison to those of other European
countries, it is still ageing. Those over 65 years of age increased by 14.4 per cent
between 2006 and 2011 and those aged over 85 years increased by 22 per cent (CSO,
2012). By 2025 the number over 85 years will have doubled (Department of Health,
2012, p.2). 
The HSE Service Plan for 2014 envisages making no new places available under the
Nursing Home Support Scheme (NHSS or ‘Fair Deal’ scheme) and acknowledges that
‘will require careful management of NHSS applications as places become vacant’ (HSE,
2014). In fact, the expected outturn for December 2014 shows almost 1,000 fewer
people in receipt of the scheme than at end 2013. This approach risks leading to more
older people remaining in inappropriate care facilities such as acute hospitals, an
outcome in the best interests of neither the individual nor the hospital. The HSE
National Service Plan for 2014 commits to a strong emphasis on home care and other
community support services but it also envisages that the absence of a significant
capital investment to improve standards within long-term care facilities, to bring them
into line with HIQA standards, means a reduction in residential care capacity; this
will result in increases in hospital and community waiting times. The Plan commits
no extra resourcing notwithstanding population ageing. This is not an appropriate
response when the number of people aged over 85 is increasing rapidly as many of
them are dependent on public services to continue to live with dignity. 
The HSE service plan does envisage shifting €23million from budget for the NHSS to
provide care in the community. Support for people to remain in their own homes is a
key and appropriate policy objective and coincides with the wish of most older people.
But increased demand for long-term care is also a predicted outcome of population
ageing (CARDI, 2012). There were over 500 people on waiting lists for the NHSS (Fair
Deal scheme) at end September 2013 (HSE, 2013a). Furthermore, a commitment to a
comprehensive system of care in the community, as announced in January 2014, is
not supported by making no further funding available, nor by further cutbacks in
housing grants intended to help older and disabled people to continue living at home.
Neither is it evidenced by the significant decrease in the provision of home help hours
since in recent years 61. As Table 8.4 shows, there were more than 10,000 fewer people
in receipt of home help support in 2012 than there had been in 2007 (a decrease of 18
per cent) and there was a decrease of some 2.5million in the hours delivered (a
decrease of 21 per cent). During the same period there was an increase in the numbers
in receipt of Home Care Packages (by 2,491 people) representing an increase of nearly
24 per cent. However, the numbers in receipt of Home Care Packages had decreased
slightly between 2011 and 2012. See Table 8.4. 
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61 HSE reports make it clear that older people are the main beneficiaries of Home Help
services and Home Care Packages.
Table 8.4 – HSE Support to Older People in the Community, 2007 - 2012
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Home Help:
People in receipt 54,736 >53,000 53,971 54,000 50,986 44,387
Hours delivered 12.35m 12.64m 11.97m 11.68m 11.09m 9.8m 
Home Care Packages
People in receipt 8,035 8,990 8,959 9,941 10,968 10,526
December Performance Reports, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012; November Performance Report,
2010 and HSE Annual Report 2010.
Other Budget 2014 measures, such as the increase in prescription charges and the
abolition of the Telephone Allowance (part of the Household Benefits Package), will
have negative effects on many older people and their families, falling most heavily
on poorer groups. Over the past six years, cuts in public services such as home help
and community nursing units, reductions in the Fuel Allowance, cuts in the
Household Benefits Package and the abolition of the Christmas bonus, have all
adversely affected older people. Between 2011 and 2012 alone, there was a reduction
of 4.7 per cent in expenditure on care of older people (Department of Health, 2013).
Furthermore, the level of overall cut to the health budget for 2014 and the reduction
in staffing makes it inevitable that all front-line services will affected, including
those for older people. International experts have identified that the drop in
Ireland’s public health spending on over 65s will have fallen by approximately 32
per cent per head between 2009 and 2016 (World Health Organization & European
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2012). However, this was based on
government estimates to 2014 and assumed that funding levels would remain static
for 2015 and 2016.
Supports that enable people to live at home need to be part of a broader integrated
approach that ensures appropriate access to acute services when required. To achieve
this, the specific deficits in infrastructure that exist across the country need to be
addressed urgently. There should be an emphasis on replacement and/or
refurbishment of facilities. If this is not done the inappropriate admission of older
people to acute care facilities will continue, along with the consequent negative
effects on acute services and unnecessary stress on older people and their families.
It is crucial that funding be released in a timely manner when a person is deemed in
need of a ‘Fair Deal’ bed and that sufficient capital investment is provided to ensure
that enough residential care beds are available to meet the growing demand for
them. The focus on the development of community based services to support older
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people in their own homes/communities for as long as possible is welcome. But a
commitment to supporting people at home is only aspirational if funding is not
provided for home help services, day care centres and home care packages – areas
that have received serious and unwelcome cuts in recent Budgets. 
Social Justice Ireland believes that a total investment of €500 million over five years,
(i.e. €100 million each year), is required to meet this growing need.  This would
enable some 12 to 15 community nursing facilities with about 50 beds each to be
replaced or refurbished each year. In addition to supporting the needs of older
people, this proposal would also stimulate economic activity and increase
employment in many local communities during the construction periods.
primary care
Primary care is one of the cornerstones of the health system and was acknowledged
as such in the strategy document Primary Care – A New Direction (2001). It has also
been identified as an essential pre-requisite in the new health services reform
strategy, Future Health (2012) and its importance to health promotion and the
prevention of illness is recognised in Healthy Ireland (2013). Between 90 and 95 per
cent of the population is treated by the primary care system. The model of a primary
care adopted must be flexible so that it can respond to the local needs assessment.
Paying attention to local people’s own perspective on their health and
understanding the impact of the conditions of their lives on their health is essential
to community development and to community orientated approaches to primary
care. A community development approach is needed to ensure that the community
can define its own health needs, work out collectively how these needs can best be
met, and decide on a course of action to achieve this in partnership with service
providers. This will ensure greater control over the social, political, economic and
environmental factors that determine the health status of any community.
The principle underlining this model should be a social model of health, in-keeping
with the World Health Organization’s definition of health as a ‘state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity’. Ireland’s Healthy Ireland strategy describes health as ‘a personal, social and
economic good’ (Department of Health, 2013). Universal access is needed to ensure
that a social model of health can become a reality and Government commitment to
achieving this, which is contained in the Future Health reform strategy, is to be
welcomed in principle. However, the strategy lacks detail on how its aims will be
achieved. There are also areas in which the approaches outlined may well face serious
challenges. Amongst them is how to deliver a truly integrated system of care,
especially for people with complex or chronic conditions, within a system in which
primary and hospital care is to be funded through the proposed Universal Health
Insurance system, but social care services, including long-term care, are not. Will
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access to social care services, for example, be universal as well as access to GP services?
For the strategies outlined to be implemented there is a clear need for an increase in
the proportion of the total healthcare budget being allocated to primary care and a
more comprehensive and integrated approach to social care services to support people
living at home. Instead, a net reduction of €87 million (3.5%) in Community
(demand-led) primary care schemes is provided for in the HSE Service Plan, 2014.
primary care teams and primary care networks
Ireland’s healthcare system has struggled to provide an effective and efficient
response to the health needs of its population. Despite a huge increase in investment
in recent years great problems persist. The development of primary care teams
(PCTs) across the country could have a substantial positive impact on reducing these
problems.
Developing PCTs and primary care networks is intended as the basic building block
of local public health care provision. The Primary Care Team (PCT) is intended to
be a team of health professionals that includes GPs and Practice Nurses, community
nurses (i.e. public health nurses and community RGNs), physiotherapists,
occupational therapists and home-care staff. PCTs are expected to link in with other
community-based disciplines to ensure that health and social needs are addressed.
These include speech and language therapists, dieticians, area medical officers,
community welfare officers, addiction counsellors, community mental health
nurses, consultant psychiatrists and others. 
It was envisaged that 530 Primary Care Teams supported by 134 Health and Social
Care Networks would cover the country by 2011. According to the HSE, there were
486 PCTs in place by the end of 2012 (Department of Health, 2012). The work done
on existing teams is very welcome but much more is needed to ensure they
command the confidence and trust of local communities and there is a need for
greater transparency in relation to their roll-out.
The Government’s introduction of a new system of seven Directorates to run the
health system is of concern because this approach is likely to obstruct the delivery
of an integrated healthcare system for service users at local level. There are real
concerns that the new approach will increase rather than reduce costs and
bureaucracy. Instead of an integrated system based on primary care teams at local
level, seven ‘silos’ could emerge, competing for resources and producing a splintered
system that is not effective, sustainable or viable in the long term. 
Social Justice Ireland believes that reform of the healthcare system is necessary but is
seriously concerned that the proposed new structure will see each Directorate
establish its own bureaucracy at national, regional and local levels. 
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Children and family services
There is a need to focus on health and social care provision for children and families
in tandem with the development of primary care team services. The 2006 Concluding
Observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted the lack of a
comprehensive legal framework and the absence of statutory guidelines safeguarding
the quality of, and access to, health care services, particularly for children in
vulnerable situations (Children’s Rights Alliance, 2013). The Committee also raised
concerns about the practice of treating children with mental health issues in adult in-
patient facilities. Social Justice Ireland welcomed the announcement of free GP care for
under-fives announced as part of Budget 2014. However, its implementation is awaited
and it will require negotiation with providers and legislative changes.
Many community and voluntary services are being provided in facilities badly in
need of refurbishment or rebuilding. Despite poor infrastructure, these services are
the heart of local communities, providing vital services that are locally ‘owned’.
There is a great need to support this activity and, in particular, to meet its
infrastructural requirements. A Vision for Change (revised as per Census 2011 data)
(Department of Health, 2012) recommended the establishment of 107 specialist
Child and Adolescent Mental Health teams, but by the end of 2012 there were 63
teams operating and staffing was at just 38 per cent of what had been recommended
(Children’s Rights Alliance, 2013).
Social Justice Ireland believes that a total of €250 million is required over a five year
period to address the infrastructural deficit in Children and Family Services. This
amounts to €27 million per area for each of the nine Children Services Committee
areas and a national investment of €7 million in Residential and Special Care.
As well as the issue of Child Safeguarding, we believe current key issues are the
second National Children’s Strategy, policy on early childhood care and education,
child poverty, youth homelessness, disability among young people and the issue of
young carers. 
Disability
Disability policy remains largely as set out in the National Disability Strategy from
2004. A long-awaited implementation plan for the strategy was published in 2013.
There are many areas within the disability sector in need of further development and
core funding and an ambitious implementation process needs now to be pursued.62
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62 Other disability related issues are addressed throughout this review.
People with disabilities have been cumulatively affected by a range of policies
introduced as part of successive Budgets in recent years. These include cuts to
disability allowance, changes in medical card eligibility criteria and increased
prescription charges, cuts in respite services, cuts to home help and personal
assistant hours and other community-based supports as well as the non-
replacement of front-line staff providing services to people with disabilities. The
overall cut in health spending in Budget 2014 as well as specific measures (such as
the increase in prescription charges) will affect many people with disabilities and
families. Changes announced in January 2014 to the Housing Adaptation Grants
Scheme may make it more difficult for some people to continue to live in their
communities. Furthermore, people with disabilities experience higher everyday
costs of living because of their disabilities and, as Chapter 3 discusses, they are one
of the groups in Irish society at greatest risk of poverty. 
Mental health
The National Health Strategy entitled Quality and Fairness (2001) identified mental
health as an area needing development. The Expert Group on Mental Health Policy
published a report entitled A Vision for Change – Report of the Expert Group on Mental
Health Policy (2006). This report offered many worthwhile pathways to adequately
address mental health issues in Irish society. Unfortunately, to date little has been
implemented to achieve this vision. In 2009, the Mental Health Commission noted
with concern that the slow pace of implementation of A Vision for Change impacts
directly on the quality of mental health services available to those who need them
(2009).
There is an urgent need to address this whole area in the light of the World Health
Report (2001) Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope. This estimated that in
1990 mental and neurological disorders accounted for 10 per cent of the total
Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost due to all diseases and injuries. This
estimate increased to 12 per cent in 2000. By 2020, it is projected that these disorders
will have increased to 15 per cent. This has serious implications for services in all
countries in coming years.
In June 2011 the Institute for Public Health published a study on the impact of the
recession on men’s health, especially mental health. Entitled Facing the Challenge:
The Impact of Recession and Unemployment on Men’s Health in Ireland, the study showed
that employment status was the most important predicator of psychological distress,
with 30.4 per cent of those unemployed reporting mental health problems.
Social Justice Ireland has welcomed the allocation of €20 million in Budget 2014 for
the development of community mental health teams, but has expressed the view
that a minimum of €35million was needed to support the development of extended
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catchment areas and community mental health teams. According to the HSE’s
divisional plan for mental health, published in January 2014, staffing levels are still
at approximately 75% of what was recommended in A Vision for Change and have
reduced by 11 per cent on 2006 levels (2014). The mental health services are going
through a significant change process at a time when demands on services are
growing, as the HSE has noted, in line with population increases and the effects of
the prolonged recession (2014). It is vital that ongoing reductions in inpatient beds
are matched by adequate and effective alternative provision in the community.
Areas of concern in mental health
There is a need for effective outreach and follow-up programmes for people who
have been in-patients in institutions upon their discharge into the wider
community. These should provide:
• sheltered housing (high, medium and low supported housing); 
• monitoring of medication; 
• retraining and rehabilitation; and 
• assistance with integration into community.
 In the development of mental health teams there should be a particular focus on
people with an intellectual disability and other vulnerable groups, including
children, the homeless, prisoners, Travellers, asylum seekers, refugees and other
minority groups. People in these and related categories have a right to a specialist
service to provide for their often complex needs. A great deal remains to be done
before this right could be acknowledged as having been recognised and honoured
in the healthcare system.
The connection between disadvantage and ill health when the social determinants
of health (housing, income, childcare support, education etc.) are not met is well
documented. This is also true in respect of mental health issues.
Suicide – a mental health issue
Suicide is a problem related to mental health issues. For many years the topic was
rarely discussed in Irish society and, as a consequence, the healthcare and policy
implications of its existence were limited. Over time Ireland’s suicide rate has risen
significantly, from 6.4 suicides per 100,000 people in 1980 to a peak of 13.9 in 1998,
and to 11.7 suicides per 100,000 people in 2008 (National Office of Suicide
Prevention, 2011). 
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There was a downward trend in the rate from 2003, which stopped in 2007,
something partly attributed to the change in the economy by the National Office
of Suicide Prevention (2011). According to the latest figures available from the
National Suicide Research Foundation, which are still provisional, there were 507
recorded suicides in 2012, of which 413 were males and 94 were females.  According
to the HSE, international studies indicate that for every 1 per cent increase in
unemployment, there is a 0.9 per cent increase in suicides (2014).
Table 8.5 shows that suicide is predominantly a male phenomenon, accounting for
approximately 80 per cent of such deaths. Young males in particular, are the group
most at risk, although the rate for men remains consistently high at all ages up to
mid-sixties. At every age the rate is higher for men than for women (National Office
for Suicide Prevention, 2013). The highest rate is among 20-24 year old males at 31.9
per 100,000 population. Some 42% of those who died by suicide in 2010 were men
less than 40 years of age (National Office for Suicide Prevention, 2013). 
Identification of overall trends in suicide rates is a complex process particularly using
international comparisons. World Health Organization statistics suggest that where
overall rates of suicide are concerned, Ireland ranked 6th lowest in the EU. However,
where younger age-groups are concerned (5-24 year olds), Ireland ranks fourth
highest for deaths by suicide at 13.9 per 100,000 population (National Office of
Suicide Prevention, 2013).  
Table 8.5 – Suicides in Ireland 2003-2012
overall                                     Males                                      Females
year No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate
2003 497 12.5 386 19.5 111 5.5
2004 493 12.2 406 20.2 87 4.3
2005 481 11.6 382 18.5 99 4.8
2006 460 10.9 379 17.9 81 3.8
2007 458 10.6 362 16.7 96 4.4
2008 506 11.4 386 17.5 120 5.4
2009 552 12.4 443 20.0 109 4.9
2010 490 11 405 18.3 90 4.0
2011 554 12.2 458 20.2 96 4.1
2012* 507 11.1 413 18.2 94 4.1
Notes: * Provisional figures
Rate is rate per 100,000 of the population.
National Suicide Research Foundation (2013)
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The sustained high level of suicides in Ireland is a significant healthcare and societal
problem. Of course, the statistics only tell one part of the story. Behind each of these
victims are families and communities devastated by these tragedies. Likewise,
behind each of the figures is a personal story which leads to victims taking their own
lives. Social Justice Ireland believes that further attention and resources need to be
devoted to researching and addressing Ireland’s suicide problem. 
older people and Mental Health
Mental health issues affect all groups in society. Some 41,700 people in Ireland are
estimated to be affected by dementia or Alzheimer’s disease (Cahill, O’Shea and
Pierce, 2012). Most are over 65 but this figure includes people of all ages and some
3,600 of them are likely to be under 65. The projections for those likely to be affected
by 2041 are between 141,000 and 147,000. Older people with dementia are a
particularly vulnerable group because they often ‘fall between two stools’ (i.e.
between mental health services and general medical care). A co-ordinated service
needs to be provided for this group. It is important that this be needs-based and
service-user led and should be in keeping with the principles set out in the World
Health Organisation’s 2001 annual report. A national dementia strategy is in
development and its publication is awaited. 
Research and development in all areas of mental health are needed to ensure a
quality service is delivered. Providing good mental health services should not be
viewed as a cost but rather as an investment in the future. Public awareness needs
to be raised to ensure a clearer understanding of mental illness so that the rights of
those with mental illness are recognised. 
Future healthcare needs
A number of the factors highlighted elsewhere in this review will have implications
for the future of our healthcare system. The projected increases in population
forecast by the CSO imply that there will be more people living in Ireland in 10 to
15 years time. One clear implication of this will be additional demand for healthcare
services and facilities. In the context of our past mistakes it is important that Ireland
begins to plan for this additional demand and begins to train staff and construct the
needed facilities.
The new health reform strategy, 2012-2015, Future Health, envisages major changes
in the way that health services are organised and delivered. Legislation passed in
2013 provided for the replacement of the HSE Board with a new governing body and
the establishment of seven separate Service Directorates. Ultimately, the strategy
aims to introduce a system of Universal Health Insurance intended to facilitate
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access to healthcare based on need not income. This aim is an important one, but,
as previously mentioned, full details of the approach are not yet available and a
proposed White Paper has yet to be published. The time-frame for the introduction
of the new system (2016) is also relatively short, given the very complex health
system that currently operates and the degree of budgetary cuts and consequent
disruption that has occurred in recent years and is set to continue. It has not been
established that the proposed system of a number of competing insurers will succeed
in achieving the necessary improvements in equity, quality and efficiency. 
We share the concerns of the Council for Justice and Peace of the Irish Episcopal
Conference (2012) about a lack of focus on outcomes. We agree with it that the:
‘public health strategy should ... not only spell out goals for public health but also
set out the role that each major field of intervention is expected to perform in
achieving those goals, the implications for resource allocation that arise from such
roles, and the mechanisms that will be used to ensure that spending actually goes
to the areas where it will achieve greatest benefit’.
Key policy priorities on healthcare
• Recognise the considerable health inequalities present within the Irish
healthcare system, develop strategies and provide sufficient resources to tackle
them.
• Give far greater priority to community care and restructure the healthcare
budget accordingly. Care should be taken to ensure that the increased allocation
does not go to the GMS or the drug subsidy scheme. 
• Resource and complete the roll out of primary care teams.
• Increase the proportion of the health budget allocated to health promotion and
education in partnership with all relevant stakeholders.
• Focus on obtaining better value for money in the health budget.
• Provide the childcare services with the additional resources necessary to
effectively implement the Child Care Act. 
• Provide additional respite care and long stay care for older people and people
with disabilities and proceed to develop and implement a coherent dementia
strategy.
• Promote equality of access and outcomes to services within the Irish healthcare
system.
• Develop and resource mental health services, recognising that they will be a key
factor in determining the health status of the population.
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• Continue to facilitate and fund a campaign to give greater attention to the issue
of suicide in Irish society. In particular, focus resources on educating young
people about suicide.
• Enhance the process of planning and investment so that the healthcare system
can cope with the increase and diversity in population and the ageing of the
population projected for the next few decades.
• Ensure that structural and systematic reform of the health system reflects the
key principles of the Health Strategy aimed at achieving high performance,
person-centred quality of care and value for money in the health service. 
• Ensure the new healthcare structure is fit for purpose and publish detailed
evidence of how the decisions taken will meet healthcare goals.
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9. 
EDUCAT ION  AND  EDUCAT IONAL
D ISADVANTAGE
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE: EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE
To provide relevant education for all people throughout their lives, so that they can
participate fully and meaningfully in developing themselves, their community and the
wider society.
Education can be an agent for social transformation. Social Justice Ireland believes
that education can be a powerful force in counteracting inequality and poverty
while recognising that, in many ways, the present education system has quite the
opposite effect. The primary focus of education is to prepare students for life
enabling them to participate in and to contribute to society.  Education allows
people to live a full life.  Living a full life requires both knowledge and skills
appropriate to age, environment, and social and economic roles, as well as the ability
to function in a world of increasing complexity and to adapt to continuously
changing circumstances without sacrificing personal integrity (Department of
Education and Skills, 1995).  Education makes a fundamentally important
contribution to the quality and well-being of our society.  It is a right for each
individual and a means to enhancing well-being and quality of life for the whole of
society (ibid).   Investment in education at all levels can deliver a more equal society
and prepare citizens to participate in a democracy.  Education is one of the key policy
areas that must be addressed urgently as part of the Core Policy Framework we set
out in Chapter 2 under the heading of Enhancing Social Protection.  Education must
also be available as a right as envisaged in our Core Policy Area, Reform Governance,
set out in the same chapter.
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Education in Ireland – the numbers
There are just over one million full-time students in the formal Irish education
system. Of these, 520,444 are at primary level, 360,567 at second level and 166,088
at third level. The numbers at primary level have been increasing since 2001 and
this will have knock on implications for provision at second and third level. (CSO
2012:100). This demographic growth and the knock-on pressure on the education
system and the need to develop long-term policies to cater for increased demand
have been acknowledged by the Minister for Education and Skills.63 By 2017 there
will be an extra 105,000 extra students in education in Ireland; 64,000 at primary
level, 25,000 at second level and 16,000 at third-level.64
Ireland’s expenditure on education equalled 6.5 per cent of GDP in 2010, an increase
of almost two percentage points since 2008.  This is due mainly to the decrease of
GDP in Ireland over this period (CSO 2014).  However, education accounts for only
9.7 per cent of total public expenditure in Ireland compared with an OECD average
of 13 per cent.  Over much of the last decade, as national income has increased, the
share allocated to education has slowly increased; a development we strongly
welcome. Table 9.1 (CSO 2014) details a real expenditure increase per student of 16.4
per cent at first level and 11.6 per cent at second level over the period 2003-2012.
During the same period real expenditure per student at third level declined by one
fifth (20.1 per cent).   Real expenditure per student in 2012 at primary level was three
quarters that at third level.  Between 2003 and 2012 the numbers of students in
Ireland grew by 17 per cent at first level and by 6.5 per cent at second level. Over the
same period, the number of full-time third level students increased by 24.1 per cent
(CSO 2014).  The number of part-time third-level students increased by just 0.3 per
cent in the same period. It should also be noted, however, that Ireland’s young
population as a proportion of total population is large by EU standards and,
consequently, a higher than average spend on education would be expected.
Investment and planning for future education needs
Education is now regarded as a central plank in the economic, social and cultural
development of Irish society (Department of Education and Skills, 2004).  Education
and training are also crucial to achieving the objective of an inclusive society where
all citizens have the opportunity to participate fully and meaningfully in social and
economic life.  The development of the education and skills of people is as important
a source of wealth as the accumulation of more traditional forms of capital.
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http://www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Speeches/2012-Speeches/SP2012-09-
17.html
64 ibid
Table 9.1: Ireland: Real current public expenditure on education, 2003-2013
year First Second Third Real Current public
level* level* level* Expenditure** 
€ € € €m 
2003 5,390 7,825 10,539 6,687 
2004 5,794 7,914 10,332 6,893 
2005 5,898 8,262 10,689 7,133 
2006 6,103 8,625 11,206 7,498 
2007 6,246 9,085 11,078 7,822 
2008 6,361 9,207 10,866 8,061 
2009 6,605 9,307 10,314 8,343
2010 6,493 9,010 9,898 8,293
2011 6,455 8,911 9,161 8,326 
2012 6,272 8,735 8,417 8,005 
*€ per student at 2012 prices         **€m at 2012 prices
Source: Department of Education and Skills, CSO (2014)
The fundamental aim of education is to serve individual, social and economic well-
being and to enhance quality of life.  Policy formulation in education should value
and promote all dimensions of human development and seek to prepare people for
full participation in cultural, social and economic life.  This requires investment in
education at all levels, from early childhood right up to lifelong learning.  
Social Justice Ireland welcomes the fact that the Department of Education has begun
to use the population projections by the CSO based on the census results to plan for
future education needs, timing and spatial distribution.  Using these figures, the
Department of Education now projects the following possible increases in
enrolment across the system:
• an additional 32,500 places will be needed at primary level between now and
2014 and an increase in enrolments to 601,820 by 2020;65
• an additional 17,000 places will be needed at second level between now and 2014
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with significant increases projected in the years after 2014, to peak at an
enrolment of 413,118 in 2026;66
• at third level, the number of students is expected to rise by 15,000 by 2015;
between 205,000 and 210,000 students are expected by 2026/27.67
The Department of Education has published a capital works programme amounting
to €2.2 billion between now and 2016 to address this issue and increase the number
of places available through a School Building Programme. Social Justice Ireland
believes it is critically important that Government, and in particular the
Department of Education and Skills, pays attention to the population projection by
the CSO for the years to come in order to adequately plan and provide for the
increased places needed within the education system in the coming decades.  Budget
2012 introduced an increase in the number of pupils required to gain and retain a
classroom teaching post in small primary schools.  The reasoning given for this
change was that small schools benefitted disproportionately from the staffing
schedule and that it acted as a disincentive to consider amalgamation.  To date 79
schools have lost a classroom post and 42 schools have not gained a classroom post
as a result of this decision.  A further 75 posts are to be removed from rural schools
in 2014.  This policy, which has had a significant impact on rural schools and
education in rural areas seems to be based on a philosophy that rural schools should
be forced to amalgamate.  Such a philosophy ignores the economic and social
impact of the closure of a school on rural communities.    
Education is widely recognised as crucial to the achievement of our national
objectives of economic competitiveness, social inclusion and active citizenship.
However, the overall levels of public funding for education in Ireland are out of step
with these aspirations. This under-funding is most severe in early childhood
education and in the areas of lifelong learning and second chance education – the
very areas that are most vital in terms of the promotion of greater equity and
fairness. The projected increased demand outlined above in all areas of our
education system must be matched by a policy of investment at all levels that is
focussed on protecting and promoting quality services for those in the education
system. 
Early Childhood Education
It is widely acknowledged that early childhood (pre-primary) education helps to
build a strong foundation for lifelong learning and ensure equity in education. It
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also improves children’s cognitive abilities, reduces poverty and can mitigate social
inequalities (OECD 2012: 338). It is seen as the essential foundation for successful
lifelong learning, social integration, personal development and later employability
(European Commission, 2011). It is important that adequate resources are invested
in this area because early childhood education plays a crucial role in providing
young people with the opportunity to develop to their fullest potential.   
The most striking feature of investment in education in Ireland relative to other
OECD countries is our under-investment in early childhood education relative to
international norms.  Ireland spends 0.1 per cent of GDP on pre-primary education
compared with the OECD average of 0.5 per cent (OECD 2012: 339). The
introduction of the Early Childhood Care and Education Scheme (ECCE) has been
a positive move in addressing this under investment.   The ECCE Scheme entitles
every child between the ages of 3 years and 3 months and 4 years and 6 months to
three hours of pre-school care for thirty-eight weeks in one year free of charge.  The
ECCE scheme is availed of by over 68,000 children and is administered by the
Department of Children and Youth Affairs at a cost of approximately €175 million.68
In 2011, 95 per cent of 4 year olds in Ireland were enrolled in early childhood
education as a result of this initiative.  However only 47 per cent of 3 years olds were
enrolled in early childhood education compared with an OECD average of 67 per
cent.  Clearly Ireland still has quite a way to go to catch up with the OECD average.  
Early childhood is also the stage where education can most effectively influence the
development of children and help reverse disadvantage (European Commission,
2011).  It has the potential to both reduce the incidence of early school leaving and
to increase the equity of educational outcomes. Early childhood education is also
associated with better performance later on in school. A recent OECD study found
that 15-year-old pupils who attended pre-primary education perform better on PISA
testing (Programme for International Student Assessment) than those who did not,
even allowing for differences in their socio-economic backgrounds (OECD,
2012:338).   This is mirrored in the PISA 2012 results for Ireland which show that
Irish students who attended pre-school scored significantly better than those who
did not (Department of Education and Skills, 2013).  
Chart 9.1 below illustrates that the highest return from investment in education is
between the ages of 0 to 5. This is the point in the developmental curve where
differences in early health, cognitive and non-cognitive skills, which are costly
sources of inequality, can be addressed most effectively. The evidence shows that
early childhood education has the greatest potential to provide more equal
educational opportunity to those students from lower socio-economic backgrounds.
The importance of investment in education is widely acknowledged and the rewards
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for both individuals and the state are clear.  The Oireachtas Spotlight on Early
Childhood Education and Care details that the return on investment can be as much
as €7 for every €1 invested in a child.  Longitudinal studies internationally also show
returns of between three and ten times the original investment in children69.  It is
critically important that Ireland invest in this area and provide universal early
childhood education services for children. This will provide an economic and social
return for many years to come.  
Chart 9.1: The Heckman Curve
Source: Carneiro and Heckman, 2003
The European Commission believes that Europe’s future will be based on smart,
sustainable and inclusive growth and that improving the quality and effectiveness
of education systems is essential to this (European Commission, 2011). Achieving
such growth, and honouring the educational commitments outlined in the
Programme for Government and National Recovery in the process, will require
significant strategic investment in early childhood education and lifelong learning
through a policy making process that has long-term planning at its core. Our success
in educating future generations of pre-school children will be a major determinant
of our future sustainability.
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primary and Second level Education
Ireland has a pupil teacher ratio (PTR) of 15.7 at primary level and 14.4 at second
level (CSO, 2014), the eleventh highest in the EU.  The average class size in Ireland
at primary level is 24.1, the second highest in the EU.  Government should address
this issue and take action to reduce class sizes at primary level.  In 2011 Ireland took
part in the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) and the Trends
in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS).  These test primary school
pupils in the equivalent of fourth class in reading, mathematics and science in over
60 countries. Ireland preformed relatively well, ranking 10th out of 45 participating
countries in reading, 17th out of 50 participating countries in mathematics and 22nd
out of 50 participating countries in science. A detailed analysis has been published
by the Educational Research Centre (Eivers and Clerkin eds., 2013). 
Some of the most interesting findings are in the differences in results for children
in Northern Ireland and the Republic. Northern Irish primary school pupils
performed better in reading and numeracy than any other English speaking country,
coming 5th out of 45 participating countries in reading and 6th out of 50
participating countries in mathematics. A revised primary school curriculum and
targeted literacy and numeracy programmes were introduced in Northern Ireland
in 2007. The new curriculum is based on the skills that children should attain rather
than on content to be covered, with a focus on preparation for learning and child-
led learning. The revised curriculum has been a considerable success and provides
an excellent example of how to redesign a school curriculum, putting quality
programmes and services at the heart of the system. This is particularly relevant at
a time when the Minister for Education and Skills claims to be implementing a
reform agenda to radically improve teaching and learning in Ireland and the
learning experience of students in the Irish education system. 
At second level, Irish students performed relatively well in the 2012 PISA tests in
reading, literacy, mathematics and science.  The performance of Ireland’s fifteen-
year-olds shows a significant improvement on the 2009 performance. However,
when compared with 2003 PISA results, the overall performance showed very little
progress.  Students from fee paying schools significantly out-performed those from
non-fee paying schools, and students who never attended pre-school performed less
well than those who attended pre-school (Perkins et al, 2013).  The PISA findings
suggest that while reading levels among the school-going population are better than
the population generally, this difference is much smaller than should be expected.
The fact that the proportion of male students unable to read at the most basic level
(Level 2 PISA) is almost unchanged since 2000 (Perkins et al., 2013:143) must be a
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cause of considerable concern for policymakers.  It is clear that fundamental reforms
are needed to Ireland’s education system70 to address this problem. 
Social Justice Ireland welcomes the reforms to the Junior Cycle and the
implementation of the national literacy and numeracy strategy ‘Literacy and
Numeracy for Learning and Life’.  The strategy sets out national targets and a range of
significant measures to improve literacy and numeracy in early childhood education
and in primary and post-primary schools. These measures include improving the
performance of children and young people in PISA literacy and numeracy tests at
all levels.  The impact of these measures and of Project maths should be seen in the
next round of PISA 2015.  The strategy also proposes fundamental changes to teacher
education and the curriculum in schools and radical improvements in the
assessment and reporting of student progress at student, school and national level.
Progress on this issue is overdue and budgetary and economic constraints must not
be allowed to impede the implementation of the strategy.
The ‘reform agenda’ currently pursued by the Minister for Education and Skills is
being implemented at second level with the phased replacement of the Junior
Certificate examination with the new Junior Cycle Student Award incorporating a
school-based approach to assessment.  This award was developed in response to
weaknesses in the current model highlighted by the National Council for
Curriculum and Assessment71 and to address the issue of second level students not
achieving their potential and the wake-up call in Irish education of students failing
PISA tests.72 Social Justice Ireland welcomes the new student centred approach to the
Junior Cycle and the new emphasis on helping students who are not performing
well in Irish schools. It is important that such reforms be followed through to the
Leaving Certificate to ensure policy coherence and a truly student centred approach
in the second level education system. It is equally important that policymakers,
whilst implementing a reform agenda, remember that the primary focus of
education is to prepare students for life, not just for work.
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literacy and Adult literacy
The OECD PIAAC study 2013 provides the most up to date data on adult literacy in
Ireland.   On literacy, Ireland is placed 17th out of 24 countries with 18 per cent of
Irish adults having a literacy level at or below level 1.  People at this level of literacy
can understand and follow only basic written instructions and read only very short
texts (OECD, 2013).  On numeracy, Ireland is placed 19th out of 24 countries with 26
per cent of Irish adults scoring at or below level 1.  In the final category, problem
solving in technology rich environments, 42 per cent of Irish adults scored at or
below level 1.  In other words, a very significant proportion of Ireland’s adult
population does not possess the most basic literacy, numeracy and information-
processing skills considered necessary to success in the world today.  The report also
found that there is no statistical difference between average literacy scores of adults
in Ireland from IALS in 1994 and PIAAC in 2012.  In other words, the adult literacy
strategy implemented by successive governments in the intervening years was
grossly inadequate in terms of dealing with Ireland’s adult literacy problem.  A
significant proportion of Ireland’s labour force is not equipped with the skills
required for the modern labour market.  Those with low literacy skills are almost
twice as likely to be unemployed (OECD, 2013) and are more likely to report poor
health outcomes and are less likely to participate in social and civic life. 
The Programme for Government and National Recovery states that the government
will address the widespread and persistent problem of restricted adult literacy
through the integration of literacy in vocational training and through community
education.  The previous target for adult literacy policy set out in NAPInclusion was
that ‘the proportion of the population aged 16-64 with restricted literacy will be
reduced to between 10 per cent to 15 per cent by 2016 from the level of 25 per cent
found in 1997’.  This target was completely unacceptable and unambitious at the
time and showed a lack of interest in seriously addressing the problem. The recent
PIAAC results confirm this analysis.  The lack of focus on this issue has been further
underscored by successive budget cuts to funding for adult literacy programmes.  By
2015, funding for adult literacy will have been reduced by 11 per cent since 2010.73
No new target or strategy for adult literacy has yet been outlined, despite the
Department of Education and Skills commencing a review of adult literacy provision
in late 2012, and publishing the report of the review group in September 2013. The
Department accepted the findings of the Report and as an initial step the Adult
Literacy Operational Guidelines were revised to incorporate many of the
recommendations. These guidelines were published in December 2013.  The
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grants for adult and further education courses by 5%, a 2% reduction in Budget 2012,
2% in 2013 and 1% in 2014 and 2015).
Department has transferred responsibility for implementation of the adult literacy
strategy (including the incorporation of the outstanding review group
recommendations) and the setting of targets to SOLAS, the new Further Education
and Training Authority.  SOLAS is due to present its strategy for approval by the
Minister in March 2014.  Social Justice Ireland recommends that the new targets to
be set out in the forthcoming adult literacy strategy be ambitious and realistic in the
context of the future social and economic development of Ireland, and that the
necessary funding is provided to ensure that this target is met.  
lifelong learning
Equality of status is one of the basic democratic principles that should underpin
lifelong learning. Access in adult life to desirable employment and choices is closely
linked to level of educational attainment. Equal political rights cannot exist if some
people are socially excluded and educationally disadvantaged. The lifelong
opportunities of those who are educationally disadvantaged are in sharp contrast
to the opportunities for meaningful participation of those who have completed a
second or third level education. Unlike the rising earnings premium and earnings
rewards enjoyed by those who have completed higher education, the earnings
disadvantage for those who have not completed upper secondary education
increases with age.  Therefore, lifelong education should be seen as a basic need. In
this context, second chance education and continuing education are vitally
important and require on-going support.
The OECD recommends that lifelong learning opportunities should be accessible
to all through systems that combine high-quality initial education with
opportunities and incentives for the entire population to continue to develop
proficiency in reading and numeracy skills, whether outside work or in the
workplace, after initial education and training are completed.  It notes that the joint
impact of investing in the skills of many individuals may exceed the sum of the
individual parts.  
There is a strong link between educational attainment and employment.  Those aged
25 to 64 with only primary level qualification are three times more likely to be
unemployed than those with a third level qualification (24 per cent versus 7 per
cent) (CSO 2011:1). This gap has increased 10 percentage points since 2009,
demonstrating the difficulties faced by Government in helping those with low levels
of educational attainment up-skill and improve their prospects of getting a job. The
Programme for Government makes reference to lifelong learning as a high priority
for jobseekers. However, labour market activation cannot be the sole factor defining
the lifelong learning agenda and education and training curricula. Various reports
identify generic skills and competences as a core element of the lifelong learning
framework. The Forfás Report ‘Sharing our future: Ireland 2025’ (Forfas 2009)
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highlights the increasing range of generic skills that individuals require to operate
within society and the economy. These include basic skills such as literacy,
numeracy, use of technology, language skills, people related and conceptual skills.
The report of the Expert Group on Future Skills Needs ‘Tomorrow’s Skills – Towards a
National Skills Strategy’ (2007) indicates that there is substantial evidence to show
that employers regard generic skills as equal to, if not more important than,
technical or job specific skills.
Eight key competences for lifelong learning have been identified by the Council of
Europe and the European Parliament (Council of Europe, 2006):
• Communication in the mother tongue (reading, writing, etc.);
• Communication in foreign languages;
• Mathematical and basic competences in science and technology;
• Digital competence;
• Learning to learn;
• Social and civic competences;
• Sense of initiative and entrepreneurship;
• Cultural awareness and expression.
These key competences are all interdependent, with an emphasis in each on critical
thinking, creativity, initiative, problem solving, risk assessment and decision taking.
They also provide the framework for community education and training
programmes within the European Education and Training 2010 work programme
and the Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training
(ET 2020) (European Commission 2011).  These key competences should be included
as part of the reform of apprenticeship programmes.  Many of these key
competences are already included in one of the recommendations of the report of
the review group of apprenticeship training which recommends that apprenticeship
programmes should provide for the appropriate integration of transversal skills,
particularly literacy, numeracy, maths, science and ICT.  The reform of
apprenticeship training in Ireland will be important in terms of providing training
and lifelong learning opportunities to those who are low skilled or those who are
early school leavers.  A reformed system has the opportunity to provide relevant
skills and meaningful and clear progression paths to those involved.
Access to educational opportunity and meaningful participation in the system and
access to successful outcomes, are central to the democratic delivery of education.
Resources should be made available to support people who wish to engage in lifelong
learning, in particular those people who completed second level education but who
chose not to progress to third level education at that point.  Social Justice Ireland
welcomes the provision in the Technological Universities Act 2014 that a combined
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minimum of 30 per cent of all enrolments are to be in flexible learning programmes;
professional or industry based programmes or mature learners.  It is important that
enrolment policies for higher education are revised and amended in conjunction
with the reforms to further education and training.  
Early school leaving 
The proportion of persons aged 18-24 who left school with, at most, lower secondary
education in Ireland was 9.7% in 2012 (CSO, 2014). The rate has been decreasing
steadily since 2002 and there has been positive progress made in this area.  However
it is still remains a serious issue.  Early school leaving not only presents problems for
the young people involved but it also has economic and social consequences for
society. Education is the most efficient means by which to safeguard against
unemployment. The risk of unemployment increases considerably the lower the
level of education.  Early school leavers are: 
• at higher risk of poverty and social exclusion; 
• confronted with limited opportunities to develop culturally, personally and
socially; 
• likely to have poor health status; and
• face a cyclical effect associated with early school leaving, resulting in the
children of early school leavers experiencing reduced success in education
(European Commission, 2011). 
The unemployment rate for early school leavers is 37 per cent, almost twice that for
other persons in the same 18 to 24 age cohort.  They also had an employment rate
that was half that of their peers (21 per cent compared to 42 per cent) (CSO 2011:7).
Government has invested heavily in trying to secure a school-based solution to this
problem through, for example, the work of the National Educational Welfare Board
(NEWB). Seventy nine per cent of early school leavers are either unemployed or
classified as economically inactive, a situation that is simply unacceptable and
cannot be allowed to continue.  Combined with Ireland’s very high NEET (young
people aged 15-24 not in education, employment or training) rate of 18.4 per cent,
early school leaving is a major issue for government that requires a long-term policy
response.  It may well be time to try alternative approaches aimed at ensuring that
people in this cohort attain the skills required to progress in the future and
participate in society.  With this in mind the review of apprenticeship training
should include this cohort of young people as one of its target groups.
198 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Contributing to higher education
There are strong arguments from an equity perspective that those who benefit from
higher education and who can afford to contribute to the costs of their higher
education should do so.  This principle is well established internationally and is an
important component of funding strategies for many of the better higher education
systems across the world. People with higher education qualifications reap a
substantial earnings premium in the labour market which increases with age
(OECD, 2012:140). The earnings premium in Ireland for those with higher education
has increased by 22 percentage points since 2010. Third-level graduates in
employment in Ireland earn on average 64 per cent more that those with a leaving
certificate only (OECD, 2011), and 81 per cent of people aged 25 to 64 with a third-
level qualification are in employment compared with 35 per cent of those with a
primary level qualification only. Ireland is one of the few countries where the
relative earnings of 25-64 year olds with qualifications from tertiary type A (largely
theory based) and advanced research programmes are more than 100 per cent
higher than the earning of people with upper secondary or post-secondary
education (OECD, 2013).  
Ireland is the highest ranking country in the EU in terms of higher education
attainment, with 48 per cent of all 25-34 year olds having a third-level qualification.
At present third-level students do not pay fees but do incur a student contribution
charge at the beginning of each academic year.  Undergraduate students are
supported through the provision of maintenance grants under the Student Grant
Scheme 2013.  As a result of decisions taken in Budget 2012 postgraduate students
are no longer eligible for maintenance grant support.  Without the introduction of
some form of income-contingent loan facility this decision is likely to have a
significant impact on entry into postgraduate courses in Ireland over the coming
years.  
There has been much discussion regarding the future funding for Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) and how they might be configured in the future. In the ‘National
Strategy for Higher Education to 2030’ the Higher Education Authority (HEA) discusses
broadening the base of funding for HEIs and sets out in detail how a student
contribution framework might be developed and managed. Various policy options
for student contributions are discussed in a report to the Minister (Department of
Education, 2009) and the fiscal impact of these options are outlined in detail.
Further research concludes that an income contingent student loan rather than a
graduate tax system would be the most equitable funding option for Ireland
(Flannery & O’Donoghue, 2011). Social Justice Ireland believes that Government
should introduce a system in which fees are paid by all participants in third-level
education with an income-contingent loan facility being put in place to ensure that
all participants who need to do so can borrow to pay their fees and cover their living
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costs, repaying such borrowing when their income rises above a prescribed level.  In
this system:
• All students would be treated on the same basis insofar as both tuition and living
cost loans would be available on a deferred repayment basis;
• All students would be treated on the same basis as repayment is based on their
own future income rather than on current parental income; and
• Inclusion of all part-time students would reduce the present disparity between
full-time and part-time students.  
Were such a scheme introduced, Social Justice Ireland calculates that the gain to the
Exchequer would be €445 million in a full year (2011 estimates) and proposes that
€120 million of this should go towards early childhood education and adult literacy
programmes.
Key priorities on Education and Educational Disadvantage
• Invest in universal, quality early childhood education.
• Set an ambitious adult literacy target and ensure adequate funding is provided
for adult literacy programmes.
• Increase resources available to lifelong learning and alternative pathways to
education.
• Introduce an income-contingent loan facility for all third-level students and
develop a system in which fees are paid by all participants in third-level
education. 
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10.
PEOPLE  AND  PART IC I PAT ION
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE: PEOPLE AND PARTICIPATION
To ensure that all people from different cultures are welcomed in a way that is
consistent with our history, our obligations as world citizens and with our economic
status. To ensure that every person has a genuine voice in shaping the decisions
that affect them and that every person can contribute to the development of society.
People have a right to participate in shaping the decisions that affect them and to
participate in developing and shaping the society in which they live. These rights
are part of  Social Justice Ireland’s Core Policy Area, Reform Governance as set out in
Chapter 2. In this chapter we set out some of the implications of these rights and
how they might be met in Ireland today.
people
Migration issues of various kinds, both inwards and outwards, present important
challenges for Government and Irish society. The circumstances that generate
involuntary emigration must be addressed in an open, honest and transparent
manner. For many migrants immigration is not temporary. They will remain in
Ireland and make it their home.  Irish society needs to adapt to this reality. Ireland
is now a multi-racial and multi-cultural country and Government policies should
promote and encourage the creation of an inclusive and integrated society in which
respect for and recognition of their culture is an important right for all people.   
The key challenge of integration
The rapid internationalisation of the Irish population in recent years presents
Ireland with the key challenge of avoiding mistakes made by many other countries.
The focus should be on integration rather than on isolating new migrant
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communities. Census 2011 showed that there were a total of 544,357 non-Irish
nationals – representing 199 different nations - living in Ireland in 2011 (CSO, 2012:
8). It also showed that that 268,180, or 15.1%, of the workforce are non-Irish
nationals (CSO, 2012: 19). These figures are unlikely to change significantly over the
next few years, even when allowance is made for emigration. Spending cuts have
had significant impact on strategies on integration. The fourth report (2012) of the
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) highlighted: 
• the closing of the National Consultative Committee on Racism and
Interculturalism (NCCRI) in December 2008, and the subsequent loss of the
reporting of racist incidents carried out by the NCCRI;
• the lack of adequate language support in the classroom for the 10% of primary
school and 12% of post-primary school children from an immigrant
background;
• the withdrawal of funding of the Integrate Ireland Language and Training
centres;
• and the non-renewal of the Action Plan Against Racism (2005-2008).
Discrimination against Travellers
In Irish society, Travellers have often faced discrimination and the state has been
slow to recognise Traveller’s culture to be respected as a right.  In the Programme for
Government and National Recovery 2011-2016 the Government commits to
promoting ‘greater coordination and integration of delivery of services to the
Traveller communities across Government, using available resources more
effectively to deliver on principles of social inclusion particularly in the area of
Traveller education’ (Government of Ireland 2011: 53). While the structures
recommended by the Task Force on the Travelling People have been established, it
is very important to ensure that the recommendations of the report are fully
implemented. The fourth report of the ECRI highlighted the fact that Travellers still
face problems related to adequate accommodation and recommended that
Government introduce measures binding on local authorities to support the
National Traveller/Roma Integration Strategy and fully implement the 1998 Traveller
Accommodation Act. It also called on the Government to reduce health inequalities,
particularly in relation to the Travelling Community.
Migrant Workers
The latest figures from the Central Statistics Office for nationality and employment
are presented in Table 10.1. They show that after a significant fall between 2008 and
2011 the numbers of non-Irish nationals in employment has begun to increase,
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though the numbers in employment have yet to recover to the peak level in the
fourth quarter of 2007.
Table 10.1: Estimated number of persons aged 15 years and over in employment
and classified by nationality Q4 2007-2013, by ‘000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Irish 1,804.20 1,736.00 1,632.50 1,603.20 1,584.30 1,579.70 1,626.20
Non-Irish 334.7 316 255.2 220 223.5 269.2 283.6
Including
uK 51.4 51.8 44.9 34.1 29.4 46.5 49.8
Eu15* 34.5 33.7 28.5 22.9 21.1 29.1 27.7
Eu15/27** 167.7 150.9 114 107.8 114.3 125.9 130.2
other 81 79.6 67.9 55.3 58.7 67.7 75.9
Total 2,138.9 2,052.0 1,887.7 1,823.2 1,807.8 1,848.9 1,909.8
Source: CSO QNHS Series (2008-2013). All figures from Q4. *excluding Ireland and UK
**EU15 to EU27 states.
There has been criticism of Irish immigration policy and legislation specifically due
to the lack of support for the integration of immigrants and a lack of adequate
recognition of the permanency of immigration. Three significant areas of concern
are:
• Work permits are issued to employers, not to employees, which ties the employee
to a specific employer, increasing their vulnerability to exploitation and
reducing their labour market mobility.
• The Irish asylum process can take many years and most refugees coming onto
the Irish labour market are de facto long-term unemployed. A process for training
and education of asylum seekers is needed so that they can retain and gain skills
(ECRI, 2006 & Employers Diversity Network, 2009).
• The existence of up to 30,000 undocumented migrants in Ireland. Without
credentials they are denied access to basic services and vulnerable to exploitation
by employers. The Irish Migrant Rights Centre has proposed an Earned
Regularisation Scheme to provide a pathway to permanent residency.
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Refugees and Asylum Seekers
Until recently, the number of refugees forced to flee from their own countries in
order to escape war, persecution and abuses of human rights had been declining
worldwide over a number of years. In its most recent reports, however, the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) signalled a sizeable reversal of this
trend. In 2012 alone, 7.6 million people were newly displaced due to conflict or
persecution (UNHCR, 2013a: 2). At the end of 2012 the total population of concern
to UNHCR was estimated at 35.8 million people, including: 10.5 million refugees;
928,226 asylum seekers; 525,941 refugees who had been repatriated in 2012 (almost
double the 2010 figure); 17.6 million internally displaced persons; and an estimated
number of 3.3 million stateless people worldwide (UNHCR, 2013b: 73). There were
4.9 million Palestinians refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 
Irish people have had a long tradition of solidarity with people facing oppression
within their own countries, but that tradition is not reflected in our policies towards
refugees and asylum-seekers. Social Justice Ireland believes that Ireland should use its
position in international forums to highlight the causes of displacement of peoples.
In particular, Ireland should use these forums to challenge the production, sale and
free access to arms and the implements of torture.  
Despite this tradition of solidarity with peoples facing oppression, racism is an
everyday reality for many migrants in Ireland. Preliminary figures from the
Immigrant Council of Ireland show an 85 per cent increase in the number of racist
incidences reported in 2013 with the majority of cases occurring in a person’s local
community or workplace74 .  This increase in reported racism is very worrying and
Social Justice Ireland urges Government to provide leadership in dealing with the
issue. An integrated policy response is needed to address the root causes of racism
within communities; political and institutional responses are required to address
this problem in order to prevent it deteriorating. The establishment of Citizenship
Ceremonies by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence and the reforms to the
procedure of assessing and processing citizenship applications are welcome and
have the potential to promote inclusiveness and integration. 
Table 10.2 shows the number of applications for asylum in Ireland between 2000
and 2012.  In 2012 Ireland experienced a small reduction in applications, reflecting
a consistent decrease in applications. In 2012, there were 319,185 applicants for
asylum in the European Union; the top two single largest nation of origin for
applicants were Afghanistan and Syria, reflecting the terrible situations in those
countries (Eurostat, 2013). Almost 2,250 people were deported from Ireland in 2012,
of whom 1,890 were refused entry into the country at ports of entry (Department
of Justice and Equality, 2014).
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Table 10.2 – Applications for Asylum in Ireland, 2000-2012
year Number Year Number Year Number
2000 10,938 2005 4,323 2010 1,939
2001 10,325 2006 4,314 2011 1,290
2002 11,634 2007 3,985 2012 956
2003 7,900 2008 3,866 2013 946
2004 4,766 2009 2,689
Source: Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (2013), Statistical Report
December 2013.
The third report of the ECRI identified difficulties in gaining recognition for
professional qualifications as a major challenge facing refugees and asylum-seekers
when they have been granted leave to stay in Ireland.  It means refugees are often
unable to find employment commensurate with their qualifications and experience,
impeding their full integration into society. It also means their valuable skills, which
could contribute to the Irish economy, are unused or underused (ECRI, 2006). Social
Justice Ireland proposes that asylum-seekers who currently are not entitled to take up
employment should be allowed to do so with immediate effect and that structures
are established to recognise professional qualifications. The fourth ECRI report has
already been highlighted; its recommendations should be implemented in full.
While asylum-seekers are assigned initial accommodation in Dublin, most are
subsequently allocated accommodation at locations outside Dublin, pending the
completion of the asylum-seeking process. The Reception and Integration Agency
(RIA) was established to perform this task. The latest statistics from the RIA show
that there are 34 accommodation centres throughout the country accommodating
4,360 people (RIA, 2013). The policy for “direct provision” employed in almost all
of these centres results in these asylum-seekers receiving accommodation and board,
together with €19.10 direct provision per week per adult and €9.60 per child. Over
time this sum has remained unchanged and its value has therefore been eroded by
inflation. Between 2001 and 2013 the purchasing power of these payments has been
decreased by almost 20 per cent. Furthermore, many asylum-seekers have been
placed for long periods of time in these centres, with over 59 per cent residing in the
centres for more than three years, 31 per cent for over five years and 9 per cent for
over seven years (Joyce, C. & Quinn, E., 2014). This situation, combined with the
fact that asylum-seekers are denied access to employment, means that asylum-
seekers are among the most excluded and marginalised groups in Ireland.  
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Social Justice Ireland proposes that asylum-seekers who currently are not entitled to
take up employment should be allowed to do so with immediate effect and that the
direct provision payments should be increased immediately to at least €65 per week
for an adult and €38 per week for a child. Removing employment restrictions and
increasing the direct provision allocation would cost €12.5m per annum75 and
provide noticeable improvements in the subsistence life being led by these asylum-
seekers. The accommodation centres must also be examined; some of the centres,
which include a former leisure centre, are not appropriate places for people to live,
and serve to isolate asylum seekers.  A recent report by the European Migration
Network and the ESRI highlights some of the problems with Ireland’s reception
system.  These are a lack of privacy, overcrowding, limited autonomy, and
insufficient homework and play areas for children (Joyce, C. & Quinn, E. 2014).
Despite Government acknowledging that the reception system is unsuitable for
long-term residence of asylum seekers, progress on developing an alternative
procedure has been extremely slow.
Emigration
Emigration has increased dramatically since 2009. It should be noted that in all
migration statistics the year end is April of the year in question. Net migration was
negative in 2010; the first time since 1995 more people had left Ireland than returned
or arrived from elsewhere. Net outmigration was 27,400 in 2011, rose to 34,400 in
2012, and fell slightly to 33,100 in 2013. During 2008 and 2009 the majority of those
emigrating were from the new accession countries. However, from 2010 the largest
group emigrating were Irish nationals; 42,000 left in 2011, 46,500 left in 2012, while
50,900 left in 2013. Overall, emigration of all nationalities is estimated to have
reached 89,000 in 2012.  Table 10.3 below outlines the numbers of people leaving
the country between 2006 and 2013, both Irish and non-Irish nationals. 
The rate of emigration of Irish nationals has more than tripled since 2008. This
demonstrates the lack of opportunities available for people in Ireland, especially for
those seeking employment in the 15-44 age group. Of those who emigrated in 2013,
more than 75,800 were in this age group, while 34,800 were in the 15-24 age cohort.
Net migration amongst this age group in 2013 reached a height of 21,800. The
austerity programme is contributing to Ireland’s loss of young people, the
implications of which are stark as this loss will pose significant problems for
economic recovery. 
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Table 10.3: Estimated Emigration by Nationality, 2006 – 2012, by’000
year Irish UK EU 13* EU 10/12**Rest of World Total
201376 50.9 3.9 9.9 14.0 10.3 89.1
201277 46.5 3.5 11.2 14.8 11.1 87.1
2011 42 4.6 10.2 13.9 9.9 80.6
2010 28.9 3 9 19 9.3 69.2
2009 19.2 3.9 7.4 30.5 11 72
2008 13.1 3.7 6 17.2 9 49.2
2007 12.9 3.7 8.9 12.6 8.2 46.3
2006 15.3 2.2 5.1 7.2 6.2 36
Source: CSO (2013), Population and Migration Estimates.
*EU 15 excluding UK and Ireland.  **EU MS that joined in 2004 and 2007
Chart 10.1 – Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration, 2000-2013
Source: CSO, Population and Migration Estimates (2013).
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76 Preliminary.
77 Preliminary.
This emigration ‘brain drain’, which in some quarters is perversely being heralded as
a ‘safety valve’, is in fact a serious problem for Ireland. It may well result in a significant
skills deficit in the long-term and hamper Ireland’s recovery. Sadly, outmigration has
been one of the factors keeping the unemployment rate down. In December 2012, the
IMF estimates that had all the employees who lost their job at the outset of the crisis
remained in the labour force, then unemployment would now by 20 per cent (IMF,
2012: 5). Given the continuing weakness of domestic demand and investment in the
economy induced by austerity budgets it is likely that emigration will continue at a
very high rate. Unless there are measures in place to increase employment at a faster
pace by boosting domestic demand and investment, outmigration will continue. This
is particularly a concern in the building and construction sector due to the large
section of the workforce employed in construction between 2000 and 2008. The ESRI
(2013: 18) has estimated that net out-migration will fall to 26,000 in 2014. 
participation
The changing nature of democracy has raised many questions for policy-makers and
others concerned about the issue of participation. Decisions often appear to be
made without any real involvement of the many affected by the decisions’
outcomes. The most recent in-depth analysis of voter participation was undertaken
in 2011 by the CSO. In a quarterly national household survey module on voter
participation and abstention, issued in November 2011, the CSO provided an insight
into how people regarded the electoral process. It found that just over 62 per cent of
those aged 18 to 24 voted in the 2011 general election. This contrasts with
participation figures of 92 per cent for older voters aged 55 to 64 years (CSO 2011:
3).  The survey also found that over one-third of those who did not vote were not
registered to vote, 11 per cent of non-voters said they had ‘no interest’, 10 per cent
were ‘disillusioned’ with politics and 11 per cent had difficulty getting to the polling
station (this was particularly common among non-voters aged 55 and over). (CSO,
2011:4) Those educated to primary level or below were most likely to say they did
not vote because they were disillusioned with politics. 
These findings suggest that many people, especially young people and those who
have lower educational attainment levels, have little confidence in the political
process. They have become disillusioned because the political process fails to involve
them in any real way, while also failing to address many of their core concerns.
Transparency and accountability are demanded but rarely delivered. Many of the
developments of recent years will simply have added to the disillusionment of many
people. A new approach is clearly needed to address this issue. Although
Government is engaging with members of civil society on eight specific issues as
part of the Constitutional Convention,78 it can ill afford to ignore the lack of trust
and engagement of civil society in the democratic processes of the state.  
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Some of the decision-making structures of our society and of our world, allow people
to be represented in the process. However, almost all of these structures fail to
provide genuine participation for most people affected by their decisions, resulting
in an apathy towards participating in political processes.  The decline in
participation is exacerbated by the primacy given to the market by many analysts,
commentators, policy-makers and politicians. Most people are not involved in the
processes that produce plans and decisions which affect their lives. They know that
they are being presented with a fait accompli. More critically, they realise that they
and their families will be forced to live with the consequences of the decisions taken.
This is particularly relevant in Ireland in 2014, where people are living with the
consequences of the bailout programme and repaying the debts of European banks
through a programme of austerity and upward redistribution of resources. Many
feel disenfranchised by a process that produced this outcome without any
meaningful consultation with citizens. 
Many people feel that their views or comments are ignored or patronised, while the
views of those who see the market as solving most, if not all, of society’s problems
are treated with the greatest respect. This situation seems to persist despite the total
failure of market mechanisms in recent years and despite the role these very
mechanisms played in producing Ireland’s range of current crises and the associated
EU-level crises that are not currently being recognised by most decision-makers.
Markets have a major role to play. But it needs to be honestly acknowledged that
they produce very mixed results when left to their own devices. Recent experience
has shown clearly that markets are extremely limited in terms of many policy goals.
Consequently other mechanisms are required to ensure that some re-balancing, at
least, is achieved. The mechanisms proposed here simply aim to be positive in
improving participation in a 21st century society.  Modern means of
communication and information make it relatively easy to involve people in
dialogue and decision-making. The big question is whether the groups with power
will share it with others?
A forum for dialogue on civil society issues
A new forum and structure for discussion of issues on which people disagree is
becoming more obvious as political and mass communication systems develop. A
civil society forum and the formulation of a new social contract against exclusion
has the potential to reengage people with the democratic process. Democracy means
‘rule by the people’, which implies that people participate in shaping the decisions
that affect them most closely. What we have, in practice, is a highly centralised
government in which we are ‘represented’ by professional politicians. The more
powerful a political party becomes, the more distant it seems to become from the
electorate. Party policies on a range of major issues are often difficult to discern.
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Backbenchers have little control over, or influence on, Government ministers,
opposition spokespersons or shadow cabinets. Even within the cabinet some
ministers seem to be able to ignore their cabinet colleagues.  The democratic process
has certainly benefited from the participation of various sectors in different arenas.
It would also benefit from taking up the proposals to develop a new social contract
against exclusion and a new forum for dialogue on civil society issues.
The failure to discuss openly a range of civil society issues that are of major concern
to large numbers of people is contributing to disillusionment with the political
process. When discussion or debate does take place, furthermore, many people feel
that they are not allowed to participate in any real way. The development of a new
forum within which a civil society debate could be conducted on an on-going basis
would be a welcome addition to Ireland’s political landscape. Such a forum could
make a major contribution to improving participation by a wide range of groups in
Irish society.
Social Justice Ireland proposes that Government authorises and resources an initiative
to identify how a civil society debate could be developed and maintained and to
examine how it might connect to the growing debate at European level around civil
society issues. There are many issues such a forum could address. Given recent
developments in Ireland, the issue of citizenship, its rights, responsibilities,
possibilities and limitations in the twenty-first century is one that springs to mind.
Another topical issue is the shape of the social model Ireland wishes to develop in the
decades ahead. Do we follow a European model or an American one? Or do we want
to create an alternative – and, if we do, what shape would it have and how could it be
delivered? What future levels of services and taxation will be required and how are
resources to be distributed?  The issues a civil society forum could address are many
and varied and Ireland would benefit immensely from having one.79
Deliberative Democracy
To facilitate real participation a process of ‘deliberative democracy’ is required.
Deliberative democratic structures enable discussion and debate to take place without
any imposition of power differentials. Issues and positions are argued and discussed
on the basis of the available evidence rather than on the basis of assertions by those
who are powerful and unwilling to consider the evidence. It produces evidence-based
policy and ensures a high level of accountability among stakeholders.  Deliberative
participation by all is essential if society is to develop and, in practice, to maintain
principles guaranteeing satisfaction of basic needs, respect for others as equals,
economic equality, and religious, social, sexual and ethnic equality. 
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Social Justice Ireland believes a deliberative democracy process, in which all
stakeholders would address the evidence, would go some way towards ensuring that
local issues are addressed. This process could be implemented under the framework
of the Council of Europe’s Charter on Shared Social Responsibilities. The Charter states
that shared social responsibility in terms of local government requires that local
government ‘frame local policies which acknowledge and take into account the
contribution made by everyone to strengthening social protection and social
cohesion, the fair allocation of common goods, the formation of the principles of
social, environmental and intergenerational justice and which also ensure that all
stakeholders have a negotiation and decision-making power’ (Council of Europe,
2011).  We believe these guidelines can be adapted to the Irish context and would
be useful tools for devising a policy to promote greater alignment between local
government and the community & voluntary sector in promoting participation at
local level.  This would involve:
• Local government, the community & voluntary sector and the local community
working together to ensure the design and efficient delivery of services for local
communities to cater for the specific needs of that particular local community.
• Highlighting the key role of social citizenship in creating vibrant, participative
and inclusive communities.
• Direct involvement of local communities, local authorities, state bodies and
local entrepreneurs in the policy making and decision making processes.
• Ensuring all voices are heard (especially those of people on the margins of
society) in the decision making process.
• Reform of current local government structures to better involve local
communities in the governance of and decision making in their local area.
• An increased sense of ‘ownership’ over local government by the local
community, which will only come about with increased participation. The
community & voluntary sector has a key role to play in this.
All communities are different and not every community has the capacity or the
infrastructure to engage meaningfully with and participate in local government.
This is where the community and voluntary sector has a key role to play in
informing, engaging with and providing the local communities with the skills to
participate in and contribute to local government.  
Citizen Engagement
In October 2012 the Department of Environment, Community and Local
Government published ‘Putting People First: Action Programme for Effective Local
Government’. The document outlines a vision for local government as ‘leading
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economic, social and community development, delivering efficient and good value
services, and representing citizens and local communities effectively and
accountably’ (Department of Environment, Community and Local Government,
2012: iii). One of the stated aims of this process of local government reform is to
create more meaningful and responsive local democracy (DECLG 2012:148) with
options for citizen engagement and participative democracy outlined in the report.
The report also deals with the issues of good governance, strong leadership and
democratic accountability and outlines the reforms identified by Government as
necessary to ensure that:
• local government is accountable and effective; 
• local objectives, national interests and the common good are balanced; and
• community involvement in the policy and decision making process is promoted.  
The establishment of a Working Group on Citizen Engagement to report and make
recommendations for more diverse and extensive input by citizens into decision
making at local level was a positive move by Government.  
The objective of the Working Group report was to provide structures and guidance
to assist local authorities in consultation with the public and communities to create
communities where the well-being of all, and future generations, is protected and
promoted.  The report proposes a structure for participatory engagement in
decision-making on an on-going basis at local level.  The proposed new framework
for public engagement and participation is called “The Public Participation
Network” (PPN).  The PPN facilitates input by the public into local government
through a structure that ensures public participation and representation and
decision-making committees within local government.   The role of the PPN80 is:
1. To contribute to the local authority’s development for the County/City a vision
for the well-being of this and future generations.
2. to facilitate opportunities for networking, communication and the sharing of
information between environmental, community and voluntary groups and
between these groups and the local authority.
3. to identify issues of collective concern and work to influence policy locally in
relation to these issues.
4. to actively support inclusion of socially excluded groups, communities
experiencing high levels of poverty, communities experiencing discrimination,
including Travellers, to enable them to participate at local and county level and
to clearly demonstrate same.
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80 For a detailed outline of the structure of the PPN see section 3 of the Working Group
Report.
5. to encourage and enable public participation in local decision-making and
planning of services.
6. to facilitate the selection of participants from the environmental, social
inclusion and voluntary sectors onto city/county decision making bodies.
7. to support a process that will feed the broad range of ideas, experience,
suggestions and proposals of the Network into policies and plans being
developed by agencies and decision makers in areas that are of interest and
relevant to the Network 
8. to work to develop the Environmental, Community and Voluntary sectors so
that the work of the sectors is clearly recognised and acknowledged and the
sectors have a strong collective voice within the County/City.
9. to support the individual members of the Public Participation Network so that:
• They can develop their capacity and do their work more effectively.
• They can participate effectively in the Public Participation Network
activities.
• They are included and their voices and concerns are heard.
The proposed PPN structure outlined in the report is a significant departure in terms
of citizen engagement in the decision making and policy making process at local
level.  It also embeds the need to develop sustainable communities and to consider
the well-being of communities at the heart of the local decision making process.  It
is important that the necessary resources are made available to ensure that the PPNs
function effectively and that members are given the training and support required
to enable them to represent their communities.
A deliberative democracy structure and framework embedded into the citizen
engagement and local government structures would enhance community
involvement in decision making and the policy making process at a local level.  It
would also ensure that governance, participation and policy evaluation are reformed
in line with the core policy framework detailed in chapter 2.
Supporting the Community & voluntary Sector
The issue of governance is of major importance for Government and for society at
large. Within this wider reality it is an especially crucial issue for the community &
voluntary sector. The community & voluntary sector is playing a major role in
responding to both the causes and the consequences of these crises.  It should also
play a major role in public discussion regarding what type of economic and social
vision Ireland wants to pursue in the future.   Support for the work of the community
and voluntary sector is crucial and it should not be left to the welcome but very
limited charity of philanthropists. Funding required by the sector has been provided
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over many years by Government. In recent years, however, the level of state funding
has been reduced, with obvious consequences for those depending on the
community & voluntary sector. It is crucial that Government appropriately resource
this sector into the future and that it remains committed to the principle of
providing multi-annual statutory funding. 
Social dialogue is a critically important component of effective decision making in
a modern democracy. The Community & Voluntary Pillar provides a mechanism
for social dialogue that should be engaged with by Government across the range of
policy issues in which the Pillar’s members are deeply engaged. All aspects of
governance should be characterised by transparency and accountability. Social
dialogue contributes to both transparency and accountability. We believe
governance along these lines can and should be developed in Ireland.
Key policy priorities on people and participation
• Address involuntary emigration and the long-term policy problems it presents
to society by promoting integration and an inclusive society.  
• Conduct an immediate audit of “direct provision” accommodation centres, and
commit to providing appropriate and humane accommodation for asylum
seekers.
• Immediately increase the weekly allowance allocated to asylum-seekers on
‘direct provision’ to at least €65 per week for an adult and €38 for a child and
give priority to recognising the right of all refugees and asylum-seekers to work.
• Introduce an Earned Regularisation Scheme similar to that proposed by the
Migrant Rights Centre Ireland to provide a pathway to permanent residency for
the 30,000 undocumented migrants in Ireland.
Establish and resource a forum for dialogue on civil society issues. This initiative
should identify how a civil society debate could be developed and maintained in
Ireland and should examine how it might connect to the growing debate at
European level around civil society issues.
• Implement the PPN framework recommendations for citizen engagement at
local level and ensure adequate resources are made available for capacity
building.
• Ensure that there is real and effective monitoring and impact assessment of
policy implementation using an evidence-based approach. Involve a wide range
of perspectives in this process, thus ensuring inclusion of the experience of those
currently excluded.
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11. 
SUSTA INAB I L I T Y
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE: SUSTAINABILITY
To ensure that all development is socially, economically and environmentally
sustainable
The search for a humane, sustainable model of development has gained momentum
in recent times. After years of people believing that markets and market forces would
produce a better life for everyone, major problems such as resource depletion and
pollution have raised questions and doubts. There is a growing awareness that
sustainability must be a constant factor in all development. Sustainability is about
ensuring that all development is socially, economically and environmentally
sustainable. This understanding underpins all the other chapters in this review. This
chapter focuses in more detail on promoting sustainable development and on
reviewing environmental issues.  These are key policy areas that must be addressed
urgently as part of the Core Policy Framework we set out in Chapter 2 under the
heading of Creating a Sustainable Future.
promoting Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is defined as ‘development which meets the needs of the
present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). It encompasses three
pillars; environment, society and economy. These three pillars of sustainability must
be addressed in a balanced manner if development is to indeed be sustainable.
Maintaining this balance is crucial to the long-term development of a sustainable
resource-efficient future for Ireland. While growth and economic competitiveness
are important, they are not the only issues to be considered and cannot be given
precedence over others. They must be dealt with using a framework for sustainable
development which gives equal consideration to the environmental, social and
economic pillars.  It is also important to note that, although economic growth is
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seen as the key to resolving many aspects of the current crisis across the EU, it is this
very growth that may be damaging the possibility of securing sustainable
development in the Global South.   
Sustainable development is our only means of creating a long term future for
Ireland, with the environment, economic growth and social needs met in a balanced
manner with consideration for the needs of future generations. Sustainability and
the adoption of a sustainable development model presents a significant policy
challenge: how environmental policy decisions with varying distributional
consequences are to be made in a timely manner while ensuring that a
disproportionate burden is not imposed on certain groups e.g. low income families
or rural dwellers. This policy challenge highlights the need for an evidence-based
policy process involving all stakeholders.  The costs and benefits of all policies must
be assessed and considered on the basis of evidence only. This is essential in order
to avoid the policy debate being influenced by hearsay or vested interests or the
thoughtless exercise of power. Before the current recession began the global
economy was five times the size it had been 50 years before and, had it continued
on that growth path, it would be 80 times that size by 2100 (SDC, 2009). This raises
the fundamental question of how such growth rates can be sustained in a world of
finite resources and fragile ecosystems. Continuing along the same path is clearly
not sustainable.  A successful transition to sustainability requires a vision of a viable
future societal model and also the ability to overcome obstacles such as vested
economic interests, political power struggles and the lack of open social dialogue
(Hämäläinen, 2013).  
Promoting a sustainable economy requires that we place a value on our finite natural
resources and that the interdependence of the economy, wellbeing and natural
capital are recognised (EC 2011).  A sustainable economy requires us to acknowledge
the limitations of finite natural resources and the duty we have to preserve these for
future generations.  It requires that natural capital and ecosystems are assigned value
in our national accounting systems and that resource productivity is increased.
Policy frameworks and business models should give priority to renewable energy,
resource efficiency and sustainable land use.  A sustainable economy would involve
transformative change and policies being implemented similar to those being
proposed by Stahel in the ‘performance economy’ and Wijkman in the ‘circular
economy’.  The ‘circular economy’ theory is based on the understanding that it is
the reuse of vast amounts of material reclaimed from end of life products, rather
than the extraction of new resources, that is the foundation of economic growth
(Wijkman, 2012:166).  This theory involves a shift towards servicing consumer
products rather than constantly producing new goods to be consumed.  The policy
instruments proposed to implement a circular economy are those which are also
considered to be at the heart of the sustainable development debate.  They are:
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• Binding targets for resource efficiency;
• Sustainable innovation and sustainable design being given priority in terms of
research; and
• Tax reform: lowering taxes on labour and raising taxes on the use of natural
resources.
Alongside the theories of the ‘performance economy’ and the ‘circular economy’ is
the concept of the ‘Economy of the Common Good81’.  This model, designed by
Felber (2010) is based on the idea that economic success should be measured in
terms of human needs, quality of life and the fulfilment of fundamental values.  This
model proposes a new form of social and economic development based on human
dignity, solidarity, sustainability, social justice and democratic co-determination
and transparency.  
It is clear that the current economic path is not sustainable and consideration must
be given to how we, as a society, can transform our present system and move to a
more sustainable future pathway.  Creating a sustainable Ireland is one of the five
pillars of Social Justice Ireland’s core policy framework outlined in more detail in
chapter 2.
beyond 2015 – Towards Sustainable Development goals
Discussions and negotiations at the RIO+20 summit in June 2012 culminated in the
‘Future We Want’ outcome document which outlines UN commitments for a
sustainable future and the development of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
to replace the Millennium Development Goals82 (MDGs) after 2015. Work on
developing SDGs began in earnest in January 2013 with the establishment of the
Open Working Group (OWG) on Sustainable Development Goals.83 The ‘Future We
Want’ indicates that the SDGs should address and incorporate in a balanced way all
three dimensions of sustainable development and their inter-linkages and should
be universally applicable to all countries. All stakeholders should be included in the
process of creating the SDGs and the measurable targets and indicators. While the
development of SDGs is welcome, it is of concern that there is no mention of the
common good in the ‘Future We Want’, even though it does give significant
consideration to sustained economic growth. This commitment to sustained
economic growth indicates a failure to learn from past mistakes and the current
crises by the international community – an issue that is of concern to Social Justice
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Ireland. The common good must be at the core of sustainable development to ensure
that natural resources are protected for future generations.
Civil society organisations engaged with the post-2015 development agenda have
given a cautious welcome to the development of the SDGs. They emphasise the need
for a meaningful and inclusive framework to engage people who are affected by
poverty and experience marginalisation in order to promote ownership of the SDGs.
This was one of the failures of the MDG process because those who were to benefit
from the MDGs being achieved were not involved in the development of these goals.
It is also crucial that the SDG targets are equitable, that priority is given to meeting
the challenge faced by the most disadvantaged and that fair allocation of resources
is secured for both poor people and poor countries.
The OWG is beginning the second phase of its work and is due to report to the UN
General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session.  In the first phase of its work the group
had input from experts on a variety of issues such as poverty, food security, water,
employment and health.  This input will now be processed into a report containing
a strategic outlook and a proposal for sustainable development goals (UN, 2014).
The OWG has also stated that it can build on the convergence of ideas around the
need to balance the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable
development and integrating more comprehensively economic growth and
environmental sustainability (UN, 2014). The OWG state that in order to ensure that
progress is measurable and measures quantified, targets will be required.  The
strategy for SDGs being developed by the UN is in contrast with that adopted
recently by the European Commission in the 2030 Framework on Climate and
Energy.  The European Commission commits to reducing emissions by 40% in
Europe, but the document contains no national targets.  The incoherence of policy
at international level does not bode well for the successful adoption and
implementation for SDGs. 
When formulating SDG proposals and strategies, the OWG on Sustainable
Development Goals must take into account the shortcomings of the MDGs,
specifically their failure to address the structural causes of poverty, inequality and
exclusion.  The set of SDGs which are eventually agreed should be truly universal,
integrate sustainable development and the environment and should confront the
root causes of our current crises and the reality that the world needs to move towards
a sustainable path in order to guarantee a future for generations to come.  
The need for shadow national accounts
According to Repetto, Magrath, Wells, Beer and Rossini (1989:3) the ‘difference in
the treatment of natural resources and other tangible assets [in the existing national
accounts] reinforces the false dichotomy between the economy and “the
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environment” that leads policy makers to ignore or destroy the latter in the name
of economic development.’  By not assigning value to our natural capital and
environmental resources, a major national asset, we are not measuring the cost to
our society of the ongoing depletion of these resources.
Acceptance of the need to move away from money-measured growth as the principal
economic target and measure of success towards sustainability in terms of real-life,
social, environmental and economic variables must be central to any model of
development with sustainability at its core.  This is at the core of the ‘circular
economy’ and ‘Economy for the Common Good’ theories and is a key part of our
core policy framework.  Our present national accounts are based on GNP/GDP as
scorecards of wealth and progress and miss fundamentals such as environmental
sustainability. These measures completely ignore unpaid work because only money
transactions are tracked. Ironically, while environmental depletion is ignored, the
environmental costs of dealing with the effects of economic growth, such as
cleaning up pollution or coping with the felling of rainforests, are added to, rather
than subtracted from, GNP/GDP.
It is widely acknowledged that GDP is ‘an inadequate metric to gauge wellbeing over
time, particularly in its economic, environmental, and social dimensions, some
aspects of which are often referred to as sustainability (Stiglitz Commission 2009:
8).  A new scorecard or metric model is needed which measures the effects of policy
decisions on people’s lives as well as the environmental, social and economic costs
and benefits of those policies. The United Nations High Level Panel on Global
Sustainability recommends that the international community measure
development beyond GDP and that national accounts should measure and cost
social exclusion, unemployment and social inequality and the environmental costs
of growth and market failures.  
Development of ‘satellite’ or ‘shadow’ national accounts should be a central
initiative in this.  Already a number of alternative scorecards exist, such as the
United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI), former World Bank economist
Herman Daly’s Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) and Hazel
Henderson’s Country Futures Index (CFI). A 2002 study by Wackernagel et al
presented the first systematic attempt to calculate how human demands on the
environment are matched by its capacity to cope. It found that the world currently
uses 120 per cent of what the earth can provide sustainably each year.
In the environmental context it is crucial that dominant economic models are
challenged on, among other things, their assumptions that nature’s capital (clean
air, water and environment) are essentially free and inexhaustible, that scarce
resources can always be substituted and that the planet can continue absorbing
human and industrial wastes. These are issues that most economists tend to
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downplay as externalities. Shadow national accounts would help to make
sustainability and ‘green’ procurement mandatory considerations in the decision
and policy making process.  They would also go some way towards driving a civil
society awareness campaign to help decouple economic growth from consumption.
Social Justice Ireland welcomes the publication by the Departments of Environment,
Community and Local Government and Public Expenditure and Reform of the
Action Plan for Green Public Procurement as a step on the road towards making
green procurement mandatory in public sector procurement decisions.  However
the lack of reference to Green Public Procurement in the current Draft Partnership
Agreement for European Social and Structural Funds 2014-2020 prepared by the
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform is worrying84.  
Some governments and international agencies have picked up on these issues,
especially in the environmental area and have begun to develop ‘satellite’ or
‘shadow’ national accounts that include items not traditionally measured. Social
Justice Ireland’s 2009 publication Beyond GDP: What is prosperity and how should it be
measured? explored many of these new developments. It included contributions
from the OECD, the New Economics Foundation, and other informed bodies and
proposed a series of policy developments which would assist in achieving similar
progress in Ireland.
There has, in fact, been some progress in this area, including commitments to better
data collection and broader assessment of well-being and progress by the CSO, ESRI
and EPA. The CSO published Sustainable Development Indicators Ireland in 2013
and this is a welcome development.  However, much remains to be achieved in terms
of communicating these sustainable development indicators to the public and the
inclusion of well-being in the monitoring process.  Social Justice Ireland strongly urges
Government to adopt this broader perspective and commit to producing these
accounts alongside more comprehensive indicators of progress. Measures of
economic performance must reflect their environmental cost and a price must be
put on the use of our natural capital.  
The OECD Global Project on measuring the progress of society recommends that
sets of key environmental, social and economic indicators be developed and that
these should be used to inform evidence-based decision making across all sectors
(Morrone, 2009: 23).  
Social Justice Ireland recommends that government commit to producing shadow
national accounts and that these accounts include indicators that measure the
following:
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• the use of energy and materials to produce goods; 
• the generation of pollution and waste;
• the amount of money spent by industry, government and households to protect
the environment or manage natural resources;
• natural resource asset accounts measuring the quantity and quality of a
country’s natural resources;
• sustainability of the growth being generated vis-a-vis our social and natural
capital;
• natural resource depletion and degradation as a cost to society;
• the output of waste and pollution as a result of commercial activity as a cost
within the satellite national accounts; and
• the measures of the GPI (Genuine Progress Indicator) which measure and deduct
for income inequality, environmental degradation and cost of crime, amongst
other items. By measuring and differentiating between economic activities that
diminish natural and social capital and those activities that enhance them, we
can ensure that our economic welfare is sustainable (Daly & Cobb, 1987).
Stakeholder involvement
One of the key indicators of sustainability is how a country runs stakeholder
involvement. Sustainable Development Councils (SDCs) are a model for multi-
stakeholder bodies comprising members of all major groups – public, private,
community, civil society and academic – engaged in evidence-based discussion.85
The EU-wide experience has been that SDCs are crucial to maintaining a medium
and long-term vision for a sustainable future whilst concurrently working to ensure
that sustainable development policies are embedded into socio-economic strategies
and budgetary processes.
Ireland established its sustainable development council (Comhar) in 1999 and
disbanded it in 2011, transferring its functions to NESC (National Economic and
Social Council). This is unfortunate in the light of the United Nations
recommendation that the link between informed scientific evidence and policy
making on sustainable development issues be strengthened (United Nations, 2012).
While it is admirable that Government wishes to place sustainable development at
the core of policy making and has asked NESC to ensure it gives sustainable
development major consideration in all it does, it is also important to note that
NESC is not in a position to do the detailed work done previously by Comhar.  
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All areas of governance, from international to national to local, along with civil
society and the private sector, must fully embrace the requirements of a sustainable
development future (United Nations, 2012).  In order to facilitate a move towards a
sustainable future for all, stakeholders from all arenas must be involved in the
process.  Sustainable local development should be a key policy issue on the new local
government agenda.  There is need for a deliberative democracy arena within which
all stakeholders can discuss evidence without power differentials impeding
outcomes.  
principles to underpin sustainable development
Principles to underpin sustainable development were proposed in a report for the
European Commission prepared by James Robertson in May 1997. The report, The
New Economics of Sustainable Development, argued that these principles should
include the following:
• systematic empowerment of people (as opposed to making and keeping them
dependent) as the basis for people-centred development;
• systematic conservation of resources and environment as the basis for
environmentally sustainable development;
• evolution from a ‘wealth of nations’ model of economic life to a ‘one-world’
economic system;
• evolution from today’s international economy to an ecologically sustainable,
decentralising, multi-level one-world economic system;
• restoration of political and ethical factors to a central place in economic life and
thought;
• respect for qualitative values, not just quantitative values; and
• respect for feminine values, not just masculine ones.
At first glance these might not appear to be the type of concrete guidelines that
policymakers so often seek. Yet they are principles that are relevant to every area of
economic life. They also apply to every level of life, ranging from personal and
household to global issues. They influence lifestyle choices and organisational goals.
If these principles were applied to every area, level and feature of economic life they
would provide a comprehensive checklist for a systematic policy review.  Many of
these principles underpin the ‘Economy for the Common Good’ Balance Sheets
which rates companies based on areas including ecological sustainability, social
justice and transparency86.  
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A key challenge for Ireland is to ensure that the economy and key sectors develop
in a sustainable way and that economic growth is decoupled from environmental
pressures.  This would require environmental considerations being placed at the
centre of policy and decision making at national, regional and local levels (EPA,
2012).  Protecting our natural resources and ensuring they are not degraded or
exhausted is crucial to the economic and social wellbeing of future generations in
Ireland.  
It is also important that any programme for sustainable development should take a
realistic view of human nature, recognising that people can be both altruistic and
selfish, both co-operative and competitive. It is important, therefore, to develop the
economic system to reward activities that are socially and environmentally benign
(and not the reverse, as at present). This, in turn, would make it easier for people and
organisations to make choices that are socially and environmentally responsible.
Incorporating social and environmental costs in regulating and pricing both goods
and services, combined with promoting those goods and services which are
sustainable, should also become part of sustainable development policy.   In order
to transition to an economy based on sustainable development and a ‘green growth
strategy’ a policy framework is needed that is adaptive and supports shifts away from
traditional economic models.  This would include user charges for environmental
resources to reflect environmental costs and environmental taxes to shift the tax
base towards environmental pollutants and consumption and away from labour and
production (EPA, 2012). 
Any programme for sustainable development has implications for public spending.
In addressing this issue it needs to be understood that public expenditure
programmes and taxes provide a framework which helps to shape market prices,
rewards some kinds of activities and penalises others. Within this framework there
are other areas which are not supported by public expenditure or are not taxed. This
framework should be developed to encourage economic efficiency and enterprise,
social equity and environmental sustainability. Systematic reviews should be carried
out and published on the sustainability effects of all public subsidies and other
relevant public expenditure and tax differentials. Governments should identify and
remove those subsidies which cause the greatest detriment to natural,
environmental and social resources (United Nations, 2012:14). Systematic reviews
should also be carried out and published on the possibilities for re-orientating public
spending programmes, with the aim of preventing and reducing social and
environmental problems. 
Social Justice Ireland welcomed the publication entitled ‘Our Sustainable Future – A
Framework for a Sustainable Development for Ireland’ (Department of the Environment,
Community and Local Government, 2012) which is a late but positive step on the
road towards a sustainable development model. One area of concern, however, is
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the failure by governments to implement earlier sustainability strategies (2000 &
2007) and another is the lack of quantitative and qualitative targets and indicators
to accompany the Framework itself.  Social Justice Ireland welcomes the Framework’s
emphasis on the need for a whole of government approach to sustainability and the
need for all areas of government policy to have regard for sustainable development.
Clear leadership from Government and public bodies are needed to ensure that
existing and future activities maintain and improve the quality of the environment
(EPA, 2012).   It will be important that the Cabinet Committee on Climate Change
and the Green Economy and the High-Level Inter-Departmental Group on
Sustainable Development are given the necessary resources to ensure that the
framework is at the heart of policy making in all Government departments and that
the recommendations of the report are incorporated right across Government.
Monitoring sustainable development
Many studies have highlighted the lack of socio-economic and environmental data
in Ireland required to assess trends in sustainable development. The empirical and
methodological gaps which continue to impede the incorporation of sustainable
development issues into public policy making and assessment are known (ESRI,
2005).  It is only through a sustained commitment to data collection in all of these
areas that these deficiencies will be addressed. We welcome recent developments in
this area, particularly at the CSO, and look forward to all of these data impediments
being removed in the years to come.
Comhar undertook a lot of work developing indicators in order to set targets and
quantitative means of measuring the progress of sustainable development. Social
Justice Ireland does not believe that the full range of the work of Comhar87 has been
satisfactorily adopted by NESC to date and a great deal of work needs to be done in
the area of indicators. There should be real consultation between NESC, the CSO,
and the Community & Voluntary Pillar (which has done extensive work in this
area)88 to ensure that these issues are addressed, appropriate indicators are
immediately put in place and the necessary data collected. These could be used in
conjunction with indicators developed by the CSO and data being collected by the
EPA and ESRI (through ISus) to measure Ireland’s progress towards sustainable
development. 
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In a study of national strategies towards sustainable development in 2005 (Niestroy,
2005: 185) Ireland’s sustainability strategy was criticised for: 
• having no systematic monitoring system;
• having no general timetable;
• its lack of quantitative national targets.
The lack of quantitative and qualitative targets and indicators to accompany the
new sustainability framework means that Ireland remains open to similar criticism
for its current strategy.  Implementation, targets and monitoring will be crucial to
the success of any policy approach that genuinely promotes sustainable
development. It is important that these targets and indicators and the mechanisms
for monitoring, tracking and reviewing them are developed and clearly explained
to ensure that responsibility is taken across all departments and all stakeholders for
its implementation.
The publication by the Central Statistics Office of Sustainable Development Indicators
Ireland 2013, aims to achieve continuous improvement in the quality of life and well-
being for present and future generations through linking economic development
with protection of the environment and social justice (CSO, 2013). These sustainable
development indicators should be discussed and debated in the Dáil alongside
shadow national accounts and indicators of well-being as a step towards integrating
sustainable development across the entire policy agenda in Ireland.
Environmental Issues
Maintaining a healthy environment remains one of the greatest global challenges.
Without concerted and rapid collective action to curb and decouple resource
depletion and the generation of pollution from economic growth, human activities
may destroy the very environment that supports economies and sustains life (UNEP
2011: II). 
Our environment is a priceless asset. It is also finite – a fact that is often ignored in
current debates. Protection and conservation of our environment is of major
importance as it is not just for our use alone; it is also the natural capital of future
generations.  
For environmental facts and details for Ireland see Annex 11.
The economic growth of recent decades has been accomplished mainly by drawing
down natural resources without allowing stocks to regenerate and causing
widespread degradation and loss to our eco-system. Careful stewardship of Ireland’s
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natural resources is required to ensure the long term health and sustainability of our
environment. Unsustainable use of natural resources is one of the greatest long-term
threats to humankind (European Commission, 2012:3). It is crucial therefore, that
Ireland meets the challenges of responding to climate change and protecting our
natural resources and biodiversity with policies that are based on scientific evidence
and protecting the common good.
Climate change
Climate change is one of the most significant and challenging issues currently
facing humanity. Increased levels of greenhouse gases, such as CO2, increase the
amount of energy trapped in the atmosphere which leads to global effects such as
increased temperatures, melting of snow and ice and raised global average sea-level.
If these issues are not addressed with urgency the projected effects of climate change
present a serious risk of dangerous and irreversible climate impacts at national and
global levels. Food production and ecosystems are particularly vulnerable.  
The 2013 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) outlines
the global challenge of climate change.  The report sets out the effect climate change
and greenhouse gas emissions have had on the planet and the impact of human
influence on the climate system.  Some of the main findings are:
• More than 60% of the net energy increase in the climate system is stored in the
upper ocean;
• The global ocean will continue to warm during the 21st century and global mean
sea level will continue to rise;
• Sea level rise is projected in more than 95% of the ocean area with 70% of
coastlines worldwide expected to experience sea level change;
• It is virtually certain that global mean sea level rise will continue beyond 2100,
with sea level rise due to thermal expansion to continue for many centuries;
• Carbon dioxide concentrations have increased by 40% since pre-industrial
times.  The ocean has absorbed 30% of the emitted carbon dioxide, causing
ocean acidification;
• Global surface temperature change for the end of the 21st century is likely in the
range 1.5C to 4.5C;
• It is very likely that heat waves will occur with a higher frequency and duration;
• The contrast in precipitation between wet and dry regions and between wet and
dry seasons will increase, although there may be regional exceptions;
• Cumulative emissions of CO2 largely determine global mean surface warming
by the late 21st century and beyond.  Most aspects of climate change will persist
for many centuries even if CO2 emissions are stopped.
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The IPCC report serves to highlight the challenges ahead for all countries in dealing
with climate change.  It is very disappointing therefore that the European
Commission Policy Framework for Climate and Energy 2020-2030 published in
January 2014 does not contain any binding national targets for member states for
reducing energy use or for increasing renewable energies.  This is despite the fact
that the plan commits the European Commission to reducing gas emissions by 40
per cent.  By not setting binding or measurable targets the European Commission
is taking the opposite approach to that recommended by the SDG Open Working
Group.  The European Commission claims that the 2030 climate plan sets in stone
a commitment to cap the temperature increase at 2oC. The IPCC data shows that a
40 per cent emissions target for 2030 means in effect there is a 50/50 chance of
exceeding the 2oC threshold.  This is consistent with the 450 Scenario of the IEA’s
World Energy Outlook 2011 which shows that an energy pathway consistent with a
50 per cent chance of limiting global temperature increase to 2oC requires CO2
emissions to peak at just 1.0 Gt above 2011 levels in 2017.  This will be very difficult
to achieve.
Climate change and implementation of climate policy have been challenges for
Ireland. Despite two National Climate Change Strategies (one in 2000 and one in
2007), there have been significant delays in implementing these policies. In some
cases policies have still not been implemented. The mobilisation of vested interests
has been a decisive factor in many of these delays and cases of non-implementation
(Coughlin (2007). This is very disappointing because if these policies had been
implemented on time, and as specified, Ireland’s climate policy commitments could
have been met from domestic measures. Now Ireland is faced with the prospect of
overshooting its EU 2020 emissions targets as early as 2016 (EPA 2012).
Social Justice Ireland welcomes the publication of the General Scheme of a Climate
Action and Low Carbon Development Bill 2013 by the Department of Environment,
Community and Local Government. It is crucial that all expert and evidence-based
advice should be made available in an accessible manner to increase Irish people’s
understanding, engagement and participation on climate change policy and also
to enhance political accountability and transparency on climate policy.  However,
there are a number of areas of concern:
1. Social Justice Ireland is concerned that the only mention of targets in the Bill are
those that Ireland is committed to under European Union law to reach by 2020
and those under the Kyoto Protocol. The only target beyond 2020 is to reach a
low carbon, climate resilient and environmentally sustainable economy by
2050. The absence of sectoral targets and quantitative measures and outputs has
already impeded climate change policy progress internationally (UNEP 2011:
vii). Without sectoral targets and a system whereby they are regularly reviewed,
the monitoring of progress on climate change policy will be very difficult. It will
also make enforcing responsibility and accountability for implementation of
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climate policy across all Government departments and stakeholders in all sectors
extremely challenging.
2. A national low carbon roadmap is to be submitted within 12 months of the
passing of the Bill. A public consultation process on the roadmap began in
November 2013.  This means that Government will not adopt a national policy
position on climate legislation and the transition to a low carbon future until
mid-2014 at the earliest. This will give the Government less than six years to
reach the targets set in the EU 2020 strategy (European Commission, 2010).
Given that we are on course to overshoot emissions targets by 2016, there is a
real danger that short-term planning to limit our liabilities in respect of missed
targets will overshadow the requirement for long-term planning and policy goals
for a sustainable and low carbon future. The long-term goal of a low carbon
economy beyond 2020 must be at the core of climate policy.
3. Social Justice Ireland is concerned that the Bill refers to the objective of achieving
the national low carbon roadmap at the least cost to the national economy. By
failing to take appropriate actions and measures on climate change and carbon
emissions now Ireland’s economy and society will bear a far greater cost in the
future. It is important that the National Expert Advisory Body on Climate Change
is not constrained by economic and cost issues and that its recommendations
should be based solely on scientific evidence and best practice.
A recent study examining climate change and governance in Ireland points out that
local authorities have made little progress on climate change due to barriers related
to resources, prioritisation and integration and a lack of public consensus for
proactive  measures (EPA, 2013).  The report concludes that the national government
has side-lined the climate change issue by not establishing a separate ministry for
climate change; this signals a lack of priority on this issue at national level, resulting
in a limited response at regional and local level.  An integrated, cross-departmental
approach is recommended and the potential of local authorities for innovative
solutions is highlighted.  Government must support local authorities to coordinate
climate change policy and adopt legislation that clearly signals climate change as a
priority.  Without a shift in attitudes and strong leadership nationally Ireland will
remain unprepared for upcoming challenges related to climate change.
Emissions challenge44
Ireland has two sets of emissions targets to meet: the Kyoto Protocol and the EU 2020
Targets. Ireland is on track to meet its Kyoto commitments when the effects of the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme and forest sinks are taken into account. However, it
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is already facing significant challenges in meeting its future EU emissions targets for
greenhouse gases under the EU Climate and Energy package for 2020 and further
anticipated longer term targets up to 2050. This is despite substantial declines in
greenhouse gas emissions in 2009, 2010 and 2011 which the EPA attributes primarily
to the economic recession.
Under the Climate and Energy Package, as part of the EU 2020 targets Ireland is
required to deliver a 20 per cent reduction in non-Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (relative to 2005 levels). Ireland also has binding
annual emissions limits over the period 2013 to 2020 to ensure movement towards
the EU 2020 target. The latest EPA projections indicate that Ireland will exceed its
annual binding limit in 2016 and that it will exceed its obligations over the 2013 to
2020 period, cumulatively by 7-24 Mtonnes of CO2eq.  
Ireland’s emissions profile is dominated by emissions from the energy supply,
transport and agriculture sectors (EPA, 2012). The domestic sector comprises
transport, agriculture and residential waste activities and is also responsible for 72
per cent of Ireland’s total emissions. The immediate challenge for Irish climate
policy is to meet the EU 2020 targets for the domestic sector, which is a reduction of
at least 20 per cent on the 2005 emission levels by 2020. If achieved, the projected
strong growth in the agriculture sector set out in the Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food vision Food Harvest 2020 will likely result in agricultural
emissions increasing by 7 per cent by 2020. There is a significant challenge for
Government in achieving the binding EU 2020 targets whilst also pursuing its Food
Harvest agenda.
Support for sustainable agricultural practice is important to ensure the long-term
viability of the sector and consideration must also be given to how the projected
increase in agriculture emissions can be offset. It is important that the agriculture
sector be at the fore of developing and implementing sustainable farming practices
and be innovative in terms of reducing emissions. Consideration should also be
given to the European Commission proposals to establish a framework for land use,
land use change and forestry (LULUCF) to be included in the emission reduction
targets.  This is important for Ireland because it is estimated that forest sinks could
provide significant relief in reaching emissions targets (see Annex 11).  
Transport and agriculture represent the most intractable sectors in terms of carbon
offsets and emissions mitigations, with the transport sector recording a 120 per cent
increase in emissions between 1990 and 2011.90 A national sustainable transport
network would represent a major step towards a low carbon, resource efficient
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economy. Capital investment will be required in sustainable transport infrastructure
projects to ensure the reduction of transport emissions. Agriculture, which
accounted for 32 per cent of total emissions in 2011, faces major difficulties in
limiting emissions and meeting future targets. In the agriculture sector progress
towards changing farm practices has been limited and incentives to reduce on-farm
greenhouse emissions have not been delivered on a wide scale (Curtin & Hanrahan
2012: 9). The agriculture and food sector must build on its scientific and technical
knowledge base to meet the emissions challenge.  
The European Network for Rural Development has highlighted a number of
opportunities for Ireland to use the development of renewable energy to mitigate
the effects of climate change by delivering additional reductions to Ireland’s CHG
emissions. The opportunity and capability exist to significantly mitigate climate
change through growth in afforestation and renewable energy sources. Forestry can
play a significant role in combating climate change and the development of the
forestry sector and renewable energy lack supported in the Irish CAP Rural
Development Programme 2014-2020 (discussed further in chapter 12). It is
important, therefore, that Government departments work together to tackle climate
change and recognise that action on climate change is not just a challenge but a
great opportunity to create jobs and develop a genuine, indigenous, low carbon
economy.
biodiversity
Nature and biodiversity are the basis for almost all ecosystem services and
biodiversity loss is the greatest challenge facing humanity (EPA 2011: vii).
Biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation directly affect climate change and
undermine the way we use natural resources (EEAC 2011: 114). Pollution, over-
exploitation of natural resources and the spread of non-native species are causing a
decline in biodiversity in Ireland. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
identified the four main drivers (EPA 2011: 11) of biodiversity loss in Ireland all
caused by human activity:
• habitat destruction and fragmentation;
• pollution;
• over-exploitation of natural resources; and
• the spread of non-native species.
Our eco-system is worth €2.6 billion to Ireland annually (EPA 2011) yet our
biodiversity capital is decreasing rapidly. Ireland missed the 2010 target to halt
biodiversity loss and lacks fundamental information on such issues as the
distribution of species and habitats that inform planning and policy in other
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countries. Social Justice Ireland is concerned that responsibility for biodiversity now
lies with the Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht, whereas responsibility
for all environmental issues lies with the Department of Environment, Community
and Local Government. Both departments must work together to ensure that the
policies they implement are designed to complement each other and will not have
any negative consequences on other areas of environmental concern.
Biodiversity underpins our eco-system, which supports our natural capital and in
particular the agriculture industry. It is critically important that our biodiversity is
preserved and maintained and that the effects of policies and developments on
biodiversity are monitored in order to inform environmental policy in the short and
long-term. Ireland has less land designated as a Special Protected Area under the EU
Habitats Directive than the EU average The majority of Ireland’s habitats listed
under the Habitats Directive are reported to be in poor or bad conservation status
(EPA 2012:76).  
The economic value of biodiversity and how it contributes to our well-being needs
to be better promoted and understood. The data collected by the National
Biodiversity Data Centre on the environment and the eco-system goods and services
provided by biodiversity should be included in any proposed shadow national
accounting system.  This is our greatest national asset yet we do not factor it into
our present national accounting system.   Without biodiversity and our eco-system
the development of a sustainable, low-carbon future for Ireland will not be possible
and the value of our natural capital will be lost. Climate change will not go away
and initial costs will have to be incurred in order to preserve and conserve our
natural resources.  Environmental and socio-economic decision making should be
integrated with biodiversity and resource management to maximise the benefit to
society of our natural resources.
The long-term benefits of these investments, both for the present and future
generations, will far outweigh the initial cost. It is important that the economic value
of biodiversity be factored into decision making and reflected in national accounting
and reporting systems. The EPA notes that the continuing loss of biodiversity is one
of the greatest challenges facing us (EPA 2012:82).  Social Justice Ireland believes that
Government should implement the EPA’s recommendations regarding evidence-
based decision making on biodiversity issues and the integration of the economic
value of ecosystems into the national accounting and reporting systems.
Environmental taxation
The extent of Ireland’s challenge in terms of climate change and maintaining and
preserving our national resources is clear from the information outlined above. One
way of tackling this challenge whilst also broadening the tax base is through
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environmental taxation. Eco-taxes, which put a price on the full costs of resource
extraction and pollution, will help move towards a resource efficient, low carbon
green economy. Carbon taxation was introduced in Ireland in Budget 2010 and was
increased from €15 to €20 per tonne in Budget 2012. Social Justice Ireland welcomed
the introduction of a carbon tax but is disappointed that Government has not used
some of the money raised by this tax to target low income families and rural dwellers
who were most affected by it. When considering environmental taxation measures
to support sustainable development and the environment and to broaden the tax
base, the Government should ensure that such taxes are structured in ways that are
equitable and effective and do not place a disproportionate burden on rural
communities or lower socio-economic groups.
Key policy priorities on Sustainability
• A common understanding of sustainable development must be communicated
across all Government departments, policy makers, stakeholders and civil
society.  This should underpin all public policy decisions.
• The economic value of biodiversity must be accounted for in all environmental
policy decisions.
• Shadow national accounts should be developed to move towards a more
sustainable, resource efficient model of growth.
• A progressive and equitable environmental taxation system should be developed
in a structured way that does not impose a disproportionate burden on certain
groups.
• A detailed roadmap towards the development of a low carbon sustainable
economy, with targets to be met towards 2020 and beyond, should be adopted
and published.
• Investment should be made in sustainable infrastructure projects which will
have substantial long-term dividends.
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12. 
RURAL  DEVELOPMENT
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE:  RURAL DEVELOPMENT
To secure the existence of substantial numbers of viable communities in all parts of
rural Ireland where every person would have access to meaningful work, adequate
income and to social services, and where infrastructures needed for sustainable
development would be in place.
Rural Ireland continues to change dramatically. The composition and population
patterns of rural Ireland are changing and there is a need to revise and update how we
measure rurality in Ireland. No county has shown an increase in the share of rural
population since 2006, however the numbers living in small towns (<3,000
population) has doubled since 2002.  The Central Statistics definition of rural (places
with a population of less than 1,500) shows that the population living in rural areas
has declined to 28 per cent.  However, examining the next category above rural (towns
of 1,500 to 2,999 people) the population living in this category increased by 33 per
cent (Walsh & Harvey, 2013).  This changing composition shows the need to redefine
rural areas and how we measure them.  In European discourse the concept of ‘rural’ is
often linked to regional development and includes ‘non-urban’ and ‘non-
metropolitan areas’91.  The need for an integrated transition from an agricultural to a
rural and regional development agenda to improve the quality of life for all rural
dwellers has never been more pressing. Balanced regional development is one of the
key policy areas that must be addressed urgently as part of the Core Policy Framework
we set out in Chapter 2 under the heading of Creating a Sustainable Future.
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Rural and Regional Development
The Commission for the Economic Development of Rural Areas (CEDRA) adopts a
holistic definition of rural areas as those areas being outside the main metropolitan
areas and recognises the relational nature of economic and social development and
the interconnections between urban and rural areas92.   Among the objectives of the
commission is to ensure that rural areas can benefit from and contribute to
economic recovery and to provide research to inform the medium term economic
development of rural areas to 2025.   The first White Paper on Rural Development
(1999) defined rural development policy in Ireland as “all Government policies and
interventions which are directed towards improving the physical, economic and social
conditions of people living in the open countryside, in coastal areas, in towns and villages
and in smaller urban centres outside of the five major urban areas”. Given the changing
population patterns and composition of rural Ireland it is now an appropriate time
to revisit this definition of rural development policy in Ireland.  The present model
of rural development policy in Ireland has a dominant agricultural focus.  There is
a need to broaden this model of rural development to encompass coastal areas,
towns and small urban centres and to support the diversification of the rural
economy.  
Rural development is often confused with agricultural development. This approach
fails to grasp the fact that many people living in rural Ireland are not engaged in
agriculture. This, in turn, leads to misunderstanding when the income from
agriculture increases because many people fail to realise that not everyone in rural
Ireland benefits from such an increase. Long-term strategies to address the failures
of current and previous policies on critical issues, such as infrastructure
development, the national spatial imbalance, local access to public services, public
transport and local involvement in core decision-making, are urgently required. The
1999 White Paper on rural development provided a vision to guide rural
development policy (something Social Justice Ireland had advocated for over a decade
previously). Rural economies are increasingly designed around towns of various sizes
which provide a local labour market area.  It is important that rural development is
seen in the context of the relationship between a particular rural area and the
nearest town or centre of economic activity.  The interactions between more rural
areas and the small towns and villages with which they connect should provide the
framework and foundation for a rural development policy.  In order to have
successful rural communities, rural development policy must move beyond one
dominated by agricultural development and towards policies designed to support
the provision of public services, investment in micro businesses and small or
medium enterprises, innovation and the sustainable use of natural resources and
natural capital.  
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Rural areas and small villages are connected and networked to the local regions and
these local regional economies are dependent on the interaction with the rural areas
they connect with for sustainability (Walsh & Harvey, 2013).  Given this
interconnection, it is important that rural and regional development are integrated
in order to support sustainable local economies and to ensure that local services are
utilised most effectively to address the specific needs of a particular region and the
rural communities within it.     
The new Rural Development Programme 2014-2020 will be funded by the European
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the national Exchequer.  A plan for
the Rural Development Programme (RDP) 2014-2020 will be submitted to the
European Commission by Government by late Spring 2014.  The Department of
Agriculture, Food and the Marine propose a national co-financing rate of 46 per cent
be applied to measures under the RDP via this Department in the period 2014-2020.
The allocation for the delivery of LEADER is 7 per cent of Pillar 2 under the new
programme.  Irish Rural Link has called for this to be increased to 10 per cent in order
to ensure real investment in rural areas to support job creation, biodiversity and
environmental protection.  The new RDP is based on six priority areas for rural
development whilst contributing to the Europe 2020 Strategy objectives of smart
growth, inclusive growth and sustainable growth.  
The six priority areas are:
• Fostering knowledge transfer and innovation,
• Enhancing competitiveness,
• Promoting food chain organisation and risk management in agriculture,
• Restoring, preserving and enhancing ecosystems,
• Promoting resource efficiency and supporting the shift towards a low carbon
and climate resilient economy,
• Promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction and economic development in
rural areas.
The European Commission has proposed community led local development (CLLD)
as one of the cohesion policy tools to help rural communities build capacity,
stimulate innovation, increase participation and assist communities to ensure that
they can be full actors in the implementation of EU objectives in all areas.  The
reform of local government and work on citizens engagement could consider the
CLLD process as a means of ensuring local communities have a voice in designing,
shaping and delivery policy in their local area.  The Department of Agriculture, Food
and the Marine has published a draft RDP Consultation paper outlining some
proposals under each of the six priority areas.  The changes to the composition of
rural areas and rural economies and the subsequent need to move rural development
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away from a focus dominated by agriculture has been well documented93.
Therefore, it is disappointing that the draft proposals for the RDP 2014-2020 are still
predominantly focussed on agriculture and supporting the agri-sector and
insufficient attention is given to diversifying and developing rural areas and the
rural economy. The draft plan is predominantly focussed on complimenting and
supporting the Food Harvest 2020 strategy.  It points to LEADER measures to address
areas of need in rural Ireland including support for enterprise development and job
creation, supporting local development of rural areas and initiatives to improve
broadband and communications infrastructure.   Given the scope of the challenges
facing rural Ireland the lack of a broader rural development and diversification focus
in the draft plan is disappointing.  
Diversification of rural economies
A study on rural areas across Europe (ECORYS, 2012:26) identified the key drivers of
and key barriers to growth in rural economies.  The key drivers of employment and
growth were identified as (i) natural resources and environmental quality, (ii) the
sectoral nature of the economy, (iii) quality of life and cultural capital and (iv)
infrastructure and accessibility.  The key barriers to growth in rural areas were
identified as (i) demographic evolutions and migration (loss of young people and
ageing), (ii) infrastructure and accessibility and (iii) the sectoral structure of the
economy.  Across Europe the secondary and tertiary sectors94 are now the main
drivers of economic growth and job creation in rural regions. These sectors support
activities such as tourism, niche manufacturing and business services (ECORYS:
2010). For rural areas to become sustainable in the long-term these sectors must form
an integral part of any future rural development strategy both in Ireland and in
Europe.  The AGRI Vision 2015 report (Department of Agriculture, Food and the
Marine, 2004), highlighted the fact that many rural dwellers are not linked to
agriculture and that in order to improve the standard of living and quality of life in
rural communities opportunities must be created so that the rural economy can
develop agriculture in conjunction with much needed alternative enterprises.  The
report also stated that the primary purpose of rural policy development is to
underpin the economic and social wellbeing of rural communities. It is clear that
in order to diversify the rural economy, Ireland needs to move from agricultural
development to rural development, from maritime development to supporting
coastal communities and to support small, local, sustainable and indigenous
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94 The EU traditionally splits economic activities into three sectors. Primary sector
includes agriculture, forestry and fisheries; secondary sector includes industry and
construction, tertiary sector includes all services.
enterprises, farming and fishing.  The areas that are highlighted as possible drivers
of rural job creation are social enterprise and social services (e.g. child care and elder
care), tourism, ‘green’ products and services and cultural and creative industries.  In
order to promote development of these drivers of employment and to support local
entrepreneurs and local enterprises in rural and coastal areas the economic policies
for these areas must take into account specific local needs such as accessible
transport and access to childcare.  
The economies of rural areas have become increasingly dependent on welfare
transfers, with the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate in rural areas being 4.6 percentage points
higher than that of urban areas.  In 2011 the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate in rural areas was
18.8 per cent and 14.2 per cent in urban areas. The economic recession and
restructuring of agriculture and subsequent decline in off-farm employment has led
to a narrowing of the economic base in rural areas.  Small and medium sized towns
have seen unemployment increase by 193 per cent during the recession and the share
of working age households with no one in work is 20 per cent higher than the national
average at 31 per cent95.  Low-paid, part-time and seasonal work and long-term
underemployment are also significant factors in rural poverty and exclusion (Walsh
& Harvey (2013).   The problem of underemployment is further highlighted by the
recent assessment of the Rural Social Scheme (RSS) by the Department of Public
Expenditure and Reform.  It found that 60 per cent of participants have been on the
scheme for more than six years, and 82 per cent for more than three years.  The
majority of participants are male and over 70 per cent of these are aged fifty and over.
The RSS was designed as an income support scheme for people in rural occupations,
not as an employment activation scheme. The assessment acknowledges that the RSS
was established to support people who were underemployed in their primary activity.
However in light of Government’s new labour market activation policies whereby
income supports must be integrated with activation measures the RSS is under
increasing scrutiny.  The assessment concludes that the RSS is not having a meaningful
impact in terms of moving people into sustainable employment and that the social
cohesion objective of the RSS needs to be set against broader high level policy
objectives.  What this assessment does not consider is the lack of sustainable and
appropriate employment in rural areas, nor does it appropriately measure the social
value of such a scheme in terms of combating social exclusion and isolation.
Government does not have an explicit strategy to generate sustainable employment
creation in rural areas and appears to have dropped a commitment on targeting
investment outside of Ireland’s two major urban areas.  The Action Plan for Jobs 2012
contained a target of 50 per cent of Foreign Direct Investment to be outside of the
Dublin and Cork regions.  This target is not contained in the Action Plan for Jobs 2013.
To ensure policy coherence, no changes should be made to the RSS without a
corresponding commitment from Government to develop and deliver a strategy to
promote sustainable employment creation in rural areas.      
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Rural development and the challenges facing rural areas in terms of generating
sustainable employment are either absent or barely referenced in key national policies
such as the Action Plan for Jobs and the National Skills Strategy.  As a result there is a
mismatch between a Government policy aimed at attracting Foreign Direct
Investment and export-led industry and rural areas which are dominated by micro-
businesses and small and medium sized enterprises.  Employment and enterprise
policy should have a rural specific element designed to support local enterprises, rural
specific jobs and be cognisant of the need to create full-time, high quality jobs with
career progression opportunities.  Approximately 90 per cent of enterprises in the
regions employ ten people or less and underemployment and flat career structures are
particular features of rural areas that require attention (Walsh & Harvey, 2013).  
With the on-going challenges facing traditional rural sectors, including agriculture,
the future success of the rural economy is inextricably linked with the capacity of
rural entrepreneurs to innovate and to develop new business opportunities that
create jobs and income in rural areas. Some of the key needs of rural entrepreneurs
have been highlighted as:
• Better, more locally-led access to finance;
• Harnessing local knowledge at all stages of policy formulation, delivery and
evaluation;
• Developing better communication between national, regional and local actors
to ensure the needs of entrepreneurs can be met;
• Acknowledgement that rising costs and Government revenue raising measures
can hit rural businesses disproportionately compared to their urban
counterparts e.g. fuel is often a bigger cost for rural businesses and entrepreneurs
who need to transport produce or goods greater distances. (EU Rural Winter
Review 2011)
Lack of quality broadband in rural areas is a considerable barrier to the
diversification and growth of the rural economy in Ireland. Case studies show that
several large firms have moved out of the South West of Ireland as a result of poor
broadband speed and quality (ECORYS, 2010:237:241).  The provision of quality
broadband to rural areas must be a priority in the future if rural development is to
be facilitated in a meaningful manner. The commitment to between 40Mbps and
30Mbps broadband speed in rural areas contained in the National Broadband Plan
for Ireland is insufficient to encourage diversification and economic growth in rural
areas. A rural broadband strategy should be developed and implemented by
Government as a matter of priority to support the development and growth of rural
enterprise and the creation of employment in rural areas. State intervention must
be prioritised in order to prevent a two-tier digital divide developing between urban
and rural areas.  
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Small rural firms and rural entrepreneurs need to be supported in developing their
businesses and in overcoming the spatial disadvantage to benefit from the growth in
the ‘knowledge economy’.  Sustainable, integrated public transport serving rural
Ireland and reliable high speed broadband must be given priority in order to support
rural businesses and the development of the rural economy through diversification
and innovation. The current strategy of relying on ‘global demand’ and foreign direct
investment (FDI) has led to a widening of the development gap between urban and
rural areas. One of the major problems faced by the government in trying to develop
and promote sustainable rural communities is the restricted opportunities in
secondary labour markets in rural areas.  Data from the IDA and Forfás highlight the
need for a rural and regional employment strategy.  In 2012 only 23 per cent of IDA
investments were located outside of Dublin and Cork, and just 34 per cent of the jobs
approved were located outside of Dublin and Cork (IDA, 2013).  Significant regional
disparities also show up in the Forfás annual employment survey.  In the period 2003-
2012 agency supported employment in Dublin increased by 14.8 per cent.  In the same
period agency supported employment in the Border, Midlands and West (BMW)
region fell by 7 per cent and in the Rest of South and East96 by 6.2% (Forfás, 2012).
This shows a trend of falling agency assisted employment in rural areas.  
Emigration
A recent Irish study on emigration showed that at least one household in four in rural
areas has been directly affected by the emigration of at least one member since 2006
(Mac Éinrí et al, 2013).  The same study found that 28 per cent of the households in
this cluster expected that another member would emigrate within the next three
years.  This has profound implications for the future of rural areas.  Rural areas in
Ireland have already suffered a loss of young people due to out migration to urban
areas and an ageing demographic prior to the recession, such an enduring loss of
educated young people will have a negative impact on social structures, service
provision, cultural capital and levels of poverty and social exclusion.
The impact of sustained high levels of unemployment and subsequent high levels
of emigration among young people in rural communities cannot be overestimated.
It has led to a loss of young people in rural communities. This in turn means that
the development of the rural economy has been hindered and it will continue to
struggle in any future upturn due to the lack of skilled workers and the
corresponding emergence of an ageing population. By failing to support young
people to stay in their communities Government is potentially failing to address a
key aspect of sustainability while supporting an emergence of an ageing
demographic profile for rural areas which undermines both employment and
growth targets (ECORYS, 2010:249).  
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public services and rural transport
The provision of public services in rural areas in the context of a falling and ageing
population is a cause for concern.  With increased levels of emigration the
population in rural areas has become dominated by those who are more reliant on
public services (the elderly, children and people with disabilities).  There is a need
to develop a new rural strategy to take account of the changes in rural areas since
the 1999 White Paper.  Decisions need to be made regarding the provision and level
of public services in rural areas, investment in childcare and transport and the
integration of rural and regional development into a new Spatial Strategy97.   Some
European countries adopt the equivalence principle for the provision of services in
rural areas that is public services in rural areas should be equivalent quality to those
in urban areas.  Walsh and Harvey (2013) propose that this would be a useful
guidance for investment in an Irish context.  The OECD has also noted the need for
investment in rural areas in key sectors of transport, information technologies,
quality public services, rural firms, conservation and development of local amenities
and rural policy proofing (OECD, 2006).   Investment in childcare, transport,
progression and outreach are all required as part of a cohesive strategy in order to
promote employment and innovation in rural areas.
The design and implementation of a new rural development strategy would provide
Government and all stakeholders with the opportunity to consider how public
services should be provided and delivered in the regions and rural areas.  It would
also provide an opportunity for the consideration of social, ecological and cultural
benefits to and reasons for investing in rural areas.  The benefits of such investment
must be considered in terms which can encompass more than just economic
measurements.  The withdrawal of services or lack of provision of services in rural
areas undermines rural development and compromises the needs of those most
reliant on these services (Shucksmith, 2012).  It is critical that the costs of not
investing in rural areas, including social exclusion, continued under-employment,
poverty and isolation, are taken into account in any new strategy.  
The lack of an accessible, reliable and integrated rural transport system is one of the
key challenges facing people living in rural areas.  Rural dwellers at present shoulder
a disproportionate share of the burden of insufficient public transport, according
to a recent report (EPA 2011: 10), 45 per cent of the rural district electoral divisions
in Ireland have a minimal level of scheduled public transport services with varying
frequency and timing. Among the main identified issues contributing to rural
deprivation and depopulation are:
• access to secure and meaningful employment;
240 Socio-Economic Review 2014
97 Government stated in February 2013 that a new Spatial Strategy would be developed.
It has yet to be published.
• availability of public transport in order to access employment and public
services;
• access to childcare; and
• access to transport.
(McDonagh, Varley & Shortall 2009: 16)
Government has acknowledged the importance of an integrated and accessible rural
transport network and has pledged to maintain and extend the Rural Transport
Programme with other local transport services as much as possible (Government of
Ireland 2011: 63).  
Car dependency and the reliance of rural dwellers on private car access in order to
avail of public services, employment opportunities, healthcare and recreational
activities is a key challenge for policy makers. Transport policy must be included in
planning for services, equity and social inclusion. The social inclusion element of
an integrated rural public transport system can no longer be ignored. The links
between better participation, better health, access to public services, access to
employment opportunities and a public integrated rural transport service have been
documented (Fitzpatrick, 2006). Thus far there has been a failure to incorporate this
knowledge fully into rural development policy. The Rural Transport Programme
(RTP) (formerly the Rural Transport Initiative) has certainly improved access in some
areas. However, the lack of a mainstream public transport system means that many
rural areas are still not served. People with disabilities, women, older people, low
income households and young people are target groups still at a significant
disadvantage in rural areas in terms of access to public transport.  Policy makers must
ensure that local government and the local community are actively involved in
developing, implementing and evaluating rural transport policies as national
planning has not worked to date.  In 2000 there was a call for a national rural
transport policy and the prioritisation of government funding in this area (Farrell,
Grant Sparks, 2000). Fourteen years later this policy has yet to be delivered. By 2021
it is estimated that the number of people with unmet transport needs could number
450,000 and of this group an estimated 240,000 will be from the target groups of
vulnerable rural dwellers outlined above. 
The National Transport Authority (NTA) has been given responsibility for the rural
Transport Programme and progressing integrated local and rural transport.  It
published plans for restructuring the rural transport programme in 2013.  The
previous RTP Groups will be replaced by eighteen Transport Coordination Units
with responsibility for delivering rural transport services. The restructuring plan
also outlines the relationship between local authority, Socio-Economic Committees
and Transport Coordination Units in terms of developing local transport policies
and objectives. The National Integrated Rural Transport Committee was established
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to oversee six pilot programmes to integrate all state transport services in rural areas
and provide access for the whole community to health services, education,
employment and retail, recreational and community facilities and services. While
the integration of rural transport with national transport policy is welcome, it is
important that the models of best practice that emerge from the pilot programmes
are put into a national rural transport strategy without delay. A mainstreamed rural
public transport service is required to service those in need of rural public transport
and those who are potential users. Investment in a national sustainable rural
transport network is required to support rural development. It is required to ensure
access to employment, access to services and to ensure rural economies are
supported in terms of economic diversification. 
Improved rural public transport and improved accessibility to services also provide
Ireland with an opportunity to deliver a  key change which would in turn help
deliver a significant reduction of climate harming gas (CHG) emissions (Browne
2011: 12). This is all the more pressing in terms of Ireland’s EU 2020 emissions target
and CHG emissions from private vehicles. By investing in a sustainable national
public transport system covering all rural areas, government could significantly
reduce CHG emissions in the long run.  The long term costs of not investing in rural
areas and not providing adequate and quality public services to rural and regional
communities should be factored into all Government expenditure decisions.  A new
rural strategy is required which should incorporate the social infrastructure,
governance and sustainability elements of the core policy framework outlined in
Chapter 2.
Farm incomes
Preliminary results from the Teagasc Farm Income Survey 201398 suggests that
agricultural sector income was relatively unchanged in 2013 compared with 2012.
There are significant variations between sectors, with milk production doing well
in 2013. However, the drystock sector and cereal production had mixed years with
increased production costs and a drop in prices respectively.  Rural Ireland has high
dependency levels, increasing outmigration and many small farmers living on very
low incomes. The data from the most recent SILC study (CSO 2011: 10) shows there
is a very uneven national distribution of poverty. The risk of poverty in rural Ireland
is 4.6 percentage points higher than in urban Ireland – 18.8 per cent and 14.2 per
cent respectively.  
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Key farm statistics:
• Average family farm income was €25,483 in 2012, a fall of 15 per cent on the
2011 figure, but still 10 per cent ahead of the 2010 figure. This income decrease
was entirely driven by input expenditure (Teagasc, 2013). Incomes in 2012 are
the second highest on record since 2005.
• There is a wide variation of farm incomes with 19 per cent of farms producing a
family farm income of less than €5,000 in 2012 compared to 13 per cent in 2011.
• At the opposite end of the spectrum in 2012, 16 per cent of farms produced a
farm income of over €50,000 and almost 3 per cent produced an income of over
€100,000.
• The Border region has the lowest average farm income and is the most reliant
on direct payments, contributing 122 per cent of farm income.
• The number of farm households in which the farmer and/or spouse were
engaged in off-farm employment was 49.4 per cent in 2012 (Teagasc, 2013).
• Teagasc classified 33 per cent of Irish farm households (26,000) as being
‘economically vulnerable’, meaning the farm business is not economically viable
and neither the farmer nor the spouse worked outside the farm in 2012.  
• Direct payments comprised 81 per cent of farm income in 2012 and averaged
€20,534 per farm.
• According to Eurostat, real agricultural income per worker in Ireland in 2012
decreased by 10.1 per cent.99
These statistics mask the huge variation in farm income in Ireland as a whole. Only
a minority of farmers are at present generating an adequate income from farm
activity and even on these farms income lags considerably behind the national
average. An important insight into the income of Irish farmers is provided by
Teagasc in its National Farm Survey.  Table 13.1 below outlines the huge variations
in farm income in Ireland in 2012, with 57 per cent of farms in Ireland having an
income €20,000 or less.
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Table 13.1:  Distribution of Family Farm Income in Ireland 2012  
€ < 5,000 5,000 – 10,000 - 20,000 - > 50,000
10,000 20,000 50,000
% 19 17 21 27 16
Number 15,030 13,448 16,612 21,358 12,656
Source: IFA, 2014
The majority of farm families rely on income support and payments from the state
to supplement their income. The value of subsidies less taxes on production decreased
by 7.1% from €1,667.1m in 2012 to €1,548.8m in 2013 (CSO, 2014). Table 13.2 shows
that by the end of 2013 there were 10,500 families receiving the Farm Assist
payment.  Off-farm employment and income is extremely important to farming
households and the fall in availability of off-farm employment due to the recession
will increase the dependence of farms on direct subsidies to avoid rural poverty and
social exclusion.  
Table 13.2:  Farm Assist Expenditure (€m) 2006-2013  
Year Expenditure (€m) Number Benefiting Average Payment
(€/week)
2006 71 7,650 179
2007 79 7,400 205
2008 85 7,710 213
2009 96 8,845 209
2010 111 10,700 199
2011 114 11,300 190
2012 99 11,200 171
2013 92 10,500 168 
Source: IFA 2014
Agriculture and direct employment from agricultural activities have been declining
in Ireland. The Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine has outlined its
vision of the future of Irish Agriculture in Food Harvest 2020 (Department of
Agriculture, Food and the Marine, 2011). It envisages that by 2020 the Irish agri-
food industry will have developed and grown in a sustainable manner by delivering
high quality, natural-based produce. This requires the industry to adopt a ‘smart
economy’ approach by investing in skills, innovation and research. This signals a
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move away from traditional farming methods and to a method of collaboration
across the agricultural, food and fisheries industries. In implementing this policy
there needs to be significant investment in sustainable agriculture, rural anti-
poverty and social inclusion programmes in order to protect vulnerable farm
households in the transition to a rural development agenda.
Future of rural Ireland
Rural Ireland faces significant challenges in terms of job creation, service provision
for an ageing population, ensuring the natural capital and biodiversity of rural areas
is protected and encouraging young people who have left to return and settle in rural
areas.  
The cumulative impact of measures introduced in Budgets 2012-2014 are likely to
have a negative effect on rural families100 and on the weakest people in rural Ireland
as inflation rises, unemployment persists, employment creation is
disproportionately urban-based, and services are either reduced or have their
charges increased. The removal of resources from rural areas will make it difficult to
maintain viable communities. Small rural schools are under threat, with 121 schools
affected by the increase in the pupil threshold for teacher allocations introduced in
budget 2012. A value for money review of smaller schools was initiated by the
Department of Education and Skills in 2012 but the results have not yet been made
public. Concern has already been raised about the significant socio-economic
impact of the possible closure of these schools on rural communities. Combined
with the closure of 139 rural Garda stations in 2012 and 2013,101 the quality of life
for rural dwellers and the sustainability of our rural communities are facing a
significant threat.  The removal of resources from rural areas will make it difficult to
maintain viable communities. Government is failing to deal with the new
challenges an ageing population brings to rural areas in relation to health services,
social services and accessibility for older and less mobile people. Employment,
diversification of rural economies, adapting to demographic changes and
supporting young people to stay in their communities, are areas that need
immediate attention from Government.  
Social Justice Ireland believes that we are now reaching a crucial juncture that
requires key decisions on social infrastructure, governance and sustainability to
ensure the necessary structures are put in place so that rural communities can
survive and flourish.  
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101 39 Garda Stations were closed in 2012 and 100 Garda Stations were closed in 2013.
Key policy priorities on Rural Development
• Develop a new national rural strategy.  This strategy should be part of a new
national spatial strategy.
• Develop a rural and regional employment strategy as part of the Action Plan for
Jobs.
• Ensure all policies are based on equity and social justice and take account of
rural disadvantage.
• Decisions around services and provision of services must be made in the context
of a national spatial strategy.
• Support young people to remain in their communities and implement policies
to ensure rural areas can adapt to a changing demographic profile in the longer-
term.
• Prioritise rolling out high speed broadband to rural areas.
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13. 
THE  GLOBAL  SOUTH
CORE POLICY OBJECTIVE:  THE DEVELOPING WORLD
To ensure that Ireland plays an active and effective part in promoting genuine
development in the Global South and to ensure that all of Ireland’s policies are
consistent with such development.
At the end of 2013 and in early 2014 two reports were published within weeks of
each other: The UN Human Development Report 2013 and an Oxfam Briefing paper.
Both reports give us a current snapshot of human development across the Globe at
this time. The Human Development Report entitled The Rise of the South: Human
Progress in a Diverse World, sounded a note of optimism. It points to the
transformation of a large number of developing countries into dynamic major
economies and it noted that much of the expansion is being driven by new trade
and technology partnerships within the South itself. However it moves quickly to
point out that economic growth alone does not automatically translate into human
development progress. Significant investment in anti-poverty strategies, education,
healthcare, nutrition and employment skills is necessary. The Report finds that
‘most regions show declining inequality in health and education but a worrying rise
in inequality in income.’(Figure 4 p5)
The reality of income inequality is graphically reported in the Oxfam briefing paper.
Entitled Working For the Few, the paper shows that the richest 85 people in the world
share a combined wealth of €1.22 trillion which is the same as the poorest half of
the world’s population (3.5 billion people). Winnie Byanyima of Oxfam notes that
‘Widening inequality is creating a vicious circle where wealth and power are
increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few, leaving the rest of us to fight over
the crumbs from the table’ and that ‘Seven out of ten people live in countries where
economic inequality has increased in the last 30 years’. She notes that in the ‘US the
wealthiest one percent captured 95 percent of the post-financial crisis growth since
2009, while the bottom 90 percent became poorer’. Promoting genuine
development in the Global South is one of the key policy areas that must be
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addressed urgently as part of the Core Policy Framework we set out in Chapter 2
under the heading of Creating a Sustainable Future.
The 2013 UN World Hunger and Poverty Facts and Statistics show that there are 1.35
billion people in the Global South living on $1.25 a day or less. In a world with
resources many times what is required to eliminate global poverty this situation is
intolerable. There has been some progress in East Asia but the situation has changed
little since the 1980s in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The 2013 United Nations Human Development Report gives an outline of the size
of underdevelopment and inequality. Table 13.1 shows this outline.
Table13.1: United Nations development indicators by region and worldwide
Region gNI per life Expectancy Adult
capita (uS$ ppp)* at birth (yrs) literacy %**
Least Developed Countries 1,385 59.5 60.7
Arab States 8,317 71.0 74.5
East Asia + Pacific 6,874 72.7 93.8
Europe + Central Asia 12,243 71.5 98.1
L. America + Caribbean 10,300 74.7 91.3
South Asia 3,343 66.2 62.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 2,010 54.9 63.0
Very High HDI^ 33,391 80.1 n/a
Worldwide total 10,184 70.1 81.3
Source: UNDP (2013: 144, 172)
Notes: * Gross National Income (GNI) Data adjusted for differences in purchasing power.
** Adult defined as those aged 15yrs and above.
^47 Countries including the OECD with very high human development
indicators.
The comparable rates for Ireland are: GNI per capita: $28,671; Life expectancy: 80.7;
adult literacy: not available
Tables 13.1 and 13.2 show the sustained differences in the experiences of various
regions in the world. These differences go beyond just income and are reflected in
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each of the indicators reported in both tables. Today, life expectancies are 17 years
higher in the richest countries than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, the UN reports
that more than 1 in 3 Southern Asians and Sub-Saharan Africans are unable to read.
These phenomena are equally reflected in sizeable differences in income levels (GNI
per person) and in the various mortality figures in table 13.2. There has been some
progress on this front as the deaths of children under five declined in most regions
since the last report.  While there has been some improvement in the maternal
mortality rates, thanks to the many successful health aid programmes, these rates
are still very high in developing countries. Table 13.2 shows that there are 394 deaths
per 100,000 live births in Least Developed Countries as against 15 in OECD countries
Table 13.2: Maternal and Infant Mortality Rates
Region Maternal Mortality under-5yrs
Ratio# mortality rate*
Least Developed Countries 394 108
Arab States 176 48
East Asia + Pacific 73 24
Europe + Central Asia 28 21
L. America + Caribbean 74 23
South Asia 203 65
Sub-Saharan Africa 475 120
Very High HDI^ 15 6
Worldwide total 145 55
Source: UNDP 2013:156, 166
Notes: # ratio of the number of maternal deaths to the number of live births expressed
per 100,000 live births 
^47 Countries including the OECD with very high human development indicators.
*number of deaths per 1,000 live births
The comparable rates for Ireland are: Maternal mortality: 2; Under 5 mortality: 4 
uN millennium development goals
In response to these problems the UN Millennium Declaration was adopted in 2000
at the largest-ever gathering of heads of state. It committed countries - both rich and
poor - to doing all they can to eradicate poverty, promote human dignity and
equality and achieve peace, democracy and environmental sustainability. World
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leaders promised to work together to meet concrete targets for advancing
development and reducing poverty by 2015 or earlier. Emanating from the
Millennium Declaration, a set of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was
agreed. These bind countries to do more in the attack on inadequate incomes,
widespread hunger, gender inequality, environmental deterioration and lack of
education, healthcare and clean water. They also include actions to reduce debt and
increase aid, trade and technology transfers to poor countries. These goals and their
related targets are listed in Annex 13.
Progress on the MDGs has been mixed. The 2013 UN Human Development Report
notes that the first goal of having the proportion of people living on less than $1.25
a day relative to 1990 has been met three years before the target date. This outcome
is primarily because of the success of Brazil, China and India in reducing income
poverty (p.13). A recent report shows that in Sub-Saharan Africa this figure was only
reduced from 57% to 48% between 1990 and 2008. (CSO 2013:1:3). The research
shows that the increase in income inequality slows the pace of poverty reduction.
A 2012 UN report claimed the goal to halve the proportion of people living without
access to safe drinking water has been reached but with little focus on quality
monitoring. In mid-February 2014, concerned about the lack of progress, the UN
General Assembly hosted a high level meeting to discuss water, sanitation and
sustainable energy. In his address to the Assembly the President, John Ashe noted
that 783 million people live without clean water, 2.5 billion have no adequate
sanitation and 1.4 billion people are without access to electricity.
The 2013 UN Human Development Report notes that ‘The actual progress in the
achievement of these goals has been very much at the country level, through
national initiatives and ownership’ (p 109). It is widely acknowledged now that
these goals were dictated by donors, written by donors, and made sense in the Aid
Effectiveness agenda and process (Paris 2005 - Accra 2008 – Busan 2011), rather than
in the development agenda. As a consequence, there was very little ownership of
the MDGs by development actors, very few countries attempted to localise them.
In the years ahead a different approach is needed, one that engages the people who
are meant to benefit from this process. It is also essential that the focus be on
development that is sustainable (environmentally, economically and socially) and
focused on all countries and not just the poorest. 
Poverty and its associated problems of poor health, low educational attainment,
poor infrastructure etc. remain the root cause of regional conflicts and civil wars in
many of these poor countries. States and societies that are poor are prone to conflict.
It is very difficult for governments to govern adequately when their people cannot
afford to pay taxes, and industry and trade are almost non-existent. Poverty is also
a major cause of environmental degradation. Large-scale food shortages, migration
and conflicts lead to environmental pressures.
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Wars, inter-community disputes and the easy availability of arms are increasing
vulnerability and instability for many communities. Scarcity of resources especially
water, energy and land have become more acute and highlight the need for urgent
action. The overwhelming majority of violent conflicts are fought within States,
their victims mostly civilians. These conflicts are fought with small arms. The
production and trade of these arms is the least transparent of all weapons systems.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports that world military
expenditure in 2012 is estimated to have been $1,756 billion or $249 for each person.
Nearly three-quarters of the companies in the Top 100 for 2012 are headquartered
in North America or Western Europe, and they account for 87 per cent of the total
arms sales. Ireland as a neutral country should have a role in researching,
challenging and advocating for tight controls in the production and distribution of
these weapons.
Climate change has been very obvious in recent years. While we in Ireland have
not been insulated from the effects of climate change the consequences are much
more acute in developing countries. The effects of climate change have increased
the vulnerability of many communities, leading to migration, poverty and hunger.
Food production is a huge challenge for communities constantly forced to move.
Ireland should be a world leader in combating climate change. In particular, it
should lead the EU 2020 Strategy on climate change and sustainability. (A fuller
treatment of this issue is to be found in chapter 11)
Human Rights and governance.
Social Justice Ireland welcomed the Review of Ireland’s Foreign Policy and External
Relations and we look forward to reading the outcome. In our submission to the
Review we noted the importance of articulating a vision that is inspirational,
attractive and achievable and how this vision can be promoted at home and abroad.
We urged that a major focus of this review be on human rights and governance.
Social Justice Ireland is a signatory of the Galway Platform on Human Rights in Irish
Foreign Policy. This document reflects the views of many groups and academics and
is a comprehensive contribution to development policy.  We advocated that the
current Review of Ireland’s Foreign Policy and External Relations reflect the
principles and recommendations made in that document.
Governance is the institutional context within which rights are achieved or denied.
It is about how power and authority are exercised in the management of the affairs
and resources of a country. Good governance is an issue for both developing
countries and the developed world. The review should spell out how the Irish
Government intends to promote and support good governance at home and abroad. 
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In order to ensure good governance, strong independent civil society organisations
are necessary to articulate the views of the people, challenge injustices, and
highlight social exclusion. The Irish Government should ensure a space and support
for a vibrant civil society.
Social Justice Ireland echoes the call in the UNDP Report 2013 for new guiding
principles for international organisations which incorporate the experience of the
South. ‘The emergence of the Group of 20 is an important step in this direction but
the countries of the South also need more equitable representation in the Bretton
Woods institutions, United Nations and other international bodies’. (p13)
Trade and debt
The fact that the current inequality between rich and poor regions of the world
persists is largely attributable to unfair trade practices and to the backlog of
unpayable debt owed by the countries of the South to other governments, to the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to commercial banks. 
The effect of trade barriers cannot be overstated; by limiting or eliminating access
to potential markets the Western world is denying poor countries substantial
income. In 2002 at the UN Conference on Financing and Development Michael
Moore, the President of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), stated that the
complete abolition of trade barriers could ‘boost global income by $2.8 trillion and
lift 320 million people out of poverty by 2015’. 
Supporting developing countries to develop and implement just taxation systems
would give a huge boost to local social and economic activity. Social Justice Ireland
notes the initiatives outlined in the Irish Aid Report to help developing countries
to raise their own revenue. We urge Government to learn from and expand these
programmes. Prior to the G20 meeting in September 2013 Oxfam issued a briefing.
While calling on the G20 to rewrite the international trade rules Oxfam noted that
developing countries lose an estimated $100 - €160 billion annually to tax evasion.
Social Justice Ireland supports the introduction of a financial transaction tax (FTT)
which it sees as progressive since it is designed to target only those profiting from
speculation. (for more on FTT see chapter 4) . It is clear that all countries would gain
from trade reform. As the UN Human Development Report 2013 notes ‘The rise of
the South presents new opportunities for providing global public goods more
effectively and for unlocking today’s many stalemated global issues’.(p 14) 
The high levels of debt experienced by Third World countries have disastrous
consequences for the populations of these indebted countries. Governments that are
obliged to dedicate large percentages of their country’s GDP to debt repayments
cannot afford to pay for health and educational programmes for their people. Ellmers
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& Hulova (2013) estimate that the external debt of countries of the global South has
doubled over the past decade to reach $4.5 trillion. Debt and Development Coalition
estimate that revenue lost from global South countries through illicit capital flight is
at €660 - €870 billion per year. It is not possible for these countries to develop the kind
of healthy economies that would facilitate debt repayment when millions of their
people are being denied basic healthcare and education and are either unemployed
or earn wages so low that they can barely survive.
The debt relief initiatives of the past 10 years have been very welcome. These initiatives
need to be further developed as there is growing concern that the debts of the poorest
countries are beginning to rise again. It is now important that Ireland campaign on
the international stage to reduce the debt burden on poor countries. Given Ireland’s
current economic circumstances, the Irish population now has a greater appreciation
of the implications of these debts and the merit in having them reduced. 
International Development post 2015
In planning for the post-2015 development agenda, Social Justice Ireland believes that
the international community needs to play an active role in developing the
proposed Sustainable Development Goals and in assisting less developed countries
achieve their potential. Social Justice Ireland welcomed the Government’s publication
of One World, One Future: Ireland’s Policy for International Development (2013) with its
overall vision to work for “A sustainable and just world where people are empowered to
overcome poverty and hunger and fully realise their rights and potential”. The three goals
and six priority areas highlighted in this document are a basis for an integrated
framework for global development post-2015. In the development of this framework
we recommend the following
• Priorities should be shaped by the views of people living in poverty. People living
in poverty should be supported in an appropriate manner so they can participate
fully in processes that are influencing the post 2015 framework. This principle
should also apply to goal setting, targets, monitoring and evaluation processes.
• As spelled out in the Galway Platform on Human Rights in Irish Foreign Policy, the
framework should affirm the full set of social, economic, cultural, civil and
political rights of all people everywhere. Goals and targets (global and national)
should be linked to human rights obligations. 
• Equality should be mainstreamed across all goals and targets. Groups experiencing
discrimination should be enabled to actively participate in identifying appropriate
indicators to provide disaggregated data to assess progress.
• Establish effective accountability mechanisms for the implementation of the post-
2015 framework. The mechanisms should operate at local, national and global
levels. Involve people living in poverty and marginalisation in these evaluations.
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• Sustainability should be the core concept around which international
development post 2015 is organised. This should include environmental,
economic and social sustainability.
Ireland’s commitment to oDA
Ireland’s Policy for International Development, One World, One Future, reiterates the
Programme for Government’s commitment to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of
Gross National Income allocated to international development cooperation. It goes
on to state: ‘Recognising the present economic difficulties, the Government will
endeavour to maintain aid expenditure at current levels, while moving towards the
0.7 per cent target’. (p3) Social Justice Ireland had welcomed this commitment. It is
with regret that we heard the announcement that the Government will not meet
the target by 2015 (March 2014). The ODA budget has been cut every year for the
past six years both in terms of allocation and as a percentage of GNP (Table 13.3).
This is an allocation to the poorest people on the planet and should have first
priority. We urge Government to halt this slide and begin the process of increasing
the allocation to reach the 0.7per cent of GNP target.
As table 13.3 shows, over time Ireland had achieved sizeable increases in our ODA
allocation. In 2006 a total of €814m (0.53 per cent of GNP) was allocated to ODA –
reaching the interim target set by the Government. Budget 2008 further increased
the ODA budget to reach €920.7m (0.6 per cent of GNP). However, since then the
ODA budget has been a focus of government cuts and has fallen by €319.1m – more
than 34 per cent. 
Table 13.3:  Ireland’s net overseas development assistance, 1905-2014  
year €m’s % of gNp 
2005 578.5 0.42  
2006 814.0 0.53  
2007 870.9 0.53  
2008 920.7 0.60  
2009 722.2 0.55  
2010 675.8 0.53  
2011 657.0 0.50  
2012 628.9 0.48  
2013 622.0 0.48  
2014 601.6 0.43  
Source: Irish Aid (2012:73) and various Budget Documents.
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The priorities for Irish Aid as outlined in their 2012 Report (p44) were:
Hunger: The Report noted that Irish Aid had reached its target of spending
20 per cent of its budget on fighting hunger by 2012.
Environment: €111m was contributed to a number of initiatives on climate
related disasters, science based climate information and water
management. 
Gender Equality:  Irish Aid supported capacity building, women’s rights initiatives,
agricultural inputs, Education and Health programmes.
Governance: Irish Aid supported NGOs and UN organisations in their work for
transparency and accountability. It also supported initiatives to
help developing countries to raise their own revenue.
Health: Improving health is a major cornerstone of sustainable
development. Irish Aid spent over €100m on health and
HIV/AIDS in 2012.
Education: 775 million people in the world today cannot read, nearly two
thirds of them are women. Irish Aid worked with education
ministries and NGOs to address this issue especially in areas of
conflict.
Rebuilding our commitment to ODA and honouring the UN target should be
important policy paths for Ireland to pursue in the years to come. Not only would
its achievement be a major success for government, and an important element in
the delivery of promises made, but it would also be of significance internationally.
Ireland’s success would not only provide additional assistance to needy countries,
but would also provide leadership to those other European countries which do not
meet the target. In 2011 Ireland was ranked ninth in the list of Development
Assistance Committee donors in terms of their contribution as a percentage of GNI
(CSO 2013, 1:5). Despite the challenges, we believe that we should care for those less
well-off particularly the world’s poorest people.
HIv/AIDS
Target seven of the UN Millennium Development Goals committed the
international community to ‘have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread
of HIV/AIDS’.  Published in November 2013 the UN AIDS Global Report evaluated
the progress being made. It highlighted the continued progress towards the global
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vision of zero new HIV infections, zero discrimination and zero AIDS related deaths.
(p2) The Report shows that in 2011:
• 35.3 million people globally are living with HIV
• 2.3 million people became infected with HIV, a reduction of 33 per cent since
2001.
• 1.6 million people died from AIDS related illness, a reduction of 30 per cent since
2001.
• New HIV infections among children have been reduced by 52 per cent since
2001.
A region of major concern for the Report is Sub-Saharan Africa. It calls for an
intensification of preventive efforts in this region. The following statistics give the
reality:
• About 70 per cent of all people living with HIV are in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
• Nearly 88 per cent of all children living with HIV are in this region.
• 70 per cent of all new infections are in this region
• 75 per cent of AIDS related deaths are in Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, the overall Report shows very welcome progress in the fight against AIDS.
There was a 50 percent reduction in the rate of new HIV infections across 26 low and
middle income countries. Half of all reductions in new HIV infections in the past
two years has been among new born children. 
The Report notes that there is a 20 per cent gap in the resources needed to fully fund
the AIDS response by 2015. It is encouraging to note that domestic spending
accounted for 53 per cent of all HIV related spending in 2012. Although increases
in domestic investment have occurred among countries at all income levels,
spending has risen most sharply among upper middle-income countries, with many
lower middle-income countries remaining heavily dependent on international
assistance. (p7). The international community must take its commitment seriously
and act with urgency. Despite our difficulties Social Justice Ireland urges Government
to meet its commitments in this area – one where Ireland plays a key role
internationally in responding to this crisis. 
Key policy priorities 
• Ensure that Ireland delivers on its promise to meet the United Nations target of
contributing 0.7 per cent of GNP to Overseas Development Assistance by the EU
deadline of 2015.
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• Take a far more proactive stance at government level on ensuring that Irish and
EU policies towards countries in the South are just.
• Continue to support the international campaign for the liberation of the poorest
nations from the burden of the backlog of unpayable debt and take steps to
ensure that further progress is made on this issue.
• Ireland should play a prominent role in the development of Sustainable
Development Goals for the planet and, within these, maintain the focus on the
issues raised earlier in this chapter.
• Engage pro-actively and positively in the Post-Rio+20 process already referred to
in chapter 11 on sustainability. 
• Work for changes in the existing international trading regimes, to encourage
fairer and sustainable forms of trade. In particular, resource the development of
Ireland’s policies in the WTO to ensure that this goal is pursued.
• Ensure that the government takes a leadership position within the European
and international arenas to encourage other states to fund programmes and
research aimed at resolving the AIDS/HIV crisis.
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14. 
VALUES
“Few can doubt that we have been in a period of economic transition. The
financial collapse has shown that many aspects of the ‘new economy’, so widely
praised just a few years ago, are unstable and unsustainable. For years we were
told that we had entered a brand new world of unlimited financial possibilities,
brought about by sophisticated techniques and technologies, starting with the
internet and the information technology revolution, spread through the world
by “globalisation” and managed by ‘financial engineers’ who, armed with the
tools of financial derivatives, could eliminate risk and uncertainty. Now we can
see that the new financial structure was a house of cards built on sand, where
speculation replaced enterprise, and the self-interest of many financial
speculators came at the expense of the common good.”
“While there were many factors that contributed to the financial meltdown of
2008, they start with the exclusion of ethics from economic and business
decision making. The designers of the new financial order had complete faith
that the ‘invisible hand’ of market competition would ensure that the self-
interested decisions of market participants would promote the common good.”
(Clark and Alford, 2010).
When the initial shock of the meltdown was absorbed many questions remained.
Why did we fail to see the crash coming? “Where did the wealth go?” People want
to know who benefitted from the meltdown. The people who are bearing the cost
of the economic crash are obvious, the unemployed, emigrants who were forced to
leave Ireland, poor, sick and vulnerable people who have had their income and
social services cut.  We are conscious of much fear, anxiety and anger in our
communities. Today, more and more of society are questioning how the policies and
decisions of the past decade could have failed Irish society so badly. The critical
question now is how do we prevent a recurrence of this type of economic crash?
While some people advocate good regulation as the solution, others are sceptical
and search for more radical approaches.  
Now six years after the economic crash some commentators are urging us to look to
the new ‘shoots’ and new signs of economic recovery. We are being encouraged to
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accept the current reality and ‘move on’. We are discouraged from taking a critical
look at what has happened to sections of our society especially people on middle
and lower incomes and the socio-economic gap that has opened between them and
the better off.
These observations, reflections and questions bring to the fore the issue of values. Our
fears are easier to admit than our values. Do we as a people accept a two-tier society in
fact, while deriding it in principle? The earlier chapters of this review document many
aspects of this divided society. It is obvious that we are becoming an even more
unequal world. Scarce resources have been taken from poorer people to offset the debts
of bankers and speculators. This shift of resources is made possible by the support of
our national value system. This dualism in our values allows us to continue with the
status quo, which, in reality, means that it is okay to exclude almost one sixth of the
population from the mainstream of life of the society, while substantial resources and
opportunities are channelled towards other groups in society. This dualism operates
at the levels of individual people, communities and sectors.
To change this reality requires a fundamental change of values. We need a rational
debate on the kind of society in which we want to live. If it is to be realistic, this debate
should challenge our values, support us in articulating our goals, and formulating the
way forward. Social Justice Ireland wishes to contribute to this debate. We approach the
task from the concerns and values of Christian thinking.  While many people are not
Christians they support the concerns and values identified here.
Christian values
Christianity subscribes to the values of both human dignity and the centrality of
the community. The person is seen as growing and developing in a context that
includes other people and the environment. Justice is understood in terms of
relationships. The Christian scriptures understand justice as a harmony that comes
from fidelity to right relationships with God, people and the environment. A just
society is one that is structured in such a way as to promote these right relationships
so that human rights are respected, human dignity is protected, human
development is facilitated and the environment is respected and protected (Healy
and Reynolds, 2003:188).
As our societies have grown in sophistication, the need for appropriate structures
has become more urgent. The aspiration that everyone should enjoy the good life,
and the goodwill to make it available to all, are essential ingredients in a just society.
But this good life will not happen without the deliberate establishment of structures
to facilitate its development. In the past charity, in the sense of alms-giving by some
individuals, organisations and Churches on an arbitrary and ad hoc basis, was seen
14. Values 259
as sufficient to ensure that everyone could cross the threshold of human dignity.
Calling on the work of social historians it could be argued that charity in this sense
was never an appropriate method for dealing with poverty. Certainly it is not a
suitable methodology for dealing with the problems of today. As recent world
disasters have graphically shown, charity and the heroic efforts of voluntary
agencies cannot solve these problems on a long-term basis. Appropriate structures
should be established to ensure that every person has access to the resources needed
to live life with dignity.
Few people would disagree that the resources of the planet are for the use of the
people - not just the present generation, but also the generations still to come. In
Old Testament times these resources were closely tied to land and water. A complex
system of laws about the Sabbatical and Jubilee years (Lev 25: 1-22, Deut 15: 1-18)
was devised to ensure, on the one hand, that no person could be disinherited, and,
on the other, that land and debts could not be accumulated. This system also
ensured that the land was protected and allowed to renew itself
These reflections raise questions about ownership. Obviously there was an
acceptance of private property, but it was not an exclusive ownership. It carried
social responsibilities. We find similar thinking among the leaders of the early
Christian community. St John Chrysostom, (4th century) speaking to those who
could manipulate the law so as to accumulate wealth to the detriment of others,
taught that “the rich are in the possession of the goods of the poor even if they have acquired
them honestly or inherited them legally” (Homily on Lazarus). These early leaders also
established that a person in extreme necessity has the right to take from the riches
of others what s/he needs, since private property has a social quality deriving from
the law of the communal purpose of earthly goods (Gaudium et Spes 69-71).
In more recent times, Pope Paul VI (1967) said “private property does not constitute for
anyone an absolute and unconditional right. No one is justified in keeping for his/her
exclusive use what is not needed when others lack necessities.... The right to property must
never be exercised to the detriment of the common good” (Populorum Progressio No. 23).
Pope John Paul II has further developed the understanding of ownership, especially
in regard to the ownership of the means of production. 
One of the major contributors to the generation of wealth is technology. The
technology we have today is the product of the work of many people through many
generations. Through the laws of patenting and exploration a very small group of
people has claimed legal rights to a large portion of the world’s wealth. Pope John
Paul II questioned the morality of these structures. He said “if it is true that capital as
the whole of the means of production is at the same time the product of the work of
generations, it is equally true that capital is being unceasingly created through the work
done with the help of all these means of production”. Therefore, no one can claim
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exclusive rights over the means of production. Rather, that right “is subordinated to
the right to common use, to the fact that goods are meant for everyone”. (Laborem Exercens
No.14). Since everyone has a right to a proportion of the goods of the country,
society is faced with two responsibilities regarding economic resources: firstly, each
person should have sufficient to access the good life; and secondly, since the earth’s
resources are finite, and since “more” is not necessarily “better”, it is time that
society faced the question of putting a limit on the wealth that any person or
corporation can accumulate. Espousing the value of environmental sustainability
requires a commitment to establish systems that ensure the protection of our planet.
In his recent exhortation, The Joy of the Gospel, (Evangelii Gaudium) Pope Francis
named the trends that are detrimental to the common good, equality and the future
of the planet. He says: 
“While the earnings of the minority are growing exponentially, so too is the gap
separating the majority from the prosperity enjoyed by those happy few. This
imbalance is the result of ideologies which defend the absolute autonomy of the
marketplace and financial speculation. Consequently, they reject the right of
states, charged with vigilance for the common good, to exercise any form of
control. A new tyranny is thus born, invisible and often virtual, which
unilaterally and relentlessly imposes its own laws and rules. Debt and the
accumulation of interest also make it difficult for countries to realise the
potential of their economies and keep citizens from enjoying their real
purchasing power. To all this we can add widespread corruption and self-serving
tax evasion, which have taken on worldwide dimensions. The thirst for power
and possessions knows no limits. In this system, which tends to devour
everything which stands in the way of increased profits, whatever is fragile, like
the environment, is defenceless before the interests of a deified market, which
become the only rule.” (par 56)
The concern of Pope Francis to build right relationships extends from the
interpersonal to the inter-state to the global.
Interdependence, mutuality, solidarity and connectedness are words that are used
loosely today to express a consciousness which resonates with Christian values. All
of creation is seen as a unit that is dynamic - each part is related to every other part,
depends on it in some way, and can also affect it. When we focus on the human
family, this means that each person depends on others initially for life itself, and
subsequently for the resources and relationships needed to grow and develop. To
ensure that the connectedness of the web of life is maintained, each person
depending on their age and ability is expected to reach out to support others in ways
that are appropriate for their growth and in harmony with the rest of creation. This
thinking respects the integrity of the person, while recognising that the person can
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achieve his or her potential only in right relationships with others and with the
environment. 
As a democratic society we elect our leaders regularly. This gives an opportunity to
scrutinise the vision politicians have for our society. Because this vision is based on
values it is worth evaluating the values being articulated. Check if the plans
proposed are compatible with the values articulated and likely to deliver the society
we desire.
Most people in Irish society would subscribe to the values articulated here. However
these values will only be operative in our society when appropriate structures and
infrastructures are put in place. These are the values that Social Justice Ireland wishes
to promote. We wish to work with others to develop and support appropriate
systems, structures and infrastructures which will give practical expression to these
values in Irish society.
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Annex 3 
I NCOME  D ISTR IBUT ION
To accompany chapter 3, this annex outlines details of the composition of poverty
in Ireland over recent years alongside offering an overview of Ireland’s income
distribution over the past two decades. It also reviews the process by which the basic
social welfare payment became benchmarked to 30 per cent of Gross Average
Industrial Earnings. The material underpins the development of many of the policy
positions we have outlined in chapter 3.
poverty - Who are the poor?
Two interchangeable phrases have been used to describe those living on incomes
below the poverty line: ‘living in poverty’ and ‘at risk of poverty’. The latter term is the
most recent, introduced following a European Council meeting in Laeken in 2001
where it was agreed that those with incomes below the poverty line should be
termed as being ‘at risk of poverty’.
The results of the SILC survey provided a breakdown of those below the poverty line.
This section reviews those findings and provides a detailed assessment of the
different groups in poverty.
Table A3.1 presents figures for the risk of poverty facing people when they are
classified by their principal economic status (the main thing that they do). These
risk figures represent the proportion of each group that are found to be in receipt of
a disposable income below the 60 per cent median income poverty line. In 2011 the
groups within the Irish population that were at highest risk of poverty included the
unemployed and those not at work due to illness or a disability. Almost one in five
classified as being “on home duties”, mainly women, have an income below the
poverty line. The “student and school attendees” category represents a combination
of individuals living in poor families while completing their secondary education
and those attending post-secondary education but with low incomes. The latter
element of this group are not a major policy concern, given that they are likely to
only experience poverty while they gain education and skills which should ensure
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they live with sufficient income subsequently. Those still in school and experiencing
poverty are more aligned to the issue of child poverty, which is examined later in
this annex. 
Despite the increase in poverty between 2009 and 2011 (see chapter 3), the table also
reveals the groups which have driven the overall reduction in poverty over the
period (falling from 19.7 per cent to 16 per cent). Comparing 2003 and 2011, the
poverty rate has fallen for all groups other than students while there have been
pronounced falls among the welfare-dependent groups, i.e. the unemployed, retired
and those not at work due to illness or a disability. 
Table A3.1  Risk of poverty among all persons aged 16yrs + by principal economic
status, 2003-2011
2003 2006 2011
At work 7.6 6.5 6.5
Unemployed 41.5 44.0 30.6
Students and school attendees 23.1 29.5 31.4
On home duties 31.8 23.8 21.6
Retired 27.7 14.8 8.9
Unable to work as ill/disabled 51.7 40.8 22.8
Total 19.7 17.0 16.0
Source: CSO SILC reports (2005:11, 2007:15, 2013:9), using national equivalence scale
One obvious conclusion from table A3.1 is that any further progress in reducing
poverty should be driven by continuing to enhance the adequacy of welfare
payments.
The working poor
Having a job is not, of itself, a guarantee that one lives in a poverty-free household.
As table A3.1 indicates 6.5 per cent of those who are employed are living at risk of
poverty. Despite decreases in poverty among most other groups, poverty figures for
the working poor have remained static, reflecting a persistent problem with low
earnings. In 2011, almost 105,000 people in employment were still at risk of
poverty.102 This is a remarkable statistic and it is important that policy makers begin
to recognise and address this problem.
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Many working families on low earnings struggle to achieve a basic standard of living.
Policies which protect the value of the minimum wage and attempt to keep those
on that wage out of the tax net are relevant policy initiatives in this area. Similarly,
attempts to highlight the concept of a ‘living wage’ and to increase awareness among
low income working families of their entitlement to the Family Income Supplement
(FIS) are also welcome; although evidence suggests that FIS is experiencing
dramatically low take-up and as such has questionable long-term potential.
However, one of the most effective mechanisms available within the present system
to address the problem of the working poor would be to make tax credits refundable.
We have addressed this proposal in chapter 3 of this review.
Recent data from Eurostat estimates the proportion of the Irish workforce who are
low paid, defined as those below 66 per cent of the median hourly wage. Using data
for 2010, they found that threshold to be €12.20 for Ireland and that an estimated
one in five Irish workers earn below that threshold. 
Child poverty
Children are one of the most vulnerable groups in any society. Consequently the
issue of child poverty deserves particular attention. Child poverty is measured as
the proportion of all children aged 17 years or younger that live in households with
an income below the 60 per cent of median income poverty line. The 2011 SILC
survey indicates that 18.8 per cent were at risk of poverty and, as table A3.2 shows,
in recent years the rate of child poverty has begun to increase (2013:9).
Table A3.2 Child Poverty – % Risk of Poverty Among Children in Ireland.
2006* 2007* 2009 2011
Children, 0-17 yrs 19.0 17.4 18.6 18.8
Source: CSO (various editions of SILC)
Note: * 2006 and 2007 data exclude SSIA effect.
Translating the data in table A3.2 into numbers of children implies that in 2011
almost 190,000 children lived in households that were experiencing poverty.103 The
scale of this statistic is alarming. Given that our children are our future, this situation
is not acceptable. Furthermore, the fact that such a large proportion of our children
are living below the poverty line has obvious implications for the education system,
for the success of these children within it, for their job prospects in the future and
for Ireland’s economic potential in the long-term. 
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Child benefit remains a key route to tackling child poverty and is of particular value
to those families on the lowest incomes. Similarly, it is a very effective component
in any strategy to improve equality and childcare. It is of concern, therefore, that
child payments were cut in recent Budgets. On foot of these policies, it is likely that
child poverty will increase further over the next few years. This will represent a major
setback in an area in which the state already has a dismal record. 
older people
According to the CSO’s 2011 Census Results there were 535,393 people aged over 65
years in Ireland in 2011. Of these, more than a quarter live alone comprising over
87,000 women and 49,000 men (CSO, 2012:26, 27). When poverty is analysed by
age group the 2011 figures show that 9.7 per cent of those aged above 65 years live
in relative income poverty (CSO, 2013:97).
Among all those in poverty, the retired have experienced the greatest volatility in
their poverty risk rates. As table A3.3 shows, in 1994 some 5.9 per cent of this group
were classified as poor; by 1998 the figure had risen to 32.9 per cent and in 2001 it
peaked at 44.1 per cent. The most recent data record a decrease in poverty rates,
mainly driven by increases in old age pension payments. While recent decreases are
welcome, it remains a concern that so many of this county’s senior citizens are living
on so little.
Table A3.3 Percentage of older people (65yrs+) below the 60 per cent median
income poverty line.
1994 1998 2001 2003 2004 2005 2009 2011
Aged 65 + 5.9 32.9 44.1 29.8 27.1 20.1 9.6 9.7
Source: Whelan et al (2003: 28) and CSO (various editions of SILC)
The Ill /people with a Disability
As table A3.1 showed, those not employed due to illness or a disability are one of the
groups at highest risk of poverty with 22.8 per cent of this group classified in this
category. Much like the experience of Ireland’s older people, the situation of this
group has varied significantly over the last decade and a half. The group’s risk of
poverty climbed from approximately three out of every ten persons in 1994 (29.5 per
cent) to over six out of every ten in 2001 (66.5 per cent) before decreasing to
approximately two out of every ten in the period 2008-2011. As with other welfare
dependent groups, these fluctuations parallel a period where policy first let the value
of payments fall behind wage growth before ultimately increasing them to catch-up. 
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Overall, although those not at work due to illness or a disability only account for a
small proportion of those in poverty, their experience of poverty is high.
Furthermore, given the nature of this group Social Justice Ireland believes there is an
on-going need for targeted policies to assist them. These include job creation,
retraining (see chapter 5 on work) and further increases in social welfare supports.
There is also a very strong case to be made for introducing a non-means tested cost
of disability allowance. This proposal, which has been researched and costed in
detail by the National Disability Authority (NDA, 2006) and advocated by Disability
Federation of Ireland (DFI), would provide an extra weekly payment of between €10
and €40 to somebody living with a disability (calculated on the basis of the severity
of their disability). It seems only logical that if people with a disability are to be equal
participants in society, the extra costs generated by their disability should not be
borne by them alone. Society at large should act to level the playing field by covering
those extra but ordinary costs.
poverty and education
The SILC results provide an interesting insight into the relationship between poverty
and completed education levels. Table A3.4 reports the risk of poverty by completed
education level and shows, as might be expected, that the risk of living on a low
income is strongly related to low education levels. These figures underscore the
relevance of continuing to address the issues of education disadvantage and early-
school leaving (see chapter 9). Government education policy should ensure that
these high risk groups are reduced. The table also suggests that when targeting anti-
poverty initiatives, a large proportion should be aimed at those with low education
levels, including those with low levels of literacy.104
Table A3.4 Risk of poverty among all persons aged 16yrs + by completed education
level, 2007-2011
2007 2009 2011
Primary or below 24.0 18.6 18.6
Lower secondary 20.7 19.7 21.9
Higher secondary 13.8 12.8 18.9
Post leaving certificate 10.9 9.1 14.5
Third level non-degree 8.4 4.9 10.8
Third level degree or above 4.2 4.8 5.4
Total 15.8 14.1 16.0
Source: CSO (2008:15; 2013:9), using national equivalence scale and excluding SSIA effect for 2007.
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104 We address the issues of unemployment and completed education levels in chapter 5
and adult literacy in chapter 9.
poverty by region and area
Recent SILC reports have provided a regional breakdown of poverty levels. The data,
presented in table A3.5 suggests an uneven national distribution of poverty. Using
2011 data, poverty levels are recorded as higher for the BMW region compared to
the South and East. Previous SILC data (not since updated) demonstrated that
within these regions Dublin had less than one in ten people living in poverty while
figures were twice this in the Mid-West, South-East and the Midlands. The table also
reports that poverty is more likely to occur in rural areas than urban areas. In 2011
the risk of poverty in rural Ireland was 4.6 per cent higher than in urban Ireland
with at risk rates of 18.8 per cent and 14.2 per cent respectively. 
Table A3.5  Risk of poverty by region and area, 2005-2011
2005 2009 2010 2011
Border, Midland and West - 16.2 13.8 20.4
South and East - 13.3 15.0 14.3
Urban Areas 16.0 11.8 12.5 14.2
Rural Areas 22.5 17.8 18.1 18.8
overall population 18.5 14.1 14.7 16.0
Source: CSO (2008:15; 2013:9) using national equivalence scale.
Deprivation: food and fuel poverty
Chapter 3 outlines recent data from the SILC survey on deprivation. To accompany
this, we examine here two further areas of deprivation associated with food poverty
and fuel poverty.
Food poverty
While there is no national definition or measure of food poverty, a number of
reports over the past decade have examined it and its impact. A 2004 report entitled
Food Poverty and Policy considered food poverty as “the inability to access a
nutritionally adequate diet and the related impacts on health, culture and social
participation” (Society of St. Vincent de Paul et al, 2004). That report, and a later
study entitled Food on a Low Income (Safefood 2011), reached similar conclusions and
found that the experience of food poverty among poor people was that they: eat less
well compared to better off groups; have difficulties accessing a variety of
nutritionally balanced good quality and affordable foodstuffs; spend a greater
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proportion of their weekly income on food; and may know what is healthy but are
restricted by a lack of financial resources to purchase and consume it.
Recently, Carney and Maitre (2012) returned to this issue and used the 2010 SILC
data to construct a measure of food poverty based on the collected deprivation data.
They measured food poverty and profiled those at risk of food poverty using three
deprivation measures: (i) inability to afford a meal or vegetarian equivalent every
second day; (ii) inability to afford a roast or vegetarian equivalent once a week; (iii)
whether during the last fortnight there was at least one day when the respondent
did not have a substantial meal due to lack of money. An individual who
experienced one of these deprivation measures was counted as being in food poverty
(2012: 11-12, 19).
The study found that one in ten of the population experienced at least one of the
food poverty/deprivation indicators; approximately 450,000 people and an increase
of 3 per cent since 2009. Those most at risk of food poverty are households in the
bottom 20 per cent of the income distribution, households where the head of
household is unemployed or ill/disabled, household who rent at less than the
market rent (often social housing), lone parents and households with three adults
and children (2012: 29, 38-39).
The results of these studies point towards the reality many household face making
ends meet, given their limited income and challenging living conditions in Ireland
today. They also underscore the need for added attention to the issue of food
poverty.
Fuel poverty
Deprivation of heat in the home, often also referred to as fuel poverty, is another
area of deprivation that has received attention in recent times. A 2007 policy paper
from the Institute for Public Health (IPH) entitled “Fuel Poverty and Health”
highlighted the sizeable direct and indirect effects on health of fuel poverty. Overall
the IPH found that the levels of fuel poverty in Ireland remain “unacceptably high”
and that they are responsible for “among the highest levels of excess winter
mortality in Europe, with an estimated 2,800 excess deaths on the island over the
winter months” (2007:7). They also highlighted the strong links between low
income, unemployment and fuel poverty with single person households and
households headed by lone parents and pensioners found to be at highest risk.
Similarly, the policy paper shows that older people are more likely to experience fuel
poverty due to lower standards of housing coupled with lower incomes. 
More recently, The Society of St Vincent de Paul’s (SVP) has defined energy poverty
as the inability to attain an acceptable level of heating and other energy services in
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the home due to a combination of three factors: income; energy price and energy
efficiency of the dwelling.  The 2011 SILC study found that 12.2 per cent of
individuals were without heating at some stage in that year; a figure which is 21.7
per cent for those in poverty (see table 3.11). The SVP points out that households in
receipt of energy-related welfare supports account for less than half of the estimated
energy poor households and over time these payments have been cut while fuel
prices and carbon taxes have increased. Clearly, welfare payments need to address
energy poverty. Other proposals made by the SVP include detailed initiatives on
issues such as: the prevention of disconnections; investing in efficiency measures
in housing; education and public awareness to promote energy saving; and the
compensation of Ireland’s poorest households for the existing carbon tax. 105
Social Justice Ireland supports the IPH’s call for the creation of a full national fuel
poverty strategy similar to the model currently in place in Northern Ireland. While
Government have made some inroads in addressing low-income household energy
issues through funding a local authority retrofitting campaign, progress to date has
been limited given the scale of the problem and its implication for the health and
wellbeing of many low-income families. Clearly, addressing this issue, like all issues
associated with poverty and deprivation, requires a multi-faceted approach. The
proposals presented by the SVP should form the core of such a fuel poverty strategy.
The experience of poverty: Minimum Income Standards
A 2012 research report from the Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice (VPSJ) and
Trinity College Dublin casts new light on the challenges faced by people living on
low incomes in Ireland (Collins et al, 2012). Entitled ‘A Minimum Income Standard
for Ireland’, the research established the cost of a minimum essential standard of
living for individuals and households across the entire lifecycle; from children to
pensioners. Subsequently the study calculated the minimum income households
required to be able to afford this standard of living. The data in this report has been
updated annually by the VPSJ and published on their website.106
A minimum essential standard of living is defined as one which meets a person’s
physical, psychological, spiritual and social needs. To establish this figure, the
research adopted a consensual budget standards approach whereby representative
focus groups established budgets on the basis of a household’s minimum needs,
rather than wants. These budgets, spanning over 2,000 goods, were developed for
sixteen areas of expenditure including: food, clothing, personal care, health related
costs, household goods, household services, communication, social inclusion and
participation, education, transport, household fuel, personal costs, childcare,
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insurance, housing, savings and contingencies. These budgets were then
benchmarked, for their nutritional and energy content, to ensure they were
sufficient to provide appropriate nutrition and heat for families, and priced. The
study establishes the weekly cost of a minimum essential standard of living for five
household types. These included: a single person of working age living alone; a two
parent household with two children; a single parent household with two children;
a pensioner couple; and a female pensioner living alone. Within these household
categories, the analysis distinguishes between the expenditure for urban and rural
households and between those whose members are unemployed or working, either
part-time or full-time. The study also established the expenditure needs of a child
and how these change across childhood.
Table A3.6 summarises the most recent update of these numbers following Budget
2014 (October 2013). Looking at a set of welfare dependent households, the study
found that when the weekly income of these households is compared to the weekly
expenditure required to experience a basic standard of living, they all received an
inadequate income. As a result of this shortfall these households have to cut back
on the basics to make ends meet (Collins et al, 2012:105-107). The comparison
between 2013 and 2014 highlights the impact of price increases and budgetary
policy over that period. In each case the challenges facing households is increasing
as the gap between income and expenditure widens.
Table A3.6 Comparisons of minimum expenditure levels with income levels for
selected welfare dependent households (€ per week)
2A 3C 2A 2C 1A 2C 1A 2C Single Single
baby, 3 10 & baby & 10 & Adult pensioner
& 10 yrs 15 yrs 3 yrs 15 yrs
2013 
Expenditure 573.28 566.37 366.12 445.81 344.90 255.56
Income 494.11 438.17 317.60 323.37 278.00 236.70
Shortfall -79.17 -128.20 -48.52 -122.44 -66.90 -18.86
2014
Expenditure 582.93 575.94 372.32 453.45 350.59 262.13
Income 494.12 438.17 317.60 323.37 278.00 236.70
Shortfall -88.81 -137.77 -54.72 -130.08 -72.59 -25.43
Source: VPSJ, 2013:2
Notes: 2A 3C baby, 3 10 yrs = 2 adults and 3 children where the children are an infant
aged below 1 year, aged 3yrs and 10 years.
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These results, which complement earlier research by the VPSJ (2006, 2010), contain
major implications for government policy if poverty is to be eliminated. These
include the need to address child poverty, the income levels of adults on social
welfare, the ‘working poor’ issue and access to services ranging from social housing
to fuel for older people and the distribution of resources between urban and rural
Ireland.107
Ireland’s income distribution: trends from 1987-2011
The results of studies by Collins and Kavanagh (1998, 2006), Collins (2013) and CSO
income figures provide a useful insight into the pattern of Ireland’s income
distribution over 24 years. Table A3.7 combines the results from these studies and
reflects the distribution of income in Ireland as tracked by five surveys. Overall,
across the period 1987-2011 income distribution is very static. However, within the
period there were some notable changes, with shifts in distribution towards higher
deciles in the period 1994/95 to 2005. 
Table A3.7  The distribution of household disposable income, 1987-2011 (%)
Decile 1987 1994/95 1999/00 2005 2011
bottom 2.28 2.23 1.93 2.21 2.05
2nd 3.74 3.49 3.16 3.24 3.64
3rd 5.11 4.75 4.52 4.46 5.14
4th 6.41 6.16 6.02 5.70 6.39
5th 7.71 7.63 7.67 7.31 7.82
6th 9.24 9.37 9.35 9.12 9.18
7th 11.16 11.41 11.20 10.97 11.10
8th 13.39 13.64 13.48 13.23 13.32
9th 16.48 16.67 16.78 16.35 16.50
Top 24.48 24.67 25.90 27.42 24.85
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Collins and Kavanagh (2006:156), CSO (2006:18-19) and Collins (2013:2)
Note: Data for 1987, 1994/95 and 1999/00 are from various Household Budget Surveys.
2005 and 2011 data from SILC.
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Using data from the two ends of this period, 1987 and 2011, chart A3.1 examines the
change in the income distribution over the intervening years. While a lot changed
in Ireland over that period, income distribution did not change significantly; the
decile variations are all small. Compared with 1987, only two deciles saw their share
of the total income distribution increase - the fifth decile and the top decile.
However, the change for the former is small (+0.11 per cent) while the change for
the latter is larger (+0.37 per cent). All other deciles witnessed a small decrease in
their share of the national income distribution with the bottom two deciles
recording the largest falls.
Chart A3.1: Change in Ireland’s Income Distribution, 1987-2011
Source: Calculated using data from Collins and Kavanagh (2006:156), CSO (2006:18-19)
and Collins (2013:2)
The most recent data also allows as assessment of the overall level of income
inequality has grown using the Gini coefficient, which ranges from 0-100 with
higher scores indicating greater inequality. The CSO reports that Ireland’s inequality
levels grew from 29.3 in 2009 to 31.1 in 2011. Furthermore, the 2011 data indicates
that the share of the top 20 per cent of households climbed further to reach 4.9 times
the share of the bottom 20 per cent. The comparable ratio in 2009 was 4.3 times.
Looking at the last seven available SILC surveys (2005-2011), the data shows a small
decline for the bottom decile, small gains for all others and a decrease of 2.5 per cent
for the top decile (see Table A3.7). It is likely that the top deciles decline reflects the
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transition from boom to recession over those years; although the share of the top
10 per cent remains more or less the same as the share of the entire bottom 50 per
cent of households.
benchmarking Social Welfare payments, 2001-2011
While Chapter 3 considers the current challenges associated with maintaining an
adequate level of social welfare, here we examine the transition to benchmarked
social welfare payments. 
The process of benchmarking social welfare payments centred on three elements:
the 2001 Social Welfare Benchmarking and Indexation Working Group (SWBIG), the
2002 National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) Review and the Budgets 2005-2007.
Social welfare benchmarking and indexation working group
In its final report the SWBIG agreed that the lowest social welfare rates should be
benchmarked. A majority of the working group, which included a director of Social
Justice Ireland, also agreed that this benchmark should be index-linked to society’s
standard of living as it grows and that the benchmark should be reached by a
definite date. The working group chose Gross Average Industrial Earnings (GAIE) to
be the index to which payments should be linked.108 The group further urged that
provision be made for regular and formal review and monitoring of the range of
issues covered in its report. The group expressed the opinion that this could best be
accommodated within the structures in place under the NAPS and the National
Action Plan for Social Inclusion (now combined as NAPinclusion). The SWBIG report
envisaged that such a mechanism could involve:
• the review of any benchmarks/targets and indexation methodologies adopted
by government to ensure that the underlying objectives remain valid and were
being met;
• the assessment of such benchmarks/targets and indexation methodologies
against the various criteria set out in the group’s terms of reference to ensure
their continued relevance;
• the assessment of emerging trends in the key areas of concern, e.g. poverty levels,
labour market performance, demographic changes, economic performance and
competitiveness, and
• identification of gaps in the area of research and assessment of any additional
research undertaken in the interim.
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108 The group recommended a benchmark of 27 per cent although SJI argued for 30 per
cent.
National Anti-poverty Strategy (NApS) review 2002 
In 2002, the NAPS review set the following as key targets:
To achieve a rate of €150 per week in 2002 terms for the lowest rates of social welfare
to be met by 2007 and the appropriate equivalence level of basic child income support
(i.e. Child Benefit and Child Dependent Allowances combined) to be set at 33 per cent
to 35 per cent of the minimum adult social welfare payment rate.
Social Justice Ireland and others welcomed this target. It was a major breakthrough
in social, economic and philosophical terms. We also welcomed the reaffirmation
of this target in Towards 2016. That agreement contained a commitment to
‘achieving the NAPS target of €150 per week in 2002 terms for lowest social welfare
rates by 2007’ (2006:52). The target of €150 a week was equivalent to 30 per cent of
Gross Average Industrial Earnings (GAIE) in 2002.109
Table A3.8 outlines the expected growth rates in the value of €150 based on this
commitment and indicates that the lowest social welfare rates for single people
should have reached €185.80 by 2007.
Table A3.8: Estimating growth in €150 a week (30% GAIE) for 2002-2007   2002
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
% Growth of GAIE - +6.00 +3.00 +4.50 +3.60 +4.80
30% GAIE 150.00 159.00 163.77 171.14 177.30 185.80
Source: GAIE growth rates from CSO Industrial Earnings and Hours Worked (September
2004:2) and ESRI Medium Term Review (Bergin et al, 2003:49).
budgets 2005-2007
The NAPS commitment was very welcome and was one of the few areas of the anti-
poverty strategy that was adequate to tackle the scale of the poverty, inequality and
social exclusion being experienced by so many people in Ireland today.
In 2002 Social Justice Ireland set out a pathway to reaching this target by calculating
the projected growth of €150 between 2002 and 2007 when it is indexed to the
estimated growth in GAIE. Progress towards achieving this target had been slow
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109 GAIE is calculated by the CSO on the earnings of all individuals (male and female)
working in all industries. The GAIE figure in 2002 was €501.51 and 30 per cent of this
figure equals €150.45 (CSO, 2006: 2).
until Budget 2005. At its first opportunity to live up to the NAPS commitment the
government granted a mere €6 a week increase in social welfare rates in Budget 2003.
This increase was below that which we proposed and also below that recommended
by the government’s own tax strategy group. In Budget 2004 the increase in the
minimum social welfare payment was €10. This increase was again below the €12 a
week we sought and at this point we set out a three-year pathway (see table A3.9).
Table A3.9: Proposed approach to addressing the gap, 2005-2007   
2005 2006 2007 
Min. SW payment in €’s 148.80 165.80 185.80  
€ amount increase each year 14.00 17.00 20.00  
Delivered ✓ ✓ ✓
Following Budget 2004 we argued for an increase of €14 in Budget 2005. The
Government’s decision to deliver an increase equal to that amount in that Budget
marked a significant step towards honouring this commitment.. Budget 2006
followed suit, delivering an increase of €17 per week to those in receipt of the
minimum social welfare rate. Finally, Budget 2007’s decision to deliver an increase
of €20 per week to the minimum social welfare rates brought the minimum social
welfare payment up to the 30 per cent of the GAIE benchmark.
Social Justice Ireland believes that these increases, and the achievement of the
benchmark in Budget 2007, marked a fundamental turning point in Irish public
policy. Budget 2007 was the third budget in a row in which the government
delivered on its NAPS commitment. In doing so, the government moved to meet
the target so that in 2007 the minimum social welfare rate increased to €185.80 per
week; a figure equivalent to the 30 per cent of GAIE.
Social Justice Ireland warmly welcomed this achievement. It marked major progress
and underscored the delivery of a long overdue commitment to sharing the fruits
of this country’s economic growth since the mid-1990s. An important element of
the NAPS commitment to increasing social welfare rates was the acknowledgement
that the years from 2002-2007 marked a period of ‘catch up’ for those in receipt of
welfare payments. Once this income gap had been bridged, the increases necessary
to keep social welfare payments at a level equivalent to 30 per cent of GAIE became
much smaller. In that context we welcomed the commitment by Government in
NAPinclusion to ‘maintain the relative value of the lowest social welfare rate at least
at €185.80, in 2007 terms, over the course of this Plan (2007-2016), subject to
available resources’ (2007:42). Whether or not 30 per cent of GAIE is adequate to
eliminate the risk of poverty will need to be monitored through the SILC studies
and addressed when data on persistent poverty emerges.
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Annex 4 
TAXAT ION
In this annex, we outline the background data on taxation in Ireland. We first
compare the overall level of taxation in Ireland to that of other European countries
and then trace how this has changed over time. We then examine trends in income
tax levels, outline and compare income tax levels across the income distribution
and examine the distribution of indirect taxes on household.
Ireland’s total tax-take up to 2011
The most recent comparative data on the size of Ireland’s total tax-take has been
produced by Eurostat (2013) and is detailed alongside that of 26 other EU states in
table A4.1. The definition of taxation employed by Eurostat comprises all
compulsory payments to central government (direct and indirect) alongside social
security contributions (employee and employer) and the tax receipts of local
authorities.110 The tax-take of each country is established by calculating the ratio of
total taxation revenue to national income as measured by gross domestic product
(GDP). Table A4.1 also compares the tax-take of all EU member states against the
average tax-take of 35.7 per cent.
Of the EU-27 states, the highest tax ratios can be found in Denmark, Sweden,
Belgium, France, Finland and Italy while the lowest appear in Lithuania, Bulgaria,
Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Ireland. Overall, Ireland possesses the sixth lowest
tax-take at 28.9 per cent, some 6.8 per cent below the EU average. Furthermore,
Ireland’s overall tax take has notably decreased over recent years with the 2011 value
representing a marginal increase from a record low figure in 2010 (see chart A4.1).
The increase in the overall level of taxation between 2002 and 2006 can be explained
by short-term increases in construction related taxation sources (in particular stamp
duty and construction related VAT) rather than any underlying structural increase
in taxation levels. 
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110 See Eurostat (2013:266-268) for a more comprehensive explanation of this
classification.
Table A4.1:  Total tax revenue as a % of GDP for EU-27 Countries in 2011
Country % of +/- from Country % of +/- from 
gDp average gDp average
Denmark 47.7 12.0 Cyprus 35.2 -0.5
Sweden 44.3 8.6 Czech Rep 34.4 -1.3
Belgium 44.1 8.4 Malta 33.5 -2.2
France 43.9 8.2 Portugal 33.2 -2.5
Finland 43.4 7.7 Estonia 32.8 -2.9
Italy 42.5 6.8 Poland 32.4 -3.3
Austria 42.0 6.3 Greece 32.4 -3.3
Germany 38.7 3.0 Spain 31.4 -4.3
Netherlands 38.4 2.7 Ireland gDp 28.9 -6.8
Slovenia 37.2 1.5 Slovakia 28.5 -7.2
Luxembourg 37.2 1.5 Romania 28.2 -7.5
Hungary 37.0 1.3 Latvia 27.6 -8.1
United Kingdom 36.1 0.4 Bulgaria 27.2 -8.5
Ireland gNp 36.0 0.3 Lithuania 26.0 -9.7
Source: Eurostat (2013:172) and CSO National Income and Expenditure Accounts
Notes: All data is for 2011. EU-27 average is 35.7 per cent.
Chart A4.1: Trends in Ireland and EU-27 overall taxation levels, 2000-2010
Source: Eurostat (2013:172) and CSO National Income and Expenditure Accounts
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GDP is accepted as the benchmark against which tax levels are measured in
international publications. However, it has been suggested that for Ireland gross
national product (GNP) is a better measure. This is because Ireland’s large
multinational sector is responsible for significant profit outflows which, if included
(as they are in GDP but not in GNP), exaggerate the scale of Irish economic activity.111
Commenting on this, Collins stated that “while it is clear that multinational profit
flows create a considerable gap between GNP and GDP, it remains questionable as
to why a large chunk of economic activity occurring within the state should be
overlooked when assessing its tax burden” and that “as GDP captures all of the
economic activity happening domestically, it only seems logical, if not obvious, that
a nations’ taxation should be based on that activity” (2004:6).112 He also noted that
using GNP will understate the scale of the tax base and overstate the tax rate in
Ireland because it excludes the value of multinational activities in the economy but
does include the tax contribution of these companies. In this way, the size of the
tax-take from Irish people and firms is exaggerated.
Social Justice Ireland believes that it would be more appropriate to calculate the tax-
take by comparing either GNP or GNI (Gross National Income) and using an
adjusted tax-take figure which excludes the tax paid by multi-national companies.
As figures for their tax contribution are currently unavailable, we have simply used
the unadjusted GNP figures and presented the results in table A4.1. In 2011 this stood
at 36.0 per cent. 113 This also suggests to international observers and internal policy
makers that the Irish economy is not as tax-competitive as it truly is. This issue
should be addressed by Government and appropriate adjustments made when
calculating Ireland’s tax-take as a percentage of GNP.
In the context of the figures in table A4.1 and the trends in chart A4.1, the question
needs to be asked: if we expect our economic and social infrastructure to catch up
to that in the rest of Europe, how can we do this while simultaneously gathering
less taxation income than it takes to run the infrastructure already in place in most
of those other European countries?  In reality, we will never bridge the social and
economic infrastructure gaps unless we gather a larger share of our national income
and invest it in building a fairer and more successful Ireland.
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111 Collins (2004:6) notes that this is a uniquely Irish debate and not one that features in
other OECD states such as New Zealand where noticeable differences between GDP
and GNP also occur.
112 See also Collins (2011:90) and Bristow (2004:2) who make a similar argument.
113 The 2011 tax take as a percentage of GNI is 35.6 per cent.
Effective tax rates
To complement the trends and data outlined in chapter 4, it is possible to focus on
the changes to the levels of income taxation in Ireland over the past decade and a
half. Central to any understanding of these personal/income taxation trends are
effective tax rates. These rates are calculated by comparing the total amount of
income tax a person pays with their pre-tax income. For example, a person earning
€50,000 who pays a total of €10,000 in tax, PRSI and USC will have an effective tax
rate of 20 per cent. Calculating the scale of income taxation in this way provides a
more accurate reflection of the scale of income taxation faced by earners.
Following Budget 2014 we have calculated effective tax rates for a single person, a
single income couple and a couple where both are earners. Table A4.2 presents the
results of this analysis. For comparative purposes, it also presents the effective tax
rates which existed for people with the same income levels in 2000 and 2008.
In 2014, for a single person with an income of €15,000 the effective tax rate will be 2.7
per cent, rising to 15.1 per cent on an income of €25,000 and 42.9 per cent on an
income of €120,000. A single income couple will have an effective tax rate of 2.7 per
cent at an income of €15,000, rising to 8.3 per cent at an income of €25,000, 26.6 per
cent at an income of €60,000 and 39.3 per cent at an income of €120,000. In the case
of a couple, both earning and a combined income of €40,000, their effective tax rate
is 9.9 per cent, rising to 33.8 per cent for combined earnings of €120,000. 
Table A4.2: Effective Tax Rates following Budgets 2000 / 2008 / 2014 
Income Single person Couple 1 earner Couple 2 Earners
levels    
€15,000 13.9% / 0.0% / 2.7% 2.5% / 0.0% / 2.7% 0.8% / 0.0% / 2.0%  
€20,000 13.9% / 0.0% / 11.1% 8.3% / 2.7% / 7.6% 6.1% / 0.0% / 2.3%  
€25,000 24.0% / 8.3% / 15.1% 12.3% / 2.9% / 8.3% 11.0% / 0.0% / 2.5%  
€30,000 28.4% / 12.9% / 17.7% 15.0% / 5.1% / 9.5% 14.6% / 1.7% / 5.6%  
€40,000 33.3% / 18.6% / 24.8% 20.2% / 9.4% / 14.9% 17.5% / 3.6% / 9.9%  
€60,000 37.7% / 27.5% / 33.9% 29.0% /19.8% / 26.6% 28.0% /12.2% / 17.7 %  
€100,000 41.1% / 33.8%  / 41.1% 35.9% /29.2% / 36.8% 35.9% /23.8% / 30.2 %  
€120,000 41.9% / 35.4% / 42.9% 37.6% /31.6% / 39.3% 37.7% /27.2% / 33.8 %
Source: Social Justice Ireland (2013:8).
Notes: Tax = income tax + PRSI + levies/USC
Couples assume 2 children and 65%/35% income division
All workers are assumed to be PAYE earners
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While these rates have increased since 2008 for almost all earners they are still low
compared to those that prevailed in 2000. Few people complained at that time about
tax levels being excessive and the recent increases should be seen in this context.
Taking a longer view, chart A4.2 illustrates the downward trend in effective tax rates
for three selected household types since 1997. These are a single earner on €25,000;
a couple with one earner on €40,000; and a couple with two earners on €60,000.
Their experiences are similar to those on other income levels and are similar to the
effective tax rates of the self-employed over that period.
Chart A4.2: Effective tax rates in Ireland, 1997-2014
Source: Department of Finance, Budget 2013 and Social Justice Ireland (2012:8).
Notes: Tax = income tax + PRSI + levies/USC
Couples assume 2 children and 65%/35% income division
2009*= Supplementary Budget 2009 (April 2009)
All workers are assumed to be PAYE earners
The two 2009 Budgets produced notable increases in these effective taxation rates.
Both Budgets required government to raise additional revenue and with some
urgency - increases in income taxes providing the easiest option. Similarly, the
introduction of the USC in Budget 2011 increased these rates, most notably for lower
income earners, The subsequent Budget 2012 provided a welcome reduction for the
lowest earners through raising the income level at which the USC applies. Despite
that change, the employee PRSI increase in Budget 2013 targeted lowest income
earners hardest and increased effective taxation rate for almost all workers.
However, income taxation is not the only form of taxation and, as we highlight in
chapter 4, there are many in Ireland with potential to contribute further taxation
revenues.
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Income taxation and the income distribution
An insight into the distribution of income taxpayers across the income distribution
is provided each year by the Revenue Commissioners in its Statistical Report. The
Revenue’s ability to profile taxpayers is limited by the fact that it only examines ‘tax
cases’ which may represent either individual taxpayers or couples who are jointly
assessed for tax.  A further disadvantage of these figures is that there is a considerable
delay between the tax year being reported on and the publication of the data for
that year. The latest data, published in 2012, is for 2010.114
The progressivity of the Irish income taxation system is well demonstrated in table
A4.3 – as incomes increase the average income tax paid also increases. The table also
underscores the issues highlighted earlier in chapter 3; that a large proportion of
the Irish population survive on low incomes. Summarising the data in the table,
almost 20 per cent of cases have an income below €10,000; 55 per cent have an
income below €30,000 and 90 per cent of cases are below €75,000. At the top of the
income distribution, 5 per cent of households (almost 100,000) receive an income
in excess of €100,000. The table also highlights the dependence of the income
taxation system on higher income earners, with 27 per cent of income tax coming
from cases with incomes of between €60,000 and €100,000 and 46 per cent of
income tax coming from cases with incomes above €100,000. While such a structure
is not unexpected, a symptom of progressivity rather than a structural problem, it
does underscore the need to broaden the tax base beyond income taxes – a point we
have made for some time and develop further in chapter 4.
Indirect taxation and the income distribution
As chapter 4 shows, the second largest source of taxation revenue is VAT and the
third largest is excise duties. These indirect taxes tend to be regressive – meaning
they fall harder on lower income individuals and households (Barrett and Wall,
2006:17-23; Collins, 2011: 102-103). 
An assessment of how these indirect taxes impact on households across the income
distribution is possible using data from the CSO’s Household Budget Survey (HBS),
which collects details on household expenditure and income every five years. Chart
A4.3 and table A4.4 presents the results of Barrett and Wall’s examination of the
2004/05 HBS data.115 They show that indirect taxation consumes more than 20 per cent
of the lowest decile’s income and more than 18 per cent of the income of the bottom
five deciles. These findings reflect the fact that lower income households tend to spend
almost all of their income while higher income households both spend and save.
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114 An update for the 2011 tax year is due in mid 2014.
115 A subsequent study by Leahy et al (2010) found similar results but provides less data
on the income distribution impacts of indirect taxes.
Table A4.3: Income taxation and Ireland’s income distribution, 2010  
From € To € No. of cases Av. income Av. Tax % Total Tax 
- 10,000 387,175 €4,399 €12 0.05       
10,000 12,000 71,719 €11,026 €35 0.03      
12,000  15,000 109,788 €13,523 €56 0.06
15,000 17,000 72,768 €16,009 €70 0.05
17,000 20,000 122,603 €18,517 €114 0.14
20,000 25,000 200,619 €22,495 €476 0.97
25,000 27,000 74,917 €25,988 €892 0.68
27,000 30,000 102,601 €28,492 €1,196 1.25     
30,000 35,000 152,930 €32,454 €1,738 2.71     
35,000 40,000 137,680 €37,439 €2,554 3.58
40,000 50,000 198,857 €44,648 €4,242 8.59
50,000 60,000 130,636 €54,645 €6,665 8.87
60,000 75,000 124,574 €66,898 €9,497 12.05
75,000 100,000 102,146 €85,621 €14,659 15.26        
100,000 150,000 63,191 €118,783 €25,612 16.49
150,000 200,000 17,101 €170,895 €43,216 7.53
200,000 275,000 9,308 €231,717 €62,667 5.94
Over 275,000 9,830 €522,062 €157,165 15.74
Totals 2,088,443 €37,218 €4,700 100.00 
Source: Calculated from Revenue Commissioners (2012).
Dealing specifically with VAT, the study also found that lower income households
paid more at the 21 per cent (now 23 per cent) rate than did higher income
households. Consequently in our Analysis and Critique of Budget 2012, Social Justice
Ireland highlighted the way that that Budget’s increase in VAT was regressive and
unnecessarily undermined the living standards of low income households. Other,
fairer approaches to increasing taxation were available and should have been taken.
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Chart A4.3: VAT and excise duties as a % of household income, by decile
Source: Barrett and Wall (2006:19-20).
Table A4.4 VAT Payments at reduced and standard rates as a % of income, by
selected deciles
% income paid in vAT bottom 2nd 3rd 8th 9th Top
@ 13.5% rate (reduced) 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.0 1.8 1.3
@ 21% rate (standard)* 11.5 9.1 9.4 8.9 8.4 5.8
Source: Barrett and Wall (2006:19-20).
Note: * Rate subsequently decreased & increased – latest increase to 23% (Budget 2012)
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Annex 5. 
WORK , UNEMPLOYMENT  AND
JOB  CREAT ION
Measuring the labour market
When considering terms such as “employment” and “unemployment” it is
important to be as clear as possible about what we actually mean. Two measurement
sources are often quoted as the basis for labour market data, the Quarterly National
Household Survey (QNHS) and the Live Register. The former is considered the official
and most accurate measure of employment and unemployment although, unlike
the monthly live register unemployment data, it appears only four times a year.
The CSO’s QNHS unemployment data use the definition of ‘unemployment’
supplied by the International Labour Office (ILO). It lists as unemployed only those
people who, in the week before the survey, were unemployed and available to take
up a job and had taken specific steps in the preceding four weeks to find
employment. Any person who was employed for at least one hour is classed as
employed. By contrast, the live register counts everybody ‘signing-on’ and includes
part-time employees (those who are employed up to three days a week), those
employed on short weeks, seasonal and casual employees entitled to Jobseekers
Assistance or Benefit.116
labour force trends
The dramatic turnaround in the labour market after 2007 (see chapter 5) contrasts
with the fact that one of the major achievements of the preceding 20 years had been
the increase in employment and the reduction in unemployment, especially long-
term unemployment. In 1992 there were 1,165,200 people employed in Ireland. That
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116 See Healy and Collins (2006) for a further explanation of measurement in the labour
market.
figure increased by almost one million to peak at 2,169,600 in mid-2007. During
early 2006 the employment figure exceeded two million for the first time in the
history of the state. Overall, the size of the Irish labour force has expanded
significantly and today equals over 2.18 million people, eight hundred thousand
more than in 1992 (see chart A5.1). 
However, in the period since 2007 emigration has returned, resulting in a decline in
the labour force. Initially this involved recently arrived migrants returning home
but was then followed by the departure of native Irish. CSO figures indicate that
during the first quarter of 2009 the numbers employed fell below two million and
that the level continued to fall until achieving some growth in 2013. In that year
there were just under 1.9 million people employed (see chart A5.1).
Chart A5.1: The Numbers of People in the Labour Force and Employed in Ireland,
1991-2013
Source: CSO, Labour Force Survey and QNHS various editions
As chart A5.2 shows, the period from 1993 was one of decline in unemployment.
By mid-2001 Irish unemployment reached its lowest level at 3.6 per cent of the
labour force. Subsequently the international recession and domestic economic crisis
brought about increases in the rate. During 2006 unemployment exceeded 100,000
for the first time since 1999 with a total of 105,100 people recorded as unemployed
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in mid-2006. As chart A5.2 shows, it exceeded 200,000 in early-2009, 300,000 in
2010 and peaked at 328,000 in 2011. Unemployment has since declined, reaching a
figure of 280,000 in 2013. The chart also highlights the rapid growth in the number
of long-term unemployed (those unemployed for more than 12 months). The CSO
reports that there are now over 165,000 people in long-term unemployment and
that this figure has increased five-fold since 2007. Quite simply, given the on-going
economic crisis many of those who entered unemployment in 2007-2010 have
remained unemployed for more than 12 months and have therefore become long-
term unemployed. 
Chart A5.2: The Numbers of Unemployed and Long-Term Unemployed in Ireland,
1991-2012
Source: CSO, Labour Force Survey and QNHS various editions
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Annex 7 
HOUS ING  AND
ACCOMMODAT ION  
The following annex accompanies chapter seven providing data in relation to range
of areas already discussed in the chapter. Table A7.1 provides additional information
relating to house completions for the period 1993 to 2000. 
A7.1 House  Completions  by  Sector  for years 1993 to 2000
year local Authority voluntary/Non private Total
Housing profit Housing Housing
1993 1,200 890 19,301 21,391
1994 2,374 901 23,588 26,863
1995 2,960 1,011 26,604 30,575
1996 2,676 917 30,132 33,725
1997 2,632 756 35,454 38,842
1998 2,771 485 39,093 42,349
1999 2,909 579 43,024 46,512
2000 2,204 951 46,657 49,812
Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, (2013)
Table A7.2 shows new social housing output for the period from 2007 to 2012. This
data provides an overview of the fall off which has occurred in relation to
completions and acquisitions across the area of social housing, both within the
voluntary and cooperative and the local authority sectors.
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A7.2 New Social Housing Output for 2007 to 20012
year local Authority voluntary and Total Completions 
Completions Acquisitions Cooperative and acquisitions
Completions
2007 4,986 2,002 1,685 8,673
2008 4,905 787 1,896 7,588
2009 3,362 727 2,011 6,100
2010 1,328 850 741 2,919
2011 494 325 745 1,564
2012 363 351 677 1,391
Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, (2013)
Table A7.3 outlines the new RAS units acquired by the local authority for social
housing purposes over the corresponding year. In general, data in relation to RAS is
provided in cumulative format due to the nature of the scheme, numbers in RAS
constantly vary as contracts end, tenants move on to other properties, landlords
withdraw from the scheme, new tenancies are allocated or vacancies in contracted
units are filled.
A7.3 New RAS Units Acquired under Long Term Lease Years 2007 to 2012
year Number of New RAS units Acquired
2007 796
2008 1,600
2009 1,990
2010 1,783
2011 1,918
2012 1,416
Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, (2013)
Table A7.4 provides an overview in regard to the number of households assessed as
being in need of social housing from 1993-2013. The table shows a massive increase
from 1993 to 2013 with the total number of households going from 28,200 up to
89,872. This represents an increase of 61,672 households over a twenty year period.
When comparisons are drawn between 2008 and 2013, there is an increase of 33,623. 
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A7.4 Net Household Need 1993-2013
year Number of Number of households
Households yearly increase/decrease
2013 89,872 -8,446
2011 98,318 +42,069
2008 56,249 +13,303
2005 42,946 -5,467
2002 48,413 +9,327
1999 39 +11,749
1996 27,427 -773
1993 28,200
Source: Housing Agency (2013)
A7.5 Breakdown of the Local Authority Waiting List by Major Categories of Need
2005, 2008 and 2011
Category of need 2005117 as % of 2008 as % of 2011 as % of 
net need net need net need 
2005 2008 2011
Homeless 1,987 4.5 1,394 3 2,348 2.4
Traveller 1,004 2 1,317 2 1,824 1.9
Accommodation unfit 1,719 4 1,757 3 1,708 1.7
Accommodation overcrowded 4,073 10 4,805 9 4,594 4.7
Involuntary sharing 3,371 8 4,965 9 8,534 8.7
young persons leaving care 256 0.5 715 1 538 0.5
Medical compassion 3,504 8 8,059 14 9,548 9.7
older persons 1,658 4 2,499 4 2,266 2.3
people with a disability 455 1 1,155 2 1,315 1.3
unable to meet 
Accommodation Cost 24,919 58 29,583 53 65,643 66.8
Total 42,946 100 56,249 100 98,318 100
Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government, Annual
Housing Statistics Bulletin (2008) & Housing Agency (2011). 
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117 These figures are different from the figures reported in the 2005 Housing Needs
Assessment as an adjustment was made to the 2005 figures in the 2008 Housing
Statistics Bulletin for comparison purposes with the 2008 results.
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Annex 11: 
SUSTA INAB I L I T Y  AND
ENV IRONMENT
Ireland: some key environmental facts 
(CSo 2013, EpA 2013, SEAI 2013))
greenhouse gases and Climate Change
• Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions fell substantially between 2009 and by 2011.
The EPA estimates that Ireland will meet its Kyoto Protocol target through the
use of Kyoto Protocol credits already purchased by the State and use of unused
allowances in the New Entrant Set Aside under the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme.
• Agriculture is the largest source of GHG emissions, representing 32 per cent of
total national emissions in 2011. The energy industries are the second largest
source of emissions, representing 20.8 per cent of total national GHG emissions
in 2011.
• The transport sector has been the fastest growing source of GHG emissions,
showing a 120 per cent increase between 1990 and 2011, although emissions
from this sector have shown decreases on an annual basis from peak levels in
2007.   
• Ireland is likely to breach its EU 2020 target and obligations on emissions from
2016 onwards (EPA, 2013).  Emissions are projected to be between 1 – 9 per cent
higher in 2020118.  
• Forest sinks in Ireland could provide a removal of 4.6Mtonnes of CO2 in 2020
and 32 Mtonnes of CO2 over the 2014-2020 period.
118 This is based on projections using both the ‘With Measures’ and ‘With Additional
Measures’ scenarios (EPA, 2013:1).
Transport
• Ireland’s car density in 2012 was 524 cars per 1,000 adults.
• There has been a substantial increase in the number of low emission vehicles
licensed since the introduction in 2008 of motor taxation rates based upon
emissions. In 2011, 90% of new private vehicles licensed were in emission bands
A and B.
• Two out of three persons drove to work in 2011.
• 61% of children aged 5-12 were driven to school by car in 2011.
• The transport sector accounted for 40.2% of Ireland’s final energy consumption
in 2011, the highest for any economic sector in that year.
• More women walked to work (96,796) than men (73,714). Men accounted for
the majority of those cycling with 29,075 (73%), while the majority of public
transport commuters were women (55.5%).
Energy
• Ireland’s renewable energy targets for 2020 are to have 40% of electricity, 10%
of transport and 12 % of heat to be generated from renewable energy.
• In 2012 Ireland generated 19.6% of electricity, 3.8% of transport119 and 5.2% of
heat from renewable energy.
• Ireland’s primary energy requirement was 13.23 million tonnes of oil equivalent
(t.o.e) in 2012.  It rose from 9.5 million t.o.e. in 1990 to 16.5 million t.o.e. in 2008
and has been slowly decreasing since 1990.
• Transport accounted for 39% of Ireland’s final energy consumption in 2012.
• Oil accounted for 56.8% of Ireland’s total final energy consumption in 2012.
• Renewable energy accounts for 7.1% of Ireland’s gross final energy use in 2012.
The target set for 2020 is 16%.
• Wind energy accounted for 41% of Ireland’s renewable energy in 2012.
• Ireland’s overall energy import dependency was 85% in 2012. Overall indigenous
energy production decreased by 23% in 2012.
Water
• Food Harvest 2020 proposes a 50% increase in milk production.  This will present
a significant challenge if Ireland is to meet its Water Framework Directive goals
as agriculture is one of the main sources of nitrates in groundwaters and of
nutrient enrichment in surface waters. The Food Harvest target for milk
292 Socio-Economic Review 2014
119 Includes weightings for biofuels
production will potentially increase total nitrogen generation by as much as 14%
by 2020. The proportion of Irish rivers classified as being unpolluted has
declined from 77.3% in 1987-1990 to 68.9% in 1997-2009.  
• The percentage of slightly polluted river water has increased steadily from 12%
in 1987-1990 to 20.7% in the period 2007-2009.
Table A12.1: Irish River Water Quality 1987 – 2009
Quality Unpolluted Slightly Moderately Seriously Total
polluted polluted polluted
1987-1990 77.3 12.0 9.7 0.9 100
1995-1997 66.9 18.2 14.0 0.9 100
2001-2003 69.3 17.9 12.3 0.6 100
2007-2009 68.9 20.7 10.0 0.4 100
Source: Environmental Protection Agency 2010, Water Quality 2007 - 2009
Waste
• The amount of municipal waste generated fell from 800 kilograms per capita in
2006 to 618kgs per capita in 2011.  Municipal waste sent to landfill was 1.344
million tonnes in 2011 , an improvement on the two million tonnes in 2007.
• By 2011, the recovery rate for packaging waste had reached 79%.
• Almost 20% of household waste is presented at civic amenity and bring centres.
• 91% of Ireland’s hazardous waste is exported to four European countries (UK,
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands).
Table A12.2 Ireland: Municipal waste, generated, recovered and landfilled
Year Waste generated Waste recovered Waste landfilled
(000 tonnes) (% of waste generated) (% of waste generated)
2003 3,001.0 24.2 61.1
2005 3,050.1 31.6 59.8
2007 3,397.7 34.1 59.3
2009 2,952.9 37.3 58.4
2011 2,832.2 42.6 47.6
Source: Environmental Protection Agency (2013), National Waste Report Series
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land use
• In 2010, 10.7% of Ireland’s land was covered by forestry. This was the second
lowest proportion of forest cover in the EU.  The EU average forest cover in 2010
was 35.5% of total land area.
• The area of forest owned privately in Ireland increased from 23% in 1980 to 46%
in 2010.
• Although the area farmed organically increased by over 150% between 1997 and
2009, Ireland had the third lowest percentage of agricultural land designated as
organic in the EU in 2009.
• Ireland had the fifth largest cattle herd in the EU in 2010 with 6.8% of total cattle
numbers.
biodiversity and Heritage
• Only 7% of Ireland’s habitats listed under the Habitat’s Directive are considered
to be in a favourable state.
• The social and economic benefits of Ireland’s biodiversity are worth at least €2.6
billion per annum.
• Ireland had the smallest percentage of land in the EU designated as a Special
Protected Area, under the EU Birds Directive, at only 3% of total land area in
2010.
• Ireland at 11% had less land designated as a Special Protected Area under the EU
Habitats Directive than the EU average of 14% in 2010.
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Annex 13
THE  GLOBAL  SOUTH
uN Millennium Development goals
The following are the UN Millennium Development Goals and the specific targets
attached to each of these goals:
goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income
is less than $1.25 a day.
Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer
from hunger.
goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be
able to complete a full course of primary schooling.
goal 3: promote gender equality and empower women 
Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education,
preferably by 2005 and in all levels of education no later than 2015.
goal 4: Reduce child mortality
Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality
rate.
goal 5: Improve maternal health
Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal
mortality ratio.
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goal 6: Combat HIv/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and
other major diseases.
goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country
policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental
resources.
Target 10: Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to
safe drinking water.
Target 11: Have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least
100 million slum dwellers.
goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development
Target 12: Develop further an open, rule based, predictable, nondiscriminatory
trading and financial system (includes a commitment to good
governance, development, and poverty reduction - both nationally
and internationally).
Target 13: Address the special needs of the least developed countries (includes
tariff and quota free access for exports, enhanced programme of debt
relief for and cancellation of official bilateral debt, and more generous
official development assistance for countries committed to poverty
reduction).
Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island
developing states (through the Programme of Action for the
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and 22nd
General Assembly provisions).
Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries
through national and international measures in order to make debt
sustainable in the long term
Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement
strategies for decent and productive work for youth.
Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to
affordable essential drugs in developing countries.
Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of
new technologies, especially information and communications
technologies.
(UNDP, 2003: 1-3)
296 Socio-Economic Review 2014
REFERENCES
References 
Advisory Group on Unfinished Housing Developments (2011) Resolving Irelands
Unfinished Housing Developments. Dublin: Department of Environment, Community
and Local Government.
All Ireland Traveller Health Study Team. (2010) All Ireland Traveller Health Study: Our Geels
Summary Of Findings. Dublin: University College Dublin.
An Comhairle Leabharlanna (2012) Public Library Authorities Budgeted Expenditure for
2012, Full Annual Estimates Report.  Dublin: Local Government Management Agency.
An Chomhairle Leabharlanna (2010) Public Library Authority Statistics Actuals. Dublin:
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government.
Ashe, J. (2014) Remarks by H. E. Mr. John W. Ashe President of the 68th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly. Available from
www.un.org/en/ga/president/68/pdf/statements/02182014TD_Water%20Sanitation
%20and%20Sustainable%20Energy_Opening_final.pdf (14 March 2014)
Bank for International Settlements (2013) Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange
and Derivatives Market Activity. Basel: BIS.
Barrett, A. and Wall C. (2005) The Distributional Impact of Ireland’s Indirect Tax System.
Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency.
Begg, D. (2003) “The Just Society - Can we afford it?” in Reynolds B. and S. Healy (eds.)
Ireland and the Future of Europe: leading the way towards inclusion?. Dublin: CORI.
Behan, J. (2014) Occupational Employment Projections 2020. Dublin: SOLAS.
Bennett M., D. Fadden,. D. Harney, P. O’Malley, C. Regan and Sloyan L. (2003) Population
Ageing in Ireland and its Impact on Pension and Healthcare Costs - Report of Society of
Actuaries Working Party on Population Studies. Dublin: Society of Actuaries in Ireland.
Bergin, A., J. Cullen, D. Duffy, J. Fitzgerald, I. Kearney and McCoy D. (2003) Medium-Term
Review: 2003-2010. Dublin: ESRI.
Blankenburg, S., L. King, S. Konzelmann and Wilkinson, F. (2013) ‘Prospects for the
eurozone’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37 (3) 463-477.
Bristow, J. (2004) Taxation in Ireland: an economist’s perspective. Dublin: Institute of Public
Administration.
Browne, D. Caulfield, B. & O’Mahony, M. (2011) Barriers to Sustainable Transport in
Ireland. Climate Change Research Programme (CCRP) 2007-2013 Report Series No.7
Dublin: EPA.
S O C I O - E C O N O M I C  R E V I E W  2 0 1 4
References 297
Browne, M. (2007) The Right Living Space, Housing and Accommodation Needs of People with
Disabilities. Dublin: Citizens Information Board/Disability Federation of Ireland 
Cahill, S., O’Shea, E., & Pierce, M. (2012) Creating Excellence in Dementia Care: A Research
Review for Ireland’s National Dementia Strategy. Dublin: Department of Health. 
Callan, T. (2013) Distributional impact of Budgets 2009 to 2013: An Update. Dublin: ESRI.
Callan, T., B. Nolan, C. Keane, M. Savage and Walsh, J. (2013) ‘Crisis, Response and
Distributional Impact:  The Case of Ireland’. Working Paper No. 456. Dublin: ESRI.
Carneiro, P and Heckman, J. (2003) ‘Human Capital Policy’. NBER Working Paper Series.
Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Carney, C and Maître, B. (2012). ‘Constructing a Food Poverty Indicator for Ireland using
the Survey on Income and Living Conditions’, Social Inclusion Technical Paper No. 3.
Dublin: Department of Social Protection.
Carrie, A. (2005) “Lack of long-run data prevents us tracking Ireland’s social health” in
Feasta Review No2 Growth: the Celtic Cancer. Dublin: Feasta.
Carswell, S. (2013) ‘Former IMF chief says Irish authorities were not helpless over EU
policy’, The Irish Times, December 13, 2013. Available from
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/former-imf-chief-says-irish-authorities-
were-not-helpless-over-eu-policy-1.1625918  (14 March 2014). 
Central Bank (2013) ‘Central Bank publishes outcome of Mortgage Arrears Resolution
Targets’, Press Release 29 November 2013. Available from
http://www.centralbank.ie/press-area/press-
releases/Pages/CentralBankpublishesoutcomeofMortgageArrears.aspx (14March
2014).
Central Bank (2013) Residential Mortgage Arrears and Repossessions Statistics: Q3 2013.
Dublin: Central Bank.
Central Bank (2012) Residential Mortgage Arrears and Repossessions Statistics: Q2 2012.
Dublin: Central Bank.
Centre for Ageing Research and Development in Ireland (2012) Future Demand for Long-
term Care in Ireland. Dublin: CARDI.
Central Statistics Office (2014) Quarterly National Household Survey Quarter 4 2013. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2014) Measuring Ireland’s Progress 2013. Dublin: Stationery Office
Central Statistics Office (2013) Measuring Ireland’s Progress 2012. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2013) Quarterly National Household Survey, Effects on Households of
the Economic Downturn Quarter 3 2012. Dublin: Stationery Office. 
Central Statistics Office (2013) Statistical Yearbook of Ireland 2013. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Central Statistics Office (2013) Sustainable Development Indicators Ireland 2013. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2013) Population and Migration Statistics. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
298 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Central Statistics Office (2013) Survey on Income and Living Conditions 2011 and revised 2010
results, Dublin, Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2013) Information Society Statistics. Available at
http://www.cso.ie/en/statistics/informationsociety/ (14 March 2014). 
Central Statistics Office (2012) Census 2011 Profile 6: Migration and Diversity. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2012) Environmental Indicators Ireland 2012. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2012) Measuring Ireland’s Progress 2011. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2012) Population and Migration Statistics. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Central Statistics Office (2012) Census 2011 Profile 2 – Older and Younger. Dublin,
Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2012) Census 2011 Profile 8: Our Bill of Health – Health, Disability
and Carers in Ireland. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2012) Statistical Yearbook of Ireland 2012. Dublin: Stationery
Office
Central Statistics Office (2012) Census 2011 Profile 4: A Roof Over Our Heads, Dublin,
Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2011) Quarterly National Household Survey Quarter 3 2010, Health
Status and Health Service Utilisation. Updated, June 2012. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2011) Quarterly National Household Survey Voter Participation
Quarter 2 2011. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2011) Population and Migration Estimates. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Central Statistics Office (2011) Measuring Irelands Progress 2010. Dublin: Stationary Office.
Central Statistics Office (2011) Quarterly National Household Survey, Educational Attainment
Thematic Report 2011. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2010) Mortality Differentials in Ireland. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2010) Statistical Yearbook of Ireland 2010. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Central Statistics Office (2010) National Disability Survey 2006 – Volume two. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2010) Quarterly National Household Survey: Special Module on
Carers Quarter 3 2009. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2010) Survey on Income and Living Conditions 2009 Results.
Dublin: Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (2008) National Disability Survey 2006 – First Results. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
References 299
Central Statistics Office (2006) Industrial Earnings and Hours Worked. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Central Statistics Office (2004) Industrial Earnings and Hours Worked. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Central Statistics Office (2004) Quarterly National Household Survey: Special Module on
Disability Quarter 1 2004. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (various) Quarterly National Household Survey. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Central Statistics Office (various) Survey on Income and Living Conditions Results. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Central Statistics Office (various) National Income and Expenditure Annual Results. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Chambers of Commerce of Ireland (2004) Local Authority Funding – Government in Denial,
Dublin: Chambers of Commerce Ireland.
Children’s Rights Alliance (2013) Report Card 2013.Dublin: CRA.
Clark C.M.A. (2002) The Basic Income Guarantee: ensuring progress and prosperity in the 21st
century. Dublin: Liffey Press and CORI Justice Commission.
Clark C.M.A. and Alford, H. (2010) Rich and Poor: Rebalancing the economy. London: CTS.
Coates, D., F. Kane, and Treadwell Shine, K. (2008) Traveller Accommodation in Ireland
Review of Policy and Practice (Housing Policy Discussion series 3). Dublin: Centre for
Housing Research.
Collins, M.L. (2013) ‘Income Distribution, Pre-Distribution and Re-Distribution: latest
data for the Republic of Ireland’ NERI Research inBrief no5, August 2013. Dublin: NERI.
Collins, M.L. (2013) ‘Income Taxes and Income Tax Options – a context for Budget 2014’
NERI Working Paper, 2013/05. Dublin: NERI. 
Collins M.L. (2011) “Taxation”. In O’Hagan, J. and C. Newman (eds.) The Economy of
Ireland (11th edition). Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.
Collins, M.L. (2011) Establishing a Benchmark for Ireland’s Social Welfare Payments. Paper for
Social Justice Ireland. Dublin: Social Justice Ireland.
Collins, M.L. (2006) “Poverty: Measurement, Trends and Future Directions”, in Healy, S.,
B. Reynolds and M.L. Collins, Social Policy in Ireland: Principles, Practice and Problems.
Dublin: Liffey Press.
Collins, M.L. (2004) “Taxation in Ireland: an overview” in B. Reynolds, and S. Healy (eds.)
A Fairer Tax System for a Fairer Ireland. Dublin: CORI Justice Commission.
Collins, M.L., B. Mac Mahon, G. Weld and Thornton, R. (2012) ‘A Minimum Income
Standard for Ireland – a consensual budget standards study examining household
types across the lifecycle – Studies’. Public Policy No. 27, Dublin: Policy Institute,
Trinity College Dublin.
Collins, M.L. and Larragy, A. (2011) ‘A Site Value Tax for Ireland: approach, design and
implementation’ Trinity Economics Papers Working Paper 1911. Dublin: Trinity College
Dublin.
300 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Collins, M.L. and Walsh, M. (2011) Tax Expenditures: Information and Revenue Forgone
– the experience of Ireland. Trinity Economic Papers Series, 2011/12.
Collins, M.L. and Walsh, M. (2010) Ireland’s Tax Expenditure System: International
Comparisons and a Reform Agenda – Studies in Public Policy No. 24. Dublin: Policy
Institute, Trinity College Dublin.
Collins, M.L. and Kavanagh, C. (2006) “The Changing Patterns of Income Distribution
and Inequality in Ireland, 1973-2004”, in Healy, S., B. Reynolds and M.L. Collins,
Social Policy in Ireland: Principles, Practice and Problems. Dublin: Liffey Press.
Collins, M.L. and Kavanagh, C. (1998) “For Richer, For Poorer: The Changing
Distribution of Household Income in Ireland, 1973-94”, in Healy, S. and B. Reynolds,
Social Policy in Ireland: Principles, Practice and Problems. Dublin: Oak Tree Press.
Comhar (2002) Principles for Sustainable Development. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Commission for Communications Regulation (2012) The provision of telephony services
under Universal Service Obligations. Available from
http://www.comreg.ie/publications/the_provision_of_telephony_services_under_un
iversal_service_obligations_-
_response_to_consultation__decision_and_decision_instrument.583.104149.p.html
(14 March 2014) 
Commission for Communications Regulation. (2011) Provision of Universal Service by
Eircom, Performance Data – Q3 2011 (1 July 2011 to 30 September 2011).  Available from
www.comreg.ie/_fileupload/publications/ComReg1315.pdf (14 March 2014).
Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland (2011) Misjudging Risk:
Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland Report of the Commission of Investigation
into the Banking Sector in Ireland, Dublin: Stationery Office.
Commission on Taxation (2009) Commission on Taxation Report 2009. Dublin: Stationery
Office. 
Commission on Taxation (1982) Commission on Taxation First Report. Dublin: Stationery
Office. 
Considine, M. and Dukelow, F. (2009) Irish Social Policy a Critical Introduction. Dublin: Gill
and Macmillan.
Costanza, R., Hart, M., Posner S. and Talberth, J. (2009) Beyond GDP: The Need for New
Measures of Progress. Boston University: The Pardee Papers.
Coughlan, O. (2007) ‘Irish Climate Change Policy from Kyoto to the Carbon Tax: a Two-
level Game Analysis of the Interplay of Knowledge and Power’. Irish Studies in
International Affairs, Vol. 18 (2007) 131–153.
Council of Europe (2011) Council of Europe’s charter of shared social responsibilities. Brussels:
Council of Europe.
Council of the European Union (2011) Council Resolution on a renewed European Agenda for
adult learning. 20 December 2011. (2011/C 372/01)
Curtin, J and Hanrahan, G (2012) Why Legislate? Designing a Climate Law for Ireland.
Dublin: The Institute of International and European Affairs.
References 301
Daft (2013) Daft.ie rental report 2013 Q3.  Available at http://www.daft.ie/report/ronan-
lyons-2013q3-rental (14 March 2014).
Dalal-Clayton, B. and Bass, S. (2002) Sustainable development strategies: a resource book.
OECD: Paris.
Daly, H.E and Cobb, J.B. (1987) For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward
Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future. Boston: Beacon Press.
De Grauwe, P. (1992) The Economics of Monetary Integration, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
De Grauwe, P. (1998) ‘The Euro and Financial Crises’, Financial Times, February 20.
Debt and Development Coalition Ireland (2014) Submission to the Review of Ireland’s
Foreign Policy and External Relations.  Available from
http://www.debtireland.org/news/2014/02/05/ddci-calls-for-financial-justice-to-be-
prioritised/ (14 March 2014).
Delaney, A. (2011) Árainn Mhór: A Case for Combining Social and Environmental
Sustainability in an Irish Island Community. Denmark: Aalborg University.
Delaney, A. (2012) Donegal Islands Survival Plan 2012-2015. Denmark: Aalborg University.
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine (2014) The Rural Development Programme
(RDP) 2014-2020 Consultation Paper. Dublin: Department of Agriculture, Food and
the Marine.
Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine (2012) Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth – An
Integrated Marine Plan for Ireland. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Agriculture and Food (1999) Ensuring the Future –A Strategy for Rural
Development in Ireland. Dublin: Stationery Office. 
Department of An Taoiseach (2012) National Reform Programme for Ireland 2012 Update.
Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of An Taoiseach (2002) Basic Income, A Green Paper. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Department of An Taoiseach (2001) Final Report of the Social Welfare Benchmarking and
Indexation Group. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Communication, Energy, Natural Resources (2013) Doing More with
Digital, National Digital Strategy for Ireland, Phase 1 Digital Engagement. Dublin:
Stationery Office. 
Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2012) Delivering a
Connected Society, A National Broadband Plan for Ireland. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Education and Skills (2014) General Scheme Technological Universities Bill.
Dublin: Department of Education and Skills.
Department of Education and Skills (2014) Review of Apprenticeship Training in Ireland.
Dublin: Department of Education and Skills.
Department of Education and Skills (2013) Memorandum: Irish Students’ Performance in
PISA 2012. Dublin: Department of Education and Skills.
302 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Department of Education and Skills (2013) Review of ALCES funded Adult Literacy Provision.
Dublin: Department of Education and Skills.
Department of Education and Sills (2012) Address by Minister for Education and Skills,
Ruairí Quinn TD, at Nordic Education Seminar. Dublin: Department of Education
and Skills.
Department of Education and Sills (2012) Speech by Minister for Education and Skills
Ruairi Quinn, TD at the launch of his Junior Cycle Framework.  Dublin: Department
of Education and Skills.
Department of Education and Skills (2012) A Framework for Junior Cycle. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Department of Education and Skills (2012) Press Release Minister Quinn protects frontline
services in Budget 2013. Dublin: Department of Education and Skills.
Department of Education and Skills (2012) Report to the Minister for Education and Skills on
the impact in terms of posts in Budget measures in relation to The Withdrawal form DEIS
Band 1 and Band 2 Urban Primary Schools of Posts from Disadvantage Schemes pre-dating
DEIS. Dublin: Department of Education.
Department of Education and Sills (2011) 2011-2031, Twenty Years of Radical Reform
Speech by Minister for Education and Skills Ruairi Quinn, TD at the MacGill Summer
School, Glenties, Co. Donegal. 
Department of Education and Skills (2011) An Evaluation of Planning Processes in DEIS Post-
Primary Schools. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Education and Skills (2011) An Evaluation of Planning Processes in DEIS
Primary Schools. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Education and Skills (2011) Comprehensive Review of Current Expenditure.
Dublin: Department of Education and Skills.
Department of Education and Skills (2011) Information Note regarding main features of 2012
Estimates for Education and Skills Vote. Available from
http://www.education.ie/en/Press-Events/Press-Releases/2012-Press-
Releases/PR2012-12-05.html  (14 March 2014).
Department of Education and Skills (2011) Literacy and Numeracy for Learning and Life, The
National Strategy to Improve Literacy and Numeracy among Children and Young People
2011 – 2020. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Education and Skills (2011) National Strategy for Higher Education to 2030.
Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Education and Skills (2009) Policy Options for New Student Contributions in
Higher Education: Report to Minister for Education and Science. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2014) Report of the
Working Group on Citizen Engagement with Local Government. Dublin: Department of
Environment, Community and Local Government.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2013) General Scheme
of a Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Bill 2013. Dublin: Stationery Office.
References 303
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2013) Homeless Policy
Statement Dublin: Department of Environment, Community and Local Government. 
Department of Environment Community and Local Government (2013) Opportunities for
All, The Public Library as a Catalyst for Economic, Social and Cultural Development- A
strategy for public libraries 2013-2017. Dublin: Department of Environment,
Community and Local Government.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2013) Latest Social
and Affordable Housing Statistics
http://www.environ.ie/en/Publications/StatisticsandRegularPublications/HousingSt
atistics/
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2013) Resolving
Unfinished Housing Developments, Annual progress report on actions to resolve unfinished
housing developments. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2013) Latest House
Building and Private rented Statistics. Available from
http://www.environ.ie/en/Publications/StatisticsandRegularPublications/HousingSt
atistics/ (14 March 2014).
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2012) Putting People
First: Action Programme for Effective Local Government. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2012) Final Report of the
Local Government/Local Development Alignment Steering Group. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2012) Our Sustainable
Future. A Framework for Sustainable Development for Ireland. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2012) Green Tenders –
An Action Plan for Green Public Procurement Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2012) National
Housing Strategy for People with Disability 2011-2016, National Implementation
Framework. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2012) Progress Report
on Actions to Resolve Unfinished Housing Developments. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2011) A Roadmap for
Climate Policy and Legislation. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2011) Review of
National Climate Policy. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2011) 2011 National
Housing Development Survey Summary Report. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2011) Housing Policy
Statement. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2011) Press release
announcing climate policy review. Available from
http://www.environ.ie/en/Environment/Atmosphere/ClimateChange/ClimatePolic
yReview2011/News/MainBody,28331,en.htm  (14 March 2014)
304 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (various) Annual
Report and Annual Output Statement. Dublin: Department of Environment,
Community and Local Government.
Department of Environment Heritage and Local Government (2009) Annual Housing
Statistics Bulletin 2008. Dublin: Department of Environment, Heritage and Local
Government. 
Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government (2008) Statement of
Strategy. Dublin: Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government. 
Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government (2008) Branching Out -
Future Directions. Dublin: Department of Environment, Heritage and Local
Government.
Department of Environment Heritage and Local Government (2008) The Way Home: A
Strategy to Address Adult Homelessness in Ireland 2008 – 2013. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government (1998) Branching Out - A
New Public Library Service. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Finance (2014) Revised Estimates for Public Services 2014. Available from
http://per.gov.ie/estpubexp2013/  (14 March 2014).
Department of Finance (2013) Budget 2014. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Finance (2013) Budget 2014: Medium Term Budgetary Framework. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Department of Finance (2013) April 2013 Stability Programme Update. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Department of Finance (2013) Ireland’s International Tax Strategy. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Department of Finance (2012) Medium-Term Fiscal Statement November 2012. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Department of Finance (2010) National Recovery Plan. Dublin: Stationery Office. 
Department of Finance (2010) Infrastructure Investment Priorities 2010-2016 A Financial
Framework. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Finance (various) Budget Documentation – various years. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Department of Health (2014) First Annual Progress Report - National Carers Strategy. Dublin:
Department of Health.
Department of Health (2013) Health in Ireland: Key Trends, 2013. Dublin: Department of
Health.
Department of Health (2013) Healthy Ireland: A Framework for Improved Health and
Wellbeing, 2013-2015. Dublin: Department of Health.
Department of Health (2013) Minister Reilly announces free GP care for children aged 5 and
under as part of Budget 2014 ; Progress made in achieving more for less but 2014 will be a
challenging year for the health services. Press Release, 15 October 2013. Available from
http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2013/20131015.html  (14 March 2014).
References 305
Department of Health (2012) Annual Output Statement, 2013 for Health Group of Votes 38-
39. Dublin: Department of Health.
Department of Health (2012) National Carers Strategy. Department of Health.
Department of Health and Children. (2000) National Children’s Strategy, Our Children their
Lives. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Justice and Equality (2014) Immigration in Ireland – 2013 in Review. Dublin:
Department of Justice and Equality.
Department of Justice and Equality (2013) Immigration in Ireland – 2012 in Review. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (2014) Focused Policy Assessment of the
Rural Social Scheme. Dublin: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform.
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (2011) Comprehensive Expenditure Report,
2012-14. Dublin: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform.
Department of Social Protection (2013) Mortgage Arrears Information and Advice Service:
Review of the Independent Financial Advice Service. Dublin: Department of Social
Protection.  
Department of Social Protection (2012) Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services
Report 2012.Dublin: Department of Social Protection. 
Department of Social Protection (2011) Annual Report 2011.Dublin: Department of Social
Protection.
Department of Social Protection (2011) Comprehensive Review of Expenditure. Dublin:
Department of Social Protection.
Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs (2000) Supporting Voluntary
Activity. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport (2014) Varadkar Announces €332M for
Regional and Local Roads, Press release 23 January. Available from
http://www.dttas.ie/press-releases/2014/varadkar-announces-%E2%82%AC332m-
regional-and-local-roads (14 March 2014).
Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport (2011) Statement of Strategy 2011-2014.
Dublin: Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport.
Department of Transport (2009) A Sustainable Transport Future A New Transport Policy for
Ireland 2009 – 2020. Dublin: Department of Transport.
Donnellan, T., Hanrahan, K., Hennessey, T., Kinsella, A., McKeon, M., Moran, B. and
Thorne, F. (2013) Outlook 2014: Economic Prospects for Agriculture. Galway: Teagasc.
Dorgan, J. ( 2009) Adult Literacy Policy: A Review for the National Adult Literacy Agency.
Dublin: National Adult Literacy Agency.
Dorgan, J.. (2009) A Cost Benefit Analysis of Adult Literacy Training: Research Report, March
2009. Dublin: National Adult Literacy Agency.
Drudy, P.J. (2006) “Housing in Ireland, Philosophy Problems and Policies”, in Healy, S.
Reynolds, B. and Collins, M. (eds) Social Policy in Ireland: Principles, Practice, and
Problems. Liffey Press: Dublin.
306 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Duffy, D., J. FitzGerald, K. Timoney and Byrne, D. (2013) Quarterly Economic Commentary
Winter 2013. Dublin: ESRI.
Dunne, T. (2004) “Land Values as a Source of Local Government Finance” in B. Reynolds,
and S. Healy (eds.) A Fairer Tax System for a Fairer Ireland. Dublin: CORI Justice
Commission.
Economic and Social Research Institute (2003) National Development Plan Mid-Term
Review. Dublin: ESRI.
Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) European Green City Index Assessing the Environmental
Impact of Europe’s major Cities. Munich: Siemens. 
Economy for the Common Good (2013) The Economic for the Common Good – An Economic
Model for the Future. Gemeinwohl Oekonomie.  Available from
http://www.gemeinwohl-oekonomie.org/en/content/downloads (14 February, 2014)
ECORYS (2010) Study on Employment, Growth and Innovation in Rural Areas. Rotterdam:
ECORYS.
EEAC (2011) The “Green Economy” Agenda in the context of SD Institutional framework for SD
at National Level. Brussels: EEAC.
Eivers, E. and Clerkin, A. (2012) PIRLS and TIMSS 2011: Reading, Mathematics and Science
Outcomes for Ireland. Dublin: Education Research Centre.
Eivers, E. and Clerkin, A. (Ed.) (2013) National Schools, International Contexts: Beyond the
PIRLS and TIMSS test results. Dublin: Education Research Centre.
Ellmers, B. and Hulova, D. (2013) The New Debt Vulnerabilities, Why the Debt Crisis is Not
Over. Eurodad: Brussels.
Engineers Ireland (2012) The State of Ireland 2012: A review of infrastructure in Ireland.
Dublin: Enterprise Ireland.
Enterprise Ireland (2013) Annual Report and Accounts 2012. Dublin: Enterprise Ireland.
Environmental Protection Agency (2013) EPA Releases figures for key air pollutants. Press
release 26 February. Available from
http://www.epa.ie/newsandevents/news/previous/2013/february/name,51293,en.ht
ml#.UyMV7IUw2E4 (14 March 2014).
Environmental Protection Agency (2013) Governance and Climate Change: Making the
Transition to an Adapted Ireland. Wexford: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2013) Ireland’s Greenhouse Gas Emission Projections
2012-2030. Dublin: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2013) SIMBIOSYS: Sectoral Impacts on Biodiversity and
Ecosystems Services. Dublin: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2013) Winners and Losers: Climate Change Impacts on
biodiversity in Ireland. Wexford: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2012) The EU Emissions Trading Scheme. A review of the
first six years of operation. Dublin: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2012) A Year in Review – Highlights from 2011. Dublin:
EPA.
References 307
Environmental Protection Agency (2012) A Focus on Urban Waste Water Discharges in
Ireland. Dublin: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2012) Ireland’s Climate Strategy to 2020 and beyond - A
contribution to the Programme for Development of National Climate Policy and Legislation
2012.  Dublin: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2012) Ireland’s Environment 2012 – An Assessment.
Dublin: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2012) Ireland’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 2011 – Key
Highlights. Dublin: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2012) Ireland’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Projections
2011-2020. Dublin: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2012) National Waste Report 2010. Dublin: EPA. 
Environmental Protection Agency (2012) Biodiversity Action Plan 2011-2013. Dublin: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2011) Biochange: Biodiversity and Environmental
Change: An Integrated Study Encompassing a Range of Scales, Taxa and Habitats. Wexford:
EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2010) Environmental Protection Agency Biodiversity
Action Plan. Dublin: EPA.
Environmental Protection Agency (2010) Water Quality in Ireland 2007-200. Dublin: EPA.
ESRI (various) Quarterly Economic Commentary (QEC). Dublin: ESRI.
Eurostat (2012) Population and Social Conditions, Asylum applicants and first instance
decisions on asylum applications: third quarter 2012. Brussels: Eurostat.
Eurofound (2012) Third European Quality of Life Survey – Quality of Life in Europe: Impacts of
the crisis. Publications Office of the European Union: Luxembourg.
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (2009) Future skill supply in
Europe: Medium-term forecast up to 2020 – synthesis report. Luxembourg: European
Centre for the Development of Vocational Training.
European Commission (2014) Social Europe: Many ways, one objective – Annual Report of the
Social Protection Committee on the social situation in the European Union. Luxembourg:
Publications Office of the European Union.
European Commission (2014) A Policy Framework for Climate and Energy in the period 2020-
2030. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2013) A Decent Life for All: Ending Poverty and Giving the World a
Sustainable Future. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2013) Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2013-1. SWD (2013) 217 Final.
Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2013) ‘Vade mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact’,
Occasional Papers, European Economy, 151. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2013) Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland Autumn
2013 Review, European Economy, Occasional Papers, 167. Brussels: European
Commission.
308 Socio-Economic Review 2014
European Commission (2013) Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced
cooperation in the area of FTT. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2012) A View of Employment, Growth and Innovation in Rural Areas.
SWD 2012/44. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2012) The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural resources
and territorial challenges of the future. COM(2010) 672. Brussels: European
Commission.
European Commission (2012) Current account surpluses in the EU: European Economy 9.
Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2012) The 2012 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections
for the EU27 Member States (2010-2060). Brussels, European Commission.
European Commission (2011) A resource-efficient Europe – Flagship initiative under the
Europe 2020 Strategy. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2011) Early Childhood Education and Care: Providing all our children
with the best start for the world of tomorrow. Brussels: European Commission. 
European Commission (2011) Our life insurance, our natural capital: an EU biodiversity
strategy to 2020. Brussels: European Commission. 
European Commission (2011) Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe. COM(2011) 571.
Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2011) Strategic framework for European cooperation in education and
training (ET 2020). Brussels: Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2011) The Social Dimension of the Europe 2020 Strategy A report of
the Social Protection Committee. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European
Union.
European Commission (2011)  Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White
Paper - Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area –Towards a competitive and resource
efficient transport system. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2010) Digital Agenda for Europe, Digital Scorecard. Brussels:
European Commission.
European Commission (2010) Eurobarometer 74 Autumn 2010 Report. Brussels: European
Commission.
European Commission (2010) Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2008) Staff working document - Digital Literacy Report: a review for
the i2010 eInclusion Initiative Digital Literacy: High-Level Expert Group Recommendations.
Brussels: European Commission.
European Network for Rural Development (2010) Climate Change and Renewable Energy
measures in EU RDPs 2007-2013 Member State profile - Ireland. Available from
http://enrd.ec.europa.eu/themes/environment/climate-change/en/climate-
change_en.cfm  (14 March 2014). 
Eurostat (2013) Taxation Trends in the European Union. Luxembourg: Eurostat.
References 309
Eurostat (2013) Internet access and use in 2013 More than 60% of individuals in the EU28 use
the internet daily, News release 18 December. Available from
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-13-199_en.htm (14 March 2014).
Eurostat (2012) ‘In 2010, 17% of employees in the EU were low-wage earners’ Statistics in
Focus 48/2012 Population and Social Conditions. Luxembourg: Eurostat.
Eurostat (2008) Satellite accounts sharpen the focus.  Sigma – The bulletin of European
Statistics, 2008.03. Luxembourg: Eurostat.
Eurostat (2008) Taxation Trends in the European Union. Luxembourg: Eurostat.
Eurydice Network (2012) Key Data on Education in Europe 2012. Brussels: European
Commission.
Expert Group on Future Skills Needs (2007) Tomorrow’s Skills: Towards a National Skills
Strategy. 5th Report. Dublin: Expert Group on Future Skills Needs.
Expert Group on Future Skills Needs (2012) Addressing High Level ICT Skills Recruitment
Needs Research Findings. Dublin: Expert Group on Future Skills Needs.
Farrell, C., H. McAvoy, J. Wilde and Combat Poverty Agency (2008) Tackling Health
Inequalities an All-Ireland Approach to Social Determinants, Combat Poverty
Agency/Institute of Public Health: Dublin.
Financial Inclusion Working Group (2013) Report of the Financial Inclusion Working Group
on the Standard Bank Account pilot project June 2013 (Updated November 2013).Dublin:
Department of Finance. 
Flannery, D. and O’Donoghue, C. (2011) ‘The Life Cycle Impact of Alternative Higher
Education Finance Systems in Ireland’. The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 42, No.3.
(Autumn, 2011):pp.237-270 Dublin: UCD.
Forfas and National Competitiveness Council (2012) Ireland’s Competitiveness Scorecard
2012. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Forfás and National Competitiveness Council (2011) Ireland’s Competitiveness Challenge
2011. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Forfás (2013) Annual Employment Survey 2012. Dublin: Forfás.
Forfas (2011) Ireland’s Advanced Broadband Performance and Policy Priorities. Dublin: Forfás.
Friedman, M. (1951) ‘Neo-Liberalism and its Prospects’, Farmland, February 17, pp. 89-93.
Fuentes-Nieva, R. and Galasso, N. (2014) Working for the Few. Oxfam International:
Oxford.
Glynn, I., Kelly, T., and Mac Éinrí, P.  (2013) Irish Emigration in an Age of Austerity. Cork:
Emgire.
Godley, W. (1992) ‘Maastricht and all that’, London Review of Books, Vol. 14, No. 19.
Goldberg, F.T., L.L. Batchelder and P.R. Orszag (2006) Reforming Tax Incentives into
Uniform Refundable Tax Credits. Washington: Brookings.
Government of Ireland (2013) A Strategy for Growth: Medium Term Economic Strategy, 2014-
2020. Stationary Office: Dublin.
Government of Ireland (2013) Stability Programme Update. Dublin: Stationery Office.
310 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Government of Ireland (2012) Programme for Government and National Recovery 2011-2016.
Dublin: Stationery Office.
Government of Ireland (2012) Ireland’s National Reform Programme 2012 – Update.
Dublin: Stationery Office.
Government of Ireland (2011) Towards Recovery: Programme for a National Government
2011-2016. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Government of Ireland (2007) National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 2007-2016. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Government of Ireland (2007) National Climate Change Strategy. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Government of Ireland (various) Action Plan for Jobs. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Government of Ireland (various) Jobs Initiative. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Government of Ireland (various) Pathways to Work. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Growing Up in Ireland (2013) Growing Up in Ireland - Key Findings: Infant Cohort (at 5 years)
No. 3 Well-being, play and diet among five-year-olds. Dublin: ESRI/TCD.
Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (2004) Why Deliberative Democracy?. Princeton
University Press: Princeton.
H.M. Treasury (2004) Financial Statement and Budget Report, 2004. London: H.M. Treasury.
Hämäläinen, T. (2013) Towards a Sustainable Well-being Society version 1.0. Helsinki: Sitra.
Health Insurance Authority (2013) Newsletter: December 2013 Edition. Available from
www.hia.ie/assets/files/publications/Press_Releases/Dec_Newsletter_final_2013.pdf
(14 March 2014).
Health Service Executive (2014) Mental Health Divisional Operational Plan. Dublin: HSE.
Health Service Executive (2013) National Performance Assurance Report. Dublin: HSE.
Health Service Executive (2013) National Service Plan, 2014. Dublin: HSE.
Health Service Executive (2012) December 2012, Performance Report, National Service Plan,
2012. Dublin: HSE.
Health Service Executive (2012) December 2012 Supplementary Report, National Service Plan,
2012. Dublin: HSE.
Health Service Executive (2011) December 2011 Performance Report on NSP, 2011. Dublin:
HSE.
Health Service Executive (2010) Annual Report and Financial Statement, 2010. Dublin: HSE.
Health Service Executive (2010) Performance Report on NSP, 2010. Dublin: HSE.
Health Service Executive (2009) Performance Report on NSP 2009. Dublin: HSE.
Health Service Executive (2008) Performance Monitoring Report, National Service Plan 2008.
Dublin: HSE.
Healy, S. and Reynolds, B. (2011) ‘Sharing Responsibility and Shaping the Future: Why
and How?’ in Healy. S. and Reynolds, B. eds. Sharing Responsibility and Shaping the
Future. Dublin: Social Justice Ireland.
References 311
Healy, S and Reynolds, B. (2003) “Christian Critique of Economic Policy and Practice” in
Mackey, J.P. Mackey and McDonagh, E. eds. Religion and Politics in Ireland at the turn of
the millennium. Dublin: Columba Press.
Healy, S. and Collins, M.L. (2006) “Work, Employment and Unemployment”, in Healy,
S., B. Reynolds and M.L. Collins eds. Social Policy in Ireland: Principles, Practice and
Problems. Dublin: Liffey Press.
Healy, S., M. Murphy, S. Ward and Reynolds, B. (2012) ‘Basic Income – Why and How in
Difficult Economic Times: Financing a BI in Ireland’ Paper to the BIEN Congress 2012,
Munich.
Healy, S. and Reynolds, B. (Eds.). (2009) Beyond GDP: What is prosperity and how should it
be measured?. Dublin: Social Justice Ireland.
Healy, T. (2013) Banks, Governments & Citizens. NERI inBrief Research.
Hennessy, T., Buckley, C., Dillon, E., Donnellan, T., Hanrahan, K., Moran, B., and Ryan,
M. (2013) Measuring Farm Level Sustainability with the Teagasc National Farm Survey.
Galway: Teagasc.
Higgins, M. D. (2013) ‘Toward an ethical economy’, Public Lecture 11th September.
Available from http://www.president.ie/uncategorized/ethics-for-all-public-lecture-
series-toward-an-ethical-economy/ (14 March 2014).
Higher Education Authority (2013) Completing the Landscape Process for Irish Higher
Education. Dublin: HEA. 
Higher Education Authority (2013) What Do Graduates Do? The Class of 2012. Dublin:
HEA. 
Higher Education Authority (2012) 10/11 Higher Education Key Facts and Figures. Dublin:
HEA.
Higher Education Authority (2012) Springboard 2011 First Stage Evaluation. Dublin:
HEA.
Higher Education Authority (2012) Towards a Future Higher Education Landscape. Dublin:
HEA.
Higher Education Authority (2011) Report on the Social and Living Conditions of Higher
Education Students in Ireland 2009/2010. Dublin: HEA.
Higher Education Authority (2010) A Study of Progression in Irish Higher Education. Dublin:
HEA.
Higher Education Authority (2010) National Plan for Equity of Access to Higher Education
2008-2013 Mid-Term Review. Dublin: HEA.
Higher Education Authority (2010) Review of Student Charge. Dublin: HEA.
Hoegen, M (2009) Statistics and the quality of life. Measuring progress – a world beyond
GDP. Bonn: InWent.
Homelessness Oversight Group (2013) Homelessness Oversight Group 1st Report 2013.
Dublin: Department of Environment, Community and Local Government.
Honohan, P. (2010) The Irish Banking Crisis: Regulatory and Banking Stability, 2003-2008.
Dublin: Stationery Office.
312 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Housing Agency (2013) Review of Housing Grants for Older People and People with a
Disability. Dublin: Housing Agency.
Housing Agency (2013) Summary of Social Housing Assessments 2013 Key Findings. Dublin:
Housing Agency.
Housing Agency (2011) Housing Needs Assessment 2011. Dublin: Housing Agency. 
Houston, M. (2013) ‘Cuts Post Additional Threats to Safe Patient Care’. Irish Times. 19
December 2013. Available from http://www.irishtimes.com/news/health/cuts-pose-
additional-threat-to-delivery-of-safe-patient-care-1.1632329 (14 March 2014).
Human Development Report (2013) The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse
World. New York: UN Development Programme.
Hyland, A. (2011) Entry to Higher Education in Ireland in the 21st Century. (Discussion Paper
for the NCCA/HEA Seminar 2011) Dublin: HEA.
Irish Council for Social Housing (2013) Social Housing Newsletter of the Irish Council for
Social Housing Winter 2013. Dublin: Irish Council for Social Housing.
Irish Council for Social Housing (2013) Scale of waiting list figures show increased supply of
new social housing essential to avoid supply crisis- Housing Federation Warns. Press release
18 December. Available from http://www.icsh.ie/content/icsh-news/scale-waiting-
list-figures-show-increased-supply-new-social-housing-essential (14 March 2014).
Irish Council for Social Housing (2013) Press Release-Non Profit housing associations could
help find homes for 5,000 families. Press release 20 November. Available from
http://www.icsh.ie/content/icsh-news/press-release-non-profit-housing-
associations-could-help-find-homes-5000-families  (14 March 2014).
IDA Ireland (2013) IDA Ireland Annual Report and Accounts 2012. Dublin: IDA Ireland. 
IMD (2007) IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. Lausanne: IMD.
Indecon (2005) Indecon Review of Local Government Funding – Report commissioned by the
Minister for Environment, Heritage and Local Government. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Indecon (2010) Assessment of Economic Impact of Sports in Ireland. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Institute for Public Health (2007) Fuel Poverty and Health. Dublin: IPH.
Inter-Departmental Mortgage Arrears Working Group (2011) Report of the Inter-
Departmental Mortgage Arrears Working Group. Dublin: Department of Finance.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2013) Climate Change 2013: The Physical
Science Basis. Switzerland: IPCC.
International Energy Agency (2011) World Energy Outlook 2011. Paris: International
Energy Agency.
International Monetary Fund (2013) Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under
the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
International Monetary Fund (2013) Ireland: Twelfth Review under the Extended
Arrangement and Proposal for Post-Program Monitoring. Washington DC: International
Monetary Fund.
References 313
International Monetary Fund (2012) Ireland: Eighth Review Under the Extended
Arrangement; Staff Report; Staff Supplements; and Press Release on the Executive Board
discussion. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
International Monetary Fund (2010) Ireland: Request for an Extended Arrangement—Staff
Report; Staff Supplement; Staff Statement; and Press Release on the Executive Board
Discussion. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
International Monetary Fund (2008) World Economic Outlook. Washington DC: IMF.
International Monetary Fund (2004) World Economic Outlook. Washington DC: IMF.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2013) One World, One Future: Ireland’s Policy for
International Development. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Irish Aid (2012) Annual Report 2012. Dublin: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (2012) Fiscal Assessment Report September 2012. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Irish Sports Council (2013) Irish Sports Monitor 2013 Interim results from first six months of
data collection. Available from
http://www.irishsportscouncil.ie/Research/The_Irish_Sports_Monitor/Irish-Sports-
Monitor-2013.pdf (14 March 2014).
Irish Sports Council (2009) Building Sport for Life: The Next Phase The Irish Sports Council’s
Strategy 2009-2011. Dublin: Irish Sports Council.
Irish Sports Council (2011) Irish Sports Monitor 2011 Annual Report.Dublin: Irish Sports
Council.
Joint Oireachtas Committee on Arts, Sport, Tourism, Community, Rural and Gaeltacht
Affairs (2005) Volunteers and Volunteering in Ireland. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Joyce, C. and Quinn, E. (2014) The Organisation of Facilities for Asylum Seekers in Ireland.
Dublin: European Migration Network/ESRI.
Kelly, E., S. McGuinness and O’Connell, P. (2012) ‘Literacy and Numeracy Difficulties in
the Irish Workplace: Impact on Earnings and Training Expenditure’. Research Series
Number 27, September 2012. Dublin: ESRI.
Kelly, E., S. McGuinness and O’Connell, P. (2012) ‘Literacy, Numeracy and Activation
among the Unemployed’. Research Series Number 25, June 2012. Dublin: ESRI.
Kelly, R. and McQuinn, K. (2013) ‘On the hook for impaired bank lending: Do
sovereign-bank inter-linkages affect the fiscal multiplier?’, Research Technical Paper,
1/RT/13.
Kitchen, R. Gleeson, J. Keaveney, K. & O’ Callaghan, C. (2010) A Haunted Landscape:
Housing and Ghost Estates in Post Celtic Tiger Ireland Working Paper Series no. 59.
National Institute for Regional and Spatial Analysis: NUI Maynooth.  
Krugman, P (1994) Peddling Prosperity. London: W.W Norton & Company.
Larragy, A. (2013). ‘A Universal Pension for Ireland’, Social Justice Ireland Policy Research
Series, September 2013. Dublin: Social Justice Ireland.
Leahy, A., M. Murphy, S. Mallon and Healy, S. (2012) Ireland and the Europe 2020
Strategy – Employment, Education and Poverty. Dublin: Social Justice Ireland.
314 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Leahy, E., S. Lyons and Tol, R. (2010) ‘The Distributional Effects of Value Added Tax in
Ireland’ ESRI Working Paper 366. Dublin: ESRI.
Legal Aid Board (various) Annual Reports. Dublin: Legal Aid Board. 
Local Government Management Agency (2011) Public Library Authority Statistics: Actuals
2011. Dublin: Department of Environment, Community and Local Government.
Lucas, K., Grosvenor, T. and Simpson, R. (2001) Transport, the Environment and Social
exclusion. Joseph Rowntree Foundation: York.
Lunn, P. and Layte, R. (2009) The Irish Sports Monitor Third Annual Report. Dublin: Irish
Sports Council. 
MacDonald, L. (2012) A New Chapter Public Library Services in the 21st Century.
Dunfermline: Carnegie UK Trust.
Martin, M.O., I.V.S. Mullis, P. Foy, P., and Stanco, G.M. (2012) TIMSS 2011
International Results in Science. Chestnut Hill, MA: TIMSS & PIRLS International Study
Center, Boston College.
McDaid, S. and Cullen, K. (2008) ICT accessibility and social inclusion of people with
disabilities and older people in Ireland: The economic and business dimensions. Dublin:
NCBI.
McCoy, S, Byrne, D, O’Connell, P, Kelly, E and Doherty, C. (2010) Hidden Disadvantage? A
Study on the Low Participation in Higher Education by the Non-Manual Group. Dublin:
HEA. McDonagh, J., Varley,T., and Shortall, S. (Eds.). (2009) A living countryside?: the
politics of sustainable development in rural Ireland. Ashgate: England.
McGee, Harry (2012) ‘IFSC lobby group powerful in shaping policy’, The Irish Times,
October 8, 2012.
McGinnity, F. and Russell, H. (2008) Gender Inequalities in Time. Dublin: ESRI.
McGrath, B., Rogers, M. and Gilligan, R. (2010) Young People and Public libraries in Ireland:
Issues and Opportunities. Department of Health and Children: Dublin.
McGuinness, S., A. Bergin, E. Kelly, S. McCoy, E. Smyth and Timoney, K. (2012) ‘A Study
of Future Demand for Higher Education in Ireland’. Research Series Number 30,
December 2012. Dublin: ESRI.
Mental Health Commission (2009) From Vision to Action? An Analysis of the
Implementation of A Vision for Change. Dublin: Mental Health Commission.
Meredith, D. and Van Egeraat, C. (2013) ‘Revisiting the National Spatial Strategy ten years
on’, IPA Administration Journal, 60 (3) pp. 3-9. Dublin: IPA.
Morrone, A. (2009) “The OECD Global Project on Measuring Progress and the challenge
of assessing and measuring trust” in Reynolds, B. and Healy S. (eds.) Beyond GDP:
what is progress and how should it be measured. Dublin: Social Justice Ireland.
Mullis, I.V.S., M.O. Martin, P. Foy, and Arora, A. (2012) TIMSS 2011 International Results in
Mathematics. Chestnut Hill, MA: TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center, Boston
College. Mullis, I.V.S., M.O. Martin, P. Foy, and Drucker, K.T. (2012) PIRLS 2011
International Results in Reading. Chestnut Hill, MA: TIMSS & PIRLS International
Study Center, Boston College. National Anti-Poverty Strategy Review (2002) Building
an Inclusive Society. Dublin: Stationery Office.
References 315
National Anti-Poverty Strategy (1997) Sharing in Progress. Dublin: Stationery Office.
National Competitiveness Council (2012) Irelands Competitiveness Scorecard 2012. Dublin:
NCC. 
National Disability Authority (2006) Indecon Report on the Cost of a Disability. Dublin:
NDA.
National Economic and Social Council (2012) Ireland and the Climate Change Challenge:
Connecting ‘How Much’ with ‘How To’.  Final Report of the NESC Secretariat to the
Department of Environment, Community and Local Government. Dublin: NESC.
National Economic and Social Forum (2006) Improving the Delivery of Quality Public
Services. Dublin: Stationery Office.
National Office for Suicide Prevention (2013) Annual Report, 2012. Dublin: HSE.
National Office for Suicide Prevention (2011) Annual Report 2010. Dublin: HSE.
National Suicide Research Foundation (2013) Statistics: Suicides in Republic of Ireland,
2001-2011. Available from http://nsrf.ie/suicides-in-republic-of-ireland-from-2001-
2011/ (29 January 2014).
National Transport Authority (2013) Consideration of applications to increase monthly and
annual fares from Dublin Bus, Bus Éireann and Iarnród Éireann for 2014. Dublin: NTA.
National Transport Authority (2013) Strengthening the Connections in Rural Ireland: Plans for
Restructuring the Rural Transport Programme. Dublin: NTA.
NERI (2013) Quarterly Economic Facts – Winter 2013. Dublin: NERI.
Niestroy, I. (2005) Sustaining Sustainability. Brussels: EEAC
Nolan, B. (2006) “The EU’s Social Inclusion Indicators and Their Implications for
Ireland”, in Healy, S., B. Reynolds and M.L. Collins eds., Social Policy in Ireland:
Principles, Practice and Problems. Dublin: Liffey Press.
O’Hara, P. (2013) ‘What Future for the Regions?’.  In: Healy, S. and Reynolds, B. eds. A
Future worth Living For: Sustainable Foundations and Frameworks. Dublin: Social Justice
Ireland.
O’Siochru, E. (2004) “Land Value Tax: unfinished business” in B. Reynolds, and S. Healy
eds. A Fairer Tax System for a Fairer Ireland. Dublin: CORI Justice Commission.
O’Siochru, E. (Ed.). (2012) The Fair Tax. Dublin: Smart Taxes Network.
O’Sullivan, E. (2008) Researching Homelessness in Ireland Explanations, Themes and
Approaches in, Downey, D. (eds) Perspectives on Irish Homelessness, Past Present and
Future. Dublin: The Homeless Agency.
O’Toole, F. and N. Cahill (2006) “Taxation Policy and Reform”, in Healy, S., B. Reynolds
and M.L. Collins eds., Social Policy in Ireland: Principles, Practice and Problems. Dublin:
Liffey Press.
O’Brien, D. (2013) ‘Ireland ill-served as President becomes increasingly partisan and
political’, The Irish Times, 20th September 2013. Available from
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland/ireland-ill-served-as-
president-becomes-increasingly-partisan-and-political-1.1533632 (14 March 2014).
316 Socio-Economic Review 2014
OECD (2013) Education at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD (2013) Health at a Glance, 2013. OECD Indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD (2013) Health Statistics 2013, online database Available from
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en  (accessed 9 February 2014).
OECD (2013) OECD Health Data, 2013. How Does Ireland Compare? Paris: OECD
Publishing.
OECD (2013) OECD Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the Survey of Adult Skills. Paris:
OECD Publishing
OECD (2013) PISA 2012 Results: Ireland. Paris: OECD Publishing
OECD (2013) Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). Paris: OECD.
OECD (2013) Revenue Statistics. Paris: OECD.
OECD (2012) Equity and Quality in Education: Supporting Disadvantaged Students and Schools
Spotlight on Ireland. Paris: OECD.
OECD (2012) Health at a Glance, Europe 2012. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD (2011) How’s Life? Measuring well-being. Paris: OECD Publishing
OECD (2011) OECD Factbook 2011: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. Paris: OECD.
OECD (2008) Economic Survey of Ireland. Paris: OECD.
OECD (2006) The new rural paradigm - policies and governance. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2004) OECD Factbook. Paris: OECD.
OECD (2000) Literacy in the Information Age: Final Report of the International Adult Literacy
Survey. Paris: OECD.
Office of Minister for Children and Youth Affairs (2010) State of the Nation’s Children
Ireland 2010. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Office of Social Inclusion (2008) Guidelines for Poverty Impact Assessment, March 2008.
Dublin: Department of Social Protection.
Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (2013) Statistical Report December 2013.
Dublin: Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner.
Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (2012) Statistical Report December 2012.
Dublin: Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2013) Global Trends 2012.
New York: United Nations.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2013) Statistical Yearbook
2012, 12th Edition. New York: United Nations. 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2012) Global Trends 2011.
New York: United Nations.
Oxfam (2013) Media Brief 07 : Inequality massively undermining progress on poverty goals.
London: Oxfam. 
Pavee Point (2011) Irish Travellers and Roma, Shadow Report, A response to Ireland’s Third and
Fourth Report on the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD).  Dublin: Pavee Point Travellers Centre.
References 317
Perkins, R., G. Sheil, B. Merriman, J. Cosgrave and Moran, G. (2013) Learning for Life: The
Achievements of 15 year olds in Ireland on Mathematics, Reading Literacy and Science in
PISA 2012. Dublin: Educational Research Centre.
Pfizer (2012) The 2012 Pfizer Health Index. Pfizer Healthcare Ireland.
Pickett, K and Wilkinson, R. (2009) The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies
Stronger, London: Bloomsbery Press.
Pope Francis (2013) Evangelii Gaudium, Exhortation on the Joy of the Gospel. Vatican City:
Rome.
Pope John Paul II. (1981) Laborum Exercens, Encyclical Letter on Human Work. Catholic
Truth Society: London.
Pope Paul VI. (1967) Populorum Progressio. Vatican City: Rome.
Private Residential Tenancy Board (2012) Annual Report and Accounts 2012. Dublin: PRTB.
Private Residential Tenancy Board (2010) Annual Report and Accounts 2010. Dublin: PRTB.
Public Health Alliance for the Island of Ireland (2007) Health inequalities on the Island of
Ireland – the facts, the causes, the remedies. Dublin: PHAI.
Public Health Alliance for the Island of Ireland (2004) Health in Ireland – an Unequal State.
Dublin: PHAI.
Rapple, C. (2004) “Refundable Tax Credits” in B. Reynolds, and S. Healy eds. A Fairer Tax
System for a Fairer Ireland. Dublin: CORI Justice Commission.
Reception and Integration Agency (2012) Monthly Statistics Report November 2012. Dublin:
Reception and Integration Agency.
Reception and Integration Agency (2013) Monthly Statistics Report December 2013.Dublin:
Reception and Integration Agency.
Regling, K. and Watson, M. (2010) A Preliminary Report into the Sources of Ireland’s Banking
Crisis. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Repetto, R., W. Magrath, M. Wells, C. Beer and Rossini, F. (1989) Wasting Assets, Natural
Resources in the National Income Accounts. Washington: World Resources Institute.
Revenue Commissioners (2012) Statistical Report 2011. Dublin: Stationery Office.
Revenue Commissioners (various) Analysis of High Income Individuals’ Restriction. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Revenue Commissioners (various) Effective Tax Rates for High Earning Individuals. Dublin:
Stationery Office.
Robertson, J. (2007) The New Economics of Sustainable Development report to the European
Commission. Brussels: European Commission.
Russell, H. Maitre, B. and Donnelly, N. (2011) Financial Exclusion and Over-indebtedness in
Irish Households. Dublin: Department of Community, Equality and Gaeltacht Affairs.
Safefood (2011) Food on a Low Income. Safefood.
Schwab, K. (Ed.). (2013) Global Competitiveness Report 2013-14. Geneva: World Economic
Forum.
318 Socio-Economic Review 2014
Schwab, K. (Ed.). (2011) Global Competitiveness Report 2011-12. Geneva: World Economic
Forum.
Schwab, K.  and Porter, M. (Eds.). (2008) Global Competitiveness Report 2008-09. Geneva:
World Economic Forum.
Schwab, K.  and Porter, M. (Eds.). (2003) Global Competitiveness Report 2003-04. Geneva:
World Economic Forum.
Scott S. and Eakins, J. (2002) Distributive effects of carbon taxes, paper presented to ESRI
conference entitled “The sky’s the limit: efficient and fair policies on global
warming” December: Dublin.
Shucksmith, M. (2012) Future Directions in Rural Development? Dunfermline: Carnegie UK
Trust.
Simonazii, A., Ginzburg, A., and Nocella, G. (2013) ‘Economic Relations between
Germany and southern Europe’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 37 (3) pp653-675.
Social Justice Ireland (2010) Building a Fairer Taxation System: The Working Poor and the Cost
of Refundable Tax Credits. Dublin: Social Justice Ireland.
Social Justice Ireland (2013) ‘What Would Real Recovery Look Like’, Socio-Economic Review,
2013. Dublin: Social Justice Ireland.
Social Justice Ireland (2013) Analysis and Critique of Budget 2014. Dublin: Social Justice
Ireland.
Social Justice Ireland (2013) Policy Briefing: Budget Choices. Dublin: Social Justice Ireland.
Society of St. Vincent de Paul, Combat Poverty Agency and Crosscare (2004) Food
Poverty and Policy. Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency.
Stahel, W. (2010) The Performance Economy. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Stedman Jones, D. (2012) Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of
Neoliberal Politics, Princeton University Press: Princeton.
Steering Group on Financial Inclusion (2011) Strategy for Financial Inclusion Final Report.
Stiglitz Commission (2008) Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic
Performance and Social Progress. Paris.
Stiglitz, J. (2013) The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future,
New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2013) Trends in International Arms
Transfers, 2013. Available from
http://portal.sipri.org/publications/pages/transfer/splash (14 March 2014). 
Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (2013) Energy in Ireland Key Statistics 2013. Dublin:
SEAI.
Sweeney, P. (2004) “Corporation Tax: leading the race to the bottom” in Reynolds, B. and
Healy, S. eds. A Fairer Tax System for a Fairer Ireland. Dublin: CORI Justice Commission.
Szélsky, István P., and Miroslav, F. (2013) ‘Social developments in Ireland at the time
of fiscal consolidation and challenges ahead’, in Reynolds, B. and Healy, S. eds.A
Future Worth Living For: Sustainable Foundations and Frameworks. Social Justice Ireland:
Dublin.
References 319
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (2013) UN AIDS Global Report 2013. New York:
United Nations.
UNEP (2011) Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic
growth, A Report of the Working Group on Decoupling to the International Resource Panel.
Paris: UNEP.
UNEP (2011) Keeping track of our changing environment from RIO to RIO +20 1992-2012.
Nairobi: UNEP.
UNEP (2011) Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty
Eradication. Norway: UNEP.
United Nations General Assembly (2014) Progress Report of the Open Working Group of the
General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals A/67/941. United Nations. 
United Nations General Assembly (2012) Future We Want Resolution 66/288. United
Nations. 
UN High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability (2012) Resilient people, Resilient planet: A
Future Worth Choosing. New York: United Nations.
Vatican Council II. (1966) Gaudium et Spes. New York: Orbis.
Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice (2013) Budget 2014: Minimum Essential Budget
Standards: Income Briefing. Dublin: VPSJ.
Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice (2010) Minimum Essential Budgets for Households
in Rural Areas. Dublin: VPSJ.
Vincentian Partnership for Social Justice (2006) Minimum Essential Budgets for Six
Households. Dublin: VPSJ.
Von Hagen, J. and Eichengreen, B. (1996) ‘Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European
Monetary Union’, The American Economic Review, 86 (2) pp. 134-138.
Wall, M. (2014) “HSE Chief raises prospect of further cut-backs in health”. Irish Times, 14th
January. Available from http://www.irishtimes.com/news/health/hse-chief-raises-
prospect-of-further-cutbacks-in-health-service-1.1655133 (14 March 2014). 
Walsh, K. and Harvey, B. (2013) Employment and Social Inclusion in Rural Areas: A Fresh
Start. Dublin: Pobal.
Watson, D, and Maître, B. (2013). ‘Social Transfers and Poverty Alleviation in Ireland:
An Analysis of the CSO Survey on Income and Living Conditions 2004 – 2011’, Social
Inclusion Report No. 4. Dublin: Department of Social Protection/ESRI.
Weir, S and Archer P (2011) A Report on the First Phase of the Evaluation of DEIS. Dublin:
Educational Research Centre.
Whelan, C.T., R. Layte, B. Maitre, B. Gannon, B. Nolan, W. Watson, and Williams, J.
(2003) ‘Monitoring Poverty Trends in Ireland: Results from the 2001 Living in Ireland
Survey’, Policy Research Series No. 51. Dublin: ESRI.
Wijkman, A. and Rockstrom, J. (2012) Bankrupting Nature: Denying our Planetary
Boundaries. Stockholm: Routledge.
Wilkinson, R. and  Marmot, M. (eds)  (2003) Social Determinants of Health, The Solid facts
(2nd ed). Denmark: World Health Organisation.
320 Socio-Economic Review 2014
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future (the
Bruntland Report).  Oxford University Press.
Thomson, S., M. Jowett and Mladovsky, P. (Eds.). Health System responses to pressures in
Ireland: Policy Options in an International Context. World Health Organisation/
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe (2013) Review of social
determinants and the health divide in the WHO European Region: Final report.
Copenhagen: WHO.
World Health Organization (2011) World Conference on the Social Determinants of Health
19-21 October 2011: Rio Political Declaration on Social Determinants of Health. Rio de
Janeiro: WHO.
World Hunger (2013). World Hunger and Poverty Facts and Statistics. Available at
http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/Learn/world%20hunger%20facts%202002.ht
m  (Accessed 18 March 2014).
online databases
AMECO Online Database, web address:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm 
Eurostat online database, web address: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
CSO QNHS online database, web address: http://www.cso.ie/en/databases/ 
CSO Live Register online database, web address: http://www.cso.ie/en/databases/ 
References 321



Social Justice Ireland, Arena House, 
Arena Road, Sandyford, Dublin 18
Phone: 01 213 0724
www.socialjustice.ie
9 781907 501111
ISBN 978-1-907501-11-1
There is an extraordinary reluctance to address the question of Ireland’s future,
in a comprehensive and inclusive way in policy arenas.  While Government
focuses almost exclusively on its oft-repeated mantra of building “the best small
country in the world in which to do business”, and most policy developments are
justified on the basis of that target, there is little or no discussion of what
Ireland should look like ten years from now.  There has been little consideration
of how the common good and the well-being of this and future generations are
to be promoted and attained in a fair and sustainable manner.  Yet these are
critical issues.  
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Ireland needs a robust public debate to address the shape of its future. The chapters in
this Socio-Economic Review address key issues that should be central to such a debate.
They set out 
• A detailed analysis and critique of the current situation; 
• A vision of Ireland’s future; 
• A policy framework within which Ireland could move towards a desirable and
sustainable future; 
• A number of specific policy proposals in the wide range of areas addressed.
Social Justice Ireland has long advocated a new guiding vision for Irish society; one based
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the pursuit of the common good. These values are at the core of the vision for a nation
in which all men, women and children have what they require to live life with dignity
and to flourish: including sufficient income; access to the services needed; and active
inclusion in a genuinely participatory society. 
These values reflect the aspirations of the majority of Irish people.
Social Justice Ireland offers this vision and framework as a contribution to the public
debate on the shape of the future.
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